

## THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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## THE FACT-VALUE DISTINCTION AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL

*V. Subramaniam*

THE concept of decision as a logical compound of fact and value propositions was first popularized by Simon in his *Administrative Behaviour* in 1945. But this part of his theory soon fell into the background, mainly for two reasons. In the first place, when the distinction was criticized by several academics as reviving the old unreal politics-administration dichotomy, as obscuring values and as misleading decision-makers, Simon did not care much to answer these criticisms in detail.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, he shelved this element of his theory along with the means-end chain somewhat early in his discussion and rather unceremoniously in favour of concentrating straightaway on the process of choice. In doing this, Simon was instinctively right in terms of practical psychology. At the time of decision, the decision-maker is intensely aware of the element of choice—and the obligation to choose one thing to the exclusion of other things. The feeling of agony associated with choice by many<sup>2</sup> is partly a by-product and symptom of the obligation to exclude. This agony as such is glorified as the symbol of the basic moral commitment of human existence by the Existentialists. In the context of this agony, it is perhaps rare for the majority of human decision-makers to make conscious use of the fact-value distinction. Hence, studies of the

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<sup>1</sup> To my knowledge, the only published paper which attempts an answer to these criticisms is mine, i.e., V. Subramaniam, "Fact and Value in Decision-Making", *Public Administration Review*, Washington, Vol. XXIII, No. 4 (Dec., 1963).

<sup>2</sup> W. J. M. Mackenzie, "Models of Collective Decision-Making", *International Study of the Main Trends of Research in the Sciences of Man*, U.N.E.S.C.O./S.S./41/3.244. 1/4/18, 1966 refers to the agony that cannot be wished away.

actual decision-making process concentrate on the mechanism of choosing or problem-solving in terms of its steps, such as search and comparison, and of its criteria, such as maximizing or satisficing.

The non-use of the fact-value distinction by many decision-makers is, however, no argument against its effective use by academics as an analytical tool in regard to decision situations and decision phenomena. Our contention is that it has been neglected in that capacity for the foregoing wrong reason and can, in fact, be very illuminating when properly used. In this article, we illustrate its use as an analytical tool by relating it to:

- (i) the economist's concepts of probability and utility;
- (ii) the peculiar difficulties that blur the fact-value distinction in public administration;
- (iii) the specialist-administrator conflict and dialogue; and
- (iv) the extensive employment of management tools in decision-making.

#### PROBABILITY AND UTILITY

The concepts of probability and utility are of interest to us as they directly connect the fact-value pair to the process of choice and are so used by economists widely, in teaching and practical advising on economic problems. The term probability refers to the (mathematical) probability of a particular resultant event or consequence and the term 'utility' signifies quantitatively its value or utility to the decision-maker vis-a-vis other events. The product of these two, for any resultant event is the measure of its final or net utility—and the economic decision-maker is expected to choose that (resultant) event with the highest net utility. The best example of this is betting by a scientific punter, who is expected to estimate the probability of any horse winning—say  $p$ —by studying its form and measuring its utility—say  $u$ —through the odds offered and to compare the product  $p.u.$  for all horses before placing his bets.<sup>3</sup> It is clear

<sup>3</sup> For example, there are three horses, Today, Tomorrow and Dayafter, the odds offered being 2 to 1, 5 to 2 and 7 to 3 respectively. The probability of each winning, let us say, is  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{2}{5}$  and  $\frac{3}{7}$  respectively. Then the net utility is given by the following table:

Horse	Utility, i.e. odds	Probability	Net Utility
Today	2	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
Tomorrow	$\frac{5}{2}$	$\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{2}{5}$
Dayafter	$\frac{7}{3}$	$\frac{3}{7}$	$\frac{3}{7}$

Naturally, Today is chosen by the punter.

that the probability-utility pair, thus, helps *directly* in the act of decision on the condition that both can be estimated quantitatively.

We can show that this pair is closely related to the fact-value pair. A fact statement normally relates to something which has already happened and so it is either 100 per cent true or 100 per cent false. Its "probability" is, thus, either unity or zero. The probability of the economist relates to a future happening—with a probability varying from 1 to 0. But both fact and probability belong philosophically to the same category. Moreover, the distinction between a past fact and a future probability becomes less sharp if we remember that: (a) probabilities are usually estimated by a projection of past events into the future and (b) the fact statements used by Simon are themselves "general" statements with a high probability rating rather than being particular facts.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, the probabilities which are calculated from past events do not take into account the decision-maker's proposed behaviour<sup>5</sup>. In real life decision situations, however, the probability may be affected by such behaviour. In short, the concepts of fact and probability are pretty close to each other in a decision situation.

Value and utility are *prima facie* much closer, the latter being simply a quantitative measure of the former vis-a-vis another value. The philosopher's concept of value is usually an all or nothing affair as against their comparative measuring by the economist. In practice, again, it is often difficult to get even ordinal listings of different utilities, not to speak of cardinal measures. To sum up, the probability-utility pair is essentially an attempted quantified version of the fact-value pair to which it is closer than is indicated by verbal definition.

This very attempt at quantification helps to bring out the mutual influence of probability and utility. In an actual decision situation, the subjective probability as estimated by the decision-maker is what matters—not the objective probability as calculated by a neutral mathematician. The former, in the *very long run*, gets closer to the latter according to several studies, but in the short run it would be

<sup>4</sup> Simon's famous example in *Administrative Behaviour*, Free Press Paper back, 1965, p. 48, includes two fact statements namely: An attack is successful only when carried out under conditions of surprise; and the conditions of surprise are concealment of the time and place of attack. These two are clearly general statements with a high degree of probability. In fact, one can argue that absolute facts, which are simply *a priori* definitions, are normally useless in decision-making and only inductively-derived high-probability general 'facts' are useful therein.

<sup>5</sup> This is only making explicit the assumption in the statistical calculation of probability from past events.

strongly influenced by the utility factor.<sup>6</sup> In common parlance, optimists tend to rate high the probability of a (favourable) event of higher utility while pessimists err in the opposite direction. This mutual influence becomes more complex when decisions are taken on behalf of many by a few as in a democratic polity—by an administrator or politician in office.

### *Facts About Other's Values*


Thus, a decision in public administration involves two types of facts or probabilities, namely, (i) more or less, absolute facts about existing material resources, their extractability and employment under given restrictions, and (ii) estimated probabilities concerning the opinions of separate interest groups and the whole public, in a general way, as well as in regard to the specific problem discussed. In other words, the latter type of fact is concerned with the values, however vague, held by others or it is a *fact about value*. Decision-making in a democracy becomes more complicated to the extent to which: (a) such facts or probabilities about other people's values remain basically incalculable, and (b) no final allocation of authority can ever be made to any one body to decide about other people's values. As traditional bodies, such as Parliament or even cabinets, prove less and less adequate to cope up with the fast-increasing number of occasions for such decisions, two complementary developments take over. On the one hand, civil servants are asked and expected to decide on other's values (of the sectional, or whole, public). On the other hand, several interest groups organize themselves to make public their values.

There are two further complications arising from the mutual influence of values on one another and the mutual influence of facts and values. Thus, democracy involves the freedom to persuade others to change their values to coincide with one's own. A decision-maker in authority, thus, operates over a long continuum—stretching from a struggle to find out the facts about other's values in combination with one's own value-neutrality to a concentrated attempt to persuade other's to accept one's own value without any corresponding effort to find out theirs. In this continuum, the fact-value relation becomes rather complex.

This may be better represented by a graph with the X-axis representing increasing effort to find out other's values and the

<sup>6</sup> Regarding subjective probability, the work of Professor Cohen and others suggests this gets closer to objective probability after several attempts—in the case of gamblers. In the first attempt, this is more likely to depend on temperament.

Y-axis representing increasing commitment to persuade others to one's own value orientation. A public administrator or a politician may take any position—among the infinite possible relations between fact (about other's values) and (one's own) value—in this quadrant.



Secondly, some desirable values enter the realm of administration only when a patient assemblage of facts and probabilities proves their achievability. Thus, values connected with social welfare entered serious administrative discussion only after Beveridge's garland of facts and figures proved them possible even though they had been advocated for long as desirable by left-wing idealists. Similarly, progress in increasing the total feeling of security in western society was made possible more by actuarial calculations than by pleadings about the value of security itself.<sup>7</sup>

### *The Specialist and the Administrator*

The fact-value distinction also helps to throw new light on the specialist-administrator controversy made stale by traditional

<sup>7</sup> Value, in the sense of the vaguely desirable, in a social context, remains a 'myth' in the Sorellian sense, producing purely mass psychological effects. It comes into administrative discussion only when hard facts concerning its 'cost' show its possibility or impossibility.

Apart from instances given in the text, one may refer to the free education policy of Ceylon based partly on a factual report on costs (1947) as an example of possibility-demonstration. Conversely, an exercise in the Netherlands showed that accepting *all* the suggested programmes in the National Plan would require four times the existing national income.

arguments.<sup>8</sup> It shows us how the responsibility for fact and value may be so flexibly divided as to tilt the balance in favour of one or the other under different social conditions. We can see that, in general, a major decision involves:

- (a) more than one value,
- (b) not each of which is clearly postulated,
- (c) several facts, it not being always clear what facts need to be assembled, and
- (d) nor easy to assemble those needed.

In regard to (a) and (b) the specialist has no advantage. The decision-maker must be sufficiently alert to the values involved in the decision through sympathy, experience and training. By popular definition, the professional has little time and training to do this and can do it only at the expense of practising his own specialism. He also suffers the attendant difficulty (c) of not knowing what facts to assemble as this depends on the values taken into account, but in regard to (d) he may be particularly good at assembling facts in his field. The difficulties of the non-specialist administrator (or politician) are the reverse of these. His training and experience might have fitted him to recollect the values involved in the situation (his own and those of others) and he can, therefore, define the area of facts to be explored but he may not be fitted to explore that area as the professional is. He can produce a reasonably correct decision only if the specialist willingly supplies all the necessary material and scientific facts in a given organizational (and social) climate. Conversely, the specialist who would produce a correct decision must be aware of, and in tune with, the values involved either through his professional training (as in a medical question involving doctor-patient relations) or a general organizational training, and collect all his facts quickly through professional colleagues. It is *a priori* impossible to say whose difficulties are greater or predict who can produce the better decision. It would depend, in each case, on the number and complexity of the values involved, the degree of expertise necessary to assemble and understand the facts and the suggestive relation between the facts and values. But organizations, in general, cannot be bothered to make a decision in each case about the best procedure to make a decision and would rather vest the responsibility for all major decisions over a period in some definite persons. The identification of decision-

<sup>8</sup> This Section is mostly taken from my paper "Specialists in British and Australian Government Services: A Study in Contrast", *Public Administration* (London), Autumn, 1963, pp. 370-72.



makers is based partly on the anticipations about the character of the average run of decisions to be made, partly on the bargaining position of different participants in the organization and partly on extra-organizational factors. We will look briefly into the first of these as it is related to the fact-value distinction.

The image of the average decision differs from society to society and organization to organization in the same society. The government of a traditional society with a Burkean sense of continuity and responsibility for the past and future can see a multitude of complex values involved in each decision. In contrast to this, the government of a young society tresses certain basic material values as obvious and settled. In the case of Britain, the traditional propensity to discover many complex values in each decision was heightened by her imperial commitments and ramifications with the distinct possibility that every decision in London could affect world events and the destinies of millions. All this put a premium on value-sensitivity, as against fact collection, and favoured the general administrator against the specialist. On the other hand, isolation and scarce resources were added to a lack of tradition in Australia and settled her basic value as development by government itself. This laid emphasis on the material facts of development and on the specialist, who could discover, process and use them. General administrators helping the statesman to balance complex values were seen as pointless parasites in Australia just as they were considered the steel frame of the empire in Britain where each decision was seen to involve a multitude of complex values.

Secondly, the degree of public expression of each value plays a great part in making the image of government decision. Broadly, when nearly all the values have and are known to have vocal advocates in organized interest groups, their balancing in each decision may be done in the open almost wholly by politicians, so that their close advisers in administration tend to take on a specialist character. Where there is a low degree of vocal organization of interests, much care is needed in taking into account all the values involved and the politician may be thankful for the help of a politically acute and anonymous administrator in spotting the multitude of values involved. Both types of body politic may retain this character for a considerable time as cause and effect reinforce each other; the guaranteed interest sensitivity of administrators keeps off many interests from organizing and a high degree of interest organization does not encourage demand for interest-conscious administrators. British central government, till recently, belonged to the former type though this is changing fast;

British local government belongs to the latter type, while U.S.A. and Australia are probably foremost among societies where practically every interest is vocally organized.

There is a third way in which values lose their importance by their very eminence—through inclusion in a dominant ideology, such as communism. The assumption of its universal validity and the vesting of the right of interpretation in a small political group, leave no room for the value-sensitive administrator but give all power of executive administration to the specialist master of the facts concerned. A similar situation obtained in the absolute monarchies of Europe in the 18th century leading to the higher position of the specialist in Europe in comparison to Britain. In short, the generalist tends to dominate any administrative situation where values are not assumed as settled and open, while the specialist comes on top in the opposite situation.

### *Tools of Management*

Lastly, let us see how the fact-value distinction clarifies the position of tools of management in relation to organization theory. In most university teaching and in general management training, tools—such as network analysis, operations research, linear programming and computer simulation—were, in the first instance, treated as mere techniques. It is rather recently that they have at all come to be regarded as aids to decision-making.<sup>9</sup> But even so, they are not fitted in the proper manner into decision theory. It is recognized that they perform different functions in terms of alternatives and choice: tools like computer simulation formulate alternatives while others, such as linear programming, help evaluate several alternatives in terms of given restrictions while still others, such as network analysis, help locate the quickest (and most efficient) way of carrying out a chosen alternative. The fact-value distinction goes further in providing a more analytical way of looking at the tools. The limits on rational decision making may be classified on the basis of this distinction as: (a) the cognitive limit deriving from lack of the necessary facts, and (b) the emotive limit deriving from the common predicament of never knowing for sure what one really wants. All management tools may be understood in terms of reducing the cognitive limit in some way or the other. Information retrieval and survey research

<sup>9</sup> Most books on management tools refer to them now as decision-making tools, e.g., Edward C. Bursk and John F. Chapman (eds.), *New Decision-Making Tools for Managers*, Mentor, 1963. In the nineteen forties and fifties, however, these tools were taught as part of Industrial Engineering courses, and were known to the manager and the academic essentially as techniques.

do it directly by amassing the necessary facts as such. At the next level, some tools "process" the separate facts into meaningful groups, that is, alternative courses of action. Operations research and linear programming are examples of this. This "processing" is achieved by using the already existing mathematical tools on several sequential and repetitive movements by operations research and by the mathematical expression of various restrictions to demarcate feasible alternatives, by linear programming. This processing also helps to relate facts to value for the raw facts themselves cannot seem to be logically related to any value till this place. A third type of management tool, such as network analysis, helps in carrying out a decision effectively rather than making one, by working out the most efficient combination of successive and simultaneous activities into a network.

The present favourable attitude to management tools in university courses is not concerned with making an analysis of their proper place in theory. It is, however, necessary for the academic to identify the exact component of decision-making to which they belong and the exact stage at which they should come in. We can see that they serve mainly as fact-finders or fact-processors before decision-making and less frequently as fact-processors again in regard to execution after decision-making. They, thus, establish a close relation to decision theory through its fact component.



## PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION : THE CHALLENGE OF THE SEVENTIES

*Ram K. Vepa*

THE decade of the seventies, which has just begun, is likely to be a significant one in the history of the century. The end of the sixties has witnessed many new triumphs in human history; man is seeking new worlds to conquer beyond the globe yet there are many old problems still to be solved on earth. Although new techniques of agricultural production are yielding record crops, still there are millions of people who do not have enough to eat. Industrial growth has brought, in its train, problems of environmental pollution which threaten the very ecological balance of human societies. Spectacular triumphs have been registered in the field of medicine and still disease stalks large areas of the earth. The very effectiveness of public health measures is causing an unprecedented increase in population which many nations can ill afford to have; 'numbers explosion' may well be the major issue of the coming decade.

Even in the prosperous areas, there seem to be many new problems to be solved—some of these have been caused by the affluent society that has been built up since the Second World War. There is a sense of disillusionment with the established order of things, a feeling that all is not right with it and that it must be replaced by something more logical and rational. This is particularly evident in the case of youth who seem to have been possessed by a strange restlessness that expresses itself in varying forms of revolt—the hippie cult, the lovefests, the nude-ins and others which were inconceivable even a decade ago. The fact that many of these problems are psychological, makes them none the less real; and in a way, the problems of the mind seem to be more difficult of solution than those of the body. One could provide physical comfort to a person—but how does one make him happy? These are some of the problems to which the seventies will have to find an answer and a solution; and it will need the concerted efforts of scientists, administrators and policy makers if this challenge is to be met successfully.

### *Global Perspective*

On a global level, the most striking feature of the past decade is the emergence to nationhood of a number of states in Africa; but

the citizens of these new nations are now demanding a share in the good things of life. Political freedom is beginning to mean little for the emerging nations of Asia and Africa; there is, in all of them, a demand for better standards of living—better housing, better education, and better medical facilities. They are no longer content to provide raw materials to 'mother' countries at cheap prices and to accept, in return a few luxury goods for the upper strata of society. Poverty and misery, which at one time were accepted as the lot of the non-Western nations, are no longer regarded as inevitable; and millions are demanding with an insistence, which will increase, that they shall themselves benefit from the resources of their own country.

New political forces are shaping the world; the Western hegemony that has been ruling the world for over two centuries has been slowly giving way and new alignments are likely to dominate the world of the seventies. Russia, China and India with their considerable resources and massive populations are destined to play a significant role in world affairs while the USA, West Germany and Japan have built up a tremendous industrial potential which gives them a position of strength in the world today. Significantly, out of the "big six" only two are of the West, two of the far East, and two occupy a position midway between them. In political ideologies, there is little in common between them and yet all of them will play an important part in shaping the events of the seventies.

Within the developing world itself, new tensions have arisen which, in some cases, have erupted into open warfare. Political freedom has sharpened tribal feuds as in Nigeria where the simmering dispute between the Ibos of the East and the Hausa and Fulani of the North broke into a bloody civil war which has just ended. Kenya has been troubled by tribal factions which claimed the life of one of their most promising politicians—Tom Mboya. The Congo was the scene of a bloody civil strife for years while Vietnam has been the battle ground for two parties based on different ideologies. All these are, in fact, symptoms of a desire of the peoples of the developing world to go forward quickly and establish a new economic order in which the common people shall have a better deal. Kusum Nair's thesis of the "limited aspirations" of the rural people propounded a decade ago, seems to be no longer valid.\* It has been said in the Bible that the "meek shall one day inherit the earth", but today's "meek" of the developing nations are no longer prepared to wait for this millennium—they want it, right here and now, and unless the new national governments

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\*Kusum Nair, *Blossoms in the Dust—The Human Element in Indian Development*, London, Duckworth, 1961.

can satisfy them, and do so quickly, they are likely to be swept away by more radical ideologies.

### *Internal Scene*

What of India in the seventies? Here again, the closing years of the last decade have made the signs all too clear that the seventies will witness new strains on the fabric of our national unity. In many parts of the country, leftist movements have emerged which are taking advantage of the grievances of the people to indulge in violence and disorder. Such phenomena as the "Naxalites" and the "land-grab" movements are symptoms of a spirit of unrest among the 'have-nots' of the failure of administration to solve problems which had been existing for a long time. The violence in West Bengal and Kerala is again a challenge to the administration that unless local problems are solved speedily, they are likely to pose a threat to the stability of the country as a whole.

Regional imbalances are becoming another major problem in the country particularly with the beginning of the inflow of yields of the massive plan investments. Some states, like Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Punjab, are forging ahead rapidly under the stimulus of the plan schemes while others are lagging behind, unable to find adequate resources to implement the schemes—and so the gap widens between the prosperous and backward states. This again poses a problem to the administration since new industrial projects, which will contribute to prosperity, can be located more easily in the States with the necessary infrastructure, which only the more prosperous States can provide. How does one resolve the dilemma between cold economic calculation of maximum returns on investment and the need of spreading prosperity evenly in the country?

Within each state itself, there are pockets of poverty amidst plenty; dry and hilly areas as well as those with tribal populations are still far below the national average, which is deplorably low. The position of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes is again a matter of great concern since they have not generally kept pace with the growing affluence in the country. This gives rise to new tensions—social and economic—and the stability of the society is threatened. Providing new employment opportunities to vast numbers of new entrants to the labour force every year has become a major problem of development planning in the country.

There are also new divisive forces, which base themselves on cultural and linguistic variations of the country. Sometimes, as in the

case of Telengana and Vidarbha movements, these variations are not even apparent, but none the less they seem to move masses of people powerfully, providing a new threat to the delicate scaffolding of unity and integrity which has been built up by our founding fathers with so much care. And yet one must face this new challenge and reconcile regional interests with national unity; one cannot just ignore these various forces which have the power to rouse strong emotions in large numbers of people. All these problems are likely to become sharper in the seventies and, unless quick and satisfactory solutions are found, the unity of the country is likely to be imperilled.

### *Impact on Public Administration*

It is obvious that the problems enumerated above have an impact on public administration which, today, touches on varied aspects of the life of the community. The impact of some of them is apparent—as for instance, the threat to law and order—while in many others, the administrator has to take into account the prevalent conditions in the country in arriving at any solution. Administration cannot operate in a vacuum and the social conditions around have undoubtedly an impact on the nature and practice of administration. This is particularly so in developing nations which have accepted the planning process as a device to utilize fully the resource of the country since planning implies a total effort in which the administration and the public have mutually interacting roles. Planning also throws a greater responsibility on the administration and its agencies to provide for the well-being and comfort of the people. No government which has accepted planning, can remain a passive spectator to the wide regional and social disparities prevalent in society; to do so, would be to deny the very rationale of planning itself.

How will public administration meet this challenge of the seventies? In a sense, perhaps, the challenge which India and other developing nations will face in the seventies is not entirely new, many of the developed nations have trodden the same path and one may, therefore, profit by their experience. But, in many ways, the problems of the developing nations, today, are vastly different from those faced by the UK or the West two centuries ago when the Industrial Revolution triggered it or, even a century ago, when Japan started on the same path after the Meiji Restoration. Most vital of all, today's development cannot afford to take the same time as was possible earlier; speed is the essence of the matter and solutions must be found with an urgency that has no parallel in previous history. The solutions, which India or other developing nations will evolve, will



necessarily be conditioned by the circumstances and history of the country. No nation can merely copy the patterns which other countries had devised based on their own past traditions; to do so would be to invite failure. It is, therefore, important that in public administration, as in other aspects of national life, the challenge of the seventies is met taking into account national characteristics or traditions rather than merely copying what others have done.

## II

It is proposed to discuss in the rest of this paper the challenge which public administration faces at three levels—the principles (or, if you will, philosophy), the practice and the personnel. It is the principles of public administration that set the tone and temper of administration; undoubtedly, these will need to be changed under the impact of the seventies. A new philosophy has to be evolved which takes into account the hopes and aspirations that animate society. Practice is the ultimate test of all good administration; high-sounding platitudes are no substitute for a well-conducted administration. The people will judge the administration by the way it is run at all levels and not merely by the platitudinous pronouncements of those at the top. Lastly, it is the men that matter—personnel of the right calibre and right attitudes from the vital element of the administration. If a new spirit is to animate administration in the seventies, it will have to be provided not by codes but by principles and not by files but by persons. The challenge of the seventies to public administration can, therefore, be meaningfully discussed at three levels—principles, practice and personnel. A few allied problems such as those of the public sector enterprises are also mentioned to make the presentation complete, since these are likely to play a significant part in the coming decade.

### PRINCIPLES (OR PHILOSOPHY) OF ADMINISTRATION

Public administration in the seventies will have to take a total view of its role and not a fragmented one. That view has to be informed by the broad objectives of State policy as enshrined in the Constitution, and is not to be dependent on the whims and fancies of individual administrators. One must recognize the primacy of these objectives and the fact that all policies are to be judged whether they further these aims or not. It is true that the Constitution has been with us for two decades and the administration in these past 20 years has been conducted within its framework. But one gets an impression that, on many occasions, it was the letter of the Constitution that was sought



to be followed and not its spirit. In the seventies, with the growing pressures for a good life from large masses of the people, the administration has to be tempered, even more than in the past, by the fundamental objectives enunciated in the Constitution.

Again, public administration is for the community as a whole and not for the chosen few. The old concept of a 'Ma-Bap' administration which is both father and mother to the people is no longer valid, however picturesque it might appear. It is the community's interest that must be taken into consideration, not that of an individual, nor even of a group. There has been some criticism that the administration, even after Independence, has been controlled by few groups representing only a section of the population and, therefore, tended, say the critics, to favour the more privileged people. In fact, under the early days of the British rule, when the administration was with the East India Company, there was a greater sense of social awareness than after it came under the direct control of the crown; men like Bentinck tried to reform the society with the help of enlightened local leaders, such as Raja Ram Mohan Roy. But after the 'Mutiny' of 1857, when the Government of the country passed directly under the crown, these attempts at reform were given up; under the guise of protection of "native customs and habits", feudal interests were allowed to entrench themselves disregarding the good of the community as a whole. The administration needs to regard itself as responsible to the community as a whole and not just a section of it; it is the good of the community that must come first and always, howsoever, it might affect individuals.

This implies that the administration has to be more broad based than before, and more representative of the needs and aspirations of the entire community. Far too often in the past, there was the tacit feeling that only certain sections counted and that others—though numerically large—did not really matter. It was administration of the elite, by the elite, and for the elite; this had its advantages—it made problems easier of solution and provided greater rapport between the administration and the small minority for whom it was intended. But in the seventies, this will no longer be possible; the administration must recognize the problems and needs of a large section of the people who are increasingly vocal and conscious of their rights (if not, always, of their responsibilities). The administration must, therefore, cater to a larger section of the population which will correspondingly throw up problems of a larger magnitude.

For the same reason, the administration needs to be more responsive to public needs; when it catered only to a small section, it could

afford to be relaxed or even to be indifferent. But today, such an attitude is likely to be disastrous, since forces and pressures build up soon, threatening the daily life of people. There is, therefore, need for greater awareness and alertness on the part of administration to the difficulties of the people, particularly when public agencies control so large a part of the national resources. In some cases, problems are to be anticipated in advance and solutions devised for them; problems must be faced and solved with minimum of delay before explosive social forces are generated. The administration must develop a sensitive feeling for the key problem areas which need to be watched with greater vigilance so that trouble is nipped in the bud rather than allowed to grow. Increased sensitiveness to public needs is, therefore, an essential prerequisite of administration in the coming decade and will be an important criterion of its success.

The administration must operate on an agreed scheme of priorities and not take on too many things at a time. In a developing society, there are many problems to be solved; and with the limited resources in men and money, it is unrealistic to expect to be able to solve all of them simultaneously. One must, therefore, be wise enough to identify the key problems of an area and to concentrate on them rather than dissipate resources too thinly on all. The particular problem chosen would naturally vary from region to region and even from district to district. It may be education in one, medical facilities in another, fertiliser in the third and tube-wells for irrigation in the fourth and so on. Therefore, a scheme of priorities must be drawn up by the administration and constantly reviewed from time to time so as to serve best the needs of the community. In the early flush of Independence, the country had taken on too many areas to improve but it must be confessed that the effort has not always been successful.

There must be a greater sense of 'vitality' or vigour in the administration; there must be a sense of purpose and direction in its policies and practices and, perhaps, even a missionary spirit of devotion to the broad objectives of the country. One senses this spirit in the early founders of British rule—Elphinstone in Bombay, Munro in Madras, and Frere in the Punjab. This was no longer evident in the later years of the British Raj which ultimately destroyed its will to rule. Perhaps some of this spirit was displayed in the state of euphoria just after Independence; but it quickly dissipated into apathy and listlessness that characterises most of the administration in India. One misses the sense of zeal and dedication which, from all accounts, seems to prevail in some other countries, such as Castro's Cuba or Mao's China;

whatever we may think of their political ideologies, there is little doubt that a tremendous wave of idealism has been generated which animates the administration. The Victorian concept of 'muddling-through' with a bored air of indifference is no longer adequate to meet the pulsating problems of a developing society.

Public administration must base itself more and more upon a sense of mutual trust rather than on distrust which seems to be the basic attitude of most official regulations. Perhaps, this was understandable in the old days when an alien rule could not afford to trust the large mass of people; but what is incomprehensible is that the same spirit should persist in a subtle manner even 20 years after Independence and there are few signs that this is being changed. The golden law of British jurisprudence may lay down that a man is innocent unless proved guilty; but in the eyes of Indian administration, all men are considered potentially guilty, unless proved innocent.

Ultimately, the administration must become more 'contractual' than regulatory; its power must be derived from the willingness of its citizens to accept its authority. It is, therefore, a contract between the people and the administration which is vindicated in the election process; power flows from the people to the administration and not *vice versa*. This is what is meant when it is often said that the 'law-and-order state' must give way to the welfare state; it is not that regulatory measures are unnecessary or are not needed in the latter but that such measures when taken, are based on the consent of the society and for its own good. Law and order cannot, however, be imposed on an unwilling society—as the British realized in the three decades preceding Independence. It is persuasion rather than force that forms the strength of an administration and this change in the basis of administration implies a radical change in the attitudes of those who run the administration. Public Administration has to function as an instrument of the will of the people and it must derive its power from the consent of the governed; so was it said in the American declaration of Independence and our own Constitution but its true significance on public administration may well be realized only in the coming decade.

Administration needs to become an instrument of modernization and change rather than of maintaining the *status quo*. Perhaps, it is so even today; but it also needs to appear thus to the young and the intellectual elite; somehow, the image of the administration is that it is conservative—not willing to move with the times; both in the press and the public, it is derided as the 'Establishment'—a ponderous

structure that is always behind times. This needs to be changed. Containing, as it does, some of the brightest minds of the society, why should it appear so conservative? In the movement for modernization, the administrator must take a leading part and provide a new image for the administration rather than appearing to champion always the established order.

#### PRACTICE OF ADMINISTRATION

The practice of public administration is as important (if not more) as the theory of it; the average citizen judges the temper of the administration by what he experiences rather than what he hears. It is important, therefore, to discuss in what manner the new philosophy will have an impact on the practical aspect of administration.

Most important of all, it needs to be recognized that administration is a management process and that, in fact, the words "administrator" and "manager" are interchangeable. There is indeed little difference in essentials between administering a department or a district and managing an enterprise. The feeling that administration is an art that has no set rules of its own must be given up for a more rational and more scientific management process which has been studied in considerable detail. It is necessary to bring the practice of public administration into the broad stream of management so that the techniques employed in the latter could be applied, with suitable modifications, to the more familiar administrative tasks.

Another point which has been made earlier is that administration needs to reach a large mass of people instead of only a small number of them. Since the decision of administrative agencies affect the lives of a large number, it is important that they try to reach them rather than confine their attention to just a few who are easily accessible. Efforts must be made to involve large number of people in decisions affecting the community and people encouraged to participate more fully in the institutional framework—such as Panchayati Raj—set up for the purpose. In the past, administrative decisions were made known to a few people at the top since it was felt that others were largely unconcerned with it but, today, this is no longer possible or desirable. The practice of making all government announcements through an official gazette which is hardly seen by anybody is a legacy of this tradition. More and more, there is need for making use of modern communication media, such as the newspaper, the Radio and TV, to reach the people instead of relying on circulars and gazette notifications. In fact, in a country where literacy is still not

universal, the spoken word on the Radio and TV has greater appeal than the merely printed word.

There is need also to employ various aids to decision-making which modern managers need in their work. At the lowest level, the government offices, particularly in the Taluka and sub-divisional levels, need to be provided with electricity and telephones. It is surprising how many of them are still without this minimum facility even though these facilities exist in the areas. At a slightly higher level, there is need for duplicating machines and simple calculating machines (not computers) at most of the offices instead of undertaking tedious computation by hand. In fact, going one step further, there is no reason why much of the land revenue records, which figure so prominently in the work of Taluka offices, cannot be computerized making it simple both for the cultivator and for the Government agency maintaining them. In every government department, it should be possible to use modern aids to make work simpler and to use manpower for more productive work rather than for laborious calculations; let us, in the words of Norbert Wiener—the father of computers—make more “human use of human beings” in government offices.

In the seventies, there will be need for using new tools and techniques of decision-making too. The administration need not and should not be any more conducted on the basis of ‘hunches’ but take the help of new techniques, such as the critical path method or PERT and so on. In fact, the science of Operational Research (OR) which was developed during the Second World War can be applied to more routine problems than one encounters in day to day administration. This is already being done in other countries and OR has become an accepted technique for decision-making on a variety of topics. In India, however, the use of such tools is confined to a few public sector enterprises while the bulk of administrative agencies are either unaware of it or are somewhat reluctant to employ them. It is, therefore, important that a greater awareness of such techniques be inculcated in administrative personnel who should be encouraged to use them so that administrative decisions become more ‘quantifiable’ rather than based on guesses or feelings of the administrator. This will also assure the citizen that administrator does not operate in a whimsical manner but on sound well-established principles.

For this purpose, the administration needs to be conducted with greater openness than now; public administration as its very name implies must be conducted openly and not like a secret society. There

is a tendency amongst some administrative agencies to regard their work as secret which should not be made known to the public. (It is, of course, another matter that what is really secret, and should be kept as such, often gets divulged almost before the ink is dry on the paper.) There is almost a 'fetish' about secrecy even in relatively unimportant matters and the citizen is not even told the reason for a particular decision in a case affecting him. If he has the temerity to ask for it, he is told sternly that it is not in the public interest to divulge such information. Communications from government to individuals are usually cryptic (even bordering on discourtesy), since it is considered that a Government functionary is above the citizen and should, therefore, assume an appropriately superior attitude. All this, of course, hurts the image of the Government since even decisions which have been taken with good reason are often inexplicable, because no one cares to explain them to the person or group of persons most affected by it. This supercilious attitude on the part of government agencies must give place to a more humane and more personal approach, where the citizen is made aware of the reasons why a particular decision is taken and is treated with greater consideration and respect.

In fact, providing information to the citizen must be considered as an important part of the duty of any administrative agency; for, as is often said, it is not merely enough to do right, it must be known (and accepted) that it is right. All too often, public decisions suffer through misunderstanding, born of ignorance, because no one has cared to explain these to them. And, incidentally, does one need to be discourteous to persons who go to public establishments? Almost everywhere, in the post office, at the railway station, super bazar or the municipal office, one meets with lack of consideration. In fact, this has become the hall-mark of a "public" office, and it is indeed a wonder how much the citizen in India has learnt to put up with it. Public offices must show greater consideration to the average citizen and make suitable arrangements for them to wait and see the person concerned instead of wandering aimlessly in offices.

There is also need for a simplification of Codes and Regulations—many of which were admirable in their time but need to be reviewed in the light of modern needs. Over a period of time, there have been so many piecemeal revisions that it is time that many of these are formulated afresh; and they need to be simplified so as to be intelligible to ordinary people rather than to the 'goomes' who work in the offices. Such codes should be written in a simple language and made widely available so that they do not appear as esoteric incarnations of a priest or a witch doctor but common-sense rules which guide

the working of public offices. Even in the administration of these rules, there should be some flexibility and discretion given so that special cases are treated specially and not dealt with as files; to parody the Bible, are rules made for man, or Man for the Rules?

Again, the administrative procedures, followed in government organizations, seem to have an in-built safeguard against any speedy work. The complex set of regulations for the sanction of any scheme tend to kill any initiative or enthusiasm and make it difficult for anyone to function effectively. In fact, the regulations are such that any enthusiasm for a project is frowned upon; and no short cuts are allowed in the cumbersome process in which files move. Little indeed has changed since Lord Curzon, the most brilliant Viceroy of India, had wrote his classic indictment on the ponderous movement of official papers. There is still an excessive reliance on the superior wisdom of even a minor functionary of the Finance Department which has a virtual veto on any scheme to be implemented; and few will care (or dare) to disagree with a 'no' from finance. While financial constraints are an important limitation, and departments must learn to live within their budget allocations, the constant reference to a number of departments for every simple action to be taken makes the whole process of decision-making tedious and diffuse, leading to complaints of delay by the public.

A greater delegation of powers must be made to officials at various levels and to head of offices. There is at present far too much concentration of powers—most of it of a simple, even trivial, nature—in a few people at the top who complain of being over-worked—which is, of course, true. But such excessive concentration of decision-making tends to delay matters because every file has to go up through a series of levels to the top. It also undermines the self-confidence of those working below. What satisfaction does any intelligent person have by merely acting as a post office between two official layers without the opportunity to take the responsibility for a decision even on simple matters? It is amazing how limited and circumscribed are the powers of even senior heads of the departments in government offices; one departmental head (himself of the rank of a Joint Secretary) cannot even authorize sending his staff car to Faridabad—15 miles away from Delhi—to pick up material printed for him at the Government press. Every time he does so, he has to take the permission of a Joint Secretary in the administrative Ministry. Ironically, his subordinate officer has the power to do so in respect of the staff car available with him ! This lack of delegation of powers produces a sense of frustration in which team work is rarely possible.



And today's jobs are really those for a team and not for an individual—however brilliant—and not for an organization patterned on a hierarchical basis. If decisions are to be taken speedily and with greater relevance to local conditions, there is need for a wider delegation of authority and a greater trust in officials at all levels. This will also inculcate in them a greater sense of responsibility for the decisions taken by the agency.

The methods of work and the pattern of organization in a government office also need to be re-oriented to suit modern needs instead of the strictly hierarchical pattern followed in most offices in India. The working in offices should be divided amongst various officials, each one provided with a definite sphere of responsibility which does not overlap with another and the chain of reporting being made clear. Each official should be given the necessary staff to dispose of the files, such as steno and a few assistants, who will do the background work necessary for dealing with the subject. If delegation of authority is made effective, the number of papers each official has to deal with independently becomes much less and hence more attention could be paid to it so that both the quality and speed of disposal could be considerably enhanced. It would seem that unless a drastic change is made in the present organizational pattern of working, there is little hope of any significant improvement in this direction.

Many of today's problems are inter-disciplinary and cannot be solved by a single official or even a single department. In such cases, problems should be handled by a team which includes officials from several disciplines irrespective of the department to which they belong. This would make it unnecessary for the files to move to various departments with the consequent delay. The decisions can be taken by the team as a whole, which would be more meaningful, since discussions always help to clear up matters, provided they are held to take decisions and not merely to air each one's view-point on a particular problem. This would mean that the pattern of departmental working, now rigidly followed, should be broken up into flexible teams which would meet frequently to decide matters where more than one Ministry is concerned. Although this is being followed even now to some extent, the main difficulty is that decisions rarely emerge from such discussions and each one pursues his point of view on the file, hardly affected by those of the others expressed at the meeting.

One more point in this regard is the need for compression of pay scales so that the ratio between the highest and lowest in public offices is reduced immediately to 1 : 10 and ultimately to 1 : 5. This



might mean pegging or even slightly lowering the top pay scales and correspondingly raising the floor considerably. It would also imply pruning the size of government staff so that the army of messengers and peons that swarm government offices without much work to do is reduced to more manageable proportions. This compression in the salary spectrum will also help to generate a greater sense of equality and fellowship in government offices where the levels today are so unequal. If a socialistic pattern has any meaning, it should be first demonstrated in the places where it is preached; and certainly in the democratic environment in which the coming decade will function, there should be greater egalitarian spirit in public offices. Undoubtedly, this will mean a rise in administrative expenses, but part of it may be compensated by the cut in personnel and the greater efficiency of working it is expected to generate. In any case, the wide disparities in the salary structure now obtaining will be contrary to the spirit of the seventies.

#### PERSONNEL FOR ADMINISTRATION

If public administration is to meet the challenge of the seventies successfully, it would need a new type of administrator—not in terms of individuals perhaps (though even that may be necessary) but in terms of attitudes. It is ultimately men who make the administration and much of the individual citizen's view of the administration is derived from his personal experience of those who are in it. The problem of personnel for the administrative tasks of the seventies is, therefore, an important matter to be discussed.

What type of administrator do we need to have for the seventies? The most outstanding quality which the new administrator would need is the sense of identification or 'empathy' with the common people, particularly those in rural areas. It is this feeling of oneness which made some of the great administrators of the past so successful in winning the confidence and affection of the people whom they had served. But such cases were all too rare; more commonly, the administrator was aloof, perhaps efficient, but remote. In the years since Independence, the racial barrier has been broken and yet the sense of identification has not increased appreciably. There is, one feels, still an unseen wall between the top administrator and the people, which needs to be demolished. This does not come by reducing salaries or forcing them to live in smaller houses; it is basically an attitude which needs to be fostered from the early days of the service. The fact that many of the senior administrators are urban-oriented also makes for this barrier between them and the rural folk, but this can

be consciously overcome by having long spells of postings with rural people instead of living in the Olympian heights at New Delhi or Bombay or Calcutta.

Along with this feeling of identification, must also be a sense of 'commitment' on the part of top officials to the basic objectives of administration and the specific techniques employed to achieve them. It is not enough to say that we believe in Democracy or Socialism: it is like saying that one believes in God. One must feel committed to the more specific forms in which Democracy or Socialism is to operate; otherwise, it is hardly likely that the schemes will be implemented with that extra measure of devotion necessary in today's world. It is often said that the British tradition is that of neutrality of the civil servant and that we should do well to preserve it; on the other hand, commitment is felt to be dangerous as it impairs the objectivity of the senior official. Perhaps, the differences are merely semantic. If 'neutrality' and 'commitment' are used in relation to political parties, there would be wide agreement with it; but is one neutral to the policies of the administration? Is the civil servant 'neutral' on 'Bank Nationalization', 'Land Reforms' or 'Prohibition'? If one is neutral on such issues, can he implement them effectively? If one is genuinely so, he should be honest enough not to get in a position where he has to operate these schemes. There has been a great deal of criticism—not all of it is unjustified—that many senior civil servants do not 'believe' in the policies of the Government; there should perhaps, be a greater sense of commitment to the major policies of the administration—at the top level—if these schemes are to be truly productive.

The administration needs to be less hierarchical not merely in an organizational sense but also from a personal point of view. There appears to be a tendency to equate authority with wisdom and power with knowledge. If the team work, mentioned earlier, is to be genuine and effective, there should be greater freedom of expression in public offices and greater rapport between senior and junior levels. On a social level, there is hardly any mixing between these categories of personnel; in New Delhi particularly, life is so stratified that the infection has spread even to the families of civil servants, perhaps in an even more virulent form. Wives and children glory in the official positions of their husbands and fathers, with the result that genuine social mixing is limited to a narrow spectrum of official cadres, which, in turn, leads to poor fellowship in public offices. If the tasks of the seventies are to be done successfully, they cannot be discharged by a few civil servants at the top; a greater sense of true leadership is necessary to inspire the middle cadres and the rank and file which will be

effective only if there is a binding force for all who work in the organization.

Performance evaluation in public offices is far too stereotyped and based on subjective considerations. Confidential Records seem to hold a tremendous power, at least to deny a deserved promotion, if not to get one; while sycophancy and flattery play a not inconsiderable part in obtaining 'outstanding' ratings from superiors. There is need for objective criteria in evaluating the performance of an individual government employee and to indicate clearly the results expected of him. Far too often people, who merely speak well or write a polished note, are given a higher rating than those who can do things and get things done. It is only at the district and lower levels that the ability to do things is given some weightage; progressively as one goes up, the skills of debating and noting seem to take on greater importance. This is perhaps inevitable since the skills in policy formulation are necessarily different from those of implementation but a certain balance should be struck and greater recognition given to those who can get things done. Field work often tends to take second place to the secretariat; perhaps, there is need for reversal of this attitude so that a greater weightage is accorded to success in implementation.

Again, government regulations make it almost impossible to punish an offender or reward the conscientious official, with the result that, over a time, the latter slowly begins to wonder why he should work so hard while all the 'plums' and 'privileges' go to the 'courtiers' who can flatter and please. This undermines the morale of the entire organization and leads to widespread frustration and dissatisfaction. The system of rewards and punishments needs to be streamlined, taking care, of course, that objective criteria are evolved for assessing the performance. Otherwise, public officials tend to develop a sense of smugness and complacency secure in the knowledge that they can neither be punished for their indifference nor rewarded for their good work. The system of seniority as the overriding consideration for promotion even at high levels acts as a disincentive for any worthwhile effort and needs to be replaced by a modified system which takes into account both performance and seniority. It is important, however, that such decisions are taken after careful consideration since there might otherwise be a suspicion of favouritism in them.

A system of job classification in all public offices into a number of grades, as is followed in other countries, could be adopted, so as to avoid the multiplicity of salary scales and positions now prevailing in India. An official recruited to a particular grade should be able

to work his way up the ladder, irrespective of vacancies; the rate of his climb depending on his performance as assessed objectively. There should be a greater flexibility in the system of promotion so that the truly meritorious man knows that his good work will be recognized—without any detriment to the others. This will enable each to put out his best and avoid the jealousies and heart burns that seem to occur whenever any 'out-of-turn' promotion is given in the present system.

The personnel for the administration in the seventies need to be more efficient and dedicated than in the past since the tasks to be discharged are more onerous and important. There should be a greater sense of team work and a greater awareness of the broad objectives of the administration. All this implies an administrative leadership of the senior civil servant not by authority, but by example. It is only such leadership that is itself hardworking and dedicated that can inspire the entire administrative cadres to bring out their very best in the tasks they perform. This can happen only if there is a rapport between those at the top and those down below; the old attitude of being different and remote can hardly inspire the subordinate to give that loyalty which the seventies will need if the challenge is to be met.

### *The Technocratic Intervention*

As the complexity of administration increases, there is evidently a greater measure of technocratic intervention in recent years and this is bound to increase in the seventies. As government takes on new responsibilities in science and technology, administration becomes more specialized needing the services of 'technocrats' on an increasing scale. The old-fashioned amateur 'dilettantism' is becoming out of place and will soon cease to be effective as social needs become more and more complex. New public sector enterprises in fields, such as steel, oil, petro-chemicals, electronics, etc., require managers who have a grounding in physical sciences and technology. The administrative counterparts in the Ministries need to know something of these sciences if there is to be any meaningful dialogue between the technologist and the administrator.

It is the technocrat that supplies the missing link in this chain of communication. Let it be said, however, that a technocrat is not just a technologist; he may be one, but he is something more. Nor is it necessarily that an administrator cannot be a technocrat. We have had examples of scientific personnel who have made excellent

administrators of science: Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar and Homi Bhabha come readily to mind, the former as the prime mover of the magnificent chain of national laboratories dotting the country and the latter as the founding father of the Atomic Energy Research in the country. Both were men of vision, endowed with organizational abilities of a high order. There are, on the other hand, many administrators who have grasped enough of technology to make excellent managers of technical enterprises and departments.

A technocrat is basically a good manager, who has some experience or knowledge of technology of the enterprise he is handling. The knowledge need not be profound but he should have the ability to integrate it with other facets of its working—which a specialist rarely does. He is far too concerned with the details of his work to see it as a whole and be able to appreciate its impact on other aspects of the enterprise. For instance, a particular improvement in a production process may be technologically first-rate; but it has an impact on re-tooling, on labour productivity, on production cost, on sales distribution, all of which have to be taken into account before the new process is adopted. It is the job of the manager—the technocrat—to see it as a whole rather than merely as an advance in the technological process.

Granted that the technocrat will be the central figure in the administration of the seventies, how are these much needed personnel obtained? There are no training programmes for technocrats: a technologist with the right skills and attitudes may become a good technocrat. So can an experienced administrator with a basic background of science and skills acquired in diverse jobs. A good technocrat is made—not born; and it is one of the primary tasks of management of any organization to spot out good technocrat potential and nurse it to acquire the skills necessary for top management. This is what all progressive companies in the West now do; they pick their top management talent from all ranks—from the shop floor, accounting, sales; labour relations—and groom them for the top managerial posts.

Judged in this light, the current controversy in India between the 'generalists' and 'specialists' seems to be both barren and pointless. The seventies will need neither for the top management posts; the former are too diffused and the latter too narrow in outlook. What it will need is the 'integrated man'—one who can view the problem as a whole and who has sufficient knowledge of technology to understand its impact. Today, society is a tightly knit one; there is considerable interaction between apparently diverse fields and the manager

of the seventies must be quick to perceive and appreciate this interaction. He must have a background wide enough to understand and grasp the human and social significance of new devices; that is why, the trend towards intense specialization in the USA in the fifties is now giving way to the 'composite man', who can see things in their true perspective. Today's top managers come from all walks of life; but all of them have certain skills, such as of keen observation, wide background, and an ability to 'integrate' the various pieces into a coherent whole.

In India, there is, in the civil service, an instrument which traditionally has provided top managerial talent in the spheres in which the administration used to operate at that time. It is not often remembered that the civil service had its origins in the commercial transactions of the East India Company and only later switched over to the more general tasks and administration with which its home has been associated in the public mind. It would be a pity if this instrument were to be suddenly discarded for something new and untried; experiments previously conducted of forming a managerial pool have not been entirely successful. Admittedly, its successor service needs to be refashioned and remoulded to suit the needs of the seventies. Here, one can only cite two ways in which this might be done but, given the will, there is no reason why the administrative service cannot continue to provide the top managerial talent in the country. Firstly, its training programme and curriculum should be thoroughly re-oriented to take into account new technological advances as well as new principles of management. These programmes need to be re-oriented so that they may "impart necessary skills, develop right attitudes, increase decision-making abilities and stimulate critical and innovative thinking".\* It may even be possible to take a greater proportion of students with technical bias and provide an option at an early stage of their career whether they would go into general administration or industrial management; even as in the early days such a choice between judiciary and executive was provided. Those opting for the latter may, after 7 to 10 years, branch out into specialized management jobs after a six-month training programme, which would expose them to new tools of management.

The other step to make the IAS a top management cadre is to have liberal lateral entry policy at all levels. A good agricultural scientist or irrigation engineer, who has demonstrated managerial skills, should be able to come into the service at a suitable level so

\*Planning Commission, *Fourth Five Year Plan*, Delhi, Manager of Publications, Government of India, 1967, p. 112.

that his abilities may find a wider scope in other managerial jobs instead of being confined to agriculture or irrigation alone. It is the exclusiveness of the IAS and the limited entry subsequent to initial recruitment that is perhaps the reason for some of the criticism against it. If it can keep its doors open to draw into itself all the available managerial talent, it can again claim to be the premier service, not in terms of power or prestige, but in talent and service. Having built up an instrument with fine traditions, it would be a pity if, through inter-service rivalries, its capacity to provide top managerial talent is seriously impaired and the country deprived of its services.

#### POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION

It is often said that there is a dichotomy between politics and administration but, in practice, this is seen to be a myth. The administrator who does not reckon the political consequences of a policy will indeed make a poor policy adviser; living in a world dominated by political considerations, any effective administrator has to constantly keep such considerations in his mind. There is an 'osmotic' effect between politics and administration and to expect to keep them in two water-tight compartments is to expect the impossible. Earlier, it has been mentioned that the 'neutral' efficient civil servant, who can machine-like perform the policies laid down by the political executive, is indeed a mythical image. Administrators are human beings, just like other citizens; perhaps more so, being drawn from the tiny intellectual-elite of the country. They have ideas and views of their own and it is likely that at times these may not be in conformity with the policies of the party in power. The idea that policies are made by politicians and it is for administrators to implement them takes no account of the fact that policy and implementation are mutually interacting processes. Policies cannot be laid down in a vacuum; they are constantly being moulded by field experiences and administrators cannot always disclaim responsibility for the policies of the government.

It may, in this connection, be considered whether administrators should be given a greater freedom of expression instead of being 'gagged' under an outdated concept of government servant conduct rules. Society itself is the loser from being unable to have an informed criticism of government policies nor is it at once apparent why the fundamental right of citizen—to express his mind freely and frankly—denied to a public servant? In fact, as in France and Italy, there is no specific reason why administrators should not be allowed to contest elections without having to resign their jobs under government;



the country's legislative forums would be the gainer if men of proven administrative ability were encouraged to seek a popular verdict and enter them without taking the undue risk of losing their daily bread. If this is considered normal in France, the home of democracy, why, one wonders, should it shock the purists in India?

#### PUBLIC SECTOR ENTERPRISES

Another area which will become increasingly important in the seventies is the public sector organizations which call for administrative abilities of a high order. In the past decade, there has been an enormous expansion of the public sector in such fields as steel, oil, heavy engineering, drugs and pharmaceuticals, and, although there has been considerable criticism of their working, few have contested the need for government to enter into such fields which are strategically important and which call for investments of a large magnitude. Undoubtedly, there is need for developing a cadre of committed public sector managers who will be as efficient as those in the private sector—the basic material in the former is certainly as good, if not better—and, besides, will have broader social objectives instead of the sole commercial one of profitability. This is not to deny the importance of that criterion; without profitability, an enterprise becomes a liability to the community instead of being an asset. But it is equally necessary to recognize that profitability is not everything and that the very rationale of the public sector is to set an example of how enterprises should function for the good of the community and not just a few individuals or a group. The fact that this high ideal is attained only by a few of the existing enterprises does not, by itself, disprove its validity.

The reported decision of the government to enter the consumer industries in a big way seems to be based on different assumptions altogether—of mopping up the additional purchasing power generated by the 'green revolution'. This decision, when implemented, will require new skills, particularly in advertising and marketing, which have not so far been required to the same degree in the public sector enterprises. Thus, the managers of the new consumer group of industries would need to have abilities of a different type than those of the sixties. This, in turn, would throw a responsibility on those charged with the selection and training of tomorrow's managers. In any case, it is beyond doubt that the management of public sector enterprises will form an important element of public administration of the seventies and will call for skills of a high order from a cadre of dedicated and able managers.



## INTEGRATING ROLE

Public administration in India will have, during the seventies, an integrating role in the conduct of affairs. With the increasing cultural, social and linguistic divisive forces that threaten the unity of the country, it is the administrator, specially those drawn from the All India Services, who serve all over the country, who have to view the matters objectively, reconcile conflicting points of view and keep the interests of the nation above those of a region or group. This may well be the most signal service administrative agencies can render to the country in keeping intact the unity of the country, not just as an empty slogan but something real and vital. The sense of objectivity and fair-play and the non-partisan attitude displayed by officials at all levels in dealing with various languages or social groups will also help to strengthen the effort of the administration in placing national interests above those of group or regional interests. The training programmes of officers of the All India Services, must, therefore, regard it as a primary duty to inculcate in the new recruits the need for impartiality and to take a total national view rather than be swayed by regional considerations. It is only through building up a cadre of such officials, spread all over the country and discharging their duties objectively, that the administrative unity of the country can be preserved.

## III

## CONCLUSION

The sixties has witnessed the 'cybernetic' explosion which has revolutionized management functions in the West and made possible the telemetering systems which have ultimately landed the Man on the Moon. But although economy is becoming increasingly computer dominated, it is apparent that the computer cannot completely replace the Man; it is only as wise and as clever as the programmers who feed the basic data into it. The computer merely *administers* 'but does not govern'; it is Man that is still the central piece of the situation and the fanciful stories of a world dominated by robots is just a science fiction. It is for the wise administrator to take advantage of the new computer aids and use them to arrive at correct decision; the new devices provide him with greater and more up-to-date data, on which informed decisions can be based. One need have no fear that in the 'cybernetic revolution' of the seventies, the importance of the administrator will be minimized; on the contrary, his importance will increase since his responsibility to arrive at correct conclusions

and to act upon them will become greater with the plentiful data supplied to him.

The administration is ultimately the art of the possible; computers may help to make correct decisions, but, to implement them, one has to deal with human beings in human situations. This requires the age-old virtues of wisdom, understanding and tolerance which are as important as ever; but it is equally true that the challenge of the seventies cannot be met by the apparatus and attitude of the parties. New patterns of organization will have to be conceived and set up; and new skills developed to meet the needs of the coming decades. There is enough fine human material in the country; it only needs to be moulded, trained and, above all, inspired by a competent and committed administrative leadership if it is not to rust and stagnate. The administrative machinery needs to be oiled by ability and operated by men of high calibre if it is to meet the challenging tasks of the seventies.



## COMMITTED BUREAUCRACY

*P. R. Dubhashi*

WHEN the Prime Minister first talked of the concept of a "committed bureaucracy" it was lost in the din of controversy. It was construed in some quarters as an attempt to politicise the civil service or, in other words, to question the traditional concept of neutrality of the civil service in the framework of parliamentary democracy. The latter requires that the civil servants are politically neutral. This means that the members of the civil service, at least in the higher echelons, do not take part in the political processes. They do not fight elections. They cannot join political parties or work for them. Their only political activity is voting in a secret ballot. The doctrine of neutrality also implies that the members of the civil service have a duty to serve all governments with equal loyalty. Governments may come and governments may go but the civil service will go on, as it happened in France in post-World War II period, till De Gaulle regime gave a measure of political stability. The British civil service is often cited as the model of the quality of neutrality of the civil service. Lord Attlee has told us how the Russians were surprised to find him and his colleagues in the Labour Ministry accompanied by the same set of civil servants who advised Sir Winston Churchill and his team of Ministers!

This has also been the traditional concept of civil service in India. In independent democracies, the civil service has to serve different political parties in power. In India, the civil servants, who before Independence served the colonial masters, were called upon to serve the leaders of Indian Independence. Before the attainment of Independence, some of the leaders were put in jail by the same civil servants who afterwards became their subordinates! The neutrality of the civil service survived the strain of Independence. The Government of India, headed by national leaders, allowed the civil servants who functioned during the British rule, to continue to serve independent India with its new goals, aspirations, policies and programmes. Of course, the British members of the civil service left, but the Indian members of the civil service continued apparently with a complete sense of loyalty to their new masters. In fact for most of the Indian members of the civil service, serving the Government of independent

India must have involved lesser sacrifice of loyalty than serving the British Government! Indeed, it must have come as a privilege!

But the doctrine has again come into question rather in a pointed manner with pronouncements of the objective of socialist society in the country. Many politicians with socialist credentials have questioned the usefulness of the civil servants as administrators of socialist policies, programmes and activities. They have asserted that government committed to socialist policies and programmes would also require civil servants who are committed to the socialist philosophy.

If this argument were to be accepted, the traditional principle of neutrality of the civil service would no doubt be brought into question because it would imply that if a socialist government were to be succeeded by a non-socialist government or government committed to private enterprise then the entire body of civil servants committed to the socialist policy and programme would have to be changed. The implications of such an assumption in terms of the instability in administration that it involves have to be clearly appreciated. Parties may be in and out of power but if with them civil servants also get in and out of position at various levels, it may threaten the very stability in the administration of public affairs. So long as we envisage a parliamentary democracy, we have to allow the possibilities of different parties coming to power and hence a threat to administrative stability would be recurrent. It is because of this reason that the parliamentary democracy attaches such a great importance to the neutrality of civil service. The doctrine of neutrality is based upon the assumption that the same set of civil servants can function with governments committed to different political philosophies and that while politics may change, administration will remain stable. Such a concept has proved workable in Britain and in other parliamentary democracies. There is no reason why it could not be relevant to Indian conditions as well. Indeed, with the greater need of stability of administration in India, the doctrine is of even greater importance and relevance to us.

This, of course, does not mean that "the doctrine of neutrality" is inconsistent with "the doctrine of commitment". Indeed, the Prime Minister herself made it clear that her concept of commitment of the civil service did not positively imply any sacrifice of the neutrality of the civil service and its ability to serve governments with different political complexions. It is, therefore, important to understand the concept of the commitment of bureaucracy which does not involve sacrifice of neutrality.

Such a concept of committed bureaucracy implies a body of civil servants who are professionally dedicated to their task. Such a professional commitment will imply not only a keen attempt to understand the objectives of government but also to shape such policies as will help in attaining these objectives and in implementing these policies as well. It involves that the civil servant undertakes this task with a sense of enthusiasm and not in a routine manner. It contemplates a civil service which is neither complacent nor apathetic but is prepared to go all-out to see that the objectives of the government, political and economic, based on the philosophy of the party in power, are fully achieved. It also involves commitment to the popular good which transcends fluctuating policies of a government, and is the stable ultimate goal to which the civil servant is committed. There is nothing in the concept of neutrality which would go against such a concept of commitment.

It becomes so important to underline such a concept of commitment in bureaucracy because unfortunately, by and large, committed bureaucracy in this sense does not obtain. Progressively we have seen the deterioration in the quality of commitment or, to use a better term, the quality of dedication. Sometimes this is attributed to low morale amongst the civil servants, of which more and more examples are now-a-days in evidence. This fall in morale is to be seen to a greater extent at the lower levels in the civil service. The worst exhibition of the low morale is in the shape of threat to strike or direct resort to strike by the civil servants. Its less aggravated but by no means lesser harmful symptoms are resort to 'work to rule', absenteeism, spending excessive time in the canteens during office hours, gossiping in corridors, lack of concentration on work, delay in disposal of papers, evasion, inability to deal promptly with public problems and grievances, procrastination and corruption, rigidity, inhumanity, impersonal behaviour with the public or with anybody who has the misfortune to step in the public offices. If bureaucracy were to be committed, public offices must be a model of courtesy, of prompt service, of cleanliness, of enthusiasm. These would be places where any member of the public would be only too happy to go. The overriding problem of public administration is to find out the causes of the widespread absence of commitment in public service all over the country and of deterioration in this sense that has progressively crept in all ranks of civil service.

A man is committed to his work for many reasons—because he likes it, because he has interest in it, because he feels its importance

or because he is paid for it or, ultimately, because he would be punished if he were not to discharge his task adequately.

Government has disciplinary rules to enforce commitment of the civil servant to his work. The first condition of civil service is that a civil servant is at the beck and call of government for all the 24 hours. All his time and energies are paid for by government and, therefore, his total commitment to work is but a compulsory condition of service. Though this may be alright in theory or in Government Servants' Conduct Rules, everyday experience shows that commitment cannot be had under mere compulsion of this sort. A government servant is available for 24 hours only in theory. In practice, even during the seven hours of office, he may not be available. There must be disciplinary rules and, of course, they must be enforced. But the authoritarian view of commitment to the civil service is altogether simplistic and at any rate the growth of trade unionism and organized action by civil servants has considerably diminished the strength of discipline as a sanction behind commitment.

Government expects its officers to be committed because they are paid to do their work. When a government servant does his work he is only doing his duty. Commitment, therefore, it is argued, cannot be a virtue of the civil service. This also is an equally simplistic view. A pecuniary compensation is intended to attract persons of requisite qualifications and calibre and a commensurate output of work from them. A failure to provide a commensurate output of work should result in termination of service. Unfortunately, the terms of employment in government are not along this pattern at all. A government servant is not hired and fired just because his commitment to service is less than commensurate with the compensation that he gets. Moreover, the duties involved in the job of a government servant are sometimes so overwhelmingly important that they can hardly be compensated adequately in money. Moreover, due to continuous inflation in recent years, the monetary compensation to civil servants has certainly deteriorated in real terms. The salaries of civil servants have not kept pace with the rise in prices and fall in the value of money. Indeed this is one of the main reasons for unrest among the civil servants and the development of trade union activities among them. Unless the payments to civil servants keep pace with the rise in prices and, indeed, unless there is a possibility of rise in the real wage of the civil servant, it would be difficult to ensure a sense of commitment among them. On the other hand, rise in the real wage of the civil servant would provide the incentive for stepping up their productivity.

Traditionally the civil servant in India has been loyal and in that sense committed. Anybody who has worked in the district office or any other small local office of government would know how far even the humblest among the civil servants—a peon and a clerk—is prepared to go to any length and bear any burden in serving his officer, irrespective of the limitations of all the kinds. The absence of loyalty or commitment is seen rather at the main centres of power, *i.e.*, in the state and central secretariats. No one talks of a commitment in a district office. It is assumed. It becomes necessary to talk about it only at the seats of central and state governments!

But the concept of commitment involves much more than a mere sense of loyalty. It involves the image of the civil servant as an intelligent and enthusiastic person, aware of his pivotal position in subserving the public good. Commitment is not a mere commercial concept. There can be commitment in the private enterprise but the quality of commitment in public service should basically originate from the awareness of being a part of that large organization called Government which is committed all the time to public good. It assumes an elimination of 'we' and 'they' concept in civil service. It is characteristic of the private enterprise that workers do not consider themselves as members of management. On the other hand, a committed bureaucracy can only arise when even a class IV officer of government feels that he is a member of government. It is when this basic assumption is questioned and the civil servant starts considering himself not as a member of government but a mere hireling or a mercenary that the concept of commitment comes into real trouble. When this disenchantment arises even at the higher level and Secretaries to Governments and Collectors start looking upon themselves as mere employees who differentiate themselves from government, and when the scope of government is confined only to elected Ministers, that the concept of commitment becomes more and more remote.

After Independence, the feeling among the civil servants that they are members of government ought to have grown. But, unfortunately, the trend seems to be in the reverse direction. This may be because in a democracy there is a clear distinction between the political executive and the administrative executive. When government gets equated only with the political executive and the administrative executive is left out, the latter does not feel committed to the objective of government. This should not be allowed to happen but this happens when members of the administrative executive are treated as mere hirelings. I remember an incident in my early career. A minister had come for a spot inspection of a site in a village intended



to be acquired for a dispensary. He was accompanied by the State Director of Public Health. When the villagers gathered around the Minister he told them that the Director of Public Health was paid very high out of the money paid by them because he has to serve all the villagers who had gathered around him. It is doubtful whether this attempt to drive a sense of commitment in the Director of Public Health in this manner is likely to succeed. In fact, this attempt to underline the mercenary nature of duties must have deeply humiliated the Director of Public Health. It would certainly disturb the professional pride and dignity of the civil servant. The open court martial of officers attempted by some ministers whether because of immaturity or haughtiness is bound to lead to a disastrous fall in the morale which is the source of commitment of civil servants.

It is, thus, obvious that neither disciplinary rules and proceedings nor the monetary compensation can create a sense of commitment among the civil servants. It can only arise out of two sources, *viz.*, the professional pride of the civil servant in his own work, and the sense of identification with the larger objective for which public administration stands. Indeed, the two are connected. The professional pride of civil servant itself arises out of a sense of identification with and striving for the fulfilment of the largest objective, *viz.*, the fulfilment of the public good. An excessive preoccupation with comparatively petty matters connected with conditions of public service or an alienation from the main purpose of government arising out of an inhuman or undignified treatment would erode the source of commitment in the civil service. On the other hand, the source could be strengthened and enriched by a deliberate attempt to extend ready appreciation of duties well done, humane treatment and respect for the dignity of the civil servant, however, humble be the position he occupies, and a system of warm and creative personal relationship within public administration.

These essentials of public administration are at present overlooked or neglected. They require attunement of attitudes at the highest level of government. Organizational devices would also help. Commitment is normally inversely proportionate to the size of an organization. Where the size is small, loyalty becomes intensive. A pursuit of commitment in civil service, therefore, requires a restructuring of public administration involving cutting down elephantine organizations of rather impersonal nature and their replacement by small organizations largely autonomous in character. In particular, policy-making and executive organizations should be kept separate. The burdening of a policy-making organization with executive functions

has been one of the main reasons for increase in size. On the other hand, one can well follow the lead of the Scandinavian countries in the creation of small autonomous organizations directed to specific functions, tasks or purpose.

Above all, there is a need for the spread of feeling among the civil servants and the people alike that profession of the civil servant is one of the highest forms of patriotism. It is forgotten that while in democratic planning every citizen has a role to play, it is the state which provides the main bulk of activities calculated to redirect and encourage the national effort. These activities of the state have necessarily to be carried out by innumerable civil servants holding positions high and low, whose dedication to work is the condition precedent for the success of a plan. There has to be a constant sense of awareness amongst the civil servants of being the architects of the destiny of the nation rather than mere hewers of wood and drawers of water, purposelessly engaged in routine rituals, meaningless to themselves or to the organization in which they work. The commitment of the civil servants can only arise out of a sense of identification between themselves and the nation and of being engaged in the great cause of national reconstruction. It is the responsibility of democracy and democratic nations to create and foster such a sense among the civil servants, no less than the duty of the civil servants themselves to be aware of their great mission.

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## COMMITMENT IN CIVIL SERVICE

*Mrigendra K. Chaturvedi*

AS the Indian Republic completes the 21st year of its existence and we are in the decade of the seventies, an interesting and lively issue has arisen in the field of public administration. This relates to what is currently being termed as the question of 'commitment' in civil service. It has been felt for some time that discontent has sharpened in the country because the governmental policies and programmes have not been able to meet fully the rising expectations of the people. A certain amount of lag may be inevitable between expectations and results but the present gap appears much bigger than could be explained by the above mentioned argument. While searching for the causes of this failure, somehow the problem is identified as a lack of commitment on the part of the civil servants to national goals and objectives.

There are certain ingredients of the commitment issue which are beyond the pale of any controversy. Everyone would expect that a civil servant should have a commitment to the goals for which his organization stands and to the achievement of results which are expected from it. There could also be no dispute when one is to project a position that a civil servant should have commitment to professional competence, to an objective of optimum efficiency and to a methodology of work which produces maximum output. The real controversy begins when the theory of commitment is propounded to suggest a major departure from the classical theory of civil service neutrality. Before examining the relevance of the classical theory of neutrality in the modern conditions with particular reference to the developing countries, it may be worthwhile to recapitulate briefly what are the essential components of this theory.

The traditional doctrine of civil service neutrality is based on a dichotomy of the governmental processes into politics and administration, *i.e.*, decision and execution. The main functions of the political executive are supposed to be decision-making and policy formulation; of administration, the execution of policies so formulated. One of the main tenets of this doctrine is that the civil servant should

serve loyally the government in power, no matter what is its party complexion. This doctrine naturally involves three assumptions:

- (i) public confidence in the freedom of civil service from all political bias;
- (ii) confidence among ministers in obtaining loyal service from the civil servants irrespective of which political party is in power; and
- (iii) high staff morale depending on a belief that promotions, performance appraisals and selections for higher positions are free from political considerations.

It has to be noted that the classical doctrine of political neutrality developed in an age when the functions of the State were minimal not only from the point of view of their variety but also on considerations of magnitude. At that stage of governmental organization, a dichotomy between politics and administration was possible. To-day, with the decision-making processes having become extremely complex and dispersed as a result of sizable increase in the scale and scope of governmental activities, particularly in matters of welfare and growth, such a distinction can hardly be maintained.

Some of the reasons for the breakdown of the classical theory might be enumerated as follows:

- (i) The process of policy decision-making is no longer confined to the ministers; it percolates over the entire fabric of government. There are inescapable items of delegation and zones of sub-policy where the political executive does not come into the picture at all and yet the decisions have to reflect the political ethos of the party in power. It would be interesting to study the percentage of cases for decision in government organizations which do not at all go to the ministers and yet cannot escape an element of political ideology.
- (ii) In the setting of developing countries, the leadership role of the civil servants is particularly pronounced. There cannot possibly be any programme neutrality when gigantic welfare schemes are undertaken. No civil servant can possibly take a neutral position between welfare and stagnation, between service and apathy, and between action and inaction. A certain commitment to the goals and objectives of the State is inescapable; neutrality cannot be allowed to degenerate into disinterestedness; political sterilization ought not to become political desensitization.

- (iii) A modern civil servant does not perform merely agency functions, executing policies and decisions taken without his involvement; he actively influences the decision-making process and his own value structure is always a factor in the ultimate outcome. Practical implications of policy are always relevant to the advice which the civil servant tenders and many times practical and political considerations are indistinguishable.
- (iv) In the sphere of legislative work, the civil servant is so intimately involved with the minister that the area of demarcation between what is political and what is non-political becomes extremely tenuous. The civil servants have to write speeches of ministers which they deliver in the legislature to defend their policies and such speeches by necessity have a political orientation. At the top-most level, even the performance appraisal of the civil servant is done by the political head and an element of political assessment creeps into such a rating.
- (v) As a human being, no civil servant can be psychologically neutral on issues and problems which confront him; he is a child of his own upbringing and a certain subjective element from his judgments cannot be eradicated.

The above mentioned analysis shows that the classical doctrine of civil service neutrality has, to a large extent, become inapplicable in modern conditions. Nor is it true that in all parliamentary democracies, political sterilization of the civil servants is insisted upon.

Prof. C. R. Santos, in his paper "Public Administration as Politics", says, "In France, it is relatively easy for politically inclined civil servants to become active participants in the electoral contests, sometimes with the active encouragement of the political regime. For instance, leave of absence with full pay during the campaign period has sometimes been granted to facilitate the candidacies of prominent members of the public service, belonging to either the Conseil d'Etat, the Cour de Comptes or the Inspection Generale des Finances.<sup>1</sup> It is not surprising that in 1964, among the members of the Conseil d'Etat seven were members of parliament and one was a senator; and among the members of the Inspection Generale des Finances, two

<sup>1</sup> The Conseil d'Etat is the quasi-judicial and quasi-administrative body which serves as the expert adviser of the Government and also the highest appellate court for administrative cases; the Cour de Comptes is the financial court responsible for the regularity of public accounts; and the Inspection Generale des Finances is the organ primarily responsible, through spot audit and investigations, for the financial management of the various departmental units or agencies in receipt of government aid. [A.D. de Lamothe, "Ministerial Cabinets in France", *Public Administration* (London), Vol. XLIII, Winter 1965, pp. 365-81, at 380.]

were ministers, one was a senator and two were deputies, including the president of the National Assembly.<sup>2</sup>

"While serving as an elective official, the French civil servant is usually permitted to contribute payments to build up his pension as a member of the civil service and, until 1950, could even be promoted to a higher rank in the civil service corps where he belongs, even during his term of elective office."<sup>3</sup>

It may be noted that the French system of government has been subjected to much greater strain of political instability and the French civil service has for long possessed a reputation for navigating the ship of the State through turbulent waters. If a highly efficient civil service, like the French, has performed well without political sterilization, it becomes difficult to believe that civil services in other parliamentary democracies will suffer seriously in competence if the concept of neutrality was modified.

One has also to note that in modern conditions, not to say of the civil service, even judiciary cannot remain totally isolated from political participation. The ideological preferences of the judges seep into the process of statutory interpretation. When they do, they in effect reformulate the basic legislative policy embodied in the statutory language. With the passage of time, the same statute has to be interpreted and re-interpreted according to the demands of changing conditions and circumstances and often in the light of new social, economic or political theories. As Justice Cardozo affirmed, "The power to declare the law carries with it the power, and within limits the duty, to make law when none exists. I have grown to see that the judicial process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but creation; and that the doubts and misgivings, the hopes and fears, are part of the travail of the mind, the pangs of death and the pangs of birth, in which principles that have served their day expire, and new principles are born."

When we turn to the Indian situation, we are confronted with yet another fact. The Indian Constitution, as the organic law of the land, has a chapter on the directive principles of the Constitution. In many organizations, civil servants have to take an oath by this Constitution. It may be noted that there are certain features among the directive principles which in any other country could be objects of lively political debate.

<sup>2</sup> A. D. de Lamothe, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

<sup>3</sup> Roger Gregoire, "The French Fonction Publique and the British Civil Service", *Canadian Public Administration*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, December 1965, pp. 457-69, at 467.

A few of such directive principles may be reproduced:

- (i) "The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.
- (ii) "The State shall take steps to organize village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government.
- (iii) "The State shall endeavour to promote cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas.
- (iv) "The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.
- (v) "The State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption, except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks, and of drugs which are injurious to health.
- (vi) "The State shall take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.
- (vii) "The State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State."

With such directive principles enshrined in our Constitution, by which the civil servants take oath, it is not possible for them to take a philosophic position that they may be neutral in any of the programmes which are in furtherance of these objectives. Similarly, having taken oath by the Constitution of India as by law established, a civil servant cannot possibly be neutral between parliamentary democracy and totalitarianism even though these systems may be the object of lively debate in the country.

In the light of the forgoing, it is obvious that the classical doctrine of the neutrality of the civil service has broken down in the modern times and especially in the Indian situation. The only connotation in which this doctrine can exist further is an idea of non-partisanship and impartiality; impartiality in the sense that where the civil servants are executing a corpus of statutory laws and regulations, they shall act impartially and will not import into these operations any political considerations which are not contemplated in the statutory law. However, for the large bulk of their activity that is non-statutory, a new doctrine ought to be propounded to suit the modern times.



In the absence of a better phraseology one may say that in place of the doctrine of political neutrality, what should shape the attitudes of the civil servants now should be a doctrine of political responsiveness which may have the generic name of commitment. An analogy from the working of the legal profession would be apt to postulate what is precisely intended.

In the working of the legal profession, we notice that when a counsel takes a brief of a client, he is entirely committed to that brief and within the framework of the conventions of his profession, he endeavours to serve the interests of the client to his best ability. His value judgment on the propriety of the client's case does not enter into the picture. However, it is a sheer accident that he takes a particular brief; it could have been that in that very case he had the opposite brief in which situation he would have been entirely committed to harness his talents for what would be an entirely opposite view point. One is reminded of a famous legal case in which an eminent but busy lawyer, while preparing his brief somehow got confused about the side he was representing. As his arguments proceeded, his client by his side grew restive and as the lawyer was about to close his arguments, he whispered into his ears to point out the tragedy that was occurring. Though taken aback slightly, the lawyer addressed the Court thus, "My Lord, I have stated before you in full detail all the conceivable arguments which my learned friend on the other side could have mustered; I will now proceed to show how untenable they are".

Why cannot one have a similar philosophy for the civil service? When a certain political party comes in power, the civil service as a professional corps and a reservoir of talent and expertise commits itself completely to the policies and programmes of the party in power. When, in course of time, another political party with a different ideology controls the sinews of government, the same corps, in the best of the legal tradition, accepts the brief of the new dispensation. In such a philosophy of civil service conduct, out-dated principles, like neutrality, which are irrelevant to modern times do not confuse issues and a climate of commitment manifests itself.

We must note that hesitation and resistance at the intellectual and theoretical level apart, a certain philosophy of political responsiveness of the civil service is already in operation at the State level where every new government coming into power always makes changes in key civil service appointments. That this has not happened in the Central Government is because of the fact that we had so far a spell

of continuous rule from one political party. Even in Government of India, certain key appointments at the civil service level have always been influenced by the ideological preferences of the ministers in power. There is no reason to be apologetic about these trends in terms of an out-dated frame of reference of civil service neutrality. Commitment not only in a professional but a purposive sense is the need of the hour.



# THE ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE AND POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN INDIA

## A STUDY OF THE VALUE-ATTITUDES OF IAS PROBATIONERS 1970-71\*

C. P. Bhambhri

IN a developing society, an important segment of the modernizing elite is located in the bureaucracy. Generally, the broad goals of modernization are defined by the political elite, and the administrative elite concretizes these goals and also evolves the strategy of achieving them by using crucial levers of political and administrative power.

Political modernization means active participation of the people in the governance of the country. To achieve this objective, an institutional framework, based on the 'key values' of equality, secularism, democracy, and social or distributive justice, is essential. Institutionalization of political modernization is achieved by replacing primordial loyalties by secular loyalties, both in the sector of values as well as that of institutions. Loyalty to Parliament, political parties, judiciary, public accountability of the executive is the essence of political modernization in institutional terms. But these institutions reflect values which are crucial in modernization.

The question-mark is always there: whether or not the modernizers are themselves committed to the essential values of modernization. It is sometimes observed that the modernizers are ambivalent in their attitudes and values of modernization. A strange co-existence between the modern and traditional value system is observed in the behavioural pattern of the modernizers,<sup>1</sup> who find themselves involved in a struggle with the forces of history and change. Hence, it is always essential to examine the value perception of the modernizing elite of various segments and categories in a developing society.

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\*I am thankful to Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, IAS, for helping me in getting the Questionnaires filled by the Probationers. Thanks are also due to Shri Pratap Singh Verma and Shri Kuldeep Mathur for their valuable suggestions in the preparation of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> Also see, Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, *The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration in Comparative Political Analysis*, New Delhi, Affiliated East-West Press, 1970.

The focus of our analysis is on the value-attitudes of the new entrants to the Indian Administrative Service.

The main concerns of this study, in brief, are:

- (1) to explore the major dimensions of the IAS Probationer's thinking and value-attitudes,
- (2) to place the IAS Probationer in his socio-economic setting, and
- (3) to explore the relationship between the socio-economic background of the IAS Probationer and his attitudes towards equality, democracy, secularism and economic planning.

The four values, *viz.*, equality, democracy, secularism and economic planning, have been taken as an important 'content' of political modernization in India. An important area of inquiry is: What is the influence of existential situation or socio-economic background of the respondent on his value perception? In this inquiry, the independent variables are: caste, father's occupational status, rural-urban background, and metropolitan and non-metropolitan universities attended by the respondent. The dependent variables are: equality, secularism, democracy, and economic planning. In a highly stratified and hierarchical society, caste and economic status are very important variables in the attitude formation of the individuals. The intellectual culture and reference groups of a metropolitan university in India are different from those of the provincial or new universities. Hence, the exposure of students in these two kinds of universities is to different sets of atmosphere which influence value formation. Sons and daughters of parents engaged in modern professions, such as, law, engineering, medicine, teaching, etc., who live in an urban setting, tend to react to a different kind of socio-cultural atmosphere from the one to which the children of rural business and agricultural families react. All these situations influence value formation, and after considering these factors critically, the following significant hypotheses were formulated. They are:

- (1) Higher caste individual has less belief in equality than a lower caste individual.
- (2) Children of persons from modern professional classes are more secular, but believe less in democracy or economic planning.
- (3) An individual born in urban area is more secular than an individual born in rural area.

- (4) Education in metropolitan universities, because it is a privilege of a few, makes students superiority conscious. They come to believe less in equality and democracy than do the students of non-metropolitan universities.
- (5) Children of self-employed parents (business and agriculture) believe more in free enterprise than the children of modern professional classes. Public enterprise or interference by the State in trade and industry is not liked by the children of self-employed parents.
- (6) Equal participation in public affairs is not approved by the sons and daughters coming of parents of high professional class.

The above mentioned hypotheses were put in a small-sized questionnaire (of 20+25 questions), which was sent by mail to the IAS Probationers at the National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie. The whole universe was covered by the questionnaire, and 85 (88.5%) out of 96 Probationers responded to it. The data of this structured questionnaire, with controlled universe, have been processed into three parts. The first part deals with socio-economic background of the Probationers; the second deals with their value-attitudes towards equality, secularism, democracy and economic planning; and the third deals with their attitude on some specific questions. The difference between the second and the third part is that the tables in the second part are of a cumulative character on the basis of grouping of questions; while the tables of the third are on the basis of response to important individual questions. Thus, the data have been presented in the form of cumulative tables (or score tables) and single variable tables.

## I

### SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE IAS PROBATIONERS

Twenty questions were asked to determine the socio-economic background of the Probationers. The data have been analysed on the basis of the following six questions which were central to the whole scheme:

- (1) Did the respondent come from an urban or rural area?
- (2) Where did he receive his higher education?
- (3) What was the profession of his father?

- (4) What was the economic status of the father?
- (5) What was the caste of the respondent?
- (6) What were his other experiences before entering the IAS?

The following tables, based on these data, tell us much that is of interest about the background, experience and training of newly-recruited members of the IAS. In a predominantly agricultural country, where a majority of the people lives in rural areas, the majority of the successful IAS candidates are from urban regions.

**Table 1**  
**Background : Rural and Urban**

<i>Background</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Number of Respondents</i>
Urban	82.4	71
Rural	17.6	14
Total :	100.00	85

The table reveals predominantly urban representation in the IAS, i.e., 82.4 per cent.

**Table 2**  
**Caste Background**

<i>Caste</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Number of Respondents</i>
Higher castes	67.0	57
Scheduled castes and scheduled tribes	11.8	10
N.R.	21.2	18
Total :	100.00	85

The children of middle-class parents, who are employed in modern professions, such as law, engineering, medicine, teaching and government service, enter the IAS in large numbers. Father's occupational

status has been grouped into the following three categories: higher services, lower services and self-employed.<sup>2</sup>

**Table 3**  
**Father's Occupational Status**

<i>Services</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Number of Respondents</i>
Higher Services	69.4	59
Lower Services	9.4	8
Self-employed	21.2	18
Total :	100.00	85

The economic status of the parents of the Probationers was further inquired about on the basis of whether parents own a car, a house, and land for farming. The table is helpful in evaluating the economic status of the parents of the Probationers.

**Table 4**  
**Property or Economic Status of the Parents**

<i>Status of the Parents</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Number of Respondents</i>	<i>Total Number of Respondents</i>
Parents own a car	36.5	31	85
Parents own a house	75.3	64	85
Parents own land	38.8	33	85
Neither of the things	14.1	12	85

Thus, a very small fraction of the Probationers are from families which do not own any of these three things.

Education in an institution for the last degree, to a large extent, depends on economic and professional status of the parents of the

<sup>2</sup> Higher Services include IAS, IPS, Judges, Secretaries, University Professors, and Managers in big industrial enterprises, etc. Lower Services include clerks, teachers in schools, etc. The self-employed are agriculturists and businessmen.



students in India. Attending a particular university is an important privilege of the children of upper sections of society. Hence, a question was asked about the last institution attended by the respondents, and the finding is that more than half of the Probationers attended premier or metropolitan universities for their last degree.

**Table 5**  
**IAS Probationers and University Attended**

<i>University</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Number of Respondents</i>
Metropolitan Universities*	63.5	54
Non-Metropolitan Universities	36.5	31
Total :	100.00	85

\*Metropolitan or premier universities were identified as Calcutta, Delhi, Bombay, Madras, Patna and Allahabad.

Combined with a good university education is the fact that the successful IAS candidates often have previous job experience. Before taking the IAS examination, the Probationers have had some experience in other professions, which have given them maturity and self-confidence needed to face the interview of the Union Public Service Commission.

**Table 6**  
**IAS Probationers and Previous Job Experience**

<i>Job Experience</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Number of Respondents</i>
Teaching and research	47.1	40
Higher executive positions*	27.1	23
Clerical	2.3	2
Fresh from educational centres	23.5	20
Total :	100.00	85

\*Higher executive positions consist of IPS, engineers, State executives, bank administration, private executives, etc.

To sum up, urban candidates with high university qualifications and previous experience of some profession of parents, who are employed in the modern profession, and those who are exposed to urban life and are educated in premier metropolitan universities have shown greater chance of success in the IAS examination. Because of the socio-economic background, the IAS are considered an elite group in the Indian society.<sup>3</sup>

## II

### VALUE PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF THE IAS PROBATIONERS

Twentyfive questions were asked to elicit views of the IAS Probationers on four broad themes of 'equality, secularism, democracy, and economic planning' which constitute the essence of political modernization in India. The responses have been tabulated in the form of cumulative tables.<sup>4</sup> A Probationer's perception in regard to equality, democracy, secularism and economic planning has been correlated with the variables of caste, father's occupation, university attended, and rural/urban background. Before the data are presented, it is worthwhile to explain the method employed for the presentation of the data.

#### *Equality*

Six questions were asked to know the attitudes of the Probationers on equality.<sup>5</sup>

The responses were recorded in the form of "agree", "disagree", and "uncertain". To obtain cumulative results, numbers have been assigned to the replies. For instance, "+1" indicates agree, "-1" disagree, and "0" uncertain. Consequently, agreement with the statement that "certain communities have more talent than others" is given score "+1"; and those who disagree with the statement have been awarded "-1". For obtaining cumulative responses, the following process is adopted. The believer in equality should score "-4" marks in the aggregate. For instance,

<sup>3</sup> See Richard P. Taub, *Bureaucrats Under Stress: Administrators and Administration in an Indian State*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969, pp. 60-88; and C. P. Bhambhri, "Higher Civil Service in India", *Overseas Journal of Administration* (London), Vol. VIII, No. 4 (October, 1969), pp. 263-69.

<sup>4</sup> Such tables are also known as, in broad sense, score tables.

<sup>5</sup> These questions were based on the following: (1) Certain communities have more talent; (2) Reservation of seats lowers down standard of administration; (3) English should be replaced by own language; (4) Medium of all-India examinations should be the mother tongue; (5) Voting power to everybody has created troubles; (6) Women should have equal rights to reach highest position.

if he disagrees with four questions, and agrees with two, he is a believer in equality. But if a respondent disagrees with two questions, agrees with three and is uncertain about one, he is a non-believer in equality. If a respondent agrees with three questions and disagrees with the other three, he is ranked here in the category of "in-between".

### *Democracy*

Seven questions<sup>6</sup> were asked to know the attitudes of the Probationers on democracy.

To obtain cumulative response, the method continued to be the same, *i.e.*, the individual respondent scoring " $-4$ " is ranked as a believer in democracy, and one scoring " $+4$ " is ranked as non-believer in it. A respondent who has shown "uncertainty" in regard to all the questions on democracy has been placed in the category of "uncertain".

### *Secularism*

Five questions<sup>7</sup> were asked to know the attitudes of the Probationers on secularism. The method of taking responses was the same as used in "Equality" and "Democracy". The respondent scoring " $-3$ " was ranked as a "believer" in secularism and one scoring " $+3$ " was ranked as a "non-believer". In regard to secularism, the respondents were either "believers" or "non-believers"—none of them was "uncertain" on it.

### *Economic Planning*

Five questions were asked<sup>8</sup> to understand the attitudes of the respondents on economic planning.

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<sup>6</sup> These questions were based on the following: (6) Many of our problems flow from the fact that leaders are educated; (8) Elections must be done away with for some time; (9) Extension of President's rule is good; (12) Political parties seldom work in the interest of the people at large; (13) Political parties are responsible for the rising corruption in the country; (14) If we could only eliminate political parties, economic development of our country would proceed at a faster rate; and (15) Political parties are responsible for troubles in our country.

<sup>7</sup> These were based on the following: (16) Educational institutions must impart religious teaching as part of their instruction; (17) Lack of respect for religion has led to present moral deterioration in our society; (18) Members of some religions pose a threat to the security of our country; (19) The highest positions in the land must always belong to the majority community; and (20) It is legitimate for a religious community to form a party to pursue its political interests.

<sup>8</sup> These were based on the following: (21) Planning or no-planning, we will succeed only if we are lucky; (22) The legitimate functions of government are law and order and not running business or trade; (23) India's future lies in the villages and not in the cities; (24) If only we had accepted Gandhi's call, 'Back to Villages' we would not have faced such a failure in economic development; and (25) Our problems can be solved by accepting Sarvodaya and J. P. Narayan's philosophy and not by following the west.

As shown earlier, the scoring method was the same and the respondents were classified as "believer" or "non-believer". No one scored "uncertain" in this category.

After explaining the method of analysis and tabulation, let us see the results of the questionnaire.

**Table 7**  
**Caste-wise Perception in Regard to Equality**

<i>Caste</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>In-between</i>	<i>Total</i>
Higher castes	28 (49.2%)	10 (17.5%)	19 (33.3%)	57 (100%)
Lower castes	9 (90.0%)	—	1 (10.0%)	10 (100%)
N.R.*	11 (61.2%)	1 (5.5%)	6 (33.3%)	18 (100%)

\*No-Response category in caste is 18, which includes 5 Christians and 3 Muslims, whose caste identification is not mentioned by the respondents. In reality, the non-response of caste is of 10 Hindu Probationers, i.e., 11.8 per cent of the total respondents.

While the belief of the lower caste Probationers in equality is almost complete, this is not the case with the higher caste Probationers.

**Table 8**  
**Caste-wise Perception in Regard to Democracy**

<i>Caste</i>	<i>Believers</i>	<i>Non-believers</i>	<i>Uncertain</i>	<i>Total</i>
Higher castes	30 (52.6%)	27 (47.4%)	Nil	57 (100%)
Lower castes	7 (70.0%)	2 (20.0%)	1 (10.0%)	10 (100%)
N. R.	14 (77.8%)	4 (22.2%)	Nil	18 (100%)

This table indicates that, while the higher castes are more or less evenly divided in their belief in democracy, the belief of the lower castes in democracy is much higher than that of the higher castes.

**Table 9**  
**Caste-wise Perception in Regard to Secularism**

<i>Caste</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Higher castes	43 (75.4%)	14 (24.6%)	57 (100%)
Lower castes	7 (70.0%)	3 (30.0%)	10 (100%)
N.R.	15 (83.3%)	3 (16.7%)	18 (100%)

The belief of the higher caste Probationers in secularism is much higher than their belief in equality and democracy as shown in the previous tables.

**Table 10**  
**Caste-wise Perception in Regard to Economic Planning**

<i>Caste</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Higher castes	42 (73.7%)	15 (26.3%)	57 (100%)
Lower castes	6 (60.0%)	4 (40.0%)	10 (100%)
N.R.	13 (72.2%)	5 (27.8%)	18 (100%)

The majority of the higher castes believes in planning, and the lower castes are divided into 60 per cent to 40 per cent in their belief in it. One special feature of response in this table is the absence of uncertain or in-between attitudes.

After the caste-wise perception, the father's occupational status and the Probationer's attitudes have been analysed.

**Table 11**  
**Perception in Regard to Equality**

<i>Father's Occupation</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>In-between</i>	<i>Total</i>
Higher services	35 (59.3%)	7 (11.9%)	17 (28.8%)	59 (100%)
Lower services	3 (37.5%)	1 (12.5%)	4 (50.0%)	8 (100%)
Self-employed	10 (55.5%)	3 (16.7%)	5 (27.8%)	18 (100%)

Father's occupational status has not made much difference in the Probationer's attitude towards equality.

**Table 12**  
**Perception in Regard to Democracy**

<i>Father's Occupation</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>Uncertain</i>	<i>Total</i>
Higher services	31 (52.5%)	28 (47.5%)	—	59 (100%)
Lower services	3 (37.5%)	5 (62.5%)	—	8 (100%)
Self-employed	17 (94.5%)	—	1 (5.5%)	18 (100%)

Probationers belonging to lower service class families have shown less belief in democracy. Even the difference between the "believers" and "non-believers" of the Probationers belonging to the higher class families is marginal. They are more or less evenly divided.

**Table 13**  
**Perception in Regard to Secularism**

<i>Father's Occupation</i>	<i>Believers</i>	<i>Non-believers</i>	<i>Total</i>
Higher services	43 (72.9%)	16 (27.1%)	59 (100%)
Lower services	7 (87.5%)	1 (12.5%)	8 (100%)
Self-employed	15 (83.3%)	3 (16.7%)	18 (100%)

Belief in secularism has not been significantly affected by father's occupation. Majority of the Probationers believes in secularism though, in the case of belief in democracy, father's occupation seems to have affected their attitudes.

**Table 14**  
**Perception in Regard to Economic Planning**

<i>Father's Occupation</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Higher services	43 (72.9%)	16 (27.1%)	59 (100%)
Lower services	7 (87.5%)	1 (12.5%)	8 (100%)
Self-employed	12 (66.7%)	6 (33.3%)	18 (100%)

Majority of the Probationers, irrespective of father's occupational status, believes in economic planning.

The place of education, especially the last university attended, has been taken as a critical variable in examining the attitudes of the Probationers. The universities have been divided into two categories. Metropolitan and non-metropolitan universities and the attitudes of the Probationers have been tabulated on this basis.

**Table 15**  
**Attitudes Towards Equality**

<i>University</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>In-between</i>	<i>Total</i>
Metropolitan	30 (55.6%)	7 (13.0%)	17 (31.4%)	54 (100%)
Non-metropolitan	18 (58.5%)	4 (12.5%)	9 (29.0%)	31 (100%)

The Probationers, irrespective of the university attended, believe in equality.

**Table 16**  
**Attitudes Towards Democracy**

<i>University</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>In-between</i>	<i>Uncertain</i>	<i>Total</i>
Metropolitan	31(57.4%)	22(40.7%)	0(—)	1(1.9%)	54(100%)
Non-metropolitan	21(67.7%)	10(32.3%)	0(—)	0(—)	31(100%)

Belief in democracy of at least 40 per cent of the Probationers from metropolitan universities does not exist.

**Table 17**  
**Attitudes Towards Democracy**

<i>University</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>In between</i>	<i>Uncertain</i>	<i>Total</i>
Metropolitan	40(74.1%)	14(25.9%)	0(—)	0(—)	54(100%)
Non-metropolitan	24(77.4%)	7(22.6%)	0(—)	0(—)	31(100%)

Different from their attitude on democracy, a high percentage of Probationers, irrespective of the university attended, believes in secularism.



**Table 18**  
**Attitudes Towards Economic Planning**

<i>University</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>In-between</i>	<i>Uncertain</i>	<i>Total</i>
Metropolitan	35(64.8%)	19(35.2%)	0(—)	0(—)	54(100%)
Non-metropolitan	26(83.9%)	5(16.1%)	0(—)	0(—)	31(100%)

Majority of the Probationers believes in economic planning. The last variable, in terms of which attitudes have been studied, is the rural/urban background of the Probationers.

**Table 19**  
**Attitudes Towards Equality**

<i>Place of Birth</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>In-between</i>	<i>Uncertain</i>	<i>Total</i>
Urban	39(54.9%)	9(12.7%)	23(32.4%)	0(—)	71(100%)
Rural	9(64.3%)	2(14.3%)	3(11.4%)	0(—)	14(100%)

The category "In-between" is quite high (*i.e.*, 32.4 per cent) in the case of Probationers with urban background. Except this, the belief in equality is quite high.

**Table 20**  
**Attitudes Towards Democracy**

<i>Place of Birth</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>Uncertain</i>	<i>Total</i>
Urban	41 (57.7%)	29 (40.9%)	1 (1.4%)	71 (100%)
Rural	10 (71.4%)	4 (28.6%)	0 (—)	14 (100%)

The percentage of "Non-believers" is higher in the urban category than in the rural category of Probationers.

**Table 21**  
**Attitudes Towards Secularism**

<i>Place of Birth</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Urban	54 (76.0%)	17 (24.0%)	71 (100%)
Rural	11 (78.6%)	3 (21.4%)	14 (100%)

Belief in secularism is high irrespective of the rural/urban background.

**Table 22**  
**Attitudes on Economic Planning**

<i>Place of Birth</i>	<i>Believer</i>	<i>Non-believer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Urban	50 (70.4%)	21 (29.6%)	71 (100%)
Rural	11 (78.6%)	3 (21.4%)	14 (100%)

Belief in economic planning is also clear. The majority, both urban and rural, believes in it.

Thus, many of the hypotheses or commonsense beliefs about the attitudes of the IAS have been disconfirmed or disproved in this study. This study reveals that the IAS Probationers, when they enter the service, have belief in equality, secularism and economic planning. Only about democracy, the percentage of non-believers is quite substantial, though the majority believes in it. Rural/urban background, university attended, father's occupational status, and caste status have not made much difference in the attitudes of the new entrants to the IAS on their perception of values of political modernization.

### III

#### RESPONSES TO SOME SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

While cumulative tables have shown certain results, as mentioned above, four crucial questions were picked up to analyse the attitudes of the Probationers on these. The result of this exercise is that the attitudes of the Probationers on these questions are different from those of cumulative tables.

These questions are:

Question 2: Reservation of seats in the Civil Service for particular communities leads to lowering of standards of administration.

Question 13: Political parties are responsible for the rising corruption in the country.

Question 17: Lack of respect for religion has led to present moral deterioration in our society.

Question 23: India's future lies in the villages and not in the cities.

A believer in political modernization, whose key values we identified as equality, democracy, secularism and economic planning, should disagree with all the four questions. Let us see how they respond.

Table 23 (*see p. 62*) shows that the majority of the Probationers from metropolitan universities agrees with all the questions, except in the case of Question 17, on which the Probationers are equally divided. Students from non-metropolitan universities agree with the two questions (No. 2 and 23) but disagree with two other questions, *i.e.*, No. 13 and 17.

Table 24 shows that the Probationers with urban background in majority agree with Questions 2, 13 and 23, but disagree with Question 17. On the other hand, Probationers with rural background, agree with Questions 17 and 23, disagree with Question 13 and are evenly divided on Question No. 2.

Table 25 (*see p. 63*) shows that Probationers of higher executive families agree with Questions 2, 13 and 23, but disagree with Question 17; while Probationers of families of agriculturists and businessmen agree with Questions 2 and 23, and disagree with 13 and 17.

Table 26 shows that Probationers of higher castes agree with Questions 2, 13 and 23, but disagree with Question 17. The lower-caste Probationers disagree with Question 2, and agree with Questions 13 and 23.

Table 23  
Analyses of Attitudes on the Basis of the Type of University Attended by the Probationers

University	Q. 2. Reservation of seats in the Civil Service for particular communities leads to lowering of standard of administration.				Q. 13. Political parties are responsible for the rising corruption in the country.				Q. 17. Lack of respect for religion has led to present moral deterioration in our society.				Q. 23. India's future lies in the villages and not in the cities.			
	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Total	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Total	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Total	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Total
Metro-politan University	35	12	7	54	26	20	8	54	25	25	4	54	34	15	5	54
	(64.8%)	(22.2%)	(13.0%)		(48.1%)	(37.1%)	(14.8%)		(46.3%)	(46.3%)	(7.4%)		(63.0%)	(27.8%)	(9.2%)	
Non-metropolitan University	19	9	3	31	10	12	9	31	13	18	0	31	17	12	2	31
	(61.3%)	(29.0%)	(9.7%)	—	(32.3%)	(38.7%)	(29.0%)	—	(41.9%)	(58.1%)	—	—	(54.8%)	(38.7%)	(6.5%)	

Table 24  
Analyses of Attitudes on the Basis of the Rural/Urban Background of the Probationers

Background	Q. 2. Reservation of seats in the Civil Service for particular communities leads to lowering of standard of administration.				Q. 13. Political parties are responsible for the rising corruption in the country.				Q. 17. Lack of respect for religion has led to present moral deterioration in our society.				Q. 23. India's future lies in the villages and not in the cities.			
	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Total	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Total	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Total	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Total
Rural	5	5	4	14	6	8	0	14	8	5	1	14	9	4	1	14
	(35.7%)	(35.7%)	(28.6%)		(42.9%)	(57.1%)	—		(57.1%)	(35.7%)	(7.2%)		(64.3%)	(28.6%)	(7.1%)	
Urban	49	16	6	71	30	24	17	71	30	38	3	71	42	22	7	71
	(69.0%)	(22.5%)	(8.5%)		(42.3%)	(33.8%)	(23.9%)		(42.3%)	(53.5%)	(4.2%)		(59.2%)	(31.0%)	(9.8%)	

Table 25  
Analyses of Attitudes on the Basis of the Nature of Father's Occupation

Father's Occupation	Q. 2. Reservation of seats in the Civil Service for particular communities leads to lowering of standard of administration.			Q. 13. Political parties are responsible for the rising corruption in the country.			Q. 17. Lack of respect for religion has led to present moral deterioration in our society.			Q. 23. India's future lies in the villages and not in the cities.		
	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain
Higher Executive	42 (71.2%)	12 (20.3%)	5 (8.5%)	29 (49.1%)	20 (34.0%)	10 (16.9%)	26 (44.1%)	29 (49.1%)	4 (6.8%)	35 (59.3%)	19 (32.2%)	5 (8.5%)
Agriculture & Business	10 (55.5%)	5 (27.8%)	3 (16.7%)	6 (33.3%)	10 (55.5%)	2 (11.2%)	8 (44.5%)	10 (55.5%)	0	18 (55.5)	5 (27.8%)	3 (16.7%)
Others	3 (37.5%)	3 (37.5%)	2 (25.0%)	2 (25.0%)	2 (25.0%)	4 (50.0%)	4 (50%)	4 (50%)	0	8 (62.5%)	3 (37.5%)	0
	Total			Total			Total			Total		
	Un-certain			Un-certain			Un-certain			Un-certain		
	5			10			26			35		
	18			18			18			18		
	8			8			8			8		

Table 26  
Analyses of Attitudes on the Basis of Caste of Probationers

Caste	Q. 2. Reservation of seats in the Civil Service for particular communities leads to lowering of standard of administration.			Q. 13. Political parties are responsible for the rising corruption in the country.			Q. 17. Lack of respect for religion has led to present moral deterioration in our society.			Q. 23. India's future lies in the villages and not in the cities.		
	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain	Agree	Dis-agree	Un-certain
Higher castes	44 (77.2%)	9 (15.8%)	4 (7.0%)	27 (47.4%)	19 (33.3%)	11 (19.3%)	25 (43.9%)	28 (49.1%)	4 (7%)	31 (54.4%)	19 (33.3%)	7 (12.3%)
Lower castes	2 (20%)	5 (50%)	3 (30%)	5 (50%)	4 (40%)	1 (10%)	5 (50%)	5 (50%)	0	7 (70%)	2 (20%)	1 (10%)
Other castes	8 (44.4%)	7 (38.9%)	3 (16.7%)	4 (22.2%)	9 (50%)	5 (27.8%)	8 (44.4%)	10 (55.6%)	0	13 (72.2%)	5 (27.8%)	—
	Total			Total			Total			Total		
	Un-certain			Un-certain			Un-certain			Un-certain		
	4			11			11			11		
	10			10			10			10		
	18			18			18			18		

## CONCLUSION

To sum up, variance of responses is clear in the tables. Cumulative tables in Part II show one kind of response, and when the Probationers' attitudes are analysed on the basis of pin-pointing of certain questions, the responses differ.

The value of this study is that the attitudes of the modernizers about modernization have been studied in an unbiased manner. These are their attitudes at the time of entry. What attitudes they have after five or ten years of service in the field is not the concern of this study. In the process of service, these attitudes can undergo a change. They may get hardened or revised. Exposure to new experiences of life can bring about a change in the attitudes. Further, training institutions can formulate important training policies and programmes if they are aware of the value perception of the trainees. This study may help them also. Further, the inconsistency in the cognitive structure of the Probationers can be explained in terms of the fact that ambivalence towards values is a characteristic feature of the modern educated elite in developing societies. If we proceed with an ideal construct of the modern elite, we should not come across inconsistencies in cognition structure. But the differences found in Part II and III of the responses of the Probationers only show that the modern man in a developing society lives at two levels of cognition. This we experience everywhere, and the IAS is no exception to it. This struggle between inconsistent value systems is a feature of the modern elite in developing societies.

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## CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION— ITS ROLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE VIGILANCE

*L. M. Bhatia*

THE World War II left behind a 'freebooting' affluence with its inevitable pernicious consequences. With 'permissiveness' in the air, corruption has become an essential part of the dynamics of society and an unavoidable means for accumulation of wealth, economic power and even recognition in that society. The predominance of governmental activity under the Welfare State has further accelerated the process of change in values. The necessity for official assistance in so many areas, *e.g.*, licences, credit, foreign exchange, allocation of critical raw materials and bank loans and advances to agriculturists, small traders and self-employed persons—specially when the policy is oriented towards purpose-worthiness rather than credit-worthiness and involves exercise of discretion and judgment—has created a 'black market in government services'. The abuses in the service activities are incidental to the growing relationship between citizen and government. The tendency of public officials to use their offices as 'maximizing units' and the cynical attitude of the community as a whole have naturally caused growing concern over corruption.

### II

In June, 1962, the Parliament debated the growing menace of corruption in administration. The then Home Minister suggested that a formal committee should consider the important aspects of the evil of corruption. The Committee for Prevention of Corruption was, therefore, set up in pursuance of this announcement to review the existing instruments for checking corruption in the Central Services and to suggest measures calculated to produce a social climate, both amongst public servants and in the general public, in which bribery and corruption may not flourish. The Committee was also asked to recommend special measures that may be necessary in corporate public undertakings to secure honesty and integrity amongst their employees.

The Committee surveyed the measures taken to combat corruption in administration and pointed out that there was no organic



relation between the Administrative Vigilance Division in the Ministry of Home Affairs—set up in 1955 to provide the necessary drive and direction in anti-corruption work—and the Vigilance Officers of the various Ministries. The handling of anti-corruption work by the Ministries concerned or centralization of the work within the Home Ministry, it observed, was not 'a healthy practice'. The administration could not be a judge of its own conduct, besides, the popular impression that disciplinary action against the 'higher-ups' was conveniently shelved, needed to be removed. The creation of the Central Vigilance Commission was suggested by the Committee as one of the measures to improve these matters.

The Central Vigilance Commission was set up in February, 1964.

### III

In its interim report, the Committee recommended that the proposed Commission should deal comprehensively with two of the major problems of administration, namely: (a) prevention of corruption and maintenance of integrity; and (b) ensuring just and fair exercise of administrative powers vested in various authorities by statutory rules or by non-statutory executive orders. It further recommended that:

- (1) The powers and responsibilities in disciplinary matters, which are at present decentralized, should in the main be centralized in the Commission, the only exception being the power given to the Delhi Special Police Establishment to make preliminary enquiries or to institute and investigate a regular case whenever they consider it necessary to do so;
- (2) The Central Vigilance Commission should consist of three Directorates, one to deal with general complaints of citizens, Directorate of General Complaints and Redress, another to deal with all vigilance matters, Directorate of Vigilance, and third, the Central Police Organization which would exercise the powers now exercised by the Delhi Special Police Establishment till such time as the Central Bureau of Investigation is set up. [The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) was set up on April 1, 1963].

The Committee stressed that the Commission should be independent of Government in its functioning and may not be answerable

to any Minister even though administratively placed under the Ministry of Home Affairs.<sup>1</sup>

While recognizing the importance and urgency of providing a machinery for looking into the grievances of citizens against the administration and for ensuring just and fair exercise of administrative powers, the Government considered that the problem was big enough to require a separate agency or machinery and that, apart from this, the Central Vigilance Commission would be overburdened if these responsibilities were to be placed upon it and the Commission might, as a result, be less effective in dealing with the problem of corruption. It was accordingly decided that, to begin with, the Commission will not have a Directorate of General Complaints and Redress.

As regards powers to undertake an inquiry into transactions/complaints involving lack of integrity on the part of public servants, it was considered that the Commission would normally get enquiries or investigations made by the CBI or the departmental authorities. It was envisaged that a working arrangement will be evolved by the Commission and Director, CBI by which the CBI will take all cases referred to it by the Commission either for secret enquiries or for open investigations. In an exceptional case, where the Commission wished to make an inquiry itself, it could be appointed as a Commission of Inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act.

It was further decided that there should be centralization of powers and responsibilities in the Commission only to the extent necessary to make it effective. For the rest, the Commission should have the reserve power to intervene, when it considers it necessary to do so, and it should be kept fully in the picture by the Ministries, etc., in order that it may be able to exercise that power.

#### IV

The Scheme of the Commission, as approved<sup>2</sup> by the Government, provides that the Commission will have jurisdiction and powers in respect of matters to which the executive power of the Union extends. It will have powers to undertake an enquiry into any transactions in which

<sup>1</sup> Government of India (Ministry of Home Affairs), Report of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption (Chairman *Shri K. Santhanam*), Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1964, pp. 205-206.

<sup>2</sup> Government Resolution No. 24/7/64-AVD dated February 11, 1964, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.

a public servant is suspected or alleged to have acted for an improper purpose or in a corrupt manner or to cause an inquiry or investigation to be made into any complaint involving corruption, misconduct, lack of integrity or other kinds of malpractices or misdemeanour on the part of a public servant, including the members of the All India Services (AIS's) even if such members are for the time being serving in connection with the affairs of a State Government. (It will be necessary to amend the relevant rules under the AIS Act in order to bring the members of those services under the purview of the Commission.)

The status and nature of the functions of the Commission were clarified by the statement laid by the Government on the tables of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. It reads as follows:

“The Central Vigilance Commission will have, in the sphere of vigilance, a status and a role broadly corresponding to those of the Union Public Service Commission. It will have extensive functions designed to ensure that complaints of corruption or lack of integrity on the part of public servants are given prompt and effective attention, and that the offenders are brought to book without fear or favour. In the constitutional and legal sense, its functions would be advisory. But in reality, they would be advisory in the same sense as those of the Union Public Service Commission. The combined effect of the independence of the Commission, the nature of its functions, and the fact that its report would be placed before Parliament, would be to make the Commission a powerful force for eradication of corruption in the public services.”

## V

The Commission suggests, advises, but does not order. Its functions are advisory, but by convention, the disciplinary authorities abide by its advice. As the Home Minister said, it is a unique example of the Government of its own free-will imposing on itself certain extra-constitutional obligations of far-reaching importance which have the practical effect of trammelling its wide discretionary powers due to their desire to eradicate corruption.

The Commission maintains close touch with the CBI and encourages the Chief Vigilance Officers in the Ministries/Departments, etc., and other officers who may have occasion to deal with vigilance cases to avail themselves of its guidance.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Committee for Prevention of Corruption, the Chief Technical Examiner's Organization and the Commissioners for Departmental Enquiries have been placed under the control of the Commission.

The Municipal Corporation of Delhi, it may be added, has placed itself by a formal resolution within the purview of the Commission in regard to all matters falling within its jurisdiction. The New Delhi Municipal Committee also comes within the jurisdiction of the Commission.

All Central Public Undertakings, Corporations, etc., also come within the range of the Commission. The public undertakings, including the nationalized Banks, have adopted formal resolutions accepting the Commission's jurisdiction and, in one instance only, the administrative Department had to issue a directive in this regard. In this connection, it may be added that some of the major Port Trusts have yet to fall in line. The matter is receiving the attention of the appropriate Department.

The jurisdiction of the Commission extends to all employees of the Central Government and public undertakings, etc. For practical considerations, however, the Commission for the present advises on cases pertaining to gazetted officers and officers of public undertakings drawing a basic salary of Rs. 1000 p.m. or above.

The instructions issued by the Commission provide that, in cases relating to gazetted officers, the Commission should be consulted even if the disciplinary authority after a preliminary enquiry comes to the conclusion that no further action is necessary. In cases, in which it is decided to institute disciplinary proceedings, the Commission has to be furnished with full record of the enquiry for advice on further course of action.

The cases relating to non-gazetted personnel are dealt with by the Chief Vigilance Officers/Vigilance Officers in individual departments/undertakings, who are free to avail themselves of the help and guidance of the Commission in such cases. The Commission can also obtain information about cases relating to non-gazetted personnel, wherever considered necessary, and advise appropriate action.

In respect of offences of bribery, corruption and criminal misconduct, public servants cannot be prosecuted except with the previous

sanction of the authority which is competent to remove them from office. Reports of the CBI recommending prosecution of officers, in whose cases sanction for prosecution of the President is required, are routed through the Commission, which, after taking into consideration the comments of the administrative authority concerned, advises the Department of Personnel whether the sanction for prosecution sought by the CBI should be accorded or not. Formal sanction of the President is issued by the Department of Personnel. In cases where an authority other than the President is competent to accord such a sanction, the CBI sends its report direct to such an authority and the case comes to the Commission if there is a difference of opinion between the Central Bureau of Investigation and the competent authority.

The Commission is also charged with the responsibility of taking initiative in prosecuting persons who are found to have made false complaints of corruption or of lack of integrity against public servants.

All oral enquiries against Gazetted Officers and Officers of Public Undertakings are entrusted to the Commissioners for Departmental Enquiries who hold enquiries as quasi-judicial tribunals. Their reports are submitted to the Commission, which advises the disciplinary authorities in regard to the further course of action.

## VI

Apart from tendering advice at the relevant stages in disciplinary cases with a 'vigilance angle', the Commission performs various quasi-administrative, consultative and supervisory functions. According to the Government Resolution the Commission is responsible for advising the Ministries/Departments/Undertakings in respect of all matters pertaining to maintenance of integrity in Administration. The scope of this provision is very wide and enables the Commission to exercise the parallel functions of "auditing" the conduct of public servants in 'matters involving suspicion of corrupt or improper motivation or lack of integrity'. The Commission can and does look into such matters independently of any complaint. It is also under this provision that the Commission advises on proposals relating to promotion/confirmation pending enquiry/premature retirement/reduction of pension on the grounds of lack of integrity or gross misconduct. The Commission, however, does not generally advise on the question of suspension.

The Chief Vigilance Officers in Ministries/Departments are appointed in consultation with the Commission and no person whose

appointment as Chief Vigilance Officer is objected to by the Commission can be so appointed. Wherever the circumstances so warrant, the Commission takes initiative in securing a change in the personnel and advises about the equipment or experience needed for the proper performance of duties in 'sensitive' spheres. The Commission has also the power to assess the work of the Chief Vigilance Officers.

The system of Chief Vigilance Officers, it may be added, extends to public undertakings and corporate bodies and all proposals for reorganization and strengthening of the vigilance set-up are first required to be referred to the Commission for scrutiny.

Apart from advising in disciplinary proceedings, the Commission takes initiative in suggesting remedial measures in regard to the loopholes in rules and procedures which facilitate malpractices or tend to hold up the progress of disciplinary proceedings or oral enquiries.

The Commission has been greatly concerned about the delay in the disposal of disciplinary proceedings. The Commission has no control over the time taken by the CBI in furnishing final reports but it invariably takes vigorous steps to expedite their examination in the Commission and in the disposal of oral enquiries by the Commissioners for Departmental Enquiries. For example, the Commission insists that the Presenting Officers in the CBI reports must be drawn from that organization. The Railways have accepted the suggestion in respect of all oral enquiries, arising out of the CBI reports, dealt with by the Commissioners for Departmental Enquiries. The central public undertakings corporate bodies have also been urged to make similar provision in their relevant rules.

The Commissioners for Departmental Enquiries have no statutory powers to compel attendance of witnesses or production of documents and this absence of authority often creates difficulties in securing the presence of witnesses, etc., particularly when they are scattered over a large number of places. In consultation with the appropriate authorities, Government have decided to enact suitable legislation to remedy this lacuna. The Commission has also laid down certain guidelines for the inquiring authorities and indicated that, while all reasonable opportunity should be given both to the prosecution and the defence to produce their witnesses, they should exercise the discretion in the matter whether they should wait indefinitely for the production of witnesses, specially when there is little chance of a particular witness becoming available.

The Commission has prescribed time limits for submitting comments by Ministries/Departments, etc., in the CBI reports. It usually adheres to these limits but does not wait indefinitely for comments.

The quest for speed has, however, to contend with the built-in delays in disciplinary procedures. Often the progress of oral enquiries is held up due to the intervention of courts through writ petitions or other reasons, like non-availability of relevant records for inspection. Despite various handicaps, the Commission does manage to exercise some watch on the progress of oral inquiries/investigations with a view to seeing that this is not unduly prolonged.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Prof. Harry Street, in his book *Justice in the Welfare State*, has roundly criticized the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in the U.K., even though he functions in a different sphere, for his 'procrastination' and has commented on the silence in his reports 'on the size of his delays in handling cases'.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps no authority can hustle too much in such matters! The need for reform in the administrative process, however, remains.

The Commission arranges orientation courses for the Chief Vigilance Officers (CVOs) in collaboration with the National Academy of Administration. The programme for training includes instructions in various laws and rules, departmental procedures—including collection of information. The Commission is assisted by an Advisory Committee on Training. It consists of the Director of CBI and a representative of the Commission. The Director of the National Academy of Administration is the Chairman of the Committee. Such an orientation course is open to executives of central public undertakings/nationalized banks and officers of the State Governments. The Commission also collaborated with the Training Division in the preparation of some of the material for training purposes.

The Commission used to tender advice in cases of blacklisting of firms, but in view of a revised procedure recently adopted, consultation with the Commission in regard to this category of cases has been discontinued.

The Commission submits an Annual Report to the Department of Personnel about its activities drawing particular attention to any

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<sup>3</sup> Harry Street, *Justice in the Welfare State*, London, Stevens 1968, p. 122.



recommendation made by it which had not been accepted or acted upon. A copy of the report, together with a memorandum explaining the reasons for non-acceptance of any recommendation of the Commission, is laid before each House of Parliament by the Department of Personnel.

## VIII

When the Commission was set up six years ago, its authority and functions were somewhat nebulous. Nobody had any clear conception about its status or the scope of its functions. Indeed, in the initial stage, it was looked upon as a *ballon d'essai*, likely to be lost in the wonderland of bureaucracy. Though set up on a tentative, experimental basis, the Commission has become an essential part of the disciplinary process in the sphere of vigilance. Far from becoming redundant, as observed by the Administrative Reforms Commission, it has come to play a vital role in all matters pertaining to maintenance of integrity in administration. It was accordingly decided to transfer the various functions currently discharged by the Commission to the new functionaries under the Lokpal Bill.

Though a creature of government, the Commission functions, as stated earlier, outside the executive authority. The set-up is "personalistic" and there is a certain informality and flexibility about its working procedures. It shares these characteristics with the institutions of Ombudsman in other countries. The principal function of the Ombudsmen or Parliamentary Commissioners is, however, to investigate matters relating to administration and not allegations (involving lack of integrity and misconduct) in relation to public servants. In view of the difference in their basic functions and the volume of work handled by them, it is clear that the two types of institutions do not belong in the same hopper.

The Committee on Prevention of Corruption had expressed the hope that the Commission would become 'a powerful force for eradication of corruption in the public services'. Though corruption has not been eradicated, the Commission has ensured that 'complaints of corruption or lack of integrity on the part of government servants are given prompt and effective attention and that offenders are brought to book without fear and favour'. It has helped to evolve and apply common standards in matters relating to departmental action, prosecution, and award of punishment.

The role of the Commission in administrative vigilance has been discussed by the Committees of Parliament, in seminars and some recent publications on the subject.

Does the interposition of the Commission at different stages in corruption cases make the proceedings in such cases dilatory and cumbersome? In his evidence before the Estimates Committee (1968-69), the Central Vigilance Commissioner stated, "By the nature of things, if you refer a matter to another body newly created, some time has to lapse".<sup>4</sup> The point for consideration is, if on balance, specially in view of the complexity of administration, it has been worthwhile to do so.

While no spectacular results can be claimed, the extra administrative review, provided by the Commission, keeps public servants on the *qui vive* and serves to create public confidence that decisions in disciplinary cases will not be hustled. No level of the administrative hierarchy is free from political pressures. A 'give-and-take' between local party leaders and administrative personnel<sup>5</sup> has become a regular feature of day-to-day administration. In this context, a fair assessment of facts by the Commission eliminates scope for the manipulations of back stair influence and is thus conducive to better climate. In his book, *The Proposed Indian Ombudsmen*, Prof. S. K. Agarwala has concluded that, on all counts, the work of the Commission has been universally applauded and "there do not seem to be adequate reasons for throwing away this valuable inheritance and to make a fresh start".<sup>6</sup> This view, to some extent, reflects the impact made by the Commission on the public.

## VIII

Some eminent contemporary political scientists and sociologists have discovered sophisticated justification of bureaucratic corruption. Bribing bureaucracies, they argue, can promote in developing countries bureaucratic efficiency, innovation and rapid economic development.<sup>7</sup> According to J. S. Nye, corruption has probably been on balance, a positive factor in both Russian and American development.<sup>8</sup> Ordinary people, with ordinary perception, will find it difficult to accept this most un-platonic thesis propounded by eminent scholars. Plato's ideal that the guardians of the State will model themselves on sober and honourable men and act disinterestedly for the general good, though demoded by an over-dollarated age, has not lost its relevancy

<sup>4</sup> India, Estimates Committee (Fourth Lok Sabha) *Eighty Fourth Report : Central Vigilance Commission*, New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1968, p. 37.

<sup>5</sup> C. P. Bhambhri, *Bureaucracy and Politics in India*, Delhi, Vikas, 1971, p. 17.


<sup>6</sup> S. K. Agarwala, *The Proposed Indian Ombudsmen*, Bombay, N.M. Tripathi, p. 25.

<sup>7</sup> Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *Political Corruption : Readings in Comparative Analysis*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, p. 547.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 564.

in human affairs. A 'kleptocracy'—a society of the corrupt for the corrupt by the corrupt—can only be a passing phase in the march of individual nations and it may not be correct to draw conclusions regarding social behaviour on such transient basis.

It may, however, be conceded that bureaucratic corruption is not an isolated or incoherent phenomenon. It is a consequence of larger social malaise and undoubtedly draws sustenance from political corruption. Democracies are no less susceptible to the toxic action of graft than other political systems. It has been rightly said that so far from the growth of democracy sterilising graft, graft in the end tends to make democracy untenable<sup>9</sup>. 'State Bribery',<sup>10</sup> i.e., control of various public properties and of the expenditure of public funds for the purpose of creating power and intensifying loyalties, no doubt, contributes to corruption of public life and consequent disenchantment. This is, however, a subject which needs a wider canvass for treatment.



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<sup>9</sup> Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 489.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47 and 52.

## IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF THE REPORTS OF CANADA'S ROYAL COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

*S. M. Chickermane*

IN September 1960, the Government of Canada appointed a Royal Commission on Government Organization (popularly known as the Glassco Commission) with broad powers to inquire into all aspects of efficiency and economy in the government services.<sup>1</sup> The chairman of the Commission was J. Grant Glassco, Executive Vice-President of Brazilian Traction (a private company) who was formerly a management consultant and wartime civil servant. The other members were F. Eugene Therrien, a lawyer and insurance executive, and Watson Seller, a retired Auditor-General. Influenced probably by the Hoover Commission's use of 'task forces', it had a relatively small full-time staff; and the Commission, instead, appointed about 20 project groups for special topics. About 200 specialists were drawn from the civil service, professions, industry and universities to man these project groups. The reports and proposals of these groups were not published unlike the task force reports of the Hoover Commission.

The Glassco Commission submitted its reports<sup>2</sup> in the following manner :

<i>Volume No.</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Number of Reports</i>	<i>Month of Submission</i>
1.	Management of public service	4	September, 1962
2.	Supporting services for the government	9	November, 1962
3.	Services for the public	5	December, 1962
4.	Special areas of administration	5	January, 1963
5.	The organization of the Government of Canada	1	February, 1963

<sup>1</sup> Government of Canada, Order P.C. 1960-1269 of 16th September, 1960.

<sup>2</sup> Government of Canada, *Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organisation : The Organisation of the Government of Canada*, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1963.

The reports contained, in all, 294 recommendations. Two major differences between the Glassco Commission and our own Administrative Reforms Commission require to be specifically mentioned. Firstly, the terms of reference of the Glassco Commission did not extend to subjects under provincial administration. Secondly, it approached the task more to effect changes of a fundamental character in the government than to recommend detailed plan of organization or functioning of the government agencies. This was true even when the Commission took up consideration of some of the individual agencies.

It would be futile to outline the conclusions and recommendations of the Commission even in the briefest possible manner in an article of this nature. However, it may be noted that a reading of the Commission's reports brings out one significant finding of the Commission that the public service of Canada had not succeeded in meeting the challenge of adapting its procedures of administration to a task which has grown in complexity and size over the last 50 years or so. It was not that the civil servants of Canada were incapable of meeting the challenge but the mechanism within which they had to work simply failed to permit them to meet the challenge. The main philosophy of the approach of the Glassco Commission was that the departments and agencies of the Government of Canada should be given the authority which they require to be 'proper managers' of the tasks with which they are charged and, at the same time, the central agencies, like the Treasury Board and the Public Service Commission, should assume without the usual detailed web of regulations, restrictions and daily intervention, the following functions which are equally necessary: coordination, weighing of priorities, and appraisal of performance. Volume 1 of the reports is the most significant since it deals with the Commission's philosophy and approach to the problem. Besides, this volume contains four reports, one each on 'a plan for management', 'financial management', 'personnel management' and 'paper work and systems management'.

Shortly after Volume 1 was submitted in September, 1962, a committee of officials was set up under the Cabinet Secretary comprising 20 senior officers. About 15 of them were secretaries of different government departments and the other 5 were drawn from Public Service Commission, National Research Council (similar to our Council of Scientific and Industrial Research), and National Film Board. Soon after the submission of Volume 2 of the Commission's report, Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced in the House of Commons in November, 1962, that the Government was in "general agreement with the basic philosophy of the Commissioners" and that "most of the

recommendations they have submitted will be carried out at the earliest possible date".<sup>3</sup> The other significant points made in his announcement were:

- (1) Mr. McCutcheon, Minister without Portfolio, was made Minister in charge for the processing and implementation of the Commission's reports;
- (2) Mr. McCutcheon would be assisted by a special cabinet committee and a committee of senior officials;
- (3) The Public Service Commission had been asked to immediately conduct a survey of the persons in the civil service to find out that how many of them were skilled in management and administrative techniques and also to assess the need for training them in these techniques;
- (4) Reports of the Commission would be closely studied by all departments and that individual departments would be expected to consider and implement, on their own responsibility, many of the detailed suggestions concerning paper work;
- (5) All the departments, including the armed forces, had been directed to review their stores control and purchasing practices; and
- (6) The Department of Public Works had been directed to develop and maintain a complete inventory of immovable property owned and leased by the federal government.

After Volume 2 of the reports was issued in November, 1962, it became apparent that a full-time staff was required to assist the committee of senior officials. The Cabinet Secretary also found that he was unable to devote sufficient time to chair the committee. As a result, a separate organization called 'Bureau of Government Organization' was established in January 1963, in the Privy Council office (comparable to our Cabinet Secretariat) under Dr. Davidson who was then Secretary of Citizenship and Immigration Department. Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced in Parliament that the purpose of the Bureau was "to work on measures to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Government Organization" and also "to work closely with the cabinet committee that is dealing with this matter in order to ensure that the recommendations of the Royal Commission are thoroughly considered and when approved, are put into effect".<sup>4</sup> The Order-in-Council,<sup>5</sup> which established the Bureau (Bureau of

<sup>3</sup> Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, November 29, 1962, p. 2127-9.

<sup>4</sup> Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, November 29, 1962, p. 2840.

<sup>5</sup> Government of Canada, Order-in-Council, P.C. 1963-235, February 12, 1963.

Government Organization), stated that it was formally constituted "to facilitate the implementation of the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Government Organization". In April 1963 elections, the Liberals came to power under Mr. Lester Pearson. He appointed Mr. Maurice Lamontagne as the President of the Privy Council and Minister in charge of the Bureau. The Bureau acted as the secretariat for the committee of senior officials set up to take decisions on the recommendations of the Glassco Commission. It had four senior officers under Dr. Davidson—two of these were on the Glassco Commission's staff.

The strategy adopted for discussing volume 1 of the Commission, which was the main report and was global in character, was as follows. The committee of officials met under Dr. Davidson every Friday. The meeting lasted only two hours. The Bureau did not circulate any background or explanatory papers on the recommendations to be discussed. The officials were expected to come prepared with their own study and assessment of the recommendations in question. No comments of the departments were called for by the Bureau before the meeting. Dr. Davidson forced discussion on principles behind the recommendations rather than on the recommendations themselves. Mr. Yeomans, at present Assistant Deputy Minister in the Department of Supply and Services, whom I interviewed and who was formerly in the Glassco Commission and then with the Bureau under Dr. Davidson had high praise for the skill with which Dr. Davidson led the discussion in the committee of secretaries. Dr. Davidson believed in informal and pragmatic approach rather than in formal procedures, such as calling for comments of the concerned departments and similar other. Dr. Davidson had this to say about the role of the Bureau:

"It is certainly not the task of the Bureau to implement the recommendations of the Glassco Commission. Indeed, it would be presumptuous to suggest that the Bureau be given such a responsibility. It is rather, our task to ensure that the recommendations formulated by the Commission, designed for the most part by experienced businessmen who have not had experience in government, are looked at by those inside the service who have some knowledge as to what is, and what is not, possible in the government service, so that in the final analysis, the Ministers will get the best possible blend of the two kinds of experience to enable them to formulate their ministerial decisions."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Public Personnel Association, Ottawa—Chapter "Personnel Management Conference, Record of Proceedings" (March 1964), p. 4.



Volumes 2, 3 and 4 of the Glassco reports dealt with more specialized government activities and, therefore, each of them was mostly concerned with only a few departments. As these reports were published, about a dozen smaller committees of 6 to 12 senior officers, representing the concerned departments, were formed to consider the recommendations contained therein. Each of these committees included a member of the Bureau.

When its members had reached a consensus, each committee prepared a written report. It was circulated to the secretaries and other heads of agencies for their comments which were reviewed in the Bureau. The reports of the committees, together with any papers prepared in the Bureau, were then submitted through the minister responsible for the Bureau to the special cabinet committee and then to the cabinet for final decision. Gradually, the special cabinet committee also received proposals from the ministers of individual departments. However, it was the responsibility of the Bureau to prepare any explanatory papers which might be required by the cabinet to come to a decision. It was interesting to hear from Mr. Yeomans that it was the committees of senior officials which took the lead in taking decisions on the Glassco recommendations and that approval of the cabinet committee or of the cabinet was sometimes only a formality. According to him, in many cases, the conclusions of the committees of officials were taken to the cabinet committee and to the cabinet for its formal approval after the recommendations were accepted and even implemented. The decisions of the cabinet were conveyed by the Bureau to the concerned ministers for implementation.

The advantages of using the "committee form" for processing the reports of the Commission have been stated by Mr. G. V. Tunnoch (one of the officials in the Treasury Board, whom I interviewed) as follows:

- "(1) The committee reports provided a busy cabinet with the several judgments of able senior administrators concentrated into single documents.
- "(2) The sheer bulk of the Glassco reports required a division of labour in their appraisal. On the other hand, because they pertained to a complex and inter-related organization, few, if any, of the Glassco recommendations could be validly assessed in isolation. The committee structure was a means of dividing work and yet ensuring that inter-relationships were taken into consideration.

- "(3) The committee was a means of gathering and focussing the diverse and specialised expertise of several experienced senior administrators. Thus, a valid, penetrating, and acceptable evaluation of the Glassco reports and recommendations was assured.
- "(4) The committees involved most senior administrators in the task of analysis and review. In this manner, a common understanding of the Glassco reports was reached and a common and positive approach towards implementation engendered.
- "(5) The interplay of values, opinions, and judgments between committee members undoubtedly stimulated reassessment of habitual orientations and attitudes, a prerequisite to change."<sup>7</sup>

Guided by the informal approach of Mr. Davidson, the members of the Bureau would discuss with the key officials of the various departments the recommendations of the Commission concerning them to ascertain their reactions and difficulties, if any, in implementing them and persuade them to accept and implement as many recommendations as possible. In fact, a number of departments began implementing the proposals which they found immediately acceptable. According to Mr. Tunnoch, "this informal facilitative support of departmental enterprise in no small way contributed to the substantial progress towards implementation made to date . . . . Members of the Bureau, particularly Dr. Davidson, frequently addressed interested groups within the public service, such as the Federal Institute of Management and the Public Personnel Association as well as several departmental and service-wide training courses, about the Glassco concepts, the Bureau, and the progress of implementation. These speaking engagements were a valuable means of dispersing authoritative information and allaying undue anxiety in lower echelons of the public service hierarchy."<sup>8</sup>

One of the more interesting outcome of the Glassco reports requires to be specially mentioned. In the financial management field, the committee of officials wanted to test the feasibility of the recommendations, particularly regarding the applicability of concepts of Planning, Programming and Budgeting System in government departments. The Bureau hired private management consultants to conduct studies

<sup>7</sup> G.V. Tunnoch, "The Bureau of Government Organisation", *Canadian Public Administration*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December, 1965).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

in four departments for this purpose. Here, again, the Bureau played a leading role. Dr. Davidson was a member of the Policy Committee which provided overall guidance and directions on policy issues to the consultants.

After the important announcement made by Prime Minister Diefenbaker in November, 1962, in the House of Commons, his government as well as the Liberals who came to power in 1963 elections, kept the Parliament informed from time to time about the progress of implementation of the Glassco recommendations. For instance, in November, 1963, Mr. Lamontagne, who was minister in charge of the Bureau of Government Organization, placed on the Table of the House of Commons a list of 68 recommendations which had been accepted by the Government. These dealt with financial management, personnel management, purchasing and supply, transportation, telecommunication, printing and publishing, legal services, economic and statistical services, education and health services and so on.<sup>9</sup> The speech from the Throne of February 18, 1964, mentioned that the Treasury Board would be under a separate minister who would devote his full attention to the urgent problems in personnel as well as financial management. He would also be responsible for implementing the Glassco recommendations. The President of the Privy Council issued a press release on February 23, 1965, reviewing the progress of implementation of the recommendations. It announced that the feasibility studies conducted with the help of management consultant in the field of financial management had confirmed the general validity of the relevant Glassco recommendations. The press release further stated that in the realm of personnel management, plans were being developed for continuous manpower inventory of the public service and a new approach to performance appraisals of the employees was being developed. A beginning had been made to upgrade and strengthen the personnel functions of the departments. For this purpose, management consultants has been retained to study personnel functions in a few specific departments in order to develop models for application throughout the public service.

The above mentioned review of the implementation process of the Glassco reports brings out the following four striking features which characterized it:

- (1) The speed with which the government initiated action to process and implement the recommendations is really impressive. No sooner the first volume containing four reports was out

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<sup>9</sup> Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, November, 1963, p. 4382.

than the government set up a committee of officials to consider them. As soon as the second volume containing nine reports was presented, the government announced in Parliament that it was in general agreement with the basic philosophy of the Commission and that most of the recommendations would be implemented as early as possible. A cabinet minister was put in-charge of processing and implementing the recommendations.

- (2) There was a keen awareness on the part of the political parties in power and, what is more, on the part of the civil service that a change in the governmental machinery and procedures was called for. Both displayed remarkable sincerity of purpose in trying to understand the philosophy of approach of the Commission and implement the recommendations in the spirit in which they were made. Dynamic leadership was provided by top civil servants in this process.
- (3) It was realized by the Bureau of Government Organization (the agency which was made responsible for processing the recommendations and getting the government's decisions thereon) that to bring about worthwhile changes in the government, it is necessary to carry the persons along who have to work the system by discussion and persuasion rather than force the change by issuing administrative fiat. Opportunity was taken to discuss the recommendations with the civil service associations and in the various training courses run by the government. This informal approach greatly facilitated in overcoming the psychological inertia which is usual in such a big mass of civil servants.
- (4) Before introducing any changes of a fundamental characters, as recommended by the Commission, a number of intermediate steps were taken to prepare the ground. It must be realized that the recommendations of the Commission, especially in the field of personnel and financial managements, were till then considered to be applicable only in the private sector. To explain the new concepts in a language which even a layman could understand, manuals and handbooks were brought out, so that the people who had to work the new system knew what it was and how to work it. For example, before introduction of the PPBS (Planning, Programming and Budgeting System), the Treasury Board issued a series of guides and manuals such as "Financial Management in the Departments and Agencies of the Government of Canada", "Programme Review and

Estimates Manual", and "Planning, Programming and Budgeting Guide". Along with this, the government reviewed the entire accounting system and brought about changes therein so as to usher in the PPBS. These concepts were first tried in a few departments with the help of management consultants and later extended to other departments in the light of this experience. Extensive training programmes were laid out to educate the civil servants in appreciating and applying the new concepts.


One may legitimately ask what has been the overall impact of the Glassco Commission's work on the government of Canada. The government itself has not made any such assessment. Because of lack of adequate staff, the Bureau also found it difficult in watching implementation of the accepted recommendations. However, my talks with the officials of the Treasury Board revealed that in some fields, such as the financial management, the government of Canada has advanced much beyond what the Glassco Commission had visualized because of the tremendous progress made in the last few years in the concepts, like the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. According to Prof. D. C. Rowat of the Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, "one valuable result, of course, has been to bring the most important problems of the public service into the realm of public discussion and to create public pressure for improvements, whether or not the particular proposals of the Commission were adopted. The second result has been to give civil servants a much greater interest in efficiency and economy. For instance, a group of them created a new Federal Institute of Management which had the initial membership of more than 500 key officials divided into panels on such subjects as management analysis, automatic data processing, material control, finance and accounting. Moreover, as the reports appeared, the departments began implementing minor proposals that they found immediately acceptable."<sup>10</sup> Mr. John Carson, who was project director on personnel management with the Glassco Commission and now the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, has summarized beautifully in the following words what has happened since the presentation of the Glassco reports:

"A great deal has happened: In some ways it is hard to describe these changes. There has been no legislation passed, no sweeping regulations issued, and nobody has been fired. But there has been a substantial change in the orientation, attitudes, and even values

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<sup>10</sup> Prof. D. C. Rowat, "Canada's Royal Commission on Government Organisation". *Public Administration* (Summer, 1963).

of a considerable number of senior and influential civil servants. The control agencies are no longer sacrosanct; 'red tape' and delays are no longer accepted as inevitable. Change and reform are considered not only possible but highly probable."<sup>11</sup>



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<sup>11</sup> Mr. John Carson, "What's happened to Glassco?" *Public Personnel Review*, April, 1965.

## THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION: ITS PLACE IN THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

*R. B. Jain*

PERHAPS no other aspect of public administration in the Federal Government of the United States of America has been so controversial as the placement of responsibility for Federal personnel administration. It is generally assumed that the President, being the Chief Executive of the U.S. Government, has far-reaching powers to control, manage and work the bureaucracy the way he deems fit in the public interest. There is no doubt that the basic framework for personnel administration is provided by legislation and by Executive Orders issued by the President by virtue of the authority conferred on him by statute and by the Constitution directly. Nevertheless, personnel administration in the U.S. Government continues to be a divided responsibility, shared by the President, his office of the Bureau of Budget, the Congress, the United States Civil Service Commission (USCSC) and the personnel offices in various departments and agencies. The bulk of the workload and responsibility in respect of personnel policies and programmes is, however, borne by the USCSC, which is often said to be the "kingpin" of Federal personnel administration.<sup>1</sup> An attempt is made in this paper to discuss and analyse the role of the USCSC and the problems emerging out of its peculiar position in the U.S. Government structure.

### ROLE OF USCSC IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

The USCSC was originally established in 1883 under the Pendleton Act, popularly known as the Civil Service Act, with the primary object of reforming the evils of the "spoils" system and guarantee appointments in the public services on the basis of merit and fitness. To enable it to discharge its functions free from politics, it was constituted on a bi-partisan basis and kept separate and independent of the administrative hierarchy. Though originally conceived as a device to protect the services from appalling inefficiencies and insecurities of the "spoils"

<sup>1</sup> Herbet Kaufman, "The Growth of the Federal Personnel System", in the American Assembly, *The Federal Government Service : Its Character, Prestige and Problems*, New York, 1954, p. 45.



system, it has now developed into a modern central personnel agency and provides leadership and service to operating personnel offices of the U.S. Government in personnel management.

Unlike the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) in India, whose functions are mainly consultative in respect to: (a) the recruitment to all civil services and posts under the Union Government by written examination, interview and promotion, and matters relating to the methods of recruitment, promotion and transfer of civil Services and civil posts, (b) all disciplinary matters affecting a civil servant, and (c) claims of award of costs incurred by a civil servant in defending himself against legal proceedings instituted in respect of acts done by him in his official duties or claims of award of a pension in respect of injuries sustained by him while on duty, the USCSC has a much wider field of operation and performs three kinds of functions: (1) *Control and Enforcement Functions*: e.g., review of agency personnel functions carried out under delegated authority; approval of qualifications and classification in certain cases; administration of the Veterans' Preference Act and the Hatch Act; and issuance of civil service regulations and adjudication of employee appeals. (2) *Service Functions*: e.g., centralized examining for certain positions; conducting security investigations; and administration of Retirement Act, Life Insurance and Health Benefit Acts; and (3) *Leadership Functions*: e.g., development of recruiting and training programmes; salary reform plans; and personnel research.

Writers have argued that the above mentioned three categories of functions are not always complementary and must not, therefore, be performed by the same agency. Thus, in its developed role, the task of the USCSC has been very delicate with regard to both the nature of the functions performed by it and the peculiar position it occupies in the government structure of the United States. Although it is listed as an "independent" agency in the U.S. Government Organization Manual,<sup>2</sup> it should be understood that it is not as "independent" as the Union Public Service Commission in India is. Like other Departments, it is subject to control by Congress through new legislation, annual appropriations, and influence of its important members. It is subject to supervision by the President, who can and does issue orders, oral and written, to the Commission. In the Indian system, the UPSC is a constitutional body and by tradition has been kept relatively independent of the Government and other political processes. But the USCSC is under constant pressure from employee groups, veterans' associations, professional associations, and educational institutions,

<sup>2</sup> *United States Government Organization Manual 1966-67*, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. vi.

and is also under constant criticism from the press and the public about its policies and programmes. Still, it has to discharge its seemingly conflicting roles in a manner that does not give rise to any suspicion of political bias.

#### THE DILEMMA IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

The problem of Federal personnel administration is not that diverse authorities have some hand in personnel process and that each of the authority is able to influence it, because such a division of authority may rather be inevitable and desirable in a big government like that of the USA. In the American system of checks and balances, all three parts of the Government powerfully influence all agencies—the President, the Congress and the Courts. The problem today is the lack of a consistent, well-focussed executive leadership in personnel management and the somewhat negative image of the Civil Service Commission prevalent among the agency officials.

A question is often asked: For whom does the Civil Service Commission work? A USCSC publication describes that it operates as the personnel management arm of the President and provides the necessary leadership in Federal personnel administration that the President would provide if he has the time to do so.<sup>3</sup> But as one commentator has put it, "the Federal Civil Service Commission has been accustomed to serve more than one master. We think it works first for its Congressional committees, second for the status employees, third for the American Legion in support of veterans' preference laws, fourth for civil service employees' unions, and possibly fifth for the President. Since the end of World War II, the President has moved up in this list but it is difficult to tell just how far".<sup>4</sup> The inevitable result is that, in serving too many masters, the USCSC cannot serve any one effectively.

A research study of the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., has posed the same problem in different words:

"... we must take a very hard and critical look at the present arrangement (of Federal personnel administration) which places in the hands of the CSC both the regulatory function and the major responsibility for government-wide stimulation of new

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance, USCSC, *The Government Personnel System*, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 27.

<sup>4</sup> Maurice E. O'Donnell, *Readings in Public Administration*, Boston, 1966, pp. 173-74.

and positive personnel philosophies and practices. The two functions are seldom complementary—and in fact often antagonistic—both in their operational aspects and in the outlook they require of those who administer them. Furthermore, it is difficult for the people who must deal with the CSC to give full appreciation and weight to its positive functions. Its historical regulatory mission—and its continuing regulatory responsibilities—are bound to condition their view, and, in many cases, cause them to adopt a questioning or suspicious attitude. Finally, there is the very important question of whether leadership in personnel matters, which is an important executive function, ought not to be in the Office of the Chief Executive, rather than in the hands of a so-called independent agency.”<sup>5</sup>

The dilemma is, thus, quite clear. With the growing recognition that in government as well as in non-governmental organizations personnel management is essential to and integral with the executive management, it is of the utmost importance that the Chief Executive should be enabled to utilize the Federal personnel agency as well as the Federal service itself to accomplish the purposes of government. This calls for a reconciliation of the central principle of merit in selection and promotion in the Federal service with the equally basic principle that the President should be able to control the size and quality of the administration for which he is by law responsible. Has the USCSC’s functioning as a central personnel agency resulted in the reconciliation of these principles? Has the USCSC been working as an instrument of the chief executive’s personnel policies? If not, has not the time come when the President should assume full responsibility for personnel management? Must not the USCSC be abolished and replaced by an agency responsible to the President? Or, are there any special factors which justify its continuance in the “independent” form? Is there any institutional reform which is needed at this juncture to make for a better personnel management system? These are some of the questions which arise in this context.

#### PRESIDENT, USCSC AND PERSONNEL SYSTEM

The USCSC has sometimes been referred to as the first staff agency in the Federal Government established for the President. This is not, however, a correct description of the agency, as the historic Act of 1883 which created it, had not designed it as a form of staff assistance to the President—a concept hardly been popular in those days. The agency

<sup>5</sup> Franklin P. Kilpatrick, Milton C. Cummings, Jr., and M. Kent Jennings, *The Image of the Federal Service*, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 268.

was created to "aid" the President and the Executive Departments in matters of employment.<sup>6</sup> Yet it forms no part of the normal administrative hierarchy and is supposed to be non-political as far as possible and free from interference either of the executive or legislative branch of the Government. It could be called as the first set-up on which were patterned the various independent regulatory commissions which were subsequently established in the Government of the United States to remove controversial issues from the jurisdiction of the usual administrative and political channels and "to avoid some of the most acrimonious of the Presidential Congressional impasses"<sup>7</sup>. Its position is, however, different from later regulatory bodies in that the President is the source of its legal power and authority. It cannot, therefore, be said to be entirely independent as other Regulatory Commissions are. In another way, its position is peculiar, since it does not know who is its boss, and it does not know where the boundary lies between its authority and the authority of the department and agencies which it regulates. This anomalous situation of the USCSC, argues one observer, is due partly to the circumstances under which the Commission was created and partly to the fact that its role and functions laid down at the time of its inception have undergone a complete change.<sup>8</sup>

From almost the beginning of the Constitution, relations between the President and Congress in the United States have been marred by misunderstandings, deadlocks and open warfare on a variety of issues. The USCSC has also been a bone of contention between the two organs of the U.S. Government. The authority and responsibility for the personnel management of the U.S. Government has always been thought to be vested in the President. During the first hundred years of the U.S. Government, the sharing and accommodation, through which the President exercised his personnel powers, were largely informal and involved primarily relationships with Congress and with his own political party leaders. The Civil Service Act of 1883 introduced a new dimension of an "independent" central personnel agency—the Civil Service Commission (CSC)—with important powers of personnel management, but vaguely defined relationships to the President and to the Congress. Many a time Congress felt that it had a greater control over the USCSC, but as is evident from the Act and the subsequent development of the CSC, the President of the United States has had

<sup>6</sup> See, Speech of Senator Charles W. Jones of Florida on the Pendleton Bill, *Congressional Record*, 47th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 322.

<sup>7</sup> Paul P. Van Riper, "Adapting a British Political Invention to American Needs", *Public Administration* (London), Vol. 31 (1953), p. 329.

<sup>8</sup> Charles S. Hyneman, *Bureaucracy in a Democracy*, New York, N.Y. 1950, p. 383.

greater control over the affairs of the USCSC than the Congress. The American President not only appoints the Commissioners (subject to the approval of the Senate), but, since the Civil Service Law today is basically the same as it was in 1883, he may, by simply refusing to appoint Commissioners, put an end to the Civil Service Commission and the authority it exercises.<sup>9</sup>

Apart from the unrestricted power of removal over the Civil Service Commissioners, the U.S. President has full control over the rules and regulations prepared by the Civil Service Commission under the authority of various personnel Acts, and can assert his own policies against those of the Commission in the framing of such regulations.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, the Civil Service Commission cannot put its policies into operation without the authority and sanction of the President. The Presidential office has immense prestige and it is open to a Chief Executive to capitalize on it by urging Congress and the public to support improvements in personnel administration, wage increases, better retirement benefits, improvement in career, and other matters. In addition, the President can, at his own discretion, remove certain positions from the area of patronage by putting them under classified service. He can also direct that any positions could be put under the excepted categories. The Civil Service Law, in effect, provides that whatever the President chooses to place on the campus of the civil service is a part of it. From time to time, Presidents have extended the civil service system or brought about improvements in personnel administration or have spoken out on matters involving the public service. Most of the time, however, the Presidential leadership in personnel matters has been sporadic and dependent on the "philosophy and approach of those holding the Presidential office".<sup>11</sup>

In addition to the President's control over the USCSC, two of his other offices have some impact on personnel matters. The Bureau

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<sup>9</sup> Charles S. Hyneman, *op. cit.*, p. 385.

<sup>10</sup> It is interesting to note what Prof. Hyneman has to say in this respect: "The relationship between the President and the Civil Service Commission in the issuance of rules and regulations relating to the Federal Service is very confusing to the casual observer. The Pendleton Act stated that the Commission may, subject to the rules that may be made by the President, make regulations relating to certain phases of employment policy. On later occasions, Congress set up additional personnel agencies (*e.g.*, Bureau of Efficiency and Personnel Classification Board) and gave them rule-making power. These were abolished shortly after 1930, and a part of their functions and authority was transferred to the Civil Service Commission. The Commission thus acquired (particularly from the Classification Board) new legal authority for the issuance of rules, and the necessity of going to the President for confirmation of the Commission's regulations on certain matters was thrown into question. Whatever be the proper interpretation of the Statutes, however, the Civil Service Commission today lays most of its rules and regulations before the President for promulgation." *Ibid.*, p. 264.

<sup>11</sup> See also, Oliver P. Field, *Civil Service Law*, Minneapolis (Minn.), 1939, p. 4.

of the Budget, as a staff agency to the President, has considerable influence on Federal Personnel policies. While reviewing agency budgets, the Bureau studies management practices, including those relating to personnel. All proposed legislation, Executive Orders, and comments on proposed legislation are transmitted through the Bureau to the President or Congress. Similarly, the Attorney General, or legal adviser to the President, reviews proposed Executive Orders for legality. Where there is doubt as to the correct interpretation of personnel statutes, he may be called upon by the President (on the recommendation of the Commission or of any other agency) to tender advice.<sup>12</sup>

But all this control and influence of the Executive Branch has not vested the President with full authority and responsibility needed for a dynamic personnel system, nor has it made the USCSC a true management arm of the President to enable him to use it as a tool for an effective and efficient personnel system to serve public interest. Time and again, the need for such an office has been felt in the Presidential office. Prof. Sayre has emphatically pointed out the need for a special organization to help President exercise personnel leadership in these words:

"The President needs in his own office an agency for personnel leadership . . . which would possess status, responsibility, and resources comparable to those of the Budget Bureau and the Council of Economic Advisers. This personnel agency should prepare annually, or even more frequently, a Presidential message to the Congress and to the public, reporting on the quality, the accomplishments, and the difficulties of the federal personnel systems and recommending measures for their improvement."<sup>13</sup>

#### CONGRESS, USCSC AND PERSONNEL SYSTEM

The American Congress exercises control over practically every phase of executive action. Through its powers of investigation, its power of control over appointments, its power to create laws limiting the Executive's jurisdiction, its power to determine the agency structure in some cases and its power to control the purse-strings, Congress can most of the time make the Executive behave in the manner it likes. Experts in public administration believe that the Congressional control of the administrative system is not only

<sup>12</sup> USCSC, *The United States Civil Service Commission, Its Work and its People*, Washington, D.C., 1953, p. 33.

<sup>13</sup> Wallace S. Sayre, "The Public Service", *Goals for Americans* (Report of the President's Commission on National Goals), New York, N.Y., 1960, p. 289.

democratically essential, but also technically feasible. Contrary to this, however, there are writers who believe that "the dangers (to democratic processes) arise, not from lack of Congressional zeal, but from an excess of it, with a resulting demoralization of administration".<sup>14</sup>

In the realm of personnel administration, the US Congress determines some of the most important personnel policies of the Government that are not delegated to the President or the USCSC. Congress has also the responsibility to see that the personnel policies approved by it are being faithfully carried out and that the public service is being competently managed. At times, Congress has made several major changes in the basic legislative structure of federal personnel administration—the Civil Service Act of 1883—and also enacted new major personnel legislation. Some of these laws, like the Retirement Act of 1920, have directly placed operational responsibilities in the Commission and, in the administration of other laws, authority is solely and specifically vested in the USCSC. Under some laws, considerable latitude is sometimes given to the Commission and the President to set up detailed regulations and procedures. Occasionally, however, Congress prescribes specific procedures to be followed in personnel administration. Thus in one case—the Government Employees' Training Act of 1958—the responsibility is directed to be shared by the Commission and the President. Through such patterns of delegation of authority of personnel legislation, Congress has deliberately put the Commission in the position of reporting to two supervisors, Congress and the President. "The Pattern", observes one commentator, "has also raised at least a potential question of Presidential autonomy".<sup>15</sup>

Congressional influence on the Civil Service Commission is direct, particularly because in all personnel actions, it is the legislation passed by Congress which gives the personnel administration a statutory base. The USCSC is itself created through an Act of the Congress, and it could be abolished by it or made defunct simply by its refusal to renew appropriations. Congress can make a law exempting positions from the Classified Civil Service. It can also adopt laws regulating the coverage of the civil service and other "merit" systems. It can prescribe the organization for personnel management. It can enact laws, making amendments in personnel

<sup>14</sup> Kenneth Culp Davis, *Administrative Law*, St. Paul, 1951, p. 56. Quoted by Charles E. Gilbert and Max M. Kampelman, "Legislative Control of the Bureaucracy", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Philadelphia, Vol. 292, March 1954, p. 76.

<sup>15</sup> Chester G. Hall, Jr., "The U.S. Civil Service Commission: Arm of the President?", *Public Personnel Review* (Chicago), Vol. 28 (1967), p. 115.



classification, pay, retirement, rights of employees, veterans' preferences, employee conduct, and other matters of personnel policies and administration.<sup>16</sup> Additional controls can be exercised by Congress through investigations, the Senate's confirmation of Presidential appointments and various other devices, including appropriation riders for reducing the size of departmental staff or for prescribing other conditions regulating personnel administration.<sup>17</sup>

The Post Office and the Civil Service Committees of the House of Representatives and Senate are constantly reviewing the legislations affecting the Federal Civil Service and the postal service and recommend, where necessary, changes in the existing legislations or propose fresh legislations. At times, the Committees are empowered by Congress to make special investigations into the operations of the Civil Service and the Post Office systems.

Not only the Congressional influence on personnel matters is direct, the USCSC also has direct relations with Congress. Both in informal meetings and in the official hearings in the Senate and House Committees on Post Office and Civil Service as well as through their reports, Commission officials try to shape Congressional opinions in favour of what they want to be done. Sometimes, the Commission also prepares special reports for the consideration of Congress and Congressional Committees on some impending legislation.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, when the Congressional Committees or the Congressmen contemplate personnel legislation or require any personnel information or in any way exhibit a general concern on a personnel question, the Commission officials are quick to take

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<sup>16</sup> Almost every aspect of personnel administration is today covered by statutes including such subjects as eligibility, examinations and appointments, hours of work, holidays, leave of absence, training, employee ratings, employee relations, medical and other services, awards, promotions, lay-off and separation and retirement. As case studies of two important personnel programmes, mention may be made of the Training Act of 1958 and the Career Executive Programme instituted by an Executive Order of the President in 1958 and subsequently blocked by Congress, see Joseph P. Harris, *Congressional Control of Administration*, Washington, D.C., 1964, pp. 179-87.

<sup>17</sup> A recent example of such a rider is the original Whitten Amendment adopted as a rider to the Supplemental Appropriation Act for 1951 (64 Stat. 1066). It provided that the number of permanent employees of covered department and agencies could not exceed the number on September 1, 1950. It further banned permanent transfers, promotions, and re-instatements during the emergency period, and directed the departments, as far as possible, to make only temporary new appointments.

<sup>18</sup> According to a study made by Professor Harris, Congress has in recent years enacted 20 to 25 Civil Service laws annually, plus many other statutes that carry incidental provisions affecting personnel. In the 85th Congress, 787 Civil Service bills were introduced, 350 of which related to retirement and the balance to 40 other subjects. The Civil Service Commission received 879 requests from Congressional Committees for reports on personnel bills and submitted 684 such reports. Harris, n. 16, p. 167.

notice and to initiate appropriate response.<sup>19</sup> The Commission also furnishes assistance and information to the Congressional Committees whenever required.

Although most of the personnel legislation enacted by the Congress must pass through these Committees, a substantial amount of personnel legislation relating to employees of individual departments is enacted without being referred to these Committees. Investigations of particular aspects of personnel administration have been frequently conducted by other Committees. "This unfortunate splintering of responsibility", observes one commentator, "has been due in part to the failure of the Civil Service Committee to report bills granting needed personnel authority to the departments—for example, bills authorizing additional supergrade positions—so that the departments have turned to other committees for special authorization."<sup>20</sup>

Ill-advised Congressional interference can disrupt the "merit" system. On many occasions, especially in the initial stages of the Civil Service Act, the Members of Congress attempted to do so. Members of Congress can and do try to apply pressure on behalf of individual jobseekers. In respect of Post Masters of Class I, Class II and Class III, where the appointments are specifically required to be made out of the eligibles certified by the Civil Service Commission, the preference of the members of the Senate is in practice allowed to prevail, under the cloak of "Senatorial courtesy".<sup>21</sup> Above all these, Congress has the most potent weapon in its power of appropriation cuts. Many a time, the Civil Service Commission has felt greatly handicapped in its activities through Congress resorting to unjustified appropriation cuts.<sup>22</sup> It is, therefore, argued that

<sup>19</sup> Almost every report of the USCSC contains certain recommendations for legislation. The possible change-over from a Republican administration to a Democratic one in 1960 was anticipated by the USCSC in advance and it produced a booklet entitled *Problems of Transition to New Administration* (Washington, D.C., 1960) for the guidance of Congressmen. More recently with the announcement of President Johnson in 1968 that he was not going to run for the Presidency, the CSC anticipated that there would be a transition of personalities regardless of which party won. This allowed a certain amount of pre-planning on the part of the USCSC. See "Conversation with the chairman", *Civil Service Journal* (Washington, D.C.), Vol. 9 (April-June 1969), p. 6.

<sup>20</sup> Harris, n. 16, p. 166.

<sup>21</sup> USCSC, n. 12, p. 33. At the time of writing President Nixon's proposal providing for the abolition of Senate's confirmation of the appointment of post-masters was being debated in the Congress. Another proposal to reconstitute the entire Postal System as a Corporation was also pending before it.

<sup>22</sup> This was precisely the reason why the First Civil Service Commission, appointed by President Grant in 1871 was rendered defunct. Subsequently, in many of its Reports after its re-establishment, the USCSC has emphasized the handicap of the availability of increased appropriations in the extension of its work. The first twenty Reports of the USCSC are full of such examples. In 1941, the President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement recorded that "the consequences of inadequate appropriation and

Congressional action in personnel matters may be termed as an exercise of authority than an exercise of control.<sup>23</sup>

Every annual report of the USCSC has regularly recommended certain personnel programmes for action both by the President and by the Congress. Sometimes, it is the President that shows enthusiasm for a particular recommendation, while, on other occasions, it is the Congress that evinces great interest. There have been occasions when cooperative relations between Congress and the President have not prevailed in personnel matters, and as a result the public service has suffered.<sup>24</sup>

As the Sixth American Assembly Report has put it:

"Congressional intervention in the details of personnel management deprives the President and the heads of departments and agencies of needed discretion in the use of a vital tool of management. Such intervention impedes administrative effectiveness and efficiency by freezing procedure in a rigid pattern."<sup>25</sup>

The recent tendency of Congress to control and regulate personnel legislation in details has often been criticized by the USCSC. In its 69th Report in 1952, the Commission observed:

"The last few years have seen a growing tendency on the part of Congress to legislate on the details of personnel administration. The Commission believes that by going beyond statements of policy and legislative intent to spell out procedures of carrying them out, Congress often creates a rigidity of operation and administration that interfere with efficient personnel management in the executive branch. Administrative rules and regulations are flexible and easily altered to suit changing conditions. Personnel procedures set by law can be changed only by new legislation after a necessarily lengthy process."<sup>26</sup>

(Continued from page 95)

staff have been excessive delay in serving the departments, inadequate attention to the improvement of procedures, loss of public confidence by failure of long continued delay to answer correspondence, demand on the part of appointing officers to secure personnel outside the civil service system, and the necessity of carrying a workload involving an indefensible amount of overtime on the part of the higher members of the staff of the Commission." Stanley Reed, *Report of President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement*, House Document No. 118, February, 1941, pp. 17-18.

<sup>23</sup> Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, *Government by Merit: An Analysis of the Problem of Government Personnel* (New York, N.Y., 1935), p. 270. Research Monograph No. 12 by Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., Assistant to the Director of Research, Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel.

<sup>24</sup> See, Leonard D. White, "Congress and the Civil Service", *Public Personnel Review*, (Chicago), Vol. 5 (April 1944), pp. 65-69.

<sup>25</sup> The American Assembly, n. 1, p. 182.

<sup>26</sup> USCSC, *69th Report* (1952), p. 20.

The scope of the authority and of the functions performed by the USCSC are to a considerable extent dependent on the goodwill and attitude of the Congress towards it. The USCSC, as constituted at present, cannot hope to be independent of legislative control, and even if it is ultimately to be located in one of the President's Executive Offices, the problem of appropriation cuts will continue.

Despite the tendency of the Congress to try to assert its direct control over the activities of the Civil Service Commission,<sup>27</sup> it will be in the interest of the public service if Congress should confine itself only to legislation on general policies, leaving the issuance of detailed rules and regulations to the President and the USCSC. This will also ensure the President's continued and direct interest in personnel administration and will reduce the areas of friction between Congress and the President.

#### THE PROBLEM OF INDEPENDENCE

As seen earlier, the dilemma in the personnel administration of the U.S. Government arises from the fact that the USCSC, being the central personnel agency, is neither fully responsible to Congress nor to the Chief Executive, and that it has somewhat an "independent" status. It has also been noted that the relationship of the personnel agency to the Chief Executive Offices or the Executive Branch is of crucial importance for an efficient and effective management system. It will, therefore, be appropriate at this point to examine and analyse the factors and developments which have supported the present position of the USCSC and have prevented its becoming a true Presidential arm for personnel management.

Conceptually speaking, there are two different theories in respect of the placement of personnel agency in a Governmental system, which reflect two different goals. The theory that the personnel agency should be considerably "separate and independent" from the executive influence or control stems from an emphasis on the maintenance of the integrity of the "merit" system and the elimination of political influence. In contrast to this is the other theory that public personnel

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<sup>27</sup> In 1956, a Report of the House Civil Service Committee rejected the view that the Commission was a staff agency of the President. It stressed that the USCSC was an executive agency for administering Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations, and was expected to be accountable to the Congress. The Commission was supposed to work independently, but it was urged to bring plans, programmes, and proposed regulations for consultation and advice before putting them into effect. The Report on the whole gave an impression that the House Committee had the responsibility to exercise control over the Commission. See, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, *United States Civil Service Commission*, Report No. 1844, Washington. D.C., 1956.

administration should exist as a part of the executive power and as an instrument of the Chief Executive for effective and sound personnel management.

The concept of an independent central personnel agency further raises the following basic issues:

- (a) How far and to what extent should the personnel agency function "independently" of the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary?
- (b) What safeguards are necessary, and would be desirable, to guarantee such independence?
- (c) Should the personnel agency function as a single executive or a collegiate body?
- (d) What should be the relationship between the personnel agency and the operating departments?

The answer to the above mentioned questions will depend on the kind of role and functions which a personnel agency is expected to perform. If the emphasis of the role of the personnel agency is towards protection against the spoils system, then protection depends on a feeling of security and confidence, and people everywhere have preferred to be protected by a *commission* (a plural body) with certain independence rather than by an *administrator* or a *single-headed agency*. The "protectionist" school of thought, as it is called, emphasizes the need for the independence of the Commission in disregard of its potentialities as a management arm of the Chief Executive.<sup>28</sup> Prof. Friedrich C. Mosher calls it the antipatronage premise. It is true that the "independence" of the personnel agency in the United States has been supported by war veterans' organizations, labour organizations, employee representatives and also the minority groups. They have always been suspicious of the misuse of personnel power by the line officials and hence their common demand for an independent channel of power with regard to personnel policy and operation.<sup>29</sup>

But on the other hand, if the emphasis of the role of a personnel agency is put on the "management" aspect, as in business and industry,

<sup>28</sup> Felix A. Nigro, *Public Personnel Administration*, New York, N.Y., 1959, p. 64; James R. Watson in Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, *Administration of the Civil Service System*, Washington, D.C. 1957, p. 45. Cited hereafter as Watson Report.

<sup>29</sup> Frederick C. Mosher, "The Public Personnel Agency and the Chief Executive", in Thomas Page (ed.), *The Public Personnel Agency and the Chief Executive*, Chicago, Ill., 1960, p. 2.

then it becomes almost obligatory to identify the "personnel agency" more fully with the direction and control of the Chief Executive. The motive of the management premise is that personnel, like budgeting, planning and other so-called staff activities, is essentially an arm and tool of management. As such, its central organization should be integrated under the immediate direction and control of the Chief Executive. The head of such an organization should be a single officer directly responsible and responsive to the Chief Executive. Under such a system, it would be possible to decentralize the personnel operations to the extent feasible to line officers, so that they can exercise more control over, and, therefore, assume greater responsibility for, their own personnel. This is also called the "strong executive" approach, and it seeks to abolish the "Commission" system leaving, all problems completely to direct executive responsibility.<sup>30</sup>

#### ALTERNATIVES TO AN "INDEPENDENT" USCSC

Since the enactment of the Pendleton Act of 1883, people both inside and outside the Government have advocated the retention of the "independent" form of the USCSC, as well as its reorganization on the pattern of a management arm of the Chief Executive. In recent years, however, the management approach seems to have had a larger number of advocates, and in spite of the retention of the USCSC in the present form, there has been a persistent plea to re-organize personnel administration on the basis of Executive responsibility.

Although attempts towards securing the "management objective" had been made as far back as 1891, when a Select Committee on the Reform in the Civil Service (appointed on 27 January, 1890), after making extensive investigation into the civil service, recommended the appointment of a single Commissioner in the place of the three member bi-partisan Commission, the more recent efforts in this direction were made by the President's Committee on Administrative Management (popularly known as Brownlow Committee) which in 1937 suggested the abolition of the USCSC and its replacement by a single personnel director to be appointed by the President. Even although the Senate approved the proposal, the House rejected it for fear that the "elimination of the Commission would leave the way open for partisan abuses and seriously weaken the protective function of the central personnel agency"<sup>31</sup>.

It is noteworthy that following the non-acceptance of the recommendation to abolish the USCSC, President Roosevelt named one of his

<sup>30</sup> Watson Report, n. 28, p. 45; and Nigro, n. 28, p. 64.

<sup>31</sup> Nigro, n. 28, p. 54.

administrative assistants to serve as Liaison Officer for Personnel Management. His duties were to "assist the President in making closer contact with all agencies dealing with personnel matters insofar as they affect or tend to determine the personnel management policies of the Executive Branch of the Government". "The term management in his title", writes Chester G. Hall, "did not make the Liaison Officer a personnel manager or give authority over the Commission. To the contrary, the existence of the Liaison Officer gave almost tacit recognition to the Commission's independence"<sup>32</sup>.

Through his Liaison Officer for Personnel Management, President Roosevelt tried to bridge the administrative gap between the White House and the USCSC, though not altogether without success. His successor, President Truman also continued with the same arrangements. Although his administration made some significant contribution by directing through Executive Order 9830, that primary responsibility for personnel management should rest with the managers in the government and that the USCSC should be responsible to President for the application of the relevant rules and regulations, but his Liaison Officer (Donald S. Dawson) came in for sharp criticism partly because he openly handled patronage tasks as well as public personnel policy for the President and partly because of his alleged involvement in the scandal relating to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and sale of Federal jobs in Mississippi.

#### FIRST HOOVER COMMISSION

Twelve years after the publication of the Brownlow Committee Report, there came the report of the First Hoover Commission, which analysed, for the first time the working of the Federal Government's structure, including the federal personnel system. The Hoover Commission did not take any account of the Liaison Office, but proposed instead the creation of an Office of Personnel in the Executive Office of the President. It was to be headed by a person who was also to be the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, and the full responsibility for the administrative direction of the work of the Civil Service Commission was to be vested in the Chairman of the Commission.<sup>33</sup> Commissioner James K. Pollock, one of the members of the Hoover Commission, disagreed with the recommendation saying that he considered this arrangement essentially a compromise—a continuance

<sup>32</sup> Hall, n. 15, p. 117.

<sup>33</sup> The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Personnel Management*, Washington, D.C., 1949, pp. 9 and 41. Cited hereafter as the First Hoover Commission Report.



of the Commission, but a division of responsibility within it—thus making the Chairman alone responsible for administration. More or less, in substance, he supported the recommendation of the 1937 Brownlow Committee. In a strong dissent, he urged the substitution of the USCSC by a single administrator having full responsibility for all policy, judicial, and appellate functions, with a part-time board of distinguished citizens to perform the “watchdog” functions.<sup>34</sup>

Through the Re-organization Plan No. 5 of 1949, the recommendation of the First Hoover Commission that the Chairman of the USCSC assume responsibility for the general administration of the Commission was put into effect. Supplementing this arrangement and in order to establish close relations with the USCSC, President Eisenhower, by Executive Order No. 10452 of 1 May, 1953, made the Chairman of the USCSC, in addition to his duties, Personnel Adviser to the President. The Liaison Office for Personnel Management was abolished, and the Executive Order provided that the Chairman would have such assistance as might be needed to carry out his new responsibilities, both by assignment of the White House or regular Civil Service Commission personnel.<sup>35</sup> The first person to be appointed in this “double hatted” position was Phillip Young, who was at once President’s Chief Officer for personnel management as well as responsible for the administration of the Civil Service System.

Many students of personnel administration in the United States at this time strongly urged the importance of providing for institutional and personnel assistance to the President in formulating personnel policy to enable him to carry out his executive responsibilities properly<sup>36</sup>. In his book entitled *The Unfinished Business of Civil Service Reforms*, William S. Carpenter, Chairman of the Political Science Department at the Princeton University, strongly advocated the replacement of the bi-partisan Civil Service Commission by a single Commissioner responsible to the Chief Executive, and the strengthening of citizen organizations interested in the promotion and extension of the “merit” system.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, Prof. Wallace S. Sayre, of the Columbia University, stated in an address, that the “day of the traditional Civil Service Commission was over, the need now was for a personnel administrator who, like a budget director, can work closely

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<sup>34</sup> The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>35</sup> Watson Report, n. 28, p. 42.

<sup>36</sup> See, The American Assembly, n. 1, p. 181.

<sup>37</sup> William S. Carpenter, *The Unfinished Business of Civil Service Reform*, Princeton, (N.J.), 1952, pp. 124-25.



with the elected Chief Executive in relating personnel management to executive direction".<sup>38</sup>

Although the Task Force Report of the Second Hoover Commission (1955) recommended that the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission be relieved of his White House Assignment as Presidential Adviser on personnel management<sup>39</sup>, the final report of the Commission did not make any mention of it. However, President Eisenhower's arrangement that the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission should act as the Presidential adviser on personnel matters was criticized by James R. Watson, the Executive Director of the National Civil Service League, on the grounds that such an arrangement had impaired public employee confidence and had created concern for the traditional responsibility of the Commission—that of protecting the integrity of the Civil Service system against political inroads.<sup>40</sup>

Because of such criticisms, President Eisenhower, by Executive Order No. 10729 of 16 September, 1957, relieved the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission from his responsibilities as the personnel adviser to the Chief Executive. This order further established the position of a Special Assistant to the President for personnel management in the White House Office.

#### GREATER "INDEPENDENCE" FOR USCSC

Such sharp criticisms, however, did not deter Congress to propose further step for making the USCSC more independent of the Presidential control. In 1956, the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, in a report of its investigation of the USCSC, urged Congress to enact a law to provide for six-year overlapping terms for the Commissioners in order to "achieve for the Civil Service Commissioner greater independence of action, continuity of top management and freedom

<sup>38</sup> Wallace S. Sayre, *Address Before the Civil Service Assembly*, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1952, subsequently published in Wallace Sayre, Austin J. Tobin, and James P. Mitchell, *Getting Dividends from Personnel Administration*, Chicago, 1953, p. 3. He wrote:

"The Civil Service personnel system represented at the beginning and continues at present, an administrative device partly suited to our constitutional system—somewhat acceptable in the 19th century, but increasingly out of point with the development of executive prominence and responsibility in the 20th century—a Government anomaly. Its relation to the executive is not only obscure; it is also awkward and difficult. Relation to the legislature has ceased to have satisfactory meaning either for the legislature or for the practitioners of personnel administration. In a word, *The Civil Service Personnel System is a Constitutional and Governmental Orphan.*" (Emphasis in original.)

<sup>39</sup> Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service*, Washington, D.C., 1955, pp. 146-47.

<sup>40</sup> Watson Report, n. 28, p. 42.

from outside influence or domination"<sup>41</sup>. In an internal report to the Commissioners on the proposals of the House Committee, O. Glenn Stahl, Director of the Bureau of Programs and Standards of the Civil Service Commission, maintained that: (i) "complete independence of executive and legislative influence was not possible, and (ii) that the establishment of six-year overlapping terms of Office for Commissioners might not result in any substantial increase in independence for the Commission, even though adoption of such a requirement would make it more difficult for a new President to appoint immediately Commissioners having his full confidence and sharing his philosophy of administration"<sup>42</sup>. As for the question "whether independence was desirable", the Report noted that "the case for greater independence hinged on the fact that the Chief Executive is essentially a political officer and, therefore, cannot be depended on: (i) to appoint Commissioners who would administer the Commission in a non-partisan fashion, and (ii) to refrain from dominating the Commissioners in day-to-day merit system operation". It said, further, that the increased independence of the President, who was a political officer, would tend towards *less partisan* administration of the Commission's "merit" system activities and also tend to increase the public confidence in the Commission's operations. The device used to secure increased independence—six-year overlapping terms—would give great continuity in top management of the Commission, the Report added.<sup>43</sup>

The Stahl Report also listed the arguments against the increased independence of the Commission from Executive responsibility. It maintained that personnel management was essentially an Executive function, and that a central personnel agency independent of the President would be an infringement of the executive power vested in the President by Section I, Article II of the Constitution. Further, it pointed out, that the greater independence of Commission from the President would tend to decrease the effectiveness of its leadership activities; decrease the effectiveness of its "merit" system operations; diffuse the responsibility for the management of the Executive branch; and increase the dependence of the Commission on Congress, also made up of political officers.

The Report emphasized that the President's support for the interest of citizens, and a sense of responsibility on the part of the

<sup>41</sup> House Committee on Post Office and Civil Services, n. 27, p. 52.

<sup>42</sup> From O. Glenn Stahl to the Commissioners, *A Study of the Organization of the Commission and Its Relationship to the President*, 12 April 1956 (USCSC, Washington, D.C.), (mimeo.), p. 30.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

Commissioners were essential to the effective functioning of the Commission. Without these factors, the Commission could not carry out its duties properly, regardless of the organization. They were also the only really effective protection against partisanship, and were sufficient protection without organizational changes. Although fixed terms of the Commissioners would not prevent the exercise of executive leadership and responsibility, this would tend to hamper the President's control by interfering with his present discretion to choose the Commissioners.

In conclusion, the Report stated that if it was found desirable to move in the direction of greater independence for the Commission, then it would be necessary to explore: (a) the possibility of restricting the President's authority to remove the Commissioners; and (b) the possibility of automatic financing of the Commission's operations (e.g., giving the Commission a percentage of the Federal Pay Roll for its operations—along the lines followed in the Michigan Civil Service) in order to ensure adequate financial support to the Commission.

On the other hand, for closer integration of the Commission with general management in the Executive branch, the Report recommended the establishment of a central personnel agency with a single administrator, or a Department of Administration including a Bureau of Personnel and other functions of a general management nature, with a citizens advisory board as an adjunct.<sup>44</sup>

In spite of the fact that the Commission form of organization came in for substantial criticism at the hands of administrators, politicians, and the academicians alike, the 84th Congress adopted a bill in 1956 to further safeguard the "independence" of the Commission by introducing a six-year staggered term for the Commissioners.<sup>45</sup>

#### SEPARATION OF "WATCH DOG" AND "PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS"—SENATOR CLARK'S PROPOSALS

On 16 January, 1958, when the USCSC was celebrating its Diamond Anniversary, Senator Joseph Clark, a Democrat from Pennsylvania introduced a bill (S. 3011) in the Senate, which, had it been passed, would have enacted into law the proposals made by Watson for the separation of the "personnel management" function

<sup>44</sup> From O'Glenn Stahl to the Commissioner, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>45</sup> Public Law 854, Title II, 84th Congress, 31 July, 1956.

from the "watch-dog" and "protective" phase.<sup>46</sup> It would also have limited the USCSC's jurisdiction only to the quasi-judicial functions, the personnel management functions being made over to a Director of Personnel in the office of the President. The bill also sought to introduce a Director of Personnel Management in the Executive Office of the President, who was to have the authority to deal with all matters of personnel administration and procedures.<sup>47</sup> The USCSC would have thus been reduced to the status of a body having quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions.

Senator Clark introduced his bill twice, once in 1958 and again in 1959, but both times it failed to win passage in Congress. The bills did not fail because of inadequate support in the hearings before the Senate Sub-Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. In fact, according to an analysis made by Prof. Mosher, 12 out of 23 persons who testified in the hearings, were pretty definitely in favour of it while three were equivocal. All the 12 who favoured it had held high positions in the Federal Government. Ironically enough, the President and the Executive Director of the National Civil Service League (a continuation of the National Civil Service Reforms League, which was mainly instrumental in the establishment of the Civil Service Commission), testified in favour of the Clark Bill.<sup>48</sup> The League's attitude, writes Prof. Mosher, "was an almost amazing reversal in form for the organization which for many decades had been a leader in the fight against patronage".<sup>49</sup>

Six of the eight persons who testified against the bill were representatives of labour and employee organizations. The other two opponents were Harris Ellsworth, a former Chairman of the USCSC, and Roger W. Jones, then Chairman of the USCSC. The three neutrals included two who were spokesmen for the American Legion

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<sup>46</sup> Watson Report, n. 28, p. 45.

<sup>47</sup> It will also be fruitful to recall here that in 1953, the Sub-Committee on Federal Manpower Policies of the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service in one of its studies proposed to establish an Office of Management Services, which was to be headed by a Director appointed by the President. Both the General Services Administration and the United States Civil Service Commission were to be transferred to the new office, the latter under the name of United States Civil Service and Personnel Management Administration. See, U.S. Senate, *Improving the Federal Administrative Management Program*, Senate Document No. 36, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1953, p. 1.

<sup>48</sup> See also, Senator Clark's statement on Bill No. 3011 in the Senate on 16 January, 1958, *Congressional Record*, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 104, Part I, Cols. 1-3.

<sup>49</sup> Mosher, n. 29, p. 8.

and a representative of the Bureau of Budget.<sup>50</sup>

The Commission's position on the Clark Bill, S. 1638, as introduced in 86th Congress, was stated by Chairman Jones in his testimony before a Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. He said:

"Experience has now shown that the present system has failed or that it would be materially improved by changing the organizational arrangement. The Commission has always believed that it was fully responsible to the President for the exercise of its stewardship...Its principal aim of fostering and protecting the merit system is not incompatible with the discharge of whatever degree of leadership in personnel matters the President assigns to it."<sup>51</sup>

Rocco C. Siciliano, who was once Special Assistant to the President for personnel management, supported the recommendations of the Clark Bill on the ground that it would establish clear responsibility for coordination of all federal personnel systems; make possible more effective leadership in executive personnel; directly identify career personnel system with the Chief Executive; make possible a more effective appeals system for the federal service and improved facilities for the protection of the "merit" system; and result in better personnel management by the Departments and agencies of the Government.<sup>52</sup>

On the other hand, Vaux Owen, President of National Federation of Federal Employees, opposed the Clark Bill on the plea that the "concentration of vast power in one man had an inherent potential

<sup>50</sup> On 12 June, 1958, Chairman Harris Ellsworth of USCSC, in a letter to Olin D. Johnston, Chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, pointed out that the Commission did not believe that a change in the organizational structure for the central personnel agency, particularly the creation of three different establishments—an office of Personnel Management, a Civil Service Commission, and a President's Personnel Advisory Committee—would be significant factor in modernizing that system. The Commission believed that the whole problem was to be approached from the standpoint of how best to equip the executive branch to respond to the rapidly changing needs of the Government. See Harris Ellsworth to Olin D. Johnston, 12 June, 1958, in U. S. Senate, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, *Federal Personnel Administration*, Senate Report No. 1545, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C. 1960, p. 12. U.S. Senate, Sub-Committee on Civil Service of the Committee of Post Office and Civil Service, *Hearings on Clark's Bills*, S. 3011 and S. 1638, 17-25 June, 1958 and 13, 14, 27 May and 22 June, 1959, 25th Congress, 2nd Session, and 86th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C. 1958-59. Almost the same views were repeated in the hearings of the second Clark Bill (S. 1638) when it was reintroduced in the Senate in 1959.

<sup>51</sup> USCSC, Bureau of Programs and Standards. *Providing Tools for Personnel Management Leadership: IV Year Report*, 1 July, 1958 to 30 June, 1959, Washington, D.C., p. 7 (mimeo).

<sup>52</sup> Rocco C. Siciliano, "The Federal Personnel System Under Scrutiny", in Thomas Page, n. 29, pp. 16-17.

for spoils system encroachment, and that there was no evidence that the personnel functions carried out by the Civil Service Commission could be any more effectively administered by an office of Personnel Management in the Executive Office of the President under a one-man director. . . . The Civil Service Commission should be strengthened rather than destroyed".<sup>53</sup>

The Report of the Senate Committee had two differing views to offer on the Clark Bill. The majority view, of course, supported the proposals. Dealing with the argument that "the Commission must maintain its independence in order that the merit system can be fully safeguarded", the Report contended:

"On balance, this much seems clear, at least the question as to Commission's independence cannot be answered both ways. If, on the one hand, it is contended that the Commission now organized is in fact an agent of President under his full control, it cannot be contended on the other hand, that the Commission structure must be preserved in order to maintain the independence of the Commission from the President. . . . The result is an ambiguous position, where the Commission is neither close enough to the President to be fully satisfactory for purposes of Presidential leadership nor independent enough to be fully satisfactory for purposes of policing personnel practices."<sup>54</sup>

The minority view opposed the Clark Bill saying that it was based on the assumption that the protection of the "merit" system ensuring the fair treatment of the employees was in conflict with good management. It warned against the idea that the protection of the "merit" system and the effective operation of the Government's many enterprises were contradictory goals and said that the nation could regard management interests and the public interests as irreconcilable only at its peril.<sup>55</sup>

Although Senator Clark's attempts to separate the "positive leadership role" from the "watchdog" role of the Commission did not meet with any specific success, the controversy whether the Commission should be kept "independent" of the Executive or whether the "leadership in personnel management functions" should be merged with the Executive continues to be discussed. Students of personnel administration, who had earlier held the view that it was much too difficult to devise methods by which "independence" could be integrated with

<sup>53</sup> Vaux Owen and Rocco C. Siciliano, "Questions by a Federal Employee Organization and the Replies—a Discussion by Correspondence", *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>54</sup> U.S. Senate, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, *Federal Personnel Administration*, n. 50, p. 7.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

cooperation in personnel administration,<sup>56</sup> now advocated the independence of personnel agencies on the ground that the advantages of the objectivity and impartiality of the judicial process are essential in personnel functions. They said that just as the independence of the general judiciary has proved to be of value in the course of history, so an agency possessing specialized judicial functions needed to be independent. They further argued that independence has sometimes aided top management to achieve better professional results because the personnel agency has been a tower of strength to management under the bludgeoning of pressure politics.<sup>57</sup>

Even the enthusiasm of persons like Senator Clark, who once vehemently championed the cause of integration of personnel management function with the President, had diminished. When questioned in 1962, whether he still held the opinion that such integration was desirable, he unenthusiastically replied that although his earlier proposals were still desirable yet there was no urgent necessity to put these through. He regarded the then existing arrangement of President Kennedy's relations with the Chairman John W. Macy, Jr., of the USCSC as extremely cordial and thought that it was enough to bridge the gulf between the diverse roles.<sup>58</sup>

In recent years, the latest Kennedy-Johnson arrangement of making the Chairman of the USCSC the head of a new Personnel Appointments Office in the White House, charged with the "leading part" in the search for Presidential appointees and of treating him as "Presidential Adviser" in all personnel matters, has seemingly given an affirmative answer to the question whether the Commission can simultaneously carry out its regulatory function and also provide leadership for the President's personnel programme. The same arrangement has also continued in Nixon's administration. Asked how he felt about his relationship with the President, the present Chairman of the USCSC Mr. Robert Hampton replied:

"...as an institution, the Civil Service Commission should stand on its own two feet in terms of its relationship to the President. The Chairman of the Commission is designated by the President and as such would naturally fill the Adviser role without any other

<sup>56</sup> William W. Shaw, "Independent Civil Service Commission and Executive Power", *Public Personnel Review*, Vol. 14 (July 1953), p. 115. See also, Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State*, New York, 1958. Chapter VII and VIII give a very good description of independence and integration. Also see, Fritz Morstein Marx, *The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy*, Chicago, Ill., 1957, p. 27.

<sup>57</sup> William W. Shaw, "The Career Personnel Executive in Political Environment", n. 29, pp. 31-35.

<sup>58</sup> As gathered by the author in a personal interview with Senator Clark in 1962.



special designation. This is by far, in my opinion, a better way to do it because it strengthens this organization. When the Chairman acts, there is no doubt that he is acting for the Organization as a whole, rather than as an individual on the White House Staff."<sup>59</sup>

Students of personnel administration, however, note that such an arrangement is based on the President's personal equation with the Chairman of the USCSC; agreement by a strongly partisan Congress on programme issue; well-tended and effective Congressional relations; and administrative skill, demonstrated competence, integrity, and tact on the part of the Chairman. They argue that "as a Presidential arm, the Civil Service Commission, separated from the President by its tradition, reputed 'independence', and responsibilities to Congress, remains the intrinsically unstable prisoner of these factors". The current apparent equilibrium can be assured only as long as the political climate does not change. They strongly feel that the need for some sort of institutional reform is not only required but also, in time, inevitable.<sup>60</sup>

The issue of institutional arrangements to bridge the "gap" between the President and the USCSC has another dimension. It is the role of the Bureau of Budget, which deals with personnel management more than in the policy area. In this context, Chairman Hampton has made the following remark:

"One of the considerations is to more clearly establish an institutional relationship with the Bureau of the Budget in coordinating in areas that have a financial impact. As far as relationship to the President and the White House is concerned, there are any number of matters that require the President's personal attention

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<sup>59</sup> "Conversation with the Chairman", n. 19, p. 6. In its relations with the career services, the Nixon Administration's early behaviour was more like the Kennedy Administration than the Eisenhower Administration. There were few displays of the suspicion and punitive attitudes towards the civil service that were common in 1953; in its reliance on hold over political executives and dealings with senior career men, the Administration generally seemed to hold no ill will toward those who served its predecessor. Despite personnel ceilings and budget cuts, bureaucratic morale remained high, perhaps aided by a salary raise that became effective from July 1. By summer, there was active discontent in Congress and the Republican party organization, and some adjustments were made in the White House staff intended to improve the management of patronage and bring the political viewpoint more effectively into Administrative decisions of all kinds. Determination to establish Republican Control of the Presidential and exempt positions was now apparent. It remained to be seen whether there would be a major drive to expand patronage at the expense of the civil service. See Laurin L. Henry, "Presidential Transitions: The 1968-69 Experiences in Perspective", *Public Administration Review*, Washington, D.C., Vol. 29 (September-October 1969), p. 478.

<sup>60</sup> Hall, n. 15, p. 119.



or the attention of a particular staff member of the White House, and those contacts are made by the Chairman of the Commission. However, there's a dual responsibility in some personnel areas that are not under the Civil Service Act; this should be a shared responsibility... moving along with this type of operation, the Bureau of Budget and the Civil Service Commission may draw up some documents which will more clearly define these relationships. I would hope that what we establish would certainly be a less confusing and a more durable type of institutional relationship than existed in the past."<sup>61</sup>

#### THE BRITISH PATTERN

It may not be out of place at this point to make a brief survey of the system of personnel management in Britain and in India. Until 1968, the responsibility for personnel management used to be a divided affair in Britain. While the control over the Civil Service was centralized in the Treasury and was exercised through its "Pay and Management Side", headed by a Joint Permanent Secretary, known as the Head of the Civil Service, the Civil Service Commission was an independent body, whose members were appointed by the Crown through an Order-in-Council, and which was responsible for conducting various competitive examinations for the recruitment to the Civil Service.

The Fulton Committee, which reviewed the Organization and Working of the Civil Service in England during 1966-68 thought that "recruitment should be in the hands of those who also share a direct responsibility for the individual's subsequent training, deployment and development".<sup>62</sup> According to the Committee, the Service suffered from the separateness and consequent remoteness of the Civil Service Commission, which under the then existing arrangements could not know enough of the needs of the individual departments and was too little connected with the training and early management of those whom it appointed. The Fulton Committee, therefore, recommended that the Civil Service Commission should cease to be a separate and independent organization and should become part of the new Civil Service Department, which should also have responsibilities for unified central management of the Service. In suggesting the new arrangement, the Fulton Committee was of the belief that the "tradition of making appointments solely on merit was now well enough established to survive without keeping the Civil Service Commission as a separate organization".<sup>63</sup>

<sup>61</sup> "Conversation with the Chairman", n. 19, pp. 6-7.

<sup>62</sup> U.K., *Report of the Fulton Committee on the Civil Service*, Cmnd. 3638, London, 1968, p. 24.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Following the Fulton Committee's recommendations, the Civil Service Department came into existence on 1 November, 1968. It took over the functions of the Treasury in respect to the pay and management of the Civil Service and the coordination of Government policy in relation to pay and pensions throughout the public sector. The Civil Service Commission became a part of the new Department, but specific and formal arrangements were made to ensure the continued independence of the Commission in the selection of individuals for appointments to the Civil Service. The Prime Minister, as Minister for the Civil Service, is responsible for the work of the new Department, but the day-to-day responsibility for activities have been delegated to a senior non-departmental Minister who is also a member of the Cabinet—the Lord Privy Seal.

#### THE INDIAN PATTERN

Before 1970, the responsibility for personnel management function in the Government of India was shared by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Cabinet Secretary. The UPSC is a constitutionally independent body to advise on recruitment, promotion, transfer, and disciplinary actions of the civil servant and to conduct competitive examinations for recommending candidates for appointment in the government service. The central control over the public services was exercised by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. The responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs pertained to general conditions of service rather than those which had a financial bearing; while for laying down conditions of service, involving financial implications, the ultimate responsibility rested with the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Home Affairs was also the controlling authority for the All-India and some of the Central Services. In addition, it provided the necessary expertise in service matters and was consulted with a view to ensuring that similar guiding principles were followed for various other services in respect of general matters and service conditions. The Establishment Officer of the Government of India, though placed in the Home Ministry, was directly under the Cabinet Secretary. The Ministry of Home Affairs, thus, shared responsibility in matters of appointments to key positions in the Government with the Cabinet Secretary. There was, therefore, a multiplicity of agencies performing the personnel management functions.

The Estimates Committee of the Third Lok Sabha in its 93rd Report (1966) contended that "the ever expanding role of the Government, in a welfare state with its natural concomitant of a large

Civil Service, calls for effective control through a single agency” and recommended that a single agency should be entrusted with control over the services and made responsible for regulating the terms and conditions in respect of the Service as a whole.<sup>64</sup> The position was reviewed again in 1968 by the Study Team of the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) on Personnel Administration. The Study Team also endorsed the views of the Estimates Committee and pointed out that “the fashioning of an effective central personnel agency and the allocation to it of all functions of an overall character in the field of personnel administration is one of the most important reforms required in the machinery of the Government of India”.<sup>65</sup>

Based on the Study Team Report, the ARC recommended the setting up of a Department of Personnel under the charge of a full Secretary, who would work under the general guidance of the Cabinet Secretary. The new Department would have the functions and responsibilities in respect of personnel policies; talent hunting, development of personnel for “senior management” and processing of appointments to senior posts; manpower planning, training and career development; research in personnel administration, discipline, welfare of staff and machinery for redress of their grievances; liaison with the UPSC, State Governments, professional institutions, etc., and the staffing of the middle-level positions in the Central Secretariat with the assistance of and on the advice of the Establishment Board. The ARC also contemplated that the Cabinet Secretary should by convention be regarded as Secretary-General of the new Department of Personnel, without being formally so designated and he was to be actively involved in the development of and selection for “senior management”. The new Department of Personnel was to be placed directly under the Prime Minister.<sup>66</sup> The ARC’s recommendations were accepted by the Government. Under the new Allocation of Business Rules announced in a Presidential Order on 27 June, 1970, a Department of Personnel was constituted within the Cabinet Secretariat. According to a further notification issued on 1 August, 1970, the Department of Personnel was entrusted with almost all the functions outlined for it by the ARC Report.

A careful analysis of the existing arrangements of the responsibility for personnel management in Britain and India indicates that the new

<sup>64</sup> India, Estimates Committee, 3rd Lok Sabha, 93rd Report on Ministry of Home Affairs: *Public Services*, New Delhi, 1966, p. 174.

<sup>65</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, New Delhi, 1968, p. 70.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

patterns of personnel administration are likely to be more successful in achieving the goal of sound personnel system. In Britain, although the Civil Service Commission's independent identity has now been merged with the Civil Service Department, the tradition and conventions associated with the impartial selection of candidates and the principle of "merit" system are so firmly entrenched that the new system is not likely to endanger the Civil Service with the evils of patronage. Moreover, the First Civil Service Commissioner is not subject to ministerial or parliamentary questioning in the discharge of his functions of selections and appointment on "merit", and therefore, he will continue to function as independently as before. On the other hand, personnel management functions are now likely to be taken more seriously and from a more positive viewpoint. To the extent all matters relating to personnel administration are now centred in one Department directly under the Chief Executive (the real one in a Parliamentary set up), the required coordination and the dynamic leadership, which was hitherto absent in the earlier arrangements within the Treasury, would also be forthcoming. The abolition of the "independent" status of the Civil Service Commission and its merger with the Civil Service Department reflects the maturity of the personnel management practices and is the product of a rich and strong tradition of upholding "merit" principle—which, to certain extent, is still lacking in the U.S. Government.

The concept of positive personnel practices in Indian governmental system has emerged only recently. The creation of a central personnel agency—the new Department of Personnel within the Cabinet Secretariat—under the overall charge of the Prime Minister is certainly a step in the right direction. Although it is too early to make a proper assessment of the impact of these changes on the methods of personnel administration in India, it is, however, doubtful whether the multiplicity of agencies where the personnel management function was hitherto performed has in practice reduced to an extent that was considered necessary before the introduction of the reforms. The consultation with the Ministry of Finance by the Department of Personnel would still be needed for all personnel policies having financial implications. Yet it must be maintained that the new Department of Personnel, separated from the Ministry of Home Affairs, should certainly be able to give more attention to the personnel management function as a whole and is likely to concentrate its attention to more positive practices for the development of human resources. However, because of the peculiar social, psychological, political, and economic conditions in India, a time has not yet reached when the UPSC could also be merged as an integral part of the Department of Personnel, as has been done in Britain. Such

a step would certainly let loose the 'gene' of patronage and nepotism. It is probably because of this consideration that the ARC has not deemed it necessary to suggest any changes in the constitutional status of the UPSC, and hence thought it proper that "its quasi-judicial functioning" and its role as the upholder of the "merit system" should be allowed to remain as before. The new Department of Personnel, has, however, an added responsibility, *i.e.*, to maintain close liaison with the UPSC and to work in close collaboration with it on matters of personnel policy and planning. It, thus, appears that, given a fair trial, the new arrangements for personnel management in India should result in securing the two-fold objectives of "executive leadership, direction and responsibility" and the "protection of the merit system". However, such an impact is not likely to be felt for some time to come.

#### UNRESOLVED DILEMMA IN U.S. GOVERNMENT

What kind of institutional reform can be adopted at this juncture in the U.S. system of personnel administration? There seems to be no clear thinking on this point. There is certainly the argument that "... we cannot abandon the independent regulatory function that has been carried out by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. Worth of the function and the continuing need for it have been amply demonstrated."<sup>67</sup> At the same time, the need at present is to equip the President fully to enable him discharge his responsibilities in personnel management. This requires an executive personnel agency to: (a) develop and formulate general personnel policies, and (b) stimulate, assist, and review personnel management with departments and agencies. The problem is at once difficult and complex, and no easy solution is possible. The "Single Personnel Administrator Plan" is being suggested again and again without any results. In view of the successful experiment of "incongruous institutional arrangements" made by the last three Presidents, it seems doubtful if any stable institutional reform would be made in the immediate future unless some crisis develops which may force the legislature and the executive to take a harsh, critical look at the present arrangements and make radical changes in the Civil Service system.

The best thing for the moment seems to be a recognition of certain unwritten conventions on the part of all those authorities responsible for personnel management. The increasingly positive role of the USCS must be duly recognized and encouraged by all. The Commission should be given full support by Congress in respect of

<sup>67</sup> Kilpatrick, n. 5, p. 268.

needed legislation and adequate funds. It should be given full support by the President also in the shape of prompt Executive Orders and executive action when needed. Additionally, it would be of help if the operating personnel directors and administrators of agencies shed their negative attitude towards the USCSC and developed a more positive outlook to personnel matters. It is possible to evolve and maintain healthy conventions only if the positions of leadership in all these agencies are held by dynamic, far-sighted, imaginative, and able professional people. It would be necessary to make certain that, whatever be the political complexion of the Presidency, the Chairman and other Commissioners should continue to be appointed only from among the career civil servants with experience in personnel management. It would further be necessary that the Chairman of the USCSC should always act as adviser to the President and be the chief spokesman of the President in all personnel matters. Congress should also exercise a "self-imposed restriction" by limiting its interference in personnel matters only to the promulgation of broad statements of policy and to the overseeing of performance. In matters of details, the Congress should accept Presidential leadership. It is only in this manner that Congress can discharge its "obligations completely, adequately, and appropriately".<sup>68</sup> If such conventions are honestly followed, and if the Chairman of the USCSC is conscious of his professional obligations, there is no reason why a balance in the two apparently different purposes of personnel administration—protection and management—cannot be achieved. Only thus, would it be possible for the USCSC to perform effectively its role of positive leadership in federal personnel system of the United States.

The need for institutional reform will, however, remain and may not be adequately met by these short-term measures. The President would have to keep a watchful eye on the progress of the USCSC. It would be his responsibility to ensure that it is not unduly hampered in its leadership activities from other quarters. If inevitable, the President should not hesitate to assert himself to bring the leadership function in personnel management directly under him. In this context, one may venture to suggest that the requirements of Presidential leadership and direction of personnel management can be met by establishing, under one of his Secretaries, a Bureau of Civil Service with full responsibility for all aspects of personnel management, including policy formulation and execution, and direct executive control over the operating agencies in personnel matters. The conflicts between the operating agencies and the Civil Service Bureau, if any, could be solved by mutual consultation and cooperation between the agency

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<sup>68</sup> The American Assembly, n. 1, p. 182.

heads and the Bureau Chief. If the Bureau is established, the USCSC may well function as a continuing autonomous body with appropriate divisions of centralized "recruitments", "discipline" and "appeals"—fields in which it will be necessary to retain its jurisdiction. In addition, it will also be the responsibility of the USCSC to furnish an annual report to Congress and the President, bringing to their notice, and to the notice of the public, the state of affairs in respect of the personnel management system and pointing out the areas in which grave lapses in the "merit" system or lack of proper standards of efficiency and conduct have taken place or in which, it thinks, the executive agencies have succumbed to political pressure. Ultimate responsibility for all actions in personnel management should, however, rest with the President. In this way, the USCSC would concern itself more with the "protective" functions of personnel administration, and would feel itself more responsible to the Congress, while the responsibility for positive personnel leadership would be fully in the hands of the President. The success of this system would depend again on the close cooperation between the two agencies and a recognition and appreciation on their part of each other's role in the personnel management system.

To conclude, it may be said that the academic thinking with regard to the reforms of the personnel management organization in the U.S. Government points out a clear trend towards the obliteration of the various psychological factors which have so far separated the USCSC as the central personnel agency from the line-management agencies. A more enduring institutional reform in this direction would, it can be hoped, emerge in due course, as personnel practices in the United States become more mature and the political climate assumes a higher moral and ethical level.

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## HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDIA — SOME PROBLEMS

*Mohinder Singh*

NO thinking person can be reconciled to the existing health of college and university education in India, particularly in the field of general education. Higher education all over the globe is under intense pressure from changing values and demands, and is being exposed to the same critical treatment as is the fate of various established social institutions. The Indian scene, however, exhibits certain special characteristics which may not be exclusive to it but nowhere else are they so sharp and gargantuan in proportions.

Shortcomings of Indian higher education are many. Practically everyone, who writes or speaks on the subject, spells them out in his own way. Even a recount would be out of place. In fact, the whole thing has become a bit of a bore. It adds up to a pretty discouraging picture for undertaking another swipe at the system. The writer is no educationist and boasts of no association with higher education except his own years as a student, back in the forties. He could write in a manner, cavalier and sweeping, being unburdened with scholarship or proximity.

The Indian educational system displays numerous interesting features. A few significant ones are picked up for a discussion in the following order:

- (1) Its latent tenacity to thwart radical change;
- (2) Its object of catering to general craze of students for degrees;  
and
- (3) Absence of genuine involvement with the ills of society.

The system has defects, proven and glaring. Legions of educationists, politicians and reformers have rented against these and yet it rumbles along in the conventional form, like an elephant unruffled and undeflected in its course by urchins throwing pebbles at it. One sometimes wonders why the system refuses to entertain or resists meaningful changes, and how it has managed to thwart repeated attempts at radical transformation. And the fun of the situation



is that it does not bother to defend itself or give cogent replies to the criticism persistently levelled against it. It declines to put forward any logical rationale for its existence, smug in its assurance that many of those who bark at it have either no bite or don't really believe in what they say. The system has the native intelligence to gauge the strength of its friends and foes, and is confident that its backers, though they choose to remain in the background, have the vigour and influence to maintain it unscathed. It is, therefore, indifferent to its detractors, but, for tactical reasons, it keeps such a low outward posture that its critics soon get tired of hitting in the thin air and engage themselves elsewhere.

An educational system is a direct reflection of the society it serves, being a product of the same. Indian society is one of the most caste and class ridden, exploitative and inhuman towards its weakest, with effective power centralized in the hands of the higher social and economic groups. There is, of course, the adult suffrage of a democratic constitution and the poor far more numerous, yet the main edifice of power and authority, as presently constituted, functions primarily for the benefit of the privileged. Entrenched forces of tradition, religion and vested interests muster ample strength to hold on to that position. Naturally, such a description of the actual state of affairs will be hotly contested. In modern times, this is too bitter a pill to be administered openly. It has to be sugar coated by slogans in favour of the poor, loud expressions of sympathy for their misery, some legislation whose effectiveness may be nobody's concern, some half-hearted measures of help implemented more half-heartedly, and other day-to-day promises and compromises. One may not be able to argue out a conspiracy or charge everyone of the enlightened ones with hypocrisy. Indeed, to most of the high ups, the scheme of things looks so normal and natural that no disturbing thought clouds their conscience. However, the basic pattern of power and privilege is apparent to any one who cares to reflect and probe into it. Once this phenomenon is well understood, much else explains itself.

The existing system of higher education caters admirably to the needs of such a social set-up. It results in denying worthwhile entry to masses, but concentrates on securing ample facilities for the higher social and economic groups, that also largely at state expense. And this education is so academic, exclusive and generally clothed in a foreign language that none who are outside it have a chance of competing with the 'insiders' in their own ground. When the educational period comes to a close, its participants get a degree and this is the master-key to all nice and 'respectable' careers, conferring status,

authority and a final reprieve from derogatory manual work. It also bestows a social distinction on the degree-holder and an elevation over the rest, means to be unbridgeable and lasting a life time. The only notable exception may be a few of the semi-educated local party bosses, legislators and ministers who have of late pushed themselves up, and even they are made aware of the handicap. World over, there are educational elites but perhaps nowhere else is the gulf between the educated and those below so harsh and obvious as in India. Any meaningful change in the educational order would have the effect of upsetting these cosy arrangements, and so, as long as the classes who are apt to gain from it wield the levers of power, why should they countenance an upheaval.

Of course, the system has to make certain concessions to the democratic times and to accommodate the idealism and conscience of some of its members. Primary schools are opened everywhere and registered enrolment figures boosted but the funds allotted, especially for the rural areas, are so meagre and attention devoted so perfunctory that it may be inappropriate to give many such places the name of schools. There are the poorly educated and more poorly paid teachers, no school equipment or teaching aids to speak of, no books or stationery, and no other facilities of meals organized recreation or even decent school buildings to be proud of. At a level where it could be nearest to the masses and have some relevancy for them, the standards are distressing. Only 30 per cent of the Indian educational expenditure goes for schooling up to VIII class when in most other countries it is in the region of 60 to 70 per cent. Again, at this stage, presence of masses is rather illusory. On a rough estimate, not more than 30 to 35 per cent of the Indian children presently undergo satisfactory 5-year schooling. There is many a slip between enrolment and education. Beyond VIII class, masses are rarely in the picture. Stipends are offered to some children of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes. And yet so pervasive are the values of the system that on getting higher education, these children often grow into worse snobs, and pride themselves on the distance they have created between themselves and their less fortunate brethren. The forces of modernization, industrialization and urbanization do disturb the system to a degree. Skilled manual labourers or truck drivers or motor mechanics may manage to make more money than the white-collared clerks. However, so many compensations in the shape of status, prestige, security, connections and comfort are offered to the latter that they remain adherents of the set-up.

A popular excuse tendered for the failings of the system is that

it is an alien one, foisted on us by the British and designed by them to supply personnel for the 'Raj'. Perhaps the British well comprehended the Indian social setting and cooperated with it, instead of working at cross purposes. They cannot be complimented for the results, but then, foreign rulers are not there for the entertainment of the natives. It would be too much to ask that they should have laboured to plant a vigorous egalitarian educational system on a basically undemocratic society and braved all the attendant risks in the process. But what stops the nation from getting rid of the system now? There have been more than two decades to think and decide. The pointer is obvious. Those who possess the power to do it, don't feel sufficiently inclined to do it.

Mahatma Gandhi, with his original mind and a deep concern for the down-trodden, advocated one of his own, a marked departure from the conventional. He was willing 'to risk a temporary chaos in higher education to the criminal waste that is daily accumulating'. Somehow he could not succeed. His ideas would have had the consequence of devaluing the status aspect of higher education and diminishing the chasm between the educated elite and the rest. The entrenched interests proved too powerful even for him and gave away nothing but hypocritical lip sympathy. Education Commissions and a multitude of other organizations or persons have put forth all types of suggestions. Those suiting the system or fairly innocuous ones have been incorporated. Others gather the dust of oblivion. A few dedicated individuals went to the length of actually experimenting with their beliefs. The society never gave its positive acceptance to the products of that education and the trial institutions remained second rate or were wound up. In the wake of Independence, with the surge of idealism and hope, educational reforms inclusive of mass education enjoyed a transient glow but soon fatigue set in. And now, no one who matters, worries his head with so mundane a subject. It is for cranks and faddists to get exercised about it. Politics and economics have shoved everything else to the back stage.

If the Indian society is a sick society, is it possible for it to acquire a healthy education system? In all likelihood, the answer would be in the negative. Such a society will not ordinarily give itself a system which would ultimately hurt its own vested interests. So, it is a kind of a vicious circle. Should the society be reformed first or the educational system, which is an extension and an image of that society? Social reform is a frightfully complicated and back-breaking job. Even if an efficient modern government is so motivated, it needs many allies and has to mount assaults on many fronts. Educational reform is

relatively easier to manage. A strong determined government can implement it over a period of time. It can make structural changes and frame new ground rules. And if it has the nerve and stamina to fight off the established elements, it could get away with it. A breakthrough in this field would have a breath-taking impact on the society itself. In fact, action in the educational field is the only known and sure method available to modern governments for implementing social reforms. Politics of education is the most powerful weapon in the attack on inequalities in the society today. Other measures have merely a peripheral effect. Economic improvements in the condition of the poor and weak can again best and permanently be effected through the educational process and not so much by fixing minimum wages or pin pricks to the productive and the vigorous.

The other distinguishing feature is the general craze for degrees as the commonly accepted means of gaining status and 'respectable' careers. Even this could be understandable, but, alongwith, not many of the students are prepared to put in the steady hard work and display mental alertness that goes with a degree. As examination time draws near, the tenor of idleness and frivolity receives a jolt. There are bouts of cramming; a rush for ready-made knowledge in pill form, the briefest the better; an astrological mystique in 'guess' questions; brazen-faced cheating in written papers and that also to be bragged about; and employment of the keenest ingenuity to influence the outcome. When unexpected or other than routine questions show up, angry protests erupt, as if the paper setter has been guilty of cheating or at least of violating a time-honoured code. He is charged with hitting below the belt or indulging in a dirty prank. It is lucky for him that he is usually unknown and far away. Most examining authorities dare not but play the game. And in spite of all this and the usual low standards insisted upon for a pass, nearly half may fail to scrape through.

In defence of students, it could be advanced that most of what is taught to them is irrelevant to the 'business of living'. They memorise a host of names, dates and theories dealing more with cultures, civilizations and conditions far removed from their own, and that also generally in a foreign language. To most of them, it is quite an exertion and precious little fun. And then there are the standardized teaching methods often unaided by educational tours, equipment or explanations. Many times the teachers themselves have only a superficial knowledge of the subject. For the average scholar, intelligibility and relevancy of such studies is minimal. The poorer the institution and poorer the student's family background, the more night-marish the learning. Of course, academic excellence has its own virtues, but one

has to consider as to what place it should occupy in the educational training of a normal graduate, hailing from a country where 82 per cent live in rural areas and subsistence remains the primary concern of the majority. How higher education can be related to life and made more pertinent for the taught, is a question which has been discussed *ad nauseam*. There is no space here to go over it again. Anyhow, everyone concerned agrees with the necessity for a change and yet no worthwhile change has taken place. The answer may perhaps be found in the high value and esteem in which the Indian society continues to hold the recipients of such 'liberal' education. Fundamentally, there is nothing wrong with good liberal education except that it is expensive, time-consuming and rather a luxury for poor countries. It is tailored more to the needs of stable societies, times of ease, and highly productive economic set-ups. It gave India some of its best brains but also resulted in incalculable waste of time and energy for many. With the social tensions, gruelling poverty and formative stage of development, there is the greater urgency for graduates with correct attitudes to work and social regeneration than a handful of academically clever ones. One may not go the whole hog as the Chinese but to retain the conventional system in all its trappings could be well nigh ruinous.

It is the easiest thing to continue with it. There are plenty of foreign books and authors to choose from. A few text books can be prescribed, read through in class hours and tested at the end by written papers. It makes the least demands on teachers, and the education-authorities. It involves no thinking, no hard work and no real organizational ability on their part. If students are indifferent or do badly, the falling standards are lamented. It is even doubtful whether the present educational personnel is capable of running another system where lifelike teaching programmes have to be designed in the Indian framework, and then carried through in a lot of ways other than the routine lecture-room method. Naturally, it shies away from making an attempt but if it ever does so, it will entail heavy toil and tears. There are no indications that such an eventuality is anywhere in the offing and the cross of defective education will have to be borne for years.

Tremendous pressures are building up for expanding higher education to cope with the student 'explosion'. Already 70 per cent of the educational expenditure gets snapped up by education beyond VIII class and this trend to spend more and more on colleges as against schools, is gaining momentum. The whole structure has become top heavy, with no solid base of mass education. The main beneficiaries of this increased governmental spending are the higher social and

economic groups and these groups are capable of mounting vehement pressure. For their progeny, a college education is as much as a birth right, irrespective of merit or aptitude. A few years back, many would have been satisfied with a high school pass, for this was adequate for a host of white-collar jobs. Now a high school pass is categorized as semi-educated and has usually to do manual work. So, one has to jostle forward for a degree, to acquire the requisite distinction and elevation above the ranks of manual workers. Accordingly, all these young people have to be provided with free or highly subsidized college education, and as near to their home as possible, to cut down the living expenses. Whether the public exchequer can afford such runaway expansion and whether it will mean diversion from the essential task of mass education, is another matter. Why bother about the educational backwardness of the masses? Those who suffer from such deprivations often do not realize the fact and so don't complain. Economic disparities are more obvious to them. Thus, pressure for good schooling from the illiterate majority is muted while that for higher education from educated classes is the fiercest. And as things are, the latter will manage to secure the same. If there are not enough colleges in major cities, seats will have to be found in adjoining areas. New institutions may have to be opened. Even private ones may fill in the breach and, in turn, secure the bulk of their expenses through government grants. With industrialization, urbanization and increased economic activity, these classes are swelling in ranks and their expectations rising. Whatever may be the prescribed standards of admission or rules of selection, young persons from these families will join colleges and there is no escape from this reality. Even the toughest government may find it difficult to enforce the weeding out process and to limit the numbers.

And when these youths come out of the colleges with their degrees, they claim jobs and that also of a particular kind and variety. When some fail to obtain these, the spectre of educated unemployment is raised. A harassed government makes suitable noises promising remedies but may end up only by creating a few more public posts, whether wanted or not. The same sections first demanded free or subsidised higher education and then, on the strength of that education jobs of authority and comfort. They couldn't have it better. One can well understand unemployment due to economic stagnation or too many hands coming too quickly in the labour market, but educated unemployment is intrinsically a class phenomenon. The educated are not inclined to seek openings or are ill equipped by the educational process to do so, except in the limited avenues of government service or the equivalent ones in the organized private sector. Anything lower



is too low for them. Anything different is distasteful. Just because a person read a bit of Shakespeare, collected odd bits of information about Alexander, Ashoka or Napoleon, and memorised a few definitions of economics or political science, it does not make him a superman as compared to the rest who were not fortunate enough to undergo that learning. When some of these educated have to turn to jobs generally reserved for the semi-educated, they are made a subject of pity. Their failure is made painfully obvious to them. In India, it is not the manual work which is so trying or unrewarding, it is the shame of lowering oneself to it which is so mortifying. Sleepless nights are spent planning how to avoid that ignominy. Almost any escape is preferred to this degradation and family dishonour. The society has its 'ins' and 'outs'. The 'ins' may be the white collar salaried people, land owning classes, political and religious '*netas*', businessmen and parts of organized labour. The 'outs' could be the lowly classes doing manual work, petty farmers, and the great mass of unorganized labour in villages and towns. The 'ins' are nowhere affluent in the Western sense of the term, but in the Indian context, they constitute a privileged minority. And it is for the 'ins' that higher education and most other public utilities have a meaning. For the 'outs', much of it has no relevance.

Is it possible to apply some brakes to the expansion of higher education or otherwise regulate it in a manner which is more rational and egalitarian? Rising demand for higher education is a world wide phenomenon, and the trend cannot be reversed anywhere in the foreseeable future. The endeavour has perforce to be restricted to bringing some order and sanity into the picture. In India, where higher education is sought more for status and jobs than increase in skills or learning for its own sake, and where the participants are primarily the higher social and economic groups, a major step to ease the rush and start for balanced development, is to make the beneficiaries pay for their education. A percentage of seats (say 5 per cent ) could be set apart for 'outstanding' students and another percentage (say 20) for the 'meritorious poor'. This could be worked out, looking to the national requirements in a particular field of education at a given point of time and the financial state of those offering that discipline. The definition of 'poor' has to be kept rigorously low and accurate, so as not to be swamped. The remaining 75 per cent should be required to pay fully for their higher education. If arts college education costs the authorities Rs. 360 a year, then this is the amount a student has to pay for it. Contribution from fees which is fast drying up, would get a boost. It can also mean more and better education. Of course, the sections who now enjoy the windfall of

subsidized college education won't take kindly to the innovation. They will fight bitterly. But if no one of the privileged is to be hurt one can say goodbye to radical reforms.

On the face of it, a steep rise in fees may sound a retrograde step. Alround, there is a marked movement towards reduction, but that makes sense where the system caters to a broad strata of society. In the Indian setting, it is merely a gift to a minority who can pay for it if there is anyone who can pay. Currently, everyone from higher social and economic groups goes in for the subsidized higher education irrespective of his performance or aptitude. Numerous such students fail classes or show indifferent results, besides hooliganism and other allied activities to fill in the spare hours and let off energies unutilized in studies and self-improvement. And yet they blissfully continue to enjoy the use of public spending on their 'enlightenment', when there isn't enough for the essential task of mass education. One such college student can be instrumental in denying good primary schooling to ten children. In a country where crying needs go abegging it can't be the state's duty to provide a fashionable veneer of costly education to some whose inclusion springs mainly from the accident of their birth.

This single step, where higher education has to be strictly paid for except by the outstanding and the meritorious poor, can bring sanity into the Indian educational scene. Average white-collar families who are now sending all their children to colleges as a matter of routine, will have to undergo heart searching as to which of their brood should go there, for it may be too burdensome to send the whole lot. There may develop a trend to sponsor the more promising and these would know that an indifferent performance could mean a recall. It will introduce the much-needed element of seriousness in a student's life. There will be to him the constant reminder that his family is sacrificing a good deal for his education, probably the higher education of another son or daughter. It can tone up the entire atmosphere of Indian colleges and shake off some of the frivolity and flippancy. In a poor country, the basic right could be to good schooling but not to a college education. Even far-richer nations cannot afford it. The argument that high fees will hit the middle classes, already harried by inflation, and that it will be so calamitous if any of their children have to forgo their accustomed education, stems from the deep rooted class concern. It is a product of the social values where difficulties of the higher ones get magnified and are of far greater import than those of down below. The two belong to two different worlds.



The craze for degrees will continue as long as a degree is the single known means of getting a 'respectable' job. This situation has bedevilled the whole educational effort. Perhaps the only effective way out of the malaise is to devalue the degree drastically for the purpose of jobs, with the lead being given by the government in relation to its jobs. It should not matter in the least whether an applicant possesses a degree or not. Neither should it be retained as a condition for entry nor any importance or weightage accorded to it otherwise. Maybe some day, with the advance of the economy, the relentless pressure for salaried office jobs will abate, but as long as it is there, selections could be made through special tests tailored to the needs and requirements of the job in question. This would mean a break from the present system inherited from the British that anyone with a general degree is good enough to man a non-technical job. Of course, the concept has a manifest validity and applicability but it assumes certain pre-conditions if it is to function properly. The degree is presumed to be a good degree, having given the holder through the educational process powers of application, hard work, rational thinking, and a set of values and modes of conduct. Again, the jobs to be tackled have to be relatively similar and calling forth for the same qualities of general understanding, leadership and behaviour. In the present Indian context, when large numbers will be getting degrees by one way or the other, a degree may not guarantee what it was supposed to do. Again, most modern jobs are getting too complicated for this type of gentleman supervisors. Even what should be the desired values or conduct is no longer non-controversial.

The usual application for a white-collar post spotlights the following:

- (1) I hold a degree;
- (2) I belong to a respectable family;
- (3) I have played games in school and college; and
- (4) If selected, I shall leave 'no stone unturned' to give satisfaction to my superiors.

In many cases, the degree would mean nothing more than some half-digested information on dates and names and that also mostly related to countries and cultures far away. As to belonging to a respectable family, one does not know what would be a 'disrespectable' family in socialist India. Does it become respectable if a member of the family is a post master or railway station master, and disrespectful if the head is an engine driver or a carpenter! Formerly,

details used to be paraded of other family members who had or were adorning public services. This practice is getting into disfavour, perhaps out of the fear that one's selection may be ascribed to family pulls. As to why people keep on claiming sportsmanship even when applying for desk jobs, is rather comic. Possibly, it is expected that he who played games will prove a more vigorous leader. Incidentally, a majority are nowhere near real sportsmen anyway. The claim is one of those polite lies which are meant to go through unchallenged. And then the element of giving satisfaction to one's superiors; satisfaction to the general public is the least part of the exercise.

All this could be blamed as a legacy of the past but there is no earthly reason why it should be allowed to continue more or less unchanged. Jobs could be given on the basis of job requirements, with no concern whether there is a degree or not. Why even IAS and Central Services should carry a condition of degree for entrance, although here perhaps a non-degree holder has scant chance with the academic learning insisted upon. If Sales Tax Inspectors are to be recruited, the test could be the facility of expression in the language of work, and a keen appreciation of the social, economic and political life of the country and the area of posting. What is called for is not any pre-entry expertise on Sales Tax, but a better awareness of the surroundings amidst which that particular activity has to be carried on. This may give an added emphasis to the study of social sciences, with a down-to-earth knowledge of Indian conditions, but that would be no loss. Work experience in any capacity should be a plus instead of the customary minus. Other skills, like typing, could be counted on the credit side. Psychological tests for aptitude and attitudes could be conducted. Thus, a person who left after high school and took up position as a shop assistant because he could afford studies no more, may have as good a chance as one who went through a few years of college, just because his parents could manage it. Of course, if the latter's college education has blessed him with a deeper knowledge and mental alertness, he could be preferred, but not because he can merely wave a degree when the other can't. The present weighty advantage bestowed on a degree holder is in essence a large bonus to higher social and economic groups who find it far easier to secure such degrees. This objection may not be exactly put forward but may lurk therein that higher social classes with degrees display qualities of leadership which is helpful to government or similar programmes. Lower classes with no degrees may lack that personality. The utility of such *pseudo* leadership is open to doubt. On the contrary, it may have done harm to the ideals of public service. There could also be the argument that a degree is some sure indication of merit. If it is completely discarded and

the other entry tests remain vague and inadequate or inefficient, nepotism and corruption would gather momentum. There is evidently an element of risk, but if universities can conduct acceptable tests, why can't other employment agencies, especially when they know what they want and may already be using a kind of selection machinery. Devaluation of the degree for the purpose of jobs may ultimately render yeomen service to higher education itself by imparting a deeper content and substance. The whole educational approach may take a sounder line. In any case, it may loosen the stranglehold of higher classes on 'respectable' jobs.

And, then, there is the social aspect of the degree. For example, to girls it could be a major plus in the marriage market and so be acquired merely with the same in view. Societies, all over, shower regard on their educated. The Indian one goes a step forward by depressing the low uneducated one still further by contrast till they appear to be of two different breeds. It is not so much a question of the degree-holder comprehending more of life than the illiterate or the semi-educated, but knowing something so academic, so special and so out of this world that it puzzles and bowls over the uneducated as if the other party had been learning magical formulas. The educational disparity heightens the abysmal class and caste disparities. Such social distinctions having been accorded by the society can only be tempered by it and this is usually a long drawn out and complicated process. Forces of modernization have started doing their bit. Financial rewards of skilled manual work will grow and its social inferiority decline. Divorce of jobs from degrees could give it a push. Spread of mass education and devaluing of higher education can narrow the gap further. Another step which could strike at the degree as well as improve the health of college education, is the abolition of the examinations of today.

Reform of the examination system has exercised educationists for years. Proposals, such as decentralization, periodic class tests, grading and so on, have been put forward from time to time but the system has remained basically unchanged. In fact, its abuses and rigidities are aggravated with the steep rise in numbers.

Why hold examinations at all before conferring degrees? Why not award these to everyone who undergoes college education for a prescribed period? Why employ a complicated procedure of precise marking when such results can contain an ample element of chance, luck, cheating, cramming and other factors independent of positive learning? If examinations are abolished, with one stroke all hack

writers of 'notes' and 'five minutes before the examination' go out of business; students stop cramming standard questions and answers; and hordes of 'guide' books which often misguide will vanish. Even the text books if any are retained, will be viewed in their true perspective and not given disproportionate importance. The syllabi could muster flexibility. The designated period of a course could be kept more elastic and even insistence on attendance and fixed hours relaxed. All this almost works out to a plea for demolishing the elaborate structure of prescribed text books, fixed syllabi, examinations with exact marks and divisions, and the over-emphasis on degrees. It could be a move in the direction of, 'free universities'. Youths join these places for learning's sake and a better appreciation of life. They are provided with libraries, thought-provoking assistance and an atmosphere. The rest is left to the students who would imbibe from inclination and debate, and not through pressure or spoon-feeding. People may leave and rejoin when they wish or stay part-time. They may learn by correspondence and a host of other ways. It could become an integrated part of life like adult education and not an activity in isolation. And at some stage, these institutions may even stop bothering to award degrees.

Any such proposals would immediately raise an outcry "what will happen to the standards", as if much is happening these days. "The students will do no work". "How will one distinguish between the good scholar and the bad?" "What will be the incentive to read books?" "What little people study for exams will also be lost." One is not sure whether it will be such a dreadful tragedy if in the initial stages the so-called standards fall a little lower. Will there be such an irreparable loss if a graduate passes out with a somewhat diminished stock of undigested academic information? When the difference between the bulk of those who pass and those who fail is rather marginal, does it very much matter if all are lumped into one category and passed? In any case, if a college student is bent upon wasting his time, what can really be done about it? One way is to fail him repeatedly till he learns the tricks to pass or throw him out. The other is to give him his 'coveted' degree which is to carry no job benefit. If he is aware of the position beforehand, he would probably leave himself when no longer interested. Why should he waste his time and effort to get something which is to become so devalued?

The main pillar of the examination system is the presumption that its results will determine what job one can get. Disassociate jobs with results and the whole system loses its *raison d'être*. Without some such disassociation, the ills of the existing examinations would linger on in one shape or the other, howsoever brilliant be the solutions offered. The

malaise is that a degree still means a terrible lot and so the desperate struggles to acquire one by hook or crook. With this pressure off, perhaps a sound attraction for learning may emerge. It may develop more enquiring and thoughtful minds, instead of the ones relying on memory and rote.

For admission into technical and professional courses, where certain standards are essential for the eventual practitioner to ensure safety and efficiency, the candidates can take special entry tests. Why bother all who merely want a general degree? Similarly, for post-graduate and research work, entry tests could be held. The problem of some students going abroad for studies and getting their 'new' degrees recognized for equivalence, is a minor one. Important universities in advanced countries operate with a fair amount of flexibility and should be able to sort it out.

A question may be posed as to why India alone should go in for such a drastic devaluation of degree and loosening of the conventional system of higher education, when countries elsewhere are managing to keep the situation within acceptable limits? Debate on these matters is growing everywhere but the position in India could be termed as alarming. It is one of the most caste and class ridden societies, stratified and rigid, and higher education presently works as a major instrument of heightening these disparities and distinctions. The masses are not even at the literacy and elementary stage, and their numbers run into hundreds of millions. Howsoever fast higher education may expand, it will for decades remain a preserve of the privileged and will intensify and support the privilege. It is a vain hope that the current values and approach to higher education would undergo any dramatic change in the near future. And, so, there is no way out of the impasse but to devalue its prestige and profit, to usher in a more egalitarian social structure. Those who now gain by it will not give up without a contest, although there is a reasonable chance that ultimately the 'devalued' graduates may turn out to be better workers and finer human beings than the 'valued' ones produced these days.

Incidentally, the devaluation of the degree and to some extent of the higher education itself need be no permanent feature for times to come. Once the society gets out of the strait-jacket of caste and class mentality, concedes human dignity to all and sundry, affords more equal opportunities to the lower strata for higher education after having attained mass education, the recovery could start. But

for the present, its devaluation may prove the surest method of improving both the health of the society and the higher education.

Another salient feature of the present day college and university scene in India is the striking absence among students of a genuine involvement with the ills of the society amidst which they live. There is a school of thought which considers that the student years should be devoted entirely to academic pursuits. All activities which detract from these studies should be avoided and discouraged. It is difficult to dogmatise what is the ideal but it is a fact of current history that students everywhere and more so of advanced nations, are taking keen and active part in the social and political drama of their countries and the world. An explanation could be that modern life is lived at such an intense pitch that students can't help getting dragged into it. Again, it could be argued that if young men and women do not feel and get involved with the ills of their society at the stage of higher education, perhaps they shall never do so afterwards. If their sense of fairplay and hatred of injustice does not get provoked at this period of their lives, it is unlikely to be awakened later on when they are burdened with the responsibilities of bread winning and family cares.

College and university students all over the western world are becoming a lively, restive and original thinking community. They have developed certain special values, such as contempt of hypocrisy, a sympathy for the underdog and resistance to cruelty or misuse of power and authority. And such feelings often transcend national barriers. The student community has debated these matters with a fair amount of intellectual honesty and gone into action to pursue their line of thought, many times in a manner unorthodox and against established standards. Frequently, such action has led to violence and even a blow to reason and liberalism. In other cases, political groups may have manoeuvred to take advantage of this enthusiasm. Still of the majority of students, the genuineness of their beliefs and the depth of their emotions expressed against social, economic and political oppression cannot be doubted. They are said to be 'battling the whole modern life'. It could be Vietnam, racialism, colour bar, development aid, abortion, even tyranny of dress and hair cuts. And they have become a power to be reckoned with. They have forced changes in government policies and modified the time-honoured values of their elders. For good or bad, they are leaders in their own way.

How does the Indian counterpart compare with this picture. He has his quota of agitational approach. He has dabbled in politics and, in fact, has been found a handy tool by political factions and



personalities. However, in such matters he has basically been led instead of leading. Where he has agitated on his own and quite rowdily for that, he has done so more from personal gain or pique than for a cause. He has battled against bus conductors, cinema managements, train ticket collectors, invigilators, hostel wardens, police personnel, local goondas, neighbouring shopkeepers, or the college authorities. Whenever an agency dares to insist on any irksome obligations on his part, a section of the student community flares up. The main body rarely debates or questions the merits of the dispute and acts as no restraint to the initiators of the strife. And unfortunately, if the trouble spreads, everyone pitches in. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Indian student is too busy with his academic work or has no inclination for a diversion. The tragedy is that he fights primarily for personal ends. He should get a nice job on completion of his studies; he should be given concessions in travelling on public transport or at places of public entertainment; his fees should never be raised; his examinations should be easy enough; he should not be worsted in a private fight; and the outside world should treat him as a darling of the community.

In pursuance of these aims, he could become violent, he could become unreasonable and he could be irritatingly indisciplined. Of course, it does not follow that he has no grievances and no scores to settle. His studies are usually dull and irrelevant. His teachers are often not men of wide learning. College facilities of all sorts are generally poor and over-crowded. His own means may be meagre and recreations limited. Prospects of satisfying activity after education may be dim. He is misunderstood and maligned, bored, bitter and frustrated.

But what is his record and contribution to problems and sufferings other than his own, particularly in relation to those sections of society who are far worse off than him. Has he done any worthwhile work in the field of social welfare, constructive or even in the shape of a protest? Has he felt upset with the social and political evils coming to his notice? Let alone taking action, has he given such wrongs a serious and sustained attention as a member of an organized group? Has there been a searching debate among the student community on aspects like untouchability, mass illiteracy or exploitation of the landless labour? Here are young men and women financially better off than the bulk of their countrymen. They are imparted a liberal education and are expected to develop some independent thinking. They have the company of books, professors and, as a group, a reservoir of talent second to none. They have the



leisure to ponder and discuss. They have a ready place to meet and exchange views. They are not hamstrung with the deadening chores of daily routine and family worries. There could be no misgivings about their future. At any rate, that can wait till the educational stage is over. And yet what is the net result? A majority of them show neither any abiding interest in academic studies nor a sense of kinship and sympathy with the world of the poor and the ignorant around. Nobody wants to take away the fun from college life, but it has to have some content and meaning, some excellence and depth.

At times one wonders why all this is so. Why is the student so different from his counterpart in advanced countries? Where is the responsiveness and social conscience which has become the hallmark of student community? He has been influenced from outside in matters of dress, fashion, music, dance and so on. Why not in things of deeper import? Is it because what is taught to him is mostly irrelevant to the business of living? Is it that his studies are so boring and uninspiring that they generate no spirit of enquiry and questioning?

Is it that the caste and class concepts are so all-pervasive that even the modern youth undergoing the highest education in the land, is mentally trapped in it and cannot visualize the viciousness of the system, a system where millions are hardly accepted as human beings? Is it that he has adopted the values of his elders without a murmur or dissent? Naxalites have been attacking educational institutions. Perhaps to them, colleges are a vanguard of the Establishment, snobbish and class-ridden as the rest.

Is it that the majority of students undergoing higher education are financially so weak and resourceless that their basic struggle remains for their own existence? Of course, some of them could be hard up yet they are a favoured minority on the national scene. Their circumstances are not so harsh that it could exclude concern for others who live in grinding poverty.

Or is it that the student community feels the injustice of the social and economic set-up but finds itself helpless to alter anything significantly? Is it that they are so cowed by authority that they won't utter a protest? Who can be sure, for they do protest on some issues!

This phenomenon, where the highly educated youth of India fails to display genuine social conscience, is saddening. If he doesn't, who else would? The rest of the intelligentsia may be too engrossed

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in their jobs and homes, unwilling to risk anything and for whom the reigning system has social and economic benefits. It cannot all be at the mercy of government initiative. In fact, few governments fight for social change in a determined manner. They only move when they are pressed to do so. Energetic and positive action in this field comes against resistance and vested interests, and which organization would go out of its way to add to its headaches. And when governments do work for reform, they necessarily work through their agents, *i.e.*, the government servants, and who are these but the educated elite. One expected that the youth, with its education and sense of social justice, with its dash and emotional fervour, with its idealism and noble urges, would play a worthy role. It has not materialized. And if the educated youth do not take up this challenging task, it will be left to the uncertain and slow forces of modernization or to the masses themselves. The last alternative can be a very painful experience. It is too much to hope that time would come to a halt, waiting till the next generation of educated youth appears on the stage, and throws its weight into the cause.

The author had recently an opportunity to talk to an Indian girl in the final year of her graduation at the Punjab University. Asked how was life particularly as a boarder, her comment was that the food was lousy. If 200 educated girls living together, cannot manage to run a satisfactory mess, what else are they capable of? What stops them from taking over the entire thing, keeping turns in cooking or supervising cooking, buying food-stuff from the market and otherwise ensuring tastiness and cleanliness of their meals! These girls are going to run kitchens of their own for the rest of their lives. Her reply was that one had no time for it and co-operative effort had been found unworkable. The financial misunderstandings and disputes had been too disruptive for joint action, even for a well-off and educated group like this. How on earth are the illiterate peasants expected to run co-operative farms! What's the particular purpose of teaching these young ladies poems of Milton, politics of Laski and economics of Marshall, if they can't develop an organizational skill to run a common kitchen for their own benefit! What's the special merit in higher education if it leaves them unfit for such simple operations? In fact, an enlightened and advanced group like this one should not only look after itself but after many others less fortunately placed. Within a stone's throw of their hostel may be mothers who know no hygiene, who can't wash a baby properly, who have no notion of family planning and whose children are palpably under-nourished. And if the college girls have no time or means to render any concrete help, they can have at least a realization

of the acute want and ignorance around. Why don't they develop a social conscience? And if they don't, it is not the Americans or the Russians who will do it for them. When state legislators play ducks and drakes with democratic processes, why can't the students of political science of a local college not raise the query, "What the hell are you doing?" Or at least send a letter to that effect, after due deliberation and debate.

A question could well be asked. Is there a way of inculcating social conscience in our collegiates? Probably there is none. Social conscience is either there or not there. And it is just bad luck if it is not there. There are no proven modes of cultivating it. It comes to some individuals in its own way while to others it never occurs. And perhaps it will be a dull world if it occurred to everybody. A community, like students in colleges and universities, will have all types of individuals and their inclinations. However, it almost borders on a national tragedy if, as a group, this elite body is wrapped up in its own affairs and remains impervious to social and political evils in the country. The blame could be laid at the doors of the educational system but the students cannot be fully absolved of their responsibility. They are the country's best investment and its future. They can't just plead helplessness or be cynical about it.

If, somehow, the craze for degrees could be abated and the teaching made more earthy, it may develop progressive social values among its participants. And no society is more in need of a wind of change than the Indian one. Its whole approach to 'status', 'respectability' and jobs is outdated. Some of its principal attitudes are obstructions to progress and economic development. It has to unwind itself out of the rigid stratification to face modern times. And it is no insignificant society tucked in a corner. It is the poorest one-sixth of the human race.

Throughout this writing, extreme concern has been shown with the social health of the society, economic factors being given a secondary place. Economic issues will ultimately be licked. *Homo sapiens* have gathered enough experience and expertise to deal with the same. Science and technology can create the resources. But the social strains will still dog even the most advanced. These are no simple questions of production and distribution. They are a product of prejudices and irrationalities. Deprivations caused by lack of educational opportunities and social backwardness will be more difficult to eradicate than that caused by financial impoverishment. In the next half century, social and educational problems are going to dominate the world scene. India will face some of the toughest.

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## COMMENTS

*[In this feature, we give comments received from the readers on the articles published normally in the previous two issues of the Journal. The comments should be critical and thought-provoking and confine to the major points made by the author(s), inadequacies in reasoning of data or any new solution to the problem which suggests itself to the reader. These should not normally exceed 1,500 words.—Ed.]*

### **AN ECONOMETRIC STUDY OF MUNICIPAL FINANCES IN THE CALCUTTA METROPOLITAN DISTRICT\***

Shri Chatterji deserves to be congratulated for conducting a highly valuable econometric study, particularly because he has highlighted the significance of urban planning which unfortunately has not, so far, been accorded the priority it ought to have been. He sounds very realistic indeed when he warns that unless immediate attention is given to the problems in Indian cities, we will have to face an urban crisis in the not too distant a future.

"The situation in Calcutta in particular," runs Shri Chatterji's thesis, "is at the breaking point and at any time it might lead to a catastrophe not only for the problem state of West Bengal but also to India as a whole." This laudable observation reminds me of an article which appeared in *Imprint* of November 1968. This was entitled "Can India Survive Calcutta?" and had been authored by Mr. Joseph Lelyveld, who, in 1968, was the New York Times Correspondent in New Delhi. "Calcutta is not one disaster but many, each breeding its own kind of despair, its own special nightmare. The city planner scans the decaying water, sanitation and transport systems and holds out the prospect of total failure, a breakdown so complete that people would flee as if running from war or plague. The sociologist talks of the frayed fabric of society coming apart altogether, the economist of a depression so deep that there could never be any recovery. The political analyst resorts to words like 'anarchy' and 'nihilism' and asks whether Indian democracy can survive the erosion of faith that is taking place here."

Mr. Lelyveld makes number of other valuable points in the article and

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\*The original article of this title by Shri M. Chatterjee was Published in the Journal in Vol. XVI, No. 1. (Jan.-March), 1970.

further observes:

"Rubbing treacle in Calcutta's wounds, a brochure says, 'The city represents man's unfailing hope for a better life'. Whatever that is supposed to mean, it's obvious that 'unfailing hope' is no answer to a disaster."

The answer, in a way, has been provided by Shri Chatterji. "Obviously," as he puts it, "financial resources are the deciding factor". "The situation in Calcutta has deteriorated to such an extent that international, national, state and local financing to improve its condition will be necessary." And it is for utilising such assistance (if at all available) that Shri Chatterji has made this detailed study.

The study is indeed excellent as far as it goes, but for improving the lot of Calcutta, I am afraid, it may not go too far. Again, to quote Mr. Joseph Lelyveld, "More staggering in its way than the squalor of Calcutta is its dislocation. The city is a great machine whose gears always grind, never mesh. Obviously, there is no shortage of the manpower required to build new schools, lay new streets, dig the ditches for the missing water mains and sewers, or simply clear away the great mounds of garbage that accumulate in the streets. What is missing is the ability to relate the effort to the need. The missing ability to relate seems even more basic to the city's predicament than any missing funds."

And one of the reasons which account for this "missing ability", to my mind, is that the Government of West Bengal has so many problematic districts on their hands that they can hardly do any justice to administering of the rapidly changing and unimaginably expanding city of Calcutta. And if they venture to attempt a concentration on the city of Calcutta, it shall be at the cost and to the detriment of the districts of West Bengal. This in itself is an urban political challenge.

In Calcutta, the 'sprawling leviathan of a city', as a rule, everything seems to be 'increasing to an alarming extent' day by day. Exceptions to this rule are, paradoxically though, peace and tranquility, security and order, and cleanliness and sanitation. The population of Calcutta is increasing. Congestion is increasing. Accumulation of debris is increasing. Diseases are increasing. Number of automobiles is increasing. Traffic jams are increasing. Traffic hazards are increasing. Fire hazards are increasing. Health hazards are increasing. And on top of it all, laxity in the administration of the Calcutta City Corporation is increasing. All these increases constitute an urban sociological challenge of a very great magnitude.

To meet all these urban socio-political challenges posed by an otherwise progressive and prosperous city of Calcutta, should the nation not think in terms of expanding the Calcutta City Corporation in such a way as would be tantamount to constituting the city of Calcutta into a City State with all the powers and functions which, legitimately belong to a

State under the Constitution of India? It is very likely that the Government of the City State of Calcutta would be able to look after the cosmopolitan city of Calcutta and its innumerable and apparently insurmountable problems.

—G. C. SINGHVI



## INSTITUTE NEWS

The theme of the annual *special number* of the IIPA, to be published on the eve of Institute's General Body Meeting in October, is "Trends and Developments in Public Administration in India". The subject for *IIPA Members' Annual Conference* is "Administrative Organization for Socialist Programmes in a Parliamentary Democracy." The Conference, as usual, will be held along with the General Body Meeting.

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Entries for the IIPA's *Annual Essay Prize Competition* for 1971 can be, according to the choice of competitors, on any specific aspect of public administration.

The essay, in English, should show evidence of original thinking and scholarship (even with a historical perspective) as well as critical analysis. The essay should be of about 10,000 words. It should be submitted in triplicate under *nom de plume*, and reach the Director in a sealed cover latest by August 31.

Successful entries would carry a first prize of Rs. 1,000 and two second prizes of Rs. 500 each.

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The composition of IIPA's Standing Committee for 1970-71, which was reconstituted in October last year, is as follows: Shri Asoka Mehta (*Chairman*), Shri M. K. Chaturvedi, Prof. Shanti Kothari, Prof. M. V. Mathur, Shri D. L. Mazumdar, Shri H. M. Patel, Shri C. A. Ramakrishnan, Shri V. Subramanian, Shri M. V. Prasada Rau, Dr. Ram K. Vepa, and Prof. G.

Mukharji (*Member-Secretary*). This supercedes the news item in 'Institute News' in the 2nd column on page 599 of the previous issue.

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On January 5, Members of the Executive Council and Staff of IIPA bade farewell to *Dr. J. N. Khosla*, who laid down the office of Director on December 31, 1970. He headed the Institute for about 7 years since January 25, 1964. On the same day, *Prof. N. Srinivasan* retired after about 12 years of service as Professor of Political Science. Prof. Srinivasan was also the Vice Principal of the Indian School of Public Administration.

*Prof. G. Mukharji*, has taken over the Directorship of IIPA, in addition to his responsibilities as Director of IIPA's Centre for Training and Research in Municipal Administration, with effect from January 1.

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The Institute conducted, at New Delhi, the following nine courses during the quarter (Jan-March 1971) for senior/middle level officers of government (Central, State and Union territory), municipal corporations, public sector enterprises, etc.:

- (i) Course on Techniques of Managerial and Financial Control, January 3-9;
- (ii) First Course for Training Coordinators, January 11-15;
- (iii) Tenth Course in Municipal Administration, January 11-February 20 (three participants of this course came



from Thailand and one each from Philippines, Fiji and Mauritius);

- (iv) Fourth Orientation Course on Project Formulation, January 18-23;
- (v) Second Special Course on Performance Budgeting for Public Sector Undertakings, February 8-13;
- (vi) Fourth Orientation Course on Materials Planning, February 15-20;
- (vii) First Course in O & M Techniques in the Government, February 22-27;
- (viii) Third Course on Administrative Leadership and Behaviour, March 15-25; and
- (ix) Second Course in Social Policy and Administration (State & Social Change), March 17-27.

The Institute and the Union Department of Personnel, jointly organized a course on Efficient Reading and Effective Listening for a group of trainers from a few selected Central and State training institutions. The Course, which commenced on March 14 and continued till April 24, was conducted by Dr. Paul C. Berg of the University of South Carolina.

Apart from the above mentioned courses, the Institute organized, at New Delhi, a Seminar and a Discussion-meeting (the latter in collaboration with the Delhi Chapter of the Indian Institution of Industrial Engineering):

- (1) *Seminar on Teaching of Public Administration in India*, March 29-30.

Over 35 participants, including scholars representing 11 Indian Universities and training institutions,

and senior government officials, attended the seminar.

The seminar appointed a Committee to develop contents of the course syllabus in public administration as a subject for teaching.

The working paper was presented by Dr. S. R. Maheshwari of IIPA.

- (2) *Discussion Meeting on Role of Industrial Engineering in Developing Economy*, March 2.

The discussion leader was Dr. E. Frank Cotton (Jr.), President of the American Institute of Industrial Engineering of the Mississippi State University.

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Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, Editor of IIPA, also took over as Editor of IIPA Newsletter from January 1971, succeeding Dr. J. N. Khosla who retired in December last year.

Dr. O. Glenn Stahl, Ford Foundation Consultant from New York, joined IIPA on February 12 on a 30-day special assignment to render professional assistance in drawing up its research and training programme in the field of personnel administration.

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The following distinguished persons visited the Institute during the quarter and delivered lectures.

- (i) Shri Vishnu Sahay, former Governor of Assam and Nagaland (February 20). He spoke on "Trends in Public Administration in India".
- (ii) Dr. Jur. Thomas Oppermann, Professor of Public Law and Foreign Policy, Tubingen

University (West Germany) (February 26). He spoke on "Development Administration".

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A new book on *Panchayati Raj Administration* by Dr. Iqbal Narain and his associates was brought out by IIPA during the quarter. This 222-paged study of comparative administration in India on an inter-state basis is priced at Rs. 25.

\* \* \*

*Punjab, Haryana & Chandigarh*

Regional Branches of the Institute, with the Public Administration Department of the University of Panjab, organized a seminar on March 13-14 on "The Challenges of 1970's for Public Administration". This subject was also discussed at the last Annual General Conference of IIPA Members.

The Seminar was inaugurated by Mr. Justice D. K. Mahajan, Judge of Punjab & Haryana High Court and Chairman of Regional Branch.

The *Rajasthan* Regional Branch arranged the following lectures during March:

Date	Subject	Speaker
March 6	"Interdependencies between National Educational Systems and Economic Development"	Dr. Jur. Thomas Oppermann, Professor of Public Law and Foreign Policy, University of Tübingen, West Germany.
March 28	"Challenges of Seventies"	Dr. P. B. Gajendragadkar, Vice-Chancellor, Bombay University.

A party of members of Madras Regional Branch visited the Ashok Leyland Factory—a private sector enterprise—on February 6, 1971, and had informal question-and-answer discussions with the General

Manager.

On February 20, the Branch arranged the screening of a film titled "Animal Farm" at the premises of the British Council office.



## RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Following dissolution of Lok Sabha in December, the country went to mid-term polls during February and March 1971. The people voted back to power the ruling Congress (R) party with an overwhelming majority of two-thirds in Lok Sabha.

Mid-term polls for the State Legislative Assemblies of Orissa, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal were also held simultaneously.

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Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting have decided to open offices of Press Information Bureau at Vijaywada and Indore during the year.

With the opening of these offices, Press Information Bureau will have 25 regional and branch offices, including offices opened at Imphal, Agartala and Panaji last year under the Fourth Plan schemes.

Assamese has now become the official language for all purposes at the level of Assam's State Secretariat.

A 9-man Administrative Reforms Committee (Chairman: *Shri Harnath Mishra*) has been appointed by the Government of *Bihar* to inquire into the organization and procedure of work of Government departments and units and suggest such changes as may contribute to the efficiency, economy and better service in the disposal of work.

The Government of *Bihar* have constituted a permanent committee

to check unusual delay in the disposal of work in the secretariat and attached offices of the State Government. The Committee would examine the reasons for delay, including the procedure of working, and recommend suitable action for improvement.

In order to enable the members of the State Legislature to advise Government on matters of general public interest and to assist in the formulation of Government policies and their implementation, the Government of *Haryana* have decided to set up State Advisory Committee for all departments of the Government. These Committees will advise the Minister-in-Charge on general policy matters and in the implementation of specific programmes. Meetings of the Committees, to be held at least once in a month, will also afford a forum for ventilating public grievances relating to the department concerned. Each Committee would consist of not more than seven Legislators, Members of Parliament and non-officials and will have a 2-year term.

Government of *Haryana* have constituted an Assessment Unit in its Administrative Reforms Department to make surprise inspections of Government offices in order to check delays in the disposal of work and also to ensure punctual and regular attendance by Government employees.

To eradicate corruption and malpractices (including delay) form

Government departments, the Government of *Jammu & Kashmir* have decided to appoint a Vigilance Officer in each of the State Departments. These appointments would be made in consultation with the Anti-Corruption Organization. The Vigilance officers in the Administrative Departments will also function as a liaison between the Vigilance Officers in the offices of the Heads of the Departments and General Department (Vigilance) and anti-Corruption Organization.

The Government of *Mysore* have reorganized the Bureau of Economics and Statistics to enable it to function more purposefully and to discharge satisfactorily and effectively its several specialized and technical responsibilities. The Head Office will now be divided into two wings, namely, Economics Wing and Statistics Wing, each headed by a Joint Director.

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The reconstituted Prohibition Committee, with the Union Minister for Law and Social Welfare as Chairman, has sought complete ban on drinking among government officials. The Committee, which met in Delhi in December, felt that the Government of India should be requested to revise the Indian Service and the Central Civil Service Conduct Rules accordingly.

The Union Government have constituted a joint cadre of the Indian Administrative Service for all the Union Territories and the North-East Frontier Agency. The new cadre came into operation with effect from December 21, 1970.

A Presidential Ordinance was promulgated on February 13 to facilitate the introduction of the family pension scheme for industrial workers in the country. This has been necessitated because the Bill to

this effect, introduced in the Lok Sabha in December 1970, could not be taken up for consideration before the dissolution of the House.

The Government of India have decided to appoint *Shri N. M. Miabhoy*, retired Chief Justice of the Gujarat High Court, as a one-man Tribunal to enquire into disputes between the Railway Board and the All India Railwaymen's Federation. The Tribunal has been appointed on the demand of the Federation.

With the enforcement, on February 10, of Advisory Boards under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition), Act, 1970 along with the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules, 1971, the jurisdictions in this respect of the Central and State Governments have now been demarcated.

The Act aims at the abolition of contract labour in respect of such work as may be notified by the appropriate Government in the light of the criteria laid down. It regulates the service conditions of contract labour where its abolition is not possible. It also provides for registration of establishments, licensing of contractors and setting up of Advisory Boards.

Union Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development have raised (from January 16) financial allocation—from Rs. 2.5 to 4 crores—for House Building Advance for Central Government employees for the current financial year.

The maximum limit of the House Building Advance—now also available partly for the purchase of a plot of land and partly for the construction of a house—has also been raised to 60 times the monthly pay of a Central Government employee or Rs. 50,000 whichever is less.

The Central Government employees will get about 50 to 75 per cent more as daily allowance while on tour w.e.f. January 1. The details of the new formula for determining the allowance have been finalized and orders issued by the Finance Ministry.

The Union Ministry of Health and Family Planning have granted a special pay of Rs. 150 per month and some other fringe benefits to attract Doctors to work in remote areas.

To examine the grievances of the engineers of the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking, the Union Ministry of Irrigation & Power have appointed a three-man Committee with *Shri T. Sivasankar*, ICS (Retd.), a former Secretary of the Ministry, as Chairman.

The Government of Haryana have announced relief and rehabilitation measures for the families of those Government servants who die in service. Immediately after death, an *ex-gratia* grant equal to ten times the monthly salary, subject to a minimum of Rs. 5,000 and maximum of Rs. 15,000, will be given to the family of the deceased.

All children of the deceased will be given free education upto the degree level. Free medical aid will be given to the family on the same basis as to the pensioners except that minor children of the deceased will also receive this benefit during their minority. The family will be allowed to keep the Government house for one year at the same rent at which it was held at the time of employee's death.

The Government will also consider absorption in Government service of one or more members of the family and relevant rules will be relaxed

if considered necessary and feasible.

As recommended by the State Committee on Backward Classes (Chairman: *Mr. Justice J. N. Wazir*), Government of *Jammu & Kashmir* would now reserve 42 per cent of the posts in the State Services and in institutions of higher and professional education for Backward Classes and 8 per cent for Scheduled Castes. The Committee was appointed by the State Government to draw up a list of Backward Classes in the State.

For providing job opportunities to unemployed Engineers, the Government of *Jammu & Kashmir* have decided to create an Engineering Pool with 229 vacancies for the engineering graduates and 473 for diploma holders in the State with effect from January 1, 1971, initially for two years. Under the scheme, degree and diploma holders in civil, mechanical & electrical engineering will receive consolidated emoluments of Rs. 250 and Rs. 150 per month respectively. All appointments against the Pool vacancies would be made for a period of one year in the first instance with maximum extension of another year. All engaged in Pool vacancies will be bound to serve in any job secured or otherwise offered to them within or outside the State in the public or private sectors.

With a view to ensuring the greatest measure of cooperation between Government and the General body of its employees in matters of common concern and toning up the efficiency of public services, the Government of *Madhya Pradesh* have decided to set up Joint Advisory Councils consisting of officials' and employees' representatives at the State, divisional and district levels. At the State level, Chief Secretary

will be the Chairman of the Joint Advisory Council consisting of 25 members—10 officers and 15 staff. Government representatives on the Council will include Chief Secretary and other Secretaries nominated for the purpose, while employees' representatives will be nominated by the Association of Class II, Class III and Class IV services at the State level in the prescribed manner. Officers of Class I services and employees of the Police Department and industrial establishments have been excluded from the purview of the Joint Advisory Councils.

The Councils will advise Government on matters pertaining to the conditions of service, work and welfare of employees, improvement in the standards of work and efficiency. Matters of common interest to employees of any department will also be dealt with by the State Council; but, individual and personal cases will not be considered by it. In matters pertaining to recruitment-promotions, and discipline, the Council will confine its deliberations to evolving general principles.

The Council may appoint Committees to study and report on any matter falling within its scope.

The scope, functions and work procedure for the Divisional and District Councils to be manned by representatives of Government and its employees will be decided in consultation with the State Council.

The Government of *Madhya Pradesh* appointed on February 15, a single-member Pay Commission consisting of *Mr. Justice Suraj Bhan*, a retired Judge of the *Madhya Pradesh* High Court. The Commission would inquire into and recommend on pay structure, allowances, amenities and facilities of State Government employees.

The Commission, in making its recommendation, will take into account the financial resources of the State, the requirements of developmental planning, and other relevant factors including the structure of emoluments of the employees in other States.

The committee appointed by the Government of *Maharashtra*, to revise the minimum rates of wages of about 5 lakh employees of shops and commercial establishments, excluding banks, has submitted its unanimous report to the government on January 25, 1971.

The Government of *Mysore* will, subject to certain conditions, now allow encashment of earned leave (once in a block period of 2 years beginning from January 1, 1971) refused in public interest to an employee of the State Government.

Government of *Punjab* have increased pension rates with retrospective effect from September 1969. The increase would be as follows: up to Rs. 30—Rs. 15; from Rs. 31 to Rs. 75—Rs. 17.50; from Rs. 76 to Rs. 200—Rs. 20; and for those getting Rs. 201 and above the pension ceiling has been fixed at Rs. 220.

The Government of *Uttar Pradesh* have regulated the payment of salaries to teachers, and other employees of private schools, receiving aid from State Fund through an Ordinance promulgated on January 16, 1971. In case of default, provision has been made to punish the Manager of the institution.

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To further intensify the welfare efforts for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes during the Fourth Plan period, the Planning Commission have made a provision of

Rs. 135 crores in the Fourth Plan, besides committing about Rs. 35 crores to the non-plan Budget. In addition, State Governments are spending about Rs. 30 crores per annum on the welfare of backward classes from their non-plan budgets, which is proposed to be maintained during the Fourth Five-Year Plan.

The Union Government of India have also asked the State Governments to take effective steps to prevent harassment of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. They have been directed to set up Committees consisting of the Deputy Commissioners, Superintendents of Police and elected representatives of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at district level to attend to the grievances of these backward communities. It has also been suggested that they should set up mobile Police Squads in rural areas to prevent atrocities perpetrated on Harijans, and wherever such atrocities are committed, Special Magistrates should be appointed to try the accused.

The Governments of Haryana, Punjab and Goa have decided to set up Financial Corporations to assist members of scheduled castes to set up their own industries.

The Government of *Maharashtra* launched in Bombay a Rs. 30 crore-Western Express Highway Slum Clearance, Redevelopment and Rehabilitation Project, near Bandra East. Inaugurated by the Prime Minister, *Smt. Indira Gandhi*, the project provides for the construction of 23,000 tenements for slum-dwellers, economically poorer sections and low income group persons of that area, within six years.

The Government of *Maharashtra* have constituted a 9-member high-level committee under the chair-

manship of the Minister of State for Rural Development to take periodical review of the progress of the 40 tribal development blocks and four multi-purpose projects in the State.

The Government of *Mysore* have set up the Mysore Urban Development Corporation. This autonomous body will function primarily as a financial body to encourage and assist local bodies to undertake planned development of urban areas. It will extend loan assistance to civic bodies to implement water supply, drainage, slum clearance and such other schemes for improving urban conditions.

A Water Supply Advisory Board has been appointed by the Government of *Rajasthan*. Headed by the State's Minister for Public Health, the Board would advise the government on its various water supply schemes.

The Government of *Rajasthan* have appointed a Committee, with Famine Commissioner as its Chairman, to study and report on the adequacy or otherwise of the norms adopted for adjudging an area as scarcity-affected. The Committee, in its report, would take into account the situation obtaining in other States in this regard.

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Under a scheme of the Government of India for which a provision of Rs. 67.5 crores has been made in the Fourth Plan, Small Farmers' Development Agencies would be set up in 46 selected districts of the country. Each agency will get Rs. 1.5 crores, and generate three to four times more money from the institutional sources (cooperative and commercial banks). They would identify small but potentially viable



farmers, analyse their problems and help in the provision of institutional credit and inputs. Out of the 46 projects covering all the states, 42 have been approved and work has already commenced in 13. About 23 lakh families of small farmers will benefit from this project.

Under another scheme, with a Fourth Plan provision of Rs. 47.5 crores, 40 projects for sub-marginal farmers and agricultural labourers are to be launched. The emphasis will be on improving their income through provision of credit for undertaking dairying, animal husbandry, poultry and vegetable growing. About 10 lakh families of marginal farmers and agricultural labourers will benefit from the 40 projects out of which 22 have already been approved. Most of the States have been covered and the selection of areas in the other States will be finalised very shortly.

A unique feature of these two schemes is that cooperative credit institutions will be given outright grants proportionate to the amounts extended by them to small farmers, marginal farmers and agricultural labourers.

In a bid to raise the standards of living of the rural population in the chronically drought affected areas of the country, 53 such districts have been selected for rural works programmes whose immediate objective is to generate large-scale employment through labour intensive schemes.

These schemes—medium and minor irrigation, soil conservation, afforestation and rural communication—will be integrated with the on-going Plan schemes in the districts and will thus create long-term infra-structure assets in the areas.

For every Rs. 1 crore of expenditure on this programme, about

25,000 persons will get employment. The total provision is Rs. 100 crores. The entire expenditure is hundred per cent grant to the States except with regard to soil conservation measures in the fields of private cultivators where 25 per cent is subsidy and 75 per cent is loan, repayable in easy instalments.

Under the crash programme for rural employment concentrating on rural infra-structure schemes like roads, drainage and embankment that can be completed within two working seasons, 4.2 lakh persons are expected to benefit, approximately 1,000 people getting employment in each district. The programme will cost approximately Rs. 50 crores per annum, the whole amount being treated as Central subsidy.

With the double objective of accelerating the mechanization of Indian agriculture and providing employment to engineering graduates and diploma-holders, a scheme for establishing 5,000 Agro-service Centres has been finalized. When fully implemented, the scheme will provide employment opportunities for about 50,000 engineers and diploma-holders, in addition to an equal number of non-technical persons. Small and medium farmers cultivating about 140 million acres would also be enabled by this scheme to modernize their farming operations and stepping up their production.

A 13-member Advisory Committee on Irrigation, Flood Control and Power Projects was set up on February 11 by the Government of India under the Chairmanship of the Secretary, Ministry of Irrigation and Power.

The Committee will examine irrigation, power, flood control and other river valley projects proposed

by the State and Central Governments and other authorities and advise the Commission and the Ministry of Irrigation and Power on the merits of individual projects. While work on some schemes may commence in the Fourth Plan period, their implementation may spread over the subsequent Plans.

The Committee consists of representatives of the Ministry of Irrigation and Power, Planning Commission, Central Water and Power Commission, Ministry of Finance, Department of Agriculture in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in Community Development and Cooperation, and Department of Industrial Development in the Ministry of Industrial Development, Internal Trade and Company Affairs. It will also have as its members an expert each on irrigation and on power from outside the Government. It will be in office up to the end of March 1974.

The Government of India have set up a six-member Flood Control Board with *Dr. K. L. Rao*, Union Minister for Irrigation and Power as Chairman, to suggest an integrated plan to tackle the problem of floods and erosion in North Bengal. Set up on January 17, in consultation with the Government of West Bengal, the Board will coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive flood control programme for the region.

The Government of West Bengal will set up a whole-time organization called the North Bengal Flood Control Commission for preparing a comprehensive plan of the flood control of the region and for execution of works. The Chairman of the Commission will be an *ex-officio* member of the North Bengal Flood Control Board. A Board of Technical Consultants will also be set

up by the Government of Bengal to review the work of the Commission and to advise on the problems that may arise during planning, designing and execution of the flood control schemes.

Steps to reduce the cost of power generation and its distribution, speeding up the rural electrification programme and preparation of a long-term coordinated planning of hydro, thermal and nuclear projects to meet the growing power demands, have been recommended by the Power Economy Committee. The Union Ministry of Irrigation and Power had set up this 11-member Committee of Experts in May 1969, with *Shri K. L. Vij* as Chairman, which submitted its report on March 31, 1971.

The Report recommends preparation of a perspective 20-year power plan for the entire country on a regional basis purely on economic consideration, irrespective of location of the resources.

The Rural Electrification Corporation have sanctioned Rs. 313.90 lakhs to the West Bengal State Electricity Board for executing five schemes which will electrify 1,172 villages, energise 5,109 irrigation pumpsets and provide 11,443 rural industrial connections. These schemes cover selected areas in the districts of 24 Parganas, Hooghly, Midnapore, Birbhum and Bankura. In addition, domestic and commercial connections will also be provided.

The Life Insurance Corporation of India is to introduce a new type of policy for the agriculturists. Under this policy, non-payment of premia due to drought or crop failures would be condoned up to two years.

The Government of Gujarat have appointed a Committee which will look after the implementation, etc.,

of the programmes for small farmers, marginal farmers and agricultural labourers at the State level. The committee is presided over by State's Deputy Minister for Agriculture.

In order to implement the model village scheme, the *Haryana* State Rural Development Board will create a Rural Development Fund of Rs. 10 crores (Rs. five crores to be contributed by the State Government and the rest to be raised through public loans or contributions from local or cooperative bodies, etc.). Under the Scheme, selected villages all over the state will be provided with modern facilities required for economic development and social welfare.

By promulgating an Ordinance, the Government of *Madhya Pradesh* are to allot unoccupied land, on which any building for the purpose of residence or purposes ancillary thereto has been erected by the inhabitants of a village, to such inhabitants. According to the Ordinance, the term "inhabitant of a village" means a person who holds lands or works as an agricultural artisan or as an agricultural labourer in such a village.

To avoid wasteful expenditure on the election of Gram Panchayats in areas likely to be included in the adjacent Municipal areas or declared as Notified Areas under the M.P. Municipalities Act, the Government of *Madhya Pradesh* have promulgated an Ordinance. The State Government have now assumed powers to cancel the election of Panchas or the election proceedings of a Gram Panchayat in cases where Government have signified their intention by a notification to declare the area comprised within a Gram Panchayat to be a Municipality, or to include within the Municipal Area the area comprised within the limits of such Gram Panchayat, or to declare the area comprised within the limits of

such Gram Panchayat to be a Notified Area under the respective provisions of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961.

The Government of *Uttar Pradesh* have issued orders for constitution of a Land Management Committee in each district to advise authorities in the matter of allotment of land vested in 'gaon sabhas' and additional land made available as a result of imposition of ceilings on land holdings.

The Committee to be headed by the district magistrate, will have representation of all the recognized political parties. All the MPs and MLAs from the district will also be its members, besides the additional district magistrate (planning). The district land records officer will be its Secretary.

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To ensure the necessary balanced development of electronics in the country as rapidly as possible, the Government of India have decided to establish an Electronics Commission with full executive and financial powers.

The Government attach the highest importance to this aspect of the electronics industry and have considered it necessary to set up an organization free from all non-essential restrictions or needlessly inelastic rules.

The Commission will review the entire field of electronics with regard to research, development and industrial operations, with full authority to formulate policy in this field. It will also direct implementation, on sound technical and economic principles, of all measures, both promotional and regulatory, that are necessary for the country to attain self-reliance in the shortest possible time and in the best possible manner.

Six new projects will be started immediately in the country under the Rural Industries Projects Programme. These will be located one each in the States of Haryana, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Mysore, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh and work in co-ordination with the Pilot Cooperative Rural Electricity Projects which are already in operation there. The idea is to take advantage of the electric power being made available to rural areas for intensive development of small-scale industries. Steps are also being taken to extend the present project limits.

The Planning Commission has doubled the Fourth Plan outlay for Rural Industries Projects Programme from Rs. 4.5 crores to 9 crores on the recommendations made recently by the Rural Industries Planning Committee.

A special Corporation has been set up to administer a comprehensive guarantee scheme to cover loans of scheduled commercial banks and other financial institutions to small borrowers—like farmers, transport operators, retail traders, professional and self-employed persons, etc.—in the priority and neglected sectors. Known as the Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited, it was registered in January 1971 as a joint stock company and will start functioning soon.

Under the Scheme, 75 per cent of the loss up to specified limits will be re-imbursed by the Corporation. Ceilings have been specified for determining the loans to be covered by the guarantee scheme.

As recommended by the Board of Trade at its meeting held last month, the Government of India have set up an eight-member committee, to review the work of the Export Promotion Councils.

Chairman of the Committee is *Shri Bhagwan Singh*, Additional Secretary in the Union Ministry of Foreign Trade.

A Trade Development Authority (TDA) has been set up in the public sector to render package assistance to exporters in the engineering and chemical sectors. An important task of this new agency is to help the small scale exporters, by arranging for quick issue of import licences, industrial licences, capital goods licences, and granting permission for foreign collaboration, etc., and thus help to broad-base the national export effort. It has recourse to a especially established machinery with the Government for this purpose.

The TDA has been given a free foreign exchange by the Government for import of samples, drawings, technical literature and small lots of imported raw materials for productions of counter samples for foreign buyers.

A Technology Cell has been set up in the Union Ministry of Industrial Development to help make the small and rural industries more productive in relation to labour and other inputs employed in such industries. The Cell will also examine the levels of technology existing in such industries and identify areas where improvements are needed.

The Union Government have decided to set up a centralized agency—"Jute Corporation" in the public sector—to impart, among other things, stability to raw jute prices and to contribute to the growth of jute production in the country.

Government of India have taken over the management of Messrs Braithwaite and Company (India) Limited, Calcutta, with effect from March 6. A Board of Management has been appointed with *Shri R. V.*

*Subrahmanian*, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Industrial Development and Internal Trade, as Chairman. After an investigation into the affairs of the company, Government were of the opinion that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the public interest.

Government of India have taken over the management of Messrs Gresham and Craven of India (Private) Limited, Calcutta, a subsidiary of a British concern engaged in the manufacture of vacuum break equipment and other fittings for railways and wagon builders, etc. The concern was closed since January 6, 1971. A Board of Management has been appointed with *Shri R. V. Subrahmanian*, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Industrial Development and Internal Trade, as Chairman.

The National Book Development Board have appointed a Committee to undertake a comprehensive survey of the needs of the book industry and trade, including the import policy, in the context of the overall requirements of the country and recommend a coordinated policy for the promotion of book publishing.

Vice President, *Shri G. S. Pathak*, inaugurated country's first public enterprises information centre at New Delhi on February 25. In order to create greater consciousness about the problems of public enterprises in people, the Centre would disseminate information on the role and place of the public enterprises and would arrange regular visits to public enterprises by economists, leaders of public opinion and university students.

The Government of *Maharashtra* have declared the powerloom

industry as a small scale industry, with effect from January 22, for the purposes of giving financial assistance to handloom weavers and for converting their handlooms into powerlooms, under the *Maharashtra State Aid to Industries Act* and rules.

The Government have also directed that in case additional quota of powerlooms is given for rehabilitation of retrenched weavers or workers from textile mills, they should also be granted loans under the *State Aid to Industries Act* and rules in the same manner.

In order to provide finances for setting up of industries in its eastern parts, the Government of *Uttar Pradesh* have decided to create an Industrial Finance Corporation with a revolving fund of several crores. The government is to invest Rs. 8 to 10 crores in the Corporation from the State's Reserve Fund.

The Government of *West Bengal* have set up a 3-member Engineering Units Revival Committee (Chairman: *Shri Sanjoy Sen*) to study and recommend to the Government the measures for assisting sick or closed engineering units in the state.

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The Union Finance Minister, *Shri Y. B. Chavan*, presented the national interim budget for the year 1971-72 to the newly elected Lok Sabha, on March 24. The budget proper is to be presented in May.

An important feature of the budget is a provision of Rs. 50 crores to support a country-wide programme of creating more employment opportunities with a productive bias.

The budget shows an overall deficit of Rs. 240 crores for which

no new taxes were proposed (though the capital amount is expected to show a deficit of Rs. 354 crores, on the revenue account, a surplus of Rs. 114 crores is expected).

In Centre's plan assistance to States and Union Territories, there is provision (full) for increase by Rs. 74 crores (from Rs. 711 to Rs. 785 crores).

The budget also shows an increase of Rs. 64 crores in tax revenue (from Rs. 3,134 to Rs. 3,198 crores). A similar increase is likely in non-tax revenue. But these will be offset by the above mentioned provision of Rs. 50 crores and a reduction of Rs. 26 crores in under market loan, etc.

The Union Finance Minister expects increase in National Income similar to that of 5.5 per cent last year. While agricultural production is expected to go up by 5.5 per cent, expected increase in industrial production has been set at 6 per cent. The Government, according to the Finance Minister, shall endeavour to accelerate the process of industrial investment so that more employment opportunities are created and that there is no shortage in the coming years of key commodities.

The Finance Minister also disclosed in his speech that a new Industrial Re-construction Corporation is being set up with headquarters at Calcutta to help rehabilitate closed or closing industrial units.

The Government of India are to set up a Tax Institute of India as an autonomous body to provide a forum for constant exchange of ideas on tax collection between the Government and business and tax experts. To be governed by a board of directors, it would be financed both by the Government and private sources.

In order to encourage small savings amongst the people, the Government of India, with effect from January 15, 1971, have raised interest rates on Small Savings Securities and accounts. The increases cover all taxable securities and also the Post Office Savings Bank accounts on which interest is tax-free.

Seven-year National Savings Certificates on which interest is paid annually at  $7\frac{1}{4}$  per cent now earn  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Equally attractive are the increases on the Post Office Time Deposits introduced last year. One-year deposits now earn 6 per cent, 3-year deposits 7 per cent and 5-year deposits  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent per annum.

Deposit accounts opened and Certificates purchased before January 15, 1971, will also receive corresponding benefits.

A State Level Accounts Committee would in future review the audit reports of important co-operative institutions in *Maharashtra* State as does the Public Accounts Committee of the State legislature in respect of Government departments. The members of the committee will be nominated every year. For the current year, Government has nominated a four-member committee.

So far audit of cooperative societies was carried out by the auditors of the Cooperative Department and audit reports were communicated to the cooperative societies and departmental officers concerned for taking further necessary action. This system has now been set aside because of the continuance of irregularities committed by the office-bearers of the societies.

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The gigantic decennial Census operations were conducted by the



Census Commissioner of the Government of India throughout the length and breadth of the country during March 10 to 30. Incidentally, the year 1971 was also the centenary year for Census in India.

Through the comprehensive Census operations manned by over a million trained enumerators, data on several demographic, social, cultural and economic characteristics of individuals were collected which are so vital for economic planning. This data is to be tabulated through electronic computers.

A new professional Association called the Indian Association for the Study of Population (IASP) has been registered with the object of making Demography a more effective tool in development planning in India. The members of the Association are distinguished Demographers, Census Administrators and population experts from all over India. A number of Indian demographers settled abroad have also enrolled as members.

This Association will work in co-operation with the Census Commission, the Planning Commission and various Demographic Research Centres in India. It proposes to publish a journal of Demography.

The recently constituted National Advisory Board on Youth, which met in December, have recommended that every State Government should appoint a State Advisory Board for non-student youth welfare. There should also be a youth welfare board in every District under the chairmanship of the Collector. The State Government should ensure that a cross-section of the entire community was represented on these boards. Where a vice-chairman of the district youth board is appointed, he should be a non-official. If a State

Government so desires, a non-official may be appointed as chairman of the district youth board. The district youth board may have sub-committees for sports, education, cultural affairs and other activities. Regarding block youth boards, the Board felt that the State Government should decide whether these should be established or whether youth welfare work should be left to officials who may be given an honorarium. The Board have also suggested the appointment of a youth officer in each district for the specific purpose of looking after all youth activities.

The Board have urged that a standing committee should be formed to ensure expeditious implementation of programmes.

The Programme Evaluation Organization of the Planning Commission which made an evaluation study of the Family Planning Programme, has concluded that there is widespread knowledge and awareness among the people about the need for limiting the size of family as a result of the Family Planning Programme undertaken throughout the country. With dedicated and dynamic leadership at all levels and improvement in services, it should be possible to achieve a breakthrough in stabilising population growth.

The study is based on data collected simultaneously at all levels from 35 districts, 114 family planning centres, 350 villages, over 250 family planning staff members, about 7,000 villagers and about 6,000 adopters.

The report points out that although the overall picture is somewhat optimistic, the programme had not spread evenly among the different States and districts.



The report reveals some serious deficiencies, such as inadequacy of training programme, under-utilization of services, need for continued extension efforts to create demand for the services, delay in detecting and treating after-effects (real or fancied), ineffective supervision and guidance to field workers, inadequate use of local leaders and adopters and lack of adequate arrangements for feed-back.

The Government of *Gujarat* have decided to establish a Council for Ecology under the chairmanship of *Yuvrajshri Digvijaysinhji of Wankaner*. The Council would encourage teaching of the principles of ecology right from high school classes onwards and co-ordinate the working of agriculture, forest, public works, fisheries and health departments for the purpose of keeping a maximum balance in nature, etc.

The Government of *Maharashtra* have sanctioned a scheme for the extension of Government guarantee to the loans offered by scheduled banks to the managements of private aided secondary schools for the construction of, or extension to, their school buildings.

Government of *Punjab* have set up a Board to advise the Language Department of the State Government for one year on matters relating to promotion of Punjabi and Hindi literature. The Board is headed by the State Education Minister.

The Government of *Rajasthan* have appointed a Standing Committee to advise the Government on the necessary steps to be taken to control environments and surroundings of the monuments of national importance.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

*THE ALL INDIA SERVICES: A STUDY OF THEIR ORIGIN & GROWTH*; By R. N. THAKUR, Patna, Bharati Bhavan, 1969, p. 98, Rs. 35.

The book deals with the origin, development, and the present position of the All India Services and critically examines the need as well as their validity in the context of the present administrative set up. Shri Thakur has traced the origin of the services right from the period prior to the East India Company and has examined their growth in its historical perspective. It should, therefore, prove of considerable value both to students of Public Administration and Political Science, particularly the former. After Independence, generally, and after the last General Elections, in particular, there has been considerable discussion and debate about the desirability of having a cadre of personnel, who are recruited at a source and by an Institution which is not, except in a very small measure, directly concerned with their performance after recruitment and initial training. Many students, both of Political Science and Public Administration, question whether officers belonging to the generalist or the technical services, not directly under the control of the State Governments, could be expected to give their best and faithfully implement the policies enunciated by political masters, not competent to take disciplinary action against them. Shri Thakur has, I think rightly, devoted more than half of the book to a critical examination of the validity of these arguments, both for and against. What is particularly of interest is the

similarity of arguments that have been advanced both in favour and against these services by the official and non-official opinions right through the period. The value of the book, however, would have been greatly enhanced if the institution of the All India Services could have been compared with similar institutions in other countries of the world.

The work of this nature by a political scientist, one could hope, would contain conclusions drawn on empirical studies which support or dispute the validity of the arguments. More so, since, perhaps except at the National Level, the views for and against these services are based more on one's predilections rather than on actual experience. In my opinion, there is considerable scope and need to further examine these issues dispassionately before passing judgment for or against. One can only make a suggestion that the scope of such studies could very well cover a sizable number of eminent administrators drawn both from official and non-official circles, who could, on the basis of their long and close association with the administration of the country, say to what extent their policies could or could not be implemented to their satisfaction, and to what extent could failure be attributed to the fact that those responsible for their implementation were not directly placed under their control and supervision in the sense that they

did not have the power to hire or fire them. The proposal to constitute such services for Engineering, Agriculture and Judiciary could perhaps then be considered in the light of these studies. It is unfortunate that even though the Parliament adopted a resolution for constitution of All India Services for these disciplines about a decade ago, the State Governments yet resist further action in this direction. The trends in this direction are sure to gain momentum in the context of changing complexion of the Government at the Central and State Levels. The urgency, therefore, of having a consensus at the National level on this important issue would appear to be obvious.

The author, in Chapter I, dilated at some length on the present arrangements regarding the recruitment and allotment of officers belonging to these services to various States, and the system of tenure deputation at the Centre. He has listed the important posts manned by Officers of the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service in the various States. It may be observed that there is no rigid system of earmarking certain posts for officers belonging to these cadres. This generally depends on the State Governments. Instances are not lacking where certain posts encadred in a particular service have been decadred subsequently or *vice versa*. There is, therefore, no rigidity on this point which is as it should be. Much would depend on the persons available at a particular point of time to man key-positions. There are certain factual errors also regarding Extra State Control in that chapter. The State Governments can not impose any penalty on officers of All India Services without the concurrence of the Union Public Service Commission. The Author

has very rightly observed:

"Thus the basic features of these All India Services—external control, rotation of their members between the Provinces and the Centre, and their liability to serve anywhere in India were almost the same as those of the existing All India Services, with the difference, of course that the external control then exercised by the Secretary of State is now exercised by the Government of India."

The book contains valuable information about the origin in its historical perspective of the less known but equally important other All India Services, viz., Indian Education Service, Indian (Civil) Medical Service, Indian (Civil) Veterinary Service, Indian Service of Engineers, and Indian Agriculture Service. After tracing their origin and growth, Shri Thakur has wisely discussed at some length, effects of provincial autonomy on these services. The labour that he has put in to examine this aspect at such considerable length and the vast literature on the subject he has gleaned through, is really a matter of gratification and he deserves all compliments for his efforts.

Chapters 8 and 9 of the book are of topical interest, particularly the Chapter on All India Services after Independence. Very often, it is our emotions that sway our judgment in examining matters of such far-reaching consequences. The country must be grateful to its leaders, like Nehru and Patel, who could examine these issues with such objectivity and did not succumb to the popular feelings that ran high on these matters. There is considerable testimony now available to prove that their judgment was right in

retaining the All India character of certain important services. One can only imagine the consequences that should have followed the abolition of these services in the context of narrow and parochial thinking witnessed during the recent past. The contribution of All India Services to National Integrity and Unity of the Nation would be for the future historians to record but those who have had the privilege of being closely associated with matters of State in the higher echelons are fully aware of the stress and strains they went through in persuading their political masters to take wider and more objective look at events that momentarily affected a particular part of the country. This does not, however, mean that there was not understanding or sincerity of purpose on both the sides—in fact but for this, the system would not have worked at all. It worked well because “there was a homogeneity of interests and traditions between those who laid down public policy and those who executed it, which had the effect of leaving to a mutual understanding several matters that in other countries are more formally defined”.

The author, in Chapter 7 also, has dilated at some length on the suspicions that pervaded thinking both in the officers and the Government. His observation that external control over members of higher Services “created the situation in which Ministers not only felt helpless before their own Secretaries but also grew suspicious of them” is significant. On the other hand, the feeling in officials was equally suspicious:

“The various instances of interference that occurred during the term of my office have left an

impression on my mind that the bureaucracy still want to retain the control of the departments in their hands. They do not desire to accept the decisions of the Ministers whose position under the circumstances is reduced to that of mere Post Offices. I may go further and say that under the rules the Minister's position is inferior to that of the Heads of the Departments.

“It is obvious that the present intermediate stage between bureaucratic supremacy and popular control creates difficulties on both sides. On the one hand, the member of a Service may find himself obliged to carry out a policy which he regards as detrimental to the best interest of the country, while on the other, the Minister finds it irksome to work through Services not fully under his control but subject ultimately to another authority.”

One would, however, question the validity of the observation made by the author that “denial of control over services to the Ministers was, therefore, widely regretted in Indian circles”. I am reinforced in my observations, as in the Constitutional Assembly, there was hardly any serious opposition to either the inclusion of Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service as All India Services or to the possibility of the creation of more All India Services in future. This feeling was in no less measure based on the fact that those in authority were convinced about the need and desirability of keeping their All India character.

—B. MEHTA

*THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE*; By BISHWANATH PRASAD, New Delhi, S. Chand, 1968, pp. 290, Rs. 20.00.

This book is a thesis presented to the University of Bihar for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Though published in 1968, it appears to have been submitted a few years earlier as the study refers to conditions as they were till about the year 1964.

There does not appear to be anything very inspiring, brilliant or remarkable about this book, though it can be described as a painstaking analysis of several facets of the Indian Administrative Service. In his introduction, the author has stated that the sources from which the material for this thesis has been obtained are both "original and second-hand, published and unpublished". The author deserves to be congratulated for patiently marshalling his sources of material.

The author has given an objective assessment of the contribution which the members of the ICS made to the administration of the country. "For all its authoritarianism," he says, "its aim was service, its motivation was duty to the governed. More than the characteristics of the bureaucracy as such, personal achievement and service of individual officials are remembered." The transition to a suitable superior bureaucracy after the repatriation of several members of the ICS on the attainment of Independence was not easy and though the author has referred to the birth pangs of India's first nationalistic service, viz., the IAS, one is disappointed to notice the omission of the never-to-be-forgotten contribution of Sardar Patel, both in the unification of the country and in giving to it a stable administration. It is impossible to think of the Indian Administrative Service without thinking of Sardar Patel.

In a series of chapters, the author has analysed the structure of the IAS, methods of recruitment and the social, economic and educational background of the various members whether they are direct, emergency or war service recruits, or whether they are promoted from the State Services. Some of the conclusions are indeed interesting, for example, even though the number of members of the ICS in 1961 was hardly 200, a much larger proportion of them have graduated with science subjects, than any of the categories of the IAS. Again, with the exception of the war service recruits, the percentage of the members of the IAS who had a Master's degree was very much higher than of those with a similar degree among the ICS. On the social and economic side, it is significant that nearly 76 per cent of the members belonging to the ICS came from families, the monthly income of the head of which was Rs. 1,000 and over, whereas the bulk of the members of the IAS of almost all the categories, came from families the head of which had a monthly income between Rs. 300 to 800. One notable feature of both the ICS and the IAS is the fact that nearly half the number in the services came from households whose heads were employed in Government services. Only next in importance is the profession of advocates. Significantly, a sizable percentage of the emergency recruits and State promotees came from agricultural families, i.e., 15 per cent and 39 per cent respectively. The business and medical professions have not lent many offsprings to the services; but as high as 14 per cent of the direct recruits to the IAS came from families who were engaged in the teaching profession. The conclusion is, therefore, more or less inescapable

that the highest service in the country has, after Independence, slowly shed its oligarchical overtones.

"Is the IAS a bureaucracy?" The author himself has posed this question but not only has he not spelt out what meaning he attaches to the term 'bureaucracy' (because this is one of the most abused and misunderstood terms in administrative parlance) but has also not answered the question. Discussing the role of the senior echelons of the services, especially those posted in the Secretariat, the author mentions that they have a share in the formation of administrative policies. The following statement of his, however, is ambiguous and leaves us guessing about its proper implications: "They (members of the IAS) assume a role of permanent politicians who work more with the ministers than under their direction, in such cases where the latter rely exclusively on them for the preparation and execution of a policy."

"Is the IAS still rule-oriented with no human approach to administrative problems?" The author's conclusion is that, "the IAS has within the short period of its existence built up a notable and rich tradition and the impact of welfare administration on the working of the IAS has already begun to be felt, and as

time passes, it is sure to be reflected more and more in their approach to problems they handle in their career". It is heartening to note the author quoting the opinion of the late Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, more than whom there was no bitter critic of the ICS. The late Prime Minister has said that the members of the IAS have done "their utmost often with success to adapt themselves to this new situation". While one may broadly agree with the conclusion of the author, it is worth mentioning that even today, 23 years after the country has attained Independence and given itself a new administrative service, there are complaints of members of the service being arrogant, wooden in their approach, showing lack of concern for the aspirations of the people and maintaining an artificial distance from those over whom they have to exercise official authority. If the service is to be accepted and cherished by the people, there has to be among its members, a reproduction of the dedication which a large number of foreign and Indian members of the ICS brought to bear to their duties and of the missionary zeal which inspired the one time "political rebels" to achieve in a non-violent manner the emancipation of their country from foreign rule.

—V. SUBRAMANIAN

*FUNCTIONING OF VILLAGE PANCHAYATS*; By DR. N. R. INAMDAR, Bombay Popular Prakashan, 1970, pp. 368, Rs. 32.

Two views—one romantic and another realistic—have gained currency in the country about villages and Village Panchayats. The former looks at villages as centres of real community life and Panchayats as the channels for giving expression to it. It gives an idealistic picture of Indian villages throughout the ages, refers to them as autonomous

republics discharging a variety of functions aiming at the promotion of the all-round prosperity of the people. The ideal of those who hold this view is to restore the villages to the dignity they enjoyed in the past. The realists hold a different view. According to them, the so-called autonomy of ancient Indian villages was the natural expression of the



conditions of an age when there were no good means of communication. Autonomy did not mean that they escaped from the burden of taxation which Central and provincial governments always levied on them and from which they had no escape. This was a real external limitation on their autonomy. Moreover, it was all an autonomy for the higher castes in the villages who used it to maintain their control over the lower castes, especially the untouchables. It was this that Dr. Ambedkar had in his mind when he said in the Constituent Assembly: "What is the Village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism? I am glad that the Draft Constitution has discarded the Village and adopted the individual as its unit."

Ultimately, however, it was the romantic view that prevailed. It had the support of Mahatma Gandhi who propagated from 1916 onwards the philosophy of ruralism. Naturally, Nehru, Patel, Rajendra Prasad and others in the Assembly who were his devoted disciples supported it. Dr. Ambedkar had to revise his views and agree to incorporate in the Constitution Article 40 which lays down as a Directive Principle that "the State shall take steps to organize Village Panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government". Even earlier, from 1937 onwards, when Congress governments came into office under the Government of India Act, 1935, legislation on these lines was undertaken. There was more of it in the post-Independence period, especially after the inauguration of the community development movement in 1952. The Balwantrai Mehta Committee Report gave further impetus to this faith in Village Panchayats and in all states these have been constituted in every

village on the basis of adult suffrage. Further, these have been empowered not only to provide the usual civic and welfare services, like schools, roads, dispensaries, health, drinking water, etc., but also to undertake schemes for the development of agriculture, industries, cooperation, rural reconstruction and the uplift of the weaker sections of the community, especially the untouchables. These were expected to do within the village all that the Union government does for economic development in the country as a whole. This was how Article 40 was interpreted. Dr. Inamdar agrees with this view when he says: "since Independence, there has been a complete transformation in the role of the village Panchayats in the national polity". (p. 359).

True, there is a transformation in the role expected but how far has the expectation been fulfilled? This is the question for which Dr. Inamdar tries to give an answer. For this purpose, he has intensively examined the working of four Panchayats—two, Dehu and Dhamni, which are said to have functioned successfully and two, Rahatwade and Khadakwasla, which have not worked successfully. His is a thorough examination with the help of the tools fashioned by Americans in recent years. Politics and administration are deeply influenced by the economic and sociological environment around them. Starting with this assumption—which is a correct one—he gives the necessary data about the physical configuration of the villages and their *wadis*, the sociological aspects of the population—their castewise distribution, occupations, relative income, literacy and general outlook. He makes a similar analysis of the social background of the members elected to the Panchayats, of other categories of leaders in the villages and of persons included in his random and select samples whose opinions have been



surveyed. On the basis of this data and of the written records and also on the basis of his observation of election meetings, and meetings of Gram Sabhas and Panchayats, he has been able to measure the success achieved or the failures met with by the four Panchayats studied.

The methodology used is unexceptionable, the data collected adequate and the analysis made of the data satisfactory. There are, however, a few comments that may be made in regard to these. There are only four case studies in the book and this is too small a sample on the basis of which any worthwhile generalizations can be drawn in respect of the thousands of Panchayats in Maharashtra. Moreover, all the four are in Poona District. While 200 pages are devoted to Dehu, Rahatwade gets only 32 pages, Khadakwasla 40 pages and Dhamni 55. Of course, more information may be available in one case than in another and it is also possible that in the case of Rahatwade, in which the Panchayat exists only in name, there may have been no need to give more details but here the question is whether a chapter should have been devoted to a Panchayat which does not at all function (like the proverbial chapter on snakes in Iceland). Efforts have been made to point out the connection between the data collected in respect of a village and its relevance to an understanding of the working of the concerned Panchayat. But enough light has not been thrown on this. There are two Panchayats where the Panchas are young but one of these is successful and the other is not. In such a situation, it is necessary to explain the relevance of the particular factor—the age, the education, etc., of the Panchas. The same defect is observed in respect of the isolation of a village or its contacts with other villages or towns. Dhamni is an

isolated village showing much progress while Khadakwasla has very little to its credit in spite of contacts with urban centres. The mere collection of data is not enough. Its relevance has also to be fully explained.

Coming to the criteria for determining the success or failure of a Panchayat, it has to be said that the criteria adopted by Dr. Inamdar are on the whole satisfactory. He examines as to what extent power is concentrated or dispersed among the caste groups, the extent to which people participate in elections or take interest in the meetings of the Gram Sabha, their attitude towards additional taxation and their estimate of the total working of the Panchayats and of the role of the various leaders in them. There are, however, two difficulties here. One is that almost all elections have been unanimous. The other is that a fair percentage of persons interviewed are dissatisfied with the working of their Panchayats, even where, from objective evidence (as in the case of Dehu and Dhamni), they are working satisfactorily. In such cases, what is the weight that has to be attached to opinions expressed during a survey?

More important than the extent of popular participation is the success achieved by Panchayats in discharging the functions with which they have been entrusted. When this criterion is applied, it is found that even the most progressive ones are not at all interested in developmental functions or in the uplift of the weaker classes. They are content with supplying the traditional civic and welfare services. Naturally, the question arises whether Panchayats should be entrusted with developmental functions? These—agriculture, industries, irrigation—have only a sectional appeal. Is it not better to devolve them on cooperative societies or functional

organizations whose membership is confined to that section which benefits from the particular function? Here is a limitation on the romantic view of Panchayats.

Dr. Inamdar's survey throws light on the factors which contribute to the success of Panchayats (or their failure). Leadership, harmony among leaders, cooperation between leaders and the general public—these are the crucial factors. Next came the financial resources. All others are subsidiary. Where there is good leadership, the evils of any factions in the village may be neutralized. In no village are people favourably disposed towards the levy of new taxes. This means that state grants should be recognized as the main source for improvement in financial resources. So far as the machinery of Panchayats is concerned, it is necessary to have full-time secretary. At present, the offices of Secretary and Talathi are combined and the incumbent cares more for the work he has to do in the latter capacity.

In all Panchayat Acts, there is provision for the exercise of control

and the giving of guidance by the higher authorities—the District Collector, the Zila Parishads and State officials. The studies included in the volume, however, reveal that these are negligent in the discharge of their function. Even auditing is not properly done. They do not arrange for elections when they are due. This negligence has to be put an end to. In addition to this, it should be recognized that when a Panchayat is started in a village it is necessary that the first batch of Panchas should be trained in the proper discharge of their duties and they should also be given guidance for sometime. If this had been done, the Panchayat even in a village like Rahatwade would not have failed.

Dr. Inamdar's case studies supply a considerable amount of data for understanding the problems with which Panchayat are faced and for finding solutions for them. They also serve as a model for those who wish to conduct similar research. This is the special value of the book.

—M. VENKATARANGAIYA

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## APPRAISAL OF MANAGEMENT : ENVIRONMENT AND IMPERATIVES\*

*S. K. Chakraborty*

BEFORE we begin, the title of this article needs a clarification in its emphasis. Our subject of discussion is not appraisal of 'management'—that is of those involved in 'managing'—*per se*. The purpose really is to appraise the *performance* of 'management'. We are not considering for this article the 'process of managing' to be synonymous with 'management', as is often done. Another implicit assumption of this article is that we have in view a production-cum-selling enterprise. Finally, we will be confining our attention to aspects of performance appraisal regarding 'line management' only.

### *Why the Need to Appraise ?*

Every organization is an 'institution' by itself. A good definition of institutions is given by Morris Ginsberg: "Institutions are ways which society has come to recognize as meeting certain demands, and as enabling associations to continue in existence and to secure cooperation".<sup>1</sup> As an economic institution, therefore, a business enterprise has to contribute towards certain goals of the society, ensuring in the process its own long-term survival and growth. A workable adjustment of these two requirements, guided by the socio-cultural values of the environment, leads to the identification of *organizational goals*.

---

\*This article is based on a seminar conducted during a one-week course on "Managerial Efficiency and Cost Control", organized by the AIMO, West Bengal, in Calcutta during August, 1970. Illustrations given in this article draw upon the author's research experiences with the National Coal Board (U. K.) during 1967-70.

<sup>1</sup> Morris Ginsberg, *The Psychology of Society*, London, Methuen, 1964, p. 106.

On the other hand, an enterprise functions first and last through its human resources. Individuals enter an organization on a contractual basis, offering their services to it in return for satisfaction of their own goals which, for the majority, reside outside the organization.

For some, individual/group goals are on surface monetary, but at bottom comprise an endeavour to gain intrinsic satisfactions at and through work itself. Some writers on organization theory label this latter phenomenon as 'self-actualization'.<sup>2</sup> However, others, like W. G. Bennis,<sup>3</sup> consider the self-actualization concept as hazy and abstract. Yet, for either variant of individual/group goals (see the preceding para) there is need to promote both sets of goals (*i.e.*, individual and organizational) to mutual advantage.

To state the matter more plainly and generally, it is patent that there exists at all times a *plurality* of interests in the social milieu. Beginning with one individual *v.* another, through one group *v.* another, union *v.* management, public sector *v.* private sector to state *v.* citizens, large areas of conflicting interests always persist.<sup>4</sup> In course of day-to-day tactical manoeuvres, both sides tend to lose sense of a core of long-term identity of interests. This recognition of an overburden of plural interests upon an underlying potential of identical interests is, we believe, practical wisdom, as against constantly sweeping the issue of opposed interests under the carpet.<sup>5</sup> Divergences between organizational and individual or group goals, and attempts to resolve them, seem to reflect the truth of this thesis.

Hence, *prima facie* and for all practical purposes between individual/group goals and organizational goals, there remain varying degrees of 'incongruence'.<sup>6</sup> It is, therefore, submitted that the need for performance appraisal arises from the basic initial non-identity of organizational and individual group goals. The recognition of this divergence is of recent origin. During the days roughly up to the early 1930s, the doctrine of the 'Protestant Ethic' seemed to rule supreme in the business world.<sup>7</sup> In essence, it did not admit of any divergence between organizational and individual goals. Once you accept a contract of employment for money, your goals are those of your source of income. If

<sup>2</sup> For example, see E. H. Scheing, *Organisational Psychology*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1965.

<sup>3</sup> W. G. Bennis, *Changing Organisations*, London, McGraw Hill, 1966.

<sup>4</sup> G. H. Labovitz, "The Individual *v.* The Organisation", *Advanced Management Journal*, January, 1970.

<sup>5</sup> A. Fox, *Industrial Relations and Industrial Sociology*, London, H. M. S. O., 1966.

<sup>6</sup> C. Argyris, *Integrating The Individual and The Organization*, New York, Wiley, 1964.

<sup>7</sup> A. Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry*, New York, Wiley, 1956.

you do not meet them you go, and none is going to ask if this was due to frustration of your own goals in the organizational milieu. From the late 1930s onwards, sociologists, social psychologists and psychologists began bringing in the dimension of individual group goals within the framework of organization theory. A 'Social Ethic' began emerging.<sup>8</sup> Although sometimes there has been an extension of this into what some authors criticize as 'Freudian Ethic'<sup>9</sup>—an unseemly concern with the subterranean human mind—it remains true that the acceptance of the fact of individual goals *within* an organization has opened up a new dimension of performance appraisal.

Against the above mentioned background, the role of performance appraisal seems twofold: (1) assessing the gap between professed organizational goals and the actual performance turned out by organizational members, and (2) progressively narrowing the gap between organizational and individual/group goals. In a developing country like India, where managerial manpower is a particularly scarce resource, both these functions of performance appraisal are highly relevant. Also, a successful pursuit of these two aims should ultimately lead to the acceptance of a business enterprise as a valued socio-economic institution.

#### ENVIRONMENT OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

The performance of managers is the consummation of the simultaneous operation of many autonomous 'causal' variables upon several 'intervening' variables within the organization.<sup>10</sup> Before performance is judged, therefore, the state of affairs regarding these causal variables should be clearly perceived. Thus, the poor performance of a manager should be judged in the light of variables outside his control that impinge on his work. The idea is certainly not to find scapegoats for his shortcomings, but to identify the role of certain attendant factors in bringing about specific results through him.

A preliminary survey along the following dimensions within the organization is, therefore, an essential prerequisite to the assessment of managerial performance.

#### *Dependence on Environment*

No active organization is an entirely 'closed' system.<sup>11</sup> Whether

<sup>8</sup> W. H. Whyte, *The Organization Man*, Baltimore, Pelican, 1967.

<sup>9</sup> For example, see R. Lapiere, *The Freudian Ethic*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1960.

<sup>10</sup> R. Likert, *New Patterns of Management*, New York, McGraw Hill-Kogakusha, 1961.

<sup>11</sup> D. Katz and R. L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations*, New York, John Wiley, 1966.



explicitly recognized or not, an organization is in fact a twin-stream 'open' system in relation to the environment. The first stream relates to 'inputs' from the environment, while the second relates to 'output' passed on to the environment. The organizational system itself serves as an agency for transformation and addition of economic values.<sup>12</sup> The quality of this transformation will depend directly upon the quality of 'inputs' the organization can draw from the environment, and indirectly on the extent of stable or high demand markets it can secure for its 'outputs'.

Empirical evidence shows a circular relationship in the "input→ transformation→ output" chain. The National Coal Board of the U.K. is facing a continuously declining market for its output. The labour market (an input) is too conscious of this fact to enter and plan a career in coal mining. Even ignoring the relative unattractiveness of this industry, its drawing power amongst skilled and technical men is weak. Men with such background—particularly those in the younger age group—are in fact leaving the industry at every opportunity. (Of course, the process is being helped by the near-full employment situation in the economy). Thus, the qualitative index of manpower input is falling due to dwindling output markets. And, of course, less-than-optimum quality manpower lowers the quality of transformation. This is shown, for example, by a slowing down in the rate of increase in mining productivity. This, in turn, diminishes further the marketability of coal in an increasingly competitive fuel economy. The cycle tends to be self-generating.

In a situation such as the one described above, appraisal of managerial performance has to be done with caution. Before, for example, blaming a colliery manager for not reaching the targetted productivity figure, the environmental constraints have got to be seen clearly. If the labour-mix in his colliery has worsened qualitatively during a certain interval, other things remaining the same, this is a very plausible reason for lower productivity. Similarly, if the markets for the colliery's high grade premium fuel contract unexpectedly, colliery profits would be less than planned. This is not the colliery manager's responsibility in the first instance. Assessment of demand and planning of markets were done at higher echelons in the organization because they possessed necessary information and data for the purpose. Even for them, complete information on market behaviour is difficult to obtain. The colliery manager's organizational position is very remote from all this, his being the lowest stage in a three-tier hierarchy. To ignore this fact in judging his performance would be unjust.

<sup>12</sup> E. J. Miller and A. K. Rice, *Systems of Organization*, London, Tavistock, 1967.

### Organizational Leadership

The function of a leader is to carve out an institutional niche for the enterprise through positive goal orientation.<sup>13</sup> Also, again, it is the nature of leadership at the top which determines to a large extent the loyalty and commitment of managerial personnel to the goals of the organization. Our study of the management of the National Coal Board (U.K.) bears out this point. With Lord Robens becoming the Chairman of the Board in 1960,\* managers at every level in the structure became highly performance-conscious. Lord Robens missed no opportunity of public appearance to keep up the image of a 'live and kicking' British Coal Mining industry. At the same time, he continually announced public commitment of the industry to reach a certain level of productivity, costs, and output targets within a definite time span. Due to these aggressive leadership tactics, management within the industry spontaneously endeavoured to achieve these targets as if these were a life-and-death matter for the industry. Nor did Lord Robens ever forget to praise the achievements of his men and management before the public. He seems to conform to Bennis' statement that "effective leadership depends primarily on mediating between the individual and the organization in such a way that both can obtain maximum satisfaction".<sup>14</sup>

Performance appraisal under such purposeful and aggressive leadership becomes much more meaningful. *Performance-orientation must precede performance-appraisal.* Leadership of the type of Lord Robens is a good example of how a whole organization can become motivated for better performance. Once such motivation is there, performance appraisal ceases to appear to be an imposition or a stricture.

### Organizational System Interdependencies

It is imperative to appreciate that performance of not a single individual within an organization stands wholly on its own.<sup>15</sup> The structural system is based on division of work, authority and responsibility, so that the functioning of each sub-system is related to that of others. Beyond a certain stage, successes or failures of any organizational sub-system, or for that matter of any individual manager, have got to be interpreted in the context of overall system-functioning.<sup>16</sup> Very

<sup>13</sup> P. Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*, New York, Row Peterson, 1957.

\*Very recently, Lord Robens has relinquished Chairmanship of the Board.

<sup>14</sup> W. G. Bennis, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>15</sup> F. E. Emery (ed.), *Systems Thinking*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969.

<sup>16</sup> R. A. Jhonson, F. E. Kast, and J. E. Rosenzweig, "Systems Theory and Management", *Management Science*, January, 1964,

often, analysis from this viewpoint may lead to a circular rather than linear cause-and-effect relationship amongst two or more functional activities of the enterprise. Yet, this apparent intractability can be resolved by pushing up the point of reference to the next higher level at which decisions about the lower-level functions are taken. The idea can very simply be illustrated like this. The production department of a factory may be turning out sub-standard products due to shortages of appropriate quality materials, while the purchasing department finds that its buying and inventory schedules are being disrupted. Confined to the operational level, the two departments could engage in an inconclusive wrangle about each other's poor performances. The two sub-systems by themselves could fail to settle the issue. If, now, a sub-system in the structure at the next higher level is identifiable, where possibly some integrated planning of various functions took place, the root of the lower-level sub-system conflict could be found.

It would seem, therefore, that a scheme of performance appraisal based on the establishment of performance objectives just for lower level sub-systems can only be partially effective. Appraisal of managerial performance must start from the apex of the organization structure. Only then can an inter-linked sub-system net-work be built up right through the hierarchy. This would lead to more systematic and logical cause-and-effect tracing of performance at all levels within the organization.

### *Organization Strategy and Structure*

Although seldom explicitly acknowledged, the organizational structure always affects performance from the roots. The successful execution of a strategy in a certain context depends, in a large measure, on the appropriateness of the structure meant to serve the strategy.<sup>17</sup> Thus, a very useful organizational typology has been suggested by T. Burns and G. M. Stalker.<sup>18</sup> They have classified organizational structures into two types: (1) "organismic", and (2) "mechanistic". Organismic structures tend to have quite flexible organizational relationships. There is very little formal organizational consciousness. Elaborate organization charts or manuals are usually non-existent. In rapidly changing environments, such structures can quickly manoeuvre themselves into vantage positions to confront new situations. This dynamism makes such structures readily responsive to innovations of all kinds. Mechanistic structures tend, on the other hand, to be rigid,

<sup>17</sup> A. D. Chandler (Jr.), *Strategy and Structure*, Cambridge, M. I. T. Press, 1962.

<sup>18</sup> T. Burns and G. M. Stalker, *The Management of Innovation*, London, Tavistock, 1961.

with clearly defined relationships and responsibilities. A formal awareness of the structural pattern pervades such organizations as shown by the readily available organizational blueprints and the like. By implication, these structures tend to be static and are designed to carry out a nearly fixed strategy in a relatively stable environment.

If, therefore, in a dynamic environment, one ignores the fact that an enterprise has a mechanistic structure not readily sensitive to the nuances of rapid change, then performance appraisal is bound to be superficial. Even the apparently right remedies applied within a wrong structure will be ineffective in the improvement of performance. Initiative, drive and imagination are not the qualities that receive encouragement in a mechanistic structure. But these are the qualities needed most where environmental elements change fast.

The relevance of structure to performance is illustrated by another kind of distinction between structural types. Normally, organizational structures are 'functional', *i.e.* separate activities, like production, marketing, purchasing, industrial relations, research and development, etc., existing at two or more levels in the organization. There are 'functional chains' of authority and responsibility for each function. The team of functional heads at each level looks after all product lines, projects, etc., of the enterprise. In contrast, there can be 'project' organizations where all kinds of functional expertise are brought to bear upon a single project from inception to completion. The latter type of structure will suit an enterprise whose business consists of large-scale, long-term individual projects. To persist with a functional structure in such cases will almost certainly bring down the level of performance.

Indeed, many case histories of organizational failure are likely to show that inappropriate structures have been a basic cause of their decline and demise.


### *Alienation v. Commitment*

Ever since the use of the word 'alienation' by Marx, it has become an important sociological concept explaining the behaviour and performance of organizational members. Alienation can have several variants, the ultimate being alienation from one's self, *i.e.* 'self-estrangement'.<sup>19</sup> Also, degrees of alienation differ from organization to organization. For example, Blauner found it to be least in a printing works, increasing progressively through a machining factory, a textile mill, to a car assembly plant. In highly integrated modern organizations, like a chemical

<sup>19</sup> R. Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964.

plant, the alienation curve droops again. The less the control over workplace, the less apparent one's contribution to a final output, the less the use of one's intrinsic talents in work, the greater the extent of alienation. The converse of this situation is likely to lead to 'commitment' in work.

In a highly 'alienating' organizational climate, therefore, the incongruence between organizational and individual goals is likely to be great. Performance appraisal must take account of the basically alienating character of the organization while interpreting conventional comparisons of set objectives vis-a-vis achieved results. In effect, performance appraisal in a climate of alienation is fundamentally different from appraisal in an organization imbued with commitment. Of course, it certainly is an aim of performance appraisal schemes to gradually bring about commitment amongst personnel hitherto alienated, or to at least reduce the degree of alienation.



The diagram given above intends to show that none of the five underlying factors discussed in the preceding pages acts discretely in affecting performance. An attempt is made to establish the point that a kind of sequential relationship (which may not necessarily be the same always, or even of the same sequence above) obtains among them. The following hypothetical explanation of this relationship would be useful.

Let an enterprise be faced with contraction in both the factor and product (*i.e.* input and output) markets. For survival, then, the dependence of the enterprise on its environment becomes critical. It cannot take the environment for granted. This increased dependence tends now to react on the internal organization through organizational leadership and through the internal system interdependencies. The leadership attempts to motivate the organizational members for achieving lower costs and better quality to expand markets, and to retain and

increase inputs as well. It tries to project the image of a battling enterprise before society. Flexibility, adaptability and quick reflexes in a deteriorating situation become its watchwords. At the same time, the leader's emphasis on these aspects begins throwing up to the surface the hitherto submerged inter-linking of sub-systems within the enterprise. To create smooth manoeuvrability within the enterprise, the network of related sub-systems has to be given conscious coherence.

The impact of such organizational leadership, and of the profound importance of the recognition of system interdependencies, then leads directly to changes in the organization structure (mark how structure follows strategy). *Prima facie*, these tendencies should dictate an 'organismic' structure (see last para on p. 170). Such a structure is fit to cope with rapid change. With the adoption of such a structure of authority-responsibility relationships, there should now be greater commitment on the part of managerial personnel towards achieving viability for the enterprise. Appraisal of performance could now take place in a proper structural and motivational framework.

We could also work back the sequence, starting with, say current poor performance, and try to trace the weak links in the flow-diagram of the factors depicted above. Indeed, this could be a very worthwhile exercise before an enterprise plans to instal an appraisal system.

Without consideration of a wide context of inter-connected factors, such as those analyzed above, the essential groundwork for performance appraisal would not have been prepared.

#### CRITERIA OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

Two broad criteria of performance appraisal may be suggested: (1) *quantitative*, and (2) *qualitative*. It is perhaps common in the business world to emphasize the quantitative criteria alone because they are so obvious. For appraising the performance of the management of an enterprise as a whole, the following quantitative measures can be regarded as representative:

- (1) The percentage of cost reduction or cost effectiveness achieved relative to a base period.
- (2) The percentage increase in labour or machine productivity compared to a base period.
- (3) The percentage increase in profitability of sales compared to a base period.



- (4) The percentage of increase in return on capital employed compared to a base period.

Of course, results in the above mentioned areas can move in the opposite direction too. These criteria have the following characteristics.

These are blanket measures covering the management of the enterprise in its generic sense. But there are several aspects in the managing of an enterprise, *e.g.*, production management, materials management, labour management, sales management, research and development management, and so on. Also, management is not a homogeneous collection of managerial personnel. There is top management, besides there being middle and supervisory management cadres. For useful assessment of performance, therefore, these criteria have to be applied by managerial functions, as well as by managerial levels. In doing so, it will become apparent that not all the criteria can be meaningfully applied to each function or to each level. This aspect will be elaborated in the following section of the article.

The listed criteria can be visualized as a flow-process. Cost reduction or cost effectiveness leads to higher productivity, because the ratio of outputs to inputs is increased. Higher productivity and lower costs lead, in turn, to greater profitability of sales. Given the same amount of capital employed, increased profitability means higher return on capital employed. This flow process applies to the whole enterprise taken as a single unit. Thus, reduction of costs in a service department (*e.g.*, personnel) does not directly increase its own profitability, although contributing to the profits of the enterprise as a whole. The same logic applies to return on capital employed. In other words, there will be many sub-systems in the organization, whose performance cannot be assessed in terms of profitability or return on capital employed. The contributions of managerial personnel in these areas merge into aggregate enterprise results. This makes it difficult to measure their performance directly and quantitatively.

These criteria represent only the 'end-results' of the whole process of managing. They do not reflect the 'intermediate' effects of policies pursued and actions taken at various levels in the organization. The impact on the 'intervening variables' is wholly ignored. These variables consist of factors, like employee loyalty and commitment, opportunity for management development, the extent of consultation and participation in matters effecting employees, their morale and motivation, their readiness to accept change, and so on. It is quite possible, and perhaps usual, to be positive on end-results, yet negative on the intervening



variables. However, the long-term effect of ignoring these latter variables is bound to be negative even on the end-results.

The preceding two paras lead to the consideration of 'qualitative' criteria. This is only another way of expressing Likert's 'intervening' variables. They cannot be ignored since every organization is a 'human' organization.<sup>20</sup> Whatever structures, strategies and tools are applied in managing an enterprise, their effects are inevitably filtered through the 'social network' of the organization. This network covers the whole structure, and persists besides and beyond all sophistication in planning, decision-making, control, etc.

#### PROCESS OF APPRAISAL

A system of performance appraisal will now be elaborated, as it might ideally obtain, in the light of recent research in the field. Thus, Douglas McGregor has argued that it is unwise and insensitive to judge the subordinates' personality in the name of appraisal.<sup>21</sup> On this ground, he found that managers themselves were more perceptive of the reality behind appraisal compared to the personnel administrators and social scientists. In the rightness of things, appraisal should be based on performance relative to goals. A recent re-statement of this thesis is made by P. H. Thompson and G. W. Dalton.<sup>22</sup> They argue that 'peer-comparisons' of managers (another name for personality rating) is a deflating experience for the latter. Such comparisons are based on the wrong premise of a business organization as having 'zero-sum' game characteristics. Such an assumption implies no scope for progressive scaling of higher peaks in performance. But, reality shows a business to possess 'non-zero-sum' game characteristics. For efficient utilization of these features, the emphasis should shift to 'objective-focussed' appraisal. This will generate a high-motivation atmosphere for the managers.

Both the articles mentioned above consider the 'Management by Objectives' (MBO) system to possess distinct advantages for objective-focussed performance appraisal.<sup>23</sup> This system, as propagated by P. F. Drucker, requires the establishment of separate objectives in all

<sup>20</sup> R. Likert, *The Human Organization*, New York, McGraw Hill-Kogakusha, 1967.

<sup>21</sup> D. McGregor, "An Uneasy Look at Performance Appraisal", *Harvard Business Review*, May-June, 1957.

<sup>22</sup> P. H. Thompson and G. W. Dalton, "Performance Appraisal—Managers Beware", *Harvard Business Review*, January-February, 1970.

<sup>23</sup> A recent article on the relevance of MBO in performance appraisal by K. Banerjee ("Performance Appraisal in Banks") appeared in the *Economic and Political Weekly*, 29th May, 1971.

identifiable result areas of the business, and then integrating these to yield an overall performance plan for the enterprise.<sup>24</sup> The responsibility for setting these objectives is not exclusively that of top management. It is more importantly a participative exercise among men at all levels in the organization. High motivation and commitment amongst personnel arise from this feature. Under MBO, attention is not paid to the behavioural traits of personnel as such, but to the results achieved by them that stand clearly on their own.<sup>25</sup> That this is largely true, has been corroborated by our own research into the practice of MBO within the British National Coal Board. The interviews with colliery managers uniformly revealed their high commitment to the targets set to them after the implementation of MBO. Although the Board has not yet started using this system as a basis for individual performance appraisal, steps are afoot in this direction.

Insofar as MBO shifts emphasis from 'manager appraisal' (*i.e.* personality ratings of managers) to 'performance appraisal' (*i.e.* comparing results against targets), it is certainly more rational in its approach. This is the point we made in the beginning of the article. However, there is more in performance appraisal than merely balancing final results against pre-set objectives. Since business results in common parlance are always expressed in physical or monetary quantities, they present a picture which is the culmination of many preceding interactions amongst a host of variables in the organization. Of these variables, the qualitative ones are as important (particularly in the long-run) as the quantitative ones. Short-term success on quantitative objectives may be achieved at the expense of long-run deterioration in the quality of organizational functioning. Popular interpretations of MBO seem to miss this point. Even if they do direct attention on these aspects, such concern seems to be confined to the manager's role in question only. It is not extended to include the results of his actions on the subordinates' behaviour at micro-level (this point will be illustrated in the following paras). Hence, the formulation in the following paras will present a twofold list, incorporating the quantitative and qualitative criteria of performance appraisal for three managerial levels, *i.e.* supervisory, middle, and top. To impart a semblance of realism to the formulation, we will again draw upon our research in the British coal mines. The component criteria will, of course, have general validity for all business enterprises. (It should be mentioned that the outline given below is not in actual use within the National Coal Board of U.K., although it is possible to do so.)

<sup>24</sup> P. F. Drucker, *The Practice of Management*, London, Heinemann, 1954.

<sup>25</sup> R. F. Valentine, *Performance Objectives for Managers*, Bombay, Taraporevala, 1969.

*Supervisory Level*

The typical first-line supervisor in a coal mine is called a 'deputy', although there is another category of such supervisors, namely, 'shot-firers'. A Deputy is in immediate charge of all production operations on a single coal-face for a single shift. In addition, he has the overriding legal responsibility for the safety of the miners he is directing. The following is a checklist of performance criteria to be applied to him under the dual classification mentioned above.

*(a) Quantitative*

- (1) Quantity of coal to be extracted per shift on average over, say, a week or a month.
- (2) Average labour cost per ton of coal, allowed over a week or a month.
- (3) Average materials cost per ton of coal, allowed over a week or a month.
- (4) Average total cost per ton of coal, allowed over a week or a month.
- (5) Average output per manshift to be achieved over a week or a month.
- (6) Average output per machineshift to be achieved over a week or a month.

(No profitability criterion has been included because neither the decision about the markets nor about the prices for coal is at the discretion of the colliery manager.)

The quantitative criteria will be set after proper consultations with the deputy by his superiors. If there are any constraints operating regarding the materials and labour factors, these should be taken into account. In a coal mine, the greatly varying geological possibilities have also got to be allowed for in the setting of targets. Owing to their unpredictability, for some coal-faces it may be injudicious to set average targets for periods exceeding one month at a time. Yet, this does not prevent overall long-term planning for the whole colliery.

*(b) Qualitative*

- (1) The permissible absence percentage from the face, including voluntary and involuntary, for a week or month.

- (2) The permissible rate of labour turnover on the face over a week or month.
- (3) The permissible number of manshifts lost due to stoppages of work by miners on the face over a week or month.
- (4) The permissible number of accidents on the coal-face for a week or month.

The rates of absenteeism and labour turnover are indicators of 'unorganized' conflict at the work-place (*i.e.* actions taken by employees individually). Work stoppages by miners in groups are evidence of 'organized' conflict. W. H. Scott *et al* consider the presence of 'un-organized' conflict as indicator of low morale among the men.<sup>26</sup> If morale were high, they might have resorted to overt, organized forms of non-cooperation with supervisors. In either form of conflict, there is some reflection upon the qualitative performance of first-line managers. But, under Indian conditions today, it may be relatively more difficult to draw such inferences because of the shop-floor relationships as they exist.

Needless to repeat, these bench-marks have also to be set after consultation with and agreement of the deputy, or first-line supervisors in general. Here too, it is indispensable to recognize that performance on each of these criteria may depend on factors beside the deputy's control. Barring these reservations, however, performance in these areas will reflect the quality of work-life prevailing on the coal-face or the work-bench. Thus, a deputy may, in his enthusiasm for high production and productivity, 'drive' and 'push' the miners so hard that they may resort to more absenteeism, or to work-stoppage even. Accidents may increase because of the 'crash' speed of work. Miners may leave this coal-face or this colliery, thus throwing the face-manpower ratio out of gear. Ultimately, all these events will be a drag on quantitative performance as well. High motivation of the deputy is desirable. But a limited view of it leads to breakdown of morale and motivation at micro-level, *i.e.* among the miners. Indeed, such situations have prevailed from time to time in some British coal mines under the sustained drive to improve productivity and to reduce costs in the face of competition. These situations point to potential conflict between the 'self-actualizing' efforts of an individual manager and the tensions generated thereby amongst subordinates who are not at the manager's pitch of enthusiasm. In a sense, Bennis' argument that whether managerial leaders can at all be considered solely self-actualizing is worth reflecting on.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> W. H. Scott *et al*, *Coal and Conflict*, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1963.

<sup>27</sup> W. G. Bennis, *op. cit.*

Thus, performance on these 'intervening' variables at the lowest operating level is as crucial as that on the 'result' variables. An appraisal system incorporating this thesis does not assess the personality traits of first-line supervisors. *The advantage of all the qualitative criteria cited above is that they are expressible in quantitative terms.* They do not have to be impressionistic. They too are objective-focussed. In this respect, the formulation given here seems to go beyond usual MBO interpretations in that the qualitative variables are being explicitly brought into the checklist. Moreover, the recognition of these variables at one level is being linked to their effects on similar variables at the next lower level. High motivation at supervisory level may infiltrate the operatives' level. But this may not always be reciprocated unless the grounds for it are carefully prepared.

### *Middle Management Level*

The middle management category at a colliery comprises the 'overman', the colliery mechanization and electrical engineers, the safety, ventilation and strata control engineers, and the machine utilization officers. From the production management viewpoint, the overman is the typical middle-level manager. Law too accords him this position. He is in overall charge of a whole 'district' in the mine for one shift. A district may include several coal-faces in one or more seam(s) underground. This means that an overman is usually in-charge of more than one deputy. He controls one 'district system', whereas the deputy supervises a 'face system'.

The significant fact about this level of management, in general, is that neither does it take policy decisions, nor does it have immediate contact with the operational level. Its role seems to be that of a clearing house for policy decisions from top level, and for information on results from the operational level. It converts policy decisions into executive decisions. The latter are the basis for operational decisions for first-line managers. Middle managers monitor information about performance at operational level, and transmit these to top managers.

How does the middle-management, then, stand in relation to the assessment of its own performance? There appears to be only one answer to this. *A middle-level manager would be judged by the extent of success the operational area in his charge manages to achieve.* The analogy of the measure of a teacher's success on the basis of laurels gained by his students may not be inapt. (Of course, students do succeed despite poor teachers, and good teachers too have poor students !) With the above mentioned remarks in view, the following suggestions may be made.

(a) *Quantitative*

A list of targets identical with that of the deputy's would be logical. These figures would, however, relate to the 'district' as a whole because this is the unit of the overman's responsibility. The formulation of district targets is straightforward enough so far as the six quantitative bench-marks listed above are concerned. However, in addition, two very important functions of the overman should be:

- (1) The rational use of overhead facilities common to all the coal-faces in his district. The emphasis on this aspect would be correlated to the degree of mechanization in the district.
- (2) The coordination of outward transport facilities from the coal-faces to the shaft-bottom. This is essential to maintain an even rate of production at the face, and thereby to help the optimum use of overheads invested in the district.

More generally, the function of the middle managers would be to create a working atmosphere and to create the overall working facilities that will help the first-line managers to improve performance. To the extent a middle manager makes this possible, this in itself is an index of his success. Since, however, his efforts mediate through others, *i.e.* first-line supervisors, the interpretation of final results attributed to him should make allowance for this fact.

(b) *Qualitative*

The criteria of rate of absenteeism, labour turnover, strikes, etc., are quite appropriate for operatives under first-line supervisors. The proportion of supervisors to workers is, however, generally quite small. These criteria, although logically applicable to the supervisors as well, do not seem quite so significant if applied in turn by middle managers to their immediate subordinates. All these symptoms of conflict are possibly less serious for supervisors than for workers. Instead, the following criteria seem to be apt in the light of the nature of functions of middle managers:

- (1) F. J. Roethlisberger said sometime ago in a classic article that the foremen were the "master and victim of double talk".<sup>28</sup> This may be generalized to include all kinds of middle-level managers and supervisors also. Such a situation appears to be caused basically by the wrong handling of these personnel by

<sup>28</sup> F. J. Roethlisberger, "Foreman: The Master and Victim of Double Talk", *Harvard Business Review*, No. 5, 1955.



middle managers. The latter should not allow supervisors and foremen to nurse the notion that they are partly workers and partly managers, even though most of them may have directly come up from the ranks of operatives. Any ambivalence in their role-attitudes arising from this fact could be most damaging to performance. *The success of a middle manager may, therefore, be gauged by the extent to which his immediate subordinates also regard themselves as managers.*

- (2) Development of future managers is certainly one of the major functions of management as a whole. Given a properly framed manpower policy in a stable or growing enterprise, one *test of success of a particular management level is the ratio of managers internally promoted from lower levels to those recruited from outside.* The same test should apply equally well to various management levels in the case of retention and wastage of management trainees recruited by several concerns.
- (3) The importance of upward communication or 'feedback', as it is called, needs emphasis even today. The extent to which it is ignored in practice makes it a necessary yardstick in the assessment of middle-management performance. The main idea in 'feedback' is: directives and instructions should not be a one-way traffic in the downward direction. Their origin and validity should lie first in the situation to which they are to apply. Hence, there should ideally be requests or demands for advice, direction, guidance, etc., from lower-level personnel to higher level personnel.<sup>29</sup> The ability of middle managers to generate this upward mobility of ideas, information and queries from first-line supervisors could be a good index of the former's success.

Since middle managers have to secure improvements in performance through first-line managers and supervisors, the above mentioned qualitative criteria seem to be of greater long-run significance. Given good performance on these, quantitative results could largely take care of themselves.

### *Top Management Level*

At a colliery, this level consists of the Colliery Manager/Colliery General Manager, Deputy Manager, and one or more Undermanagers.

<sup>29</sup> P. M. Blau, "Formal Organizations—Dimensions of Analysis", *American Sociological Review*, 1957/58.



In general, since the organizational pyramid converges to its narrowest at the apex, the performance of people at this height can only be judged by certain blanket measures applying either to the chief functional areas, or to the enterprise as a whole. In a way, the success of the enterprise is the success of its top management more than that of any other level of management. It is top management which provides leadership, which frames the organizational structure, which brings into explicit consideration environmental factors, which initiates a work-atmosphere that breeds alienation or commitment, and so on. It is here that policy decisions originate and crystallize. Capital investment programmes, wages and remuneration plans, research and development projects, etc., are all formulated and activated at this level. The executive and operational (*i.e.* tactical) decisions are all taken within the parameters of these broad policy (*i.e.* strategic) decisions.

The following criteria may now be suggested for the appraisal of performance by top management.

(a) *Quantitative*

The most significant measure of success for top management (considering it to be a cohesive group of individuals committed to specific goals for the enterprise) is the 'return on capital employed'. This percentage combines in it the profitability of sales and the effectiveness of utilization of capital employed. Although there are many problems in arriving at appropriate 'profit' and 'capital employed' figures, yet there is no detracting from the fact of its being a good single quantitative measure of aggregate success in managing an enterprise.<sup>30</sup>

The other blanket measure of top management performance is the index of 'labour productivity'. Improvements in labour productivity arise from capital investment, better work methods, better personnel policies, etc., all of which originate at the top echelons of management.<sup>31</sup> Some writers think that in a country like India, where capital is scarce but labour is plenty, the emphasis ought to be on capital productivity rather than on labour productivity.<sup>32</sup> There is apparent logic in the argument. But, it appears to us that capital cannot be productive by itself unless labour operates on it effectively. In other words, it is

<sup>30</sup> See, for example, V. J. Stafford, "Asset Base for Performance Evaluation", *Management Accounting* (U.S.A.), February, 1968.

<sup>31</sup> For instance, F. Harbison and C. A. Myers, *Management in The Industrial World*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1959.

<sup>32</sup> For example, D. B. Gupta, "Productivity and Economic Growth", *NPC Productivity Journal*, Winter, 1969/70.

contended here that an increase in labour productivity shall cause a corresponding increase in capital productivity. There cannot be improved capital productivity (with a given asset structure) unless it is accompanied by increased labour productivity.

The use of labour (or for that matter capital) productivity index is defensible on yet another ground. Profitability and productivity are not identical. Profitability of sales depends on many external factors which the enterprise cannot control, e.g., price or income elasticity of demand, emergence of substitutes, government fiscal policy, and the like. Productivity is, however, much more within the powers of management to control on its own. Scores of ways remain untapped to boost the output/input ratio. But owing to external constraints, improved productivity may be unaccompanied by commensurate improvement in profits. To judge management performance here by profitability alone would be unfair. Productivity indices would do more justice in showing the success of top management. And if these are expressed as an index upon labour input, the operational personnel are likely to perceive them as top management's recognition of their contribution.

*(b) Qualitative*

Some notions about the qualitative aspects of top management performance have been presented in the first para on p. 182.

Thus, nowhere does the role of inspired leadership at the top become more crucial to viability than in a dwindling industry. To go back to our example of the NCB (U.K.), the rearguard action being fought by it is most exemplary. The waning confidence of a vast proportion of the population in the coal industry—both in its product and labour markets—has, by and large, been forestalled by Lord Robens. Large-scale modifications in organization structure, in planning and control, in wage systems, etc., have all been done at his behest by top level executives who are equally committed to make a success of the job. A regeneration of the same kind (although not in the context of declining demand) is said to have occurred in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission of India.<sup>33</sup>

Besides the criterion of dynamic leadership from top management, all the three qualitative standards mentioned for middle managers are also applicable to the assessment of performance of top echelon

<sup>33</sup> L. J. Jhonson, "ONGC—A Study in Regeneration", *Lokudyog*, June, 1969.

managers. For the latter, these hold good in relation to the managers in ranks immediately below them.

In a still broader context, the success of top managers has to be assessed by examining the contributions, and where necessary, modifications in the interest of economic development, to the predominant socio-cultural values of the environment. It is now being gradually accepted that production of economic values is not the sole function of a business enterprise. Social cost/benefit analyses are being increasingly emphasized. Since operational techniques and managerial strategies all impinge in some way on the social fabric, the latter should be suitably taken into account to make changes acceptable.<sup>34</sup> A consideration of these aspects, concurrently with the extension of economic values, will create a niche for the enterprise as a worthwhile institution in society. It is primarily the responsibility of top management to achieve this.

#### ACCOUNTANTS AND APPRAISAL OF PERFORMANCE

The cost and management accountants have a definite contribution to make in the quantitative assessment of managerial performance. The most time-tested instrument for this purpose is functional and overall profit and loss account and balance sheet, and the budgets. However, a voice or two of doubt about conventional budgetary control practice have been raised.<sup>35</sup> This article will rest content with only drawing attention to the human relations and motivational implications of budgetary control, *i.e.* the qualitative side-effects of a quantitative tool.

Messrs Argyris, Becker and Green, and Hughes have all dwelt on the above mentioned theme in their respective articles in *Studies in Cost Analysis*.<sup>36</sup> A common belief among line managers is that budget administrators thrive on the formers' lapses and shortcomings. Budget figures are regarded as impositions—a stick wielded on them by staff people. The so-called principle 'management by exception', the line managers allege, is used to highlight only the 'unfavourable' variations. A little reasoning would suggest that better motivation can result from giving credit where it is due. Favourable variances are also exceptions. These too should be spot-lighted in reports to top management.

It appears that usual budgetary control practice is based on rules deriving from 'Theory X' assumptions about human behaviour.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>34</sup> *International Labour Review*, August, 1966.

<sup>35</sup> For example, R. D. F. Morris, "Budgetary Control is Obsolete", *Management Accounting* (U. K.), August, 1968.

<sup>36</sup> D. Solomons (ed.), *Studies in Cost Analysis*, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1970.

<sup>37</sup> D. McGregor, *The Human Side of Enterprise*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1960.

Suspensions about budgetary control can also be traced to this fundamental fallacy. The accountants with top management support should imbibe the spirit of *participative* budgetary control. Budgets should be built up from bottom so that these become 'accepted' and not 'imposed' objectives. Only under such conditions could line management cooperate with a budgetary control system. A large measure of self-controlling and self-directing effort would then be forthcoming from them. The assumptions of McGregor's 'Theory Y' would now be coming into their own.

As purveyors of quantitative information on performance, the accountants are, thus, in a position to make or mar the motivational side of performance appraisal. There is need to develop the awareness that they do not deal with figures *per se*. Figures relate to individuals, on which they will act, or to which they will react. Ability to see beyond the sets of figures into their human implications seems to require some training of accountants in human relations and allied areas. The cost accountants appear to be in a better position than financial accountants to absorb the spirit of human relations, so far as it contributes to performance appraisal. The former are already geared to providing appropriate information for internal management, compared to the latter's primary responsibility to the shareholders and outside public in general. Consequently, the cost accountants are a step nearer to appreciating the motivational implications of appraisal techniques operated by them.

#### CONCLUSION

The preceding pages have tried to shed light on: (1) certain pre-conditions, and (2) a general outline of a scheme of performance appraisal for line management. Analysis has been done from the angle of industrial/managerial sociology. The stand taken has been that despite all sophistication in appraisal techniques, improvement in managerial performance is basically a human process. All techniques must get filtered through the internal social network of the enterprise. Explicit and conscious recognition of this fact should, in our view, come first in a serious consideration of performance appraisal.

It also seems fit to bear in mind that performance appraisal is not an end in itself. It is a means to, among other things, 'management development', *i.e.* a process of maturation of managers as a vital resource of the enterprise. Here, the need for adapting internal managerial behaviour in the light of the external socio-cultural milieu of the enterprise is unquestionable. However, all this does not take place entirely in abstraction. More tangible incentives, other than purely intellectual ones, are needed to help maturation. A proper scheme of managerial compensation and remuneration should accompany a performance

appraisal system. Management development and career development (in terms of rewards) go together. It is not intended here to go into details on this subject. Only a few problem areas in fitting a compensation scheme to a performance appraisal system will be mentioned:

- (1) Since the performance of an individual is bound up in a myriad ways with what others around him do, how does one isolate his personal contribution? One has only to visualize the 'linking-pin' network of organized activity<sup>38</sup> to appreciate the significance of this problem.
- (2) While it is straightforward enough to correlate rewards to standard or better-than-standard performance, what does really one do in case of sub-standard achievements? The sack or demotion does not seem to be a very sensitive or sensible device at managerial levels. In any case, if some kind of disincentive is not devised for the persistent laggards, the impact of performance appraisal on the good performers may be diluted—even distorted. On the other hand, explicit linkage of performance appraisal—through MBO—to a reward/penalty system may cause similar symptoms to appear as with piece-work systems for shop-floor operatives.<sup>39</sup>
- (3) How and to what extent should attainment of qualitative standards of performance be reflected in the reward-system? What should be the relative weightage attached to qualitative and quantitative performances?
- (4) The relativity of wage differentials in the ranks of the operatives is always crucial. There is no reason why this should not hold true for the managerial cadres too. Much of the benefits of a compensation scheme could be wasted through insufficient consideration of this aspect.

Finally, the essential philosophy of performance appraisal should be to inculcate the attitude of and motivation for self-appraisal. With increasingly better educated and qualified personnel operating complex business enterprises, this ought to be the ultimate goal to aim for. Although, to illustrate ideas and approach mentioned in this article, researches in a public sector mining industry in a foreign country have been drawn upon, the general framework emerging therefrom should be well worth testing in public or private sector undertakings in India as well.

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<sup>38</sup> R. Likert, *The Human Organization*, op. cit.

<sup>39</sup> J. Gill and C. F. Molander, "Beyond Management by Objectives", *Personnel Management*, August, 1970.



## BUREAUCRACY IN INDIA : AN EMPIRICAL STUDY\*

V. A. Pai Panandiker and S. S. Kshirsagar

THE focus on 'bureaucracies' or the civil service systems has been the inevitable consequence of the policy and implementative roles which bureaucracies all over the world have played. In some of the countries of the West, including the United States, there was a prevalent myth that bureaucracies do not make policies; they merely implement them. As works of Paul Appleby and others have clearly brought out, the distinction between policy formulation and implementation is very thin; indeed policy is made where a decision is made.<sup>1</sup> In the socialist countries of the world led by the Soviet Russia, such distinctions are made much less. The intermeshing of the Communist party with the State bureaucracy blurs any distinctions between policy formulation and implementation.

Bureaucracies are, in other words, crucial elements of the political systems all over the world, and have been recognized to be so more or less explicitly. As Bensman and Rosenberg note, "bureaucracy is not intrinsic to communism, socialism or capitalism. It can exist in any type of society, with or without private property, and in a basically dictatorial or a basically democratic climate."<sup>2</sup>

### OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The role and significance of the public bureaucracy in India have been much more readily recognized and appreciated. The present study is an attempt to examine the characteristics of the Indian bureaucracy

\*The study reported here constituted a part of the more comprehensive study entitled "Bureaucracy and Development Administration in India", completed by the authors at the Indian Institute of Public Administration in 1968-69. The study was undertaken for the use of the Administrative Reforms Commission and was given a limited circulation. Its broader objectives were to examine the nature of Indian bureaucracy and the compatibility or otherwise between bureaucracy and development administration. The authors record their gratitude to the Indian Institute of Public Administration for sponsoring the study. The authors also wish to acknowledge the research assistance provided by S. N. Swaroop (Research Officer, Training Division, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India), in conducting the study.

<sup>1</sup> Paul H. Appleby, *Policy in Administration*, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1957, p. 173.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph Bensman and Bernard Rosenberg, *Mass, Class and Bureaucracy*, Englewood Cliffs (New Jersey), Prentice Hall, 1963, p. 548.

in the context of the prevailing bureaucratic theory. The study reviews briefly the existing theory of bureaucracy and then presents the empirical results of the application of the key postulates of this theory to the Indian bureaucracy.

### *Review of Bureaucratic Theory*

The basic theoretical constructs of an "ideal-type" bureaucracy as an administrative institution were formulated by Max Weber. These were subsequently modified by researchers, like Robert Merton, Peter Blau, etc. Bureaucracy has also been viewed as a political institution by other researchers emphasizing its role "as an instrument of power, of exercising control over people, and over different spheres of life, and of continuous expansion of such power either in the interest of the bureaucracy itself or in the interest of some (often sinister) masters".<sup>3</sup>

According to Weber, "The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization".<sup>4</sup> The Weberian definition of the benefits of bureaucracy were mainly the following:<sup>5</sup>

- (1) Bureaucracy is efficient. It is staffed by people who have developed a method which, beyond question, is technically superior to administration by amateurs or dabblers.
- (2) Bureaucracy is predictable. Since it proceeds from a well defined but rigid system of rules enforced through the hierarchical system, top officials have every reason to expect that orders will be dutifully carried out.
- (3) Bureaucracy is impersonal. That it is not influenced by any primary group sentiment, or by emotional considerations; that it subdues all personal vagaries and biases.
- (4) Bureaucracy is fast. Uniformity of rules makes it possible to handle a vast number of cases speedily which would otherwise be impossible.

As Weber himself expressed it, "Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs—that are

<sup>3</sup> For a detailed review, see S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 4 (Dec. 1959), pp. 302-320.

<sup>4</sup> See H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1948, p. 214.

<sup>5</sup> Joseph Bensman and Bernard Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 267.



raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form".<sup>6</sup> To Weber, "Bureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations . . . . The 'objective' discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable rules and 'without regard for persons'."<sup>7</sup>

Weber pointed out a large number of the characteristics of his "ideal-type" bureaucracy.<sup>8</sup> Mainly they were:

- (1) Bureaucracies are hierarchically organized. "The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super and sub-ordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones."
- (2) Bureaucracies are based on a systematic division of labour.
- (3) All bureaucratic operations are governed by a consistent system of abstract rules.
- (4) Bureaucratic operations consist in the application of these rules to particular cases.
- (5) Bureaucracies are impersonal in their character, *i.e.* they function "without regard for persons".
- (6) Bureaucracies are rational in their decision-making; developed bureaucracies "succeed in eliminating from official business love, hatred and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation".
- (7) Bureaucracies are career-based.
- (8) Recruitment to bureaucracies is based on merit and technical qualifications.

Bureaucracy as a focal point for research in public administration has been the theme of considerable literature in recent years, especially in the field of comparative public administration<sup>9</sup>. The major problem

<sup>6</sup> H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, p. 215.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 196-244.

<sup>9</sup> See Ferrel Heady, "Comparative Public Administration: Concerns and Priorities" and Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed" in Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes, *Papers in Comparative Public Administration*, Ann Arbor (Michigan), Institute of Public Administration, 1962, pp. 1-18 and 59-96. Also Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1963, p. 322.

faced in such research is whether a body of bureaucratic theory does really exist which can provide a basis for comparison. Heady, in his analysis of Berger's research<sup>10</sup>, suggests that structural characteristics of bureaucracy seem universal enough to encourage empirical research to test hypotheses concerning behavioural patterns.

#### PROBLEM FOR RESEARCH

We sought to examine the various postulates of the existing bureaucratic theory to find out the extent to which the Indian bureaucratic system conforms or does not conform to them. For purposes of the study, we decided to leave out the last two characteristics, viz., that bureaucracy is career-based and that recruitment to it is made on the basis of technical qualifications and merit. We did so because there are enough studies of the Indian bureaucracy to show that it is essentially career-based as well as that its recruitment is based on technical qualifications and on merit. We, therefore, concentrated on the first six characteristics listed earlier, which are:

#### *Structural Characteristics*

- (1) *Hierarchy*, i.e. arrangement of organizational personnel into a chain of superiors and subordinates with corresponding filtration of authority and initiative.
- (2) *Division of labour*, i.e. differentiation of functions based on specialization between the officials positioned at different organizational levels.
- (3) *System of rules*, i.e. prescription of elaborate rules and procedures to govern the operations of the office and the rights and duties of position incumbents.

#### *Behavioural Characteristics*

- (4) *Impersonality*, i.e. discharge of official business "without regard for persons" and dealing with each just as any other 'case' to be settled according to standard norms or "calculable" rules. It is not influenced by any primary group sentiments or emotional considerations. Thus, the tax officers would not discriminate between two assesseees falling in comparable tax

<sup>10</sup> See Morroe Berger, "Bureaucracy East & West", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 1 (March 1957), pp. 518-529 and Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 3 (1959), pp. 509-525.

situation on the ground that one is an ordinary citizen and the other, say a minister or a civil servant or an industrialist.

- (5) *Rationality, i.e.* choosing between alternatives objectively on considerations of efficiency; "rules, means, ends, and matter-of-factness dominate its bearing".
- (6) *Rule-orientations, i.e.* following strictly the official rules, norms of conduct, and procedures.

We have considered the first three characteristics in the above mentioned list as relating essentially to the structure of bureaucratic organizations since they set the basic foundations while the other three as basically the behavioural characteristics of bureaucracy since they involve decisional situations. In this study, we have assumed that bureaucracy is an organizational condition that exists along a continuum and that it is not a condition that is either present or absent.

In order to test the applicability of the bureaucratic model described above to the civil service in India, we developed the following specific major hypotheses:

- (1) The civil service in India is highly bureaucratic indicating that all the characteristics of bureaucracy are present in it to an equally high degree.
- (2) Since bureaucratic characteristics are inherently related to one another, the civil service is uniformly bureaucratic along structural and behavioural dimensions.

#### METHODOLOGY

In this study, we decided to use the perceptual measures of bureaucratic characteristics. Admittedly, the perceptions of member-civil servants may be at variance with official prescriptions. There is, however, sufficient research evidence to show that the degree to which the bureaucracy perceives, accepts and adheres to the official structure is as important operationally as its formal character. We, then, developed Likert type scales for all the six characteristics of bureaucracy selected for the study. Each scale<sup>11</sup> consisted of a number of items inclusive of several based on actual incidents relating to the dominant theme of a characteristic described above. These scales were used as dependent variables. The questionnaire also included a series of questions about the background information of respondents, such as the class of service,

<sup>11</sup> These scales were found to be generally moderately reliable.

level of their education, the size of their organizations, the nature of the development tasks performed by these organizations, etc. These were used as independent variables.

For illustrative purposes, we describe below a few items from the above mentioned scales along with the response categories provided for replying to them:

- (1) "There can be little action taken in this office until a superior officer approves a decision." How accurately does this statement describes the day-to-day work of your office? (An item in the scale of *Hierarchy*.)

"Most accurate—Largely accurate—Fairly accurate—Largely inaccurate—Most inaccurate."

- (2) Does your position require you to do the similar things which are performed by your immediate superior? (An item in the scale of *Division of Labour*.)

"Almost all the things—Many things—Some things—Few things—Practically none."

- (3) In handling your official duties, do you feel that there are enough rules and regulations which give you a fairly clear direction for handling your work? (An item in the scale of *System of Rules*.)

"Rather excessive—More than enough—About enough—Little—Too little."

The questionnaire was personally administered to a group of civil servants working in four developmental agencies. Three of these were more in the nature of secretariat agencies and one a field agency. The field agency handled development programmes in the area of agriculture. Two of these four agencies belonged to the Central Government, of which one was in industrial and the other in agricultural sector. The other two agencies were similarly in the two sectors but at the State level. We did so deliberately to find out what relationship these factors had to bureaucratic characteristics. The respondents covered all the officials in Class I, II and III who dealt with development work. The total number of officials in all the three classes handling development task was 911. All were administered the questionnaire; 723 or 79.3 per cent of them replied to the questionnaire in full. The class-wise break-up of this sample of 723 civil servants was: 137 (18.94 per cent) in Class I, 136 (18.81 per cent) in Class II, and 449 (62.25 per cent) in Class III. Data on one respondent was not available. In order to check the reliability of these responses, the same questionnaire

was administered to a small sub-sample drawn from the above mentioned group. The results of this follow-up enquiry closely supported the findings of the main study.

#### MAJOR FINDINGS

To test the overall character of the bureaucratic nature of the civil service responses of the 723 officers were tabulated together on the six above mentioned scales. The respondents were rated as high and low along each scale on the basis of the mean score of each scale. These results are presented in Table 1 below:

TABLE 1  
SCORES ON BUREAUCRATIC CHARACTERISTICS  
(N=723)

<i>Bureaucratic Characteristics</i>	<i>Ratings of Respondents<sup>12</sup></i>	
	<i>High</i> (per cent)	<i>Low</i> (per cent)
<i>Structural</i>		
Hierarchy	59.8	40.2
Division of labour	68.6	31.4
System of rules	52.8	47.2
<i>Behavioural</i>		
Impersonality	73.3	26.7
Rationality	45.5	54.5
Rule-orientation	34.8	65.2

As Table 1 suggests, the generalized hypothesis that the civil service in India is "highly bureaucratic" is not entirely borne out by the study. Although more than 50 per cent scored high on four characteristics, the scores were strikingly low on rationality and rule-orientation. The low score of the majority of the respondents on the scale of rationality supports the popular belief that decision-making in Government is still not based on objective or efficiency considerations. We also

<sup>12</sup> Respondents who scored above the mean of the scale were rated "high" and those who scored below the mean were rated "low".



ascertained the perceptions of the respondents about 'rationality' among Government servants. The respondents generally felt that personal and familial relations exert considerable influence on the performance of official duties of the civil servants.

We then considered the bureaucratic characteristics along two dimensions: structural and behavioural. On the structural side, the characteristics of hierarchy and division of labour were borne out by the study. However, on the third structural characteristic, *viz.*, the system of rules, the score of the respondents was not as high as anticipated. A sizable proportion of the respondents (little over 47 per cent) reported that their jobs are not so highly codified that they are reduced to mere application of prescribed rules and procedures from case to case. Perhaps, one explanation of this could be that most of the development agencies were set up more recently and their internal system of rules had not yet reached the rigid levels as in the case of the older agencies.

The findings on the structural characteristics suggest that there was sharp differentiation between the different levels and in the functions of superior officers from those of their subordinates. Thus, the process of bureaucratization in the sense of the various characteristics of bureaucratic structure seems to have generally "arrived" in the developmental agencies of the government at the State as well as the Central levels.

The findings on the behavioural dimensions, however, suggest important variations. While the scores on "impersonality" were quite high, on both "rationality" and "rule-orientation" the scores were perceptibly low. The degree of adaptation of rules suggested by the findings, indicate that the process of bureaucratization in the developmental agencies with respect to behavioural characteristics is indicative of a different trend; that a pronounced structural feature of a well-organized system of rules is not necessarily followed by a behavioural pattern of rule-orientation.

By way of a statement, therefore, suffice it to say at this stage that the civil service engaged in developmental functions is somewhat more bureaucratic in terms of the broad structural characteristics but less bureaucratic in terms of the behavioural characteristics. The hypothesis that the developmental civil service is essentially bureaucratic is, thus, only partially valid and that important variations appear to have already emerged.

To test the second hypothesis regarding the pattern of bureaucratization in the Indian public service, we adopted a different procedure. The questionnaire items relating to the structural characteristics of bureaucracy were taken together and considered as the scale of bureaucratic structure. Similarly, the items in the scales of behavioural characteristics of bureaucracy were considered together as constituting the scale of bureaucratic behaviour. Responses of each respondent to the items thus put together in each composite scale were added up to yield a single score on that scale. The dichotomization of respondents into high and low categories along the above mentioned two scales was made again on the basis of the means of the composite scales. Since we sought to identify the patterns of bureaucratization along structural and behavioural dimensions, data were tabulated, as mentioned above, separately in terms of the four offices covered in the study, their size, and also the functional content of these offices.

It is evident from Table 2 that all the four offices studied are more bureaucratic in terms of the basic structural characteristics than in terms of the behavioural ones, although there are variations between the two dimensions. However, the discrepancy between bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic behaviour is, from office to office, in the same direction as that in the case of the entire sample of 723 civil servants. The general pattern, therefore, appears to be that the civil service is less bureaucratic in the behavioural aspects than in the structural aspects. The hypothesis 2 stated above is thus only partially upheld. Further analyses revealed moderate correlation between structural and behavioural dimensions of bureaucracy implying that the latter is only partly generated by the former.

### *Relationship to the Type of Office*

While Table 2 indicates that all the four offices were more bureaucratic in terms of structural characteristics than the behavioural ones, the findings on Office D deserve special attention. Office D was a Block Development Office with primary emphasis on agricultural development. As against the other three offices, it was essentially a field office whose performance depended a great deal on the level of citizen participation in its programme of work.

The scores on both the structural and the behavioural dimensions of Office D are in considerable contrast to the three other offices. The findings, therefore, suggest that the combination of the type of offices (which in this case is a field office) and the nature of its administrative objectives which involve mass contact and participation, have an



TABLE 2.  
SCORES ON BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOUR ACCORDING  
TO THE TYPE OF OFFICE STUDY

Dimensions	Office A (N=215)		Office B (N=109)		Office C (N=262)		Office D (N=137)		Whole Sample (N=723)	
	High (per cent)	Low (per cent)	High (per cent)	Low (per cent)	High (per cent)	Low (per cent)	High (per cent)	Low (per cent)	High (per cent)	Low (per cent)
Bureaucratic structure	72.1	27.9	82.5	17.5	76.7	23.3	59.2	40.8	72.9	27.1
Bureaucratic behaviour	69.3	30.7	61.5	38.5	64.8	35.2	49.6	50.4	62.8	37.2

important bearing on the degree of its bureaucratization. Also, that the behavioural aspects have a bearing on the structure of bureaucracy itself. The findings suggest the propositions: (a) The field offices, whose performance is dependent on citizen participation and contact, will tend to be less bureaucratic and conversly, (b) headquarters or secretariat type offices, whose performance does not depend on mass contact or citizen participation, will tend to be more bureaucratic.

Both of these propositions have major implications for the theories of bureaucracy as well as for practical and policy matters.

### *Relationships with Types of Functions*

We also examined the relationship further in terms of the size of the organization and the type of development functions performed by it, on the one hand, and with the degree of bureaucratization, on the other. For this purpose, however, the performance of the respondents on each of the six characteristics of bureaucracy was considered separately. The results are presented in Table 3.

TABLE 3

SCORES ON BUREAUCRATIC CHARACTERISTICS ACCORDING TO TYPES OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES<sup>13</sup>

<i>Bureaucratic Characteristics</i>	<i>Chi-Square df=1</i>	<i>Development Programmes</i>			
		<i>Agriculture (N=399)</i>		<i>Industry (N=324)</i>	
		<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
		<i>(per cent)</i>	<i>(per cent)</i>	<i>(per cent)</i>	<i>(per cent)</i>
Hierarchy	7.58*	64.2	35.8	54.3	45.7
Division of labour	3.57†	65.5	34.5	72.2	27.8
System of rules	11.68*	47.0	53.0	59.8	40.2
Impersonality	27.89*	63.6	36.4	85.0	15.0
Rationality	1.61†	47.6	53.4	42.9	57.1
Rule-orientation	1.96†	37.1	62.9	32.1	67.9

\*Significant at 0.01 level.

†Not significant.

<sup>13</sup> The classification of respondents into high and low groups was done in the same manner as in the case of Table 1.

As Table 3 indicates, the functions, viz., agriculture and industry handled by the offices noticeably influenced the degree of their bureaucratization. Structurally, the agricultural agencies were more hierarchical but scored lower on the division of labour and on the system of rules. Their roles, thus, appeared somewhat less differentiated and formalized. On the behavioural side, agricultural agencies were much less impersonal (application of *chi*-square test showed that these differences were significant at the 1 per cent level), though they scored slightly lower on the scales of rationality and rule-orientation. The latter differences were marginal whereas, in the case of impersonality, these were found to be significant differences. Thus, the study indicates that the type of office and its functions have a major influence on the degree of its bureaucratic character.

#### *Relationship with Size of Organization*

As regards the size of the organization, it was found that the larger and the smaller offices studied did, to an extent, differ in their scores on the six characteristics. But this difference was statistically significant only in respect of the rule-orientation of their members, as shown in the following table. The table is based on data from two 'large' and two 'small' organizations; 477 respondents came from two large organizations and 246 from two small organizations. The percentages in the table are the proportion of members in large or small organizations reporting 'high' or 'low' rule-orientation.

TABLE 4  
RULE ORIENTATION AND SIZE OF THE ORGANIZATION

Size	Number of Respondents	Degree of Rule Orientation	
		High (per cent)	Low (per cent)
Large	477	39.0	61.0
Small	246	26.9	73.1

*Note*—*Chi*-square=10.58 and *df*=1. Significant at 0.01 level.

In general, the only proposition which emerges is: the larger the organization, the higher the emphasis on rule orientation. On the basis of the present study, we are not able to suggest any other major influence of organizational size on the bureaucratic character of the agencies.

*Relationship with Background Characteristics*

We were also interested to find if the background characteristics of the civil servants were associated with their bureaucratic disposition and, if so, to what extent. The results are described below.

(1) *Age*—On the first variable, viz., age, we found that the age of the civil servants made little difference in their bureaucratic disposition, especially in the degree of their attitudes of impersonality, rationality, and rule-orientation (Table 5). Since age and length of service in the Government vary together, the latter was not found to influence these attitudes to any significant degree.

TABLE 5  
BUREAUCRATIC DISPOSITION AND AGE

<i>Attitudes Considered</i>	<i>Degree of Bureaucratization</i>			
	<i>Young (&lt;40)</i>		<i>Old (&gt; 40)</i>	
	<i>(N=503)</i>		<i>(N=218)</i>	
	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
	<i>(per cent)</i>	<i>(per cent)</i>	<i>(per cent)</i>	<i>(per cent)</i>
Impersonality	72.9	27.1	73.8	26.2
Rationality	44.5	55.5	48.1	51.9
Rule-orientation	34.1	65.9	36.2	63.8

*Note*—Data on two respondents were not available.

(2) *Levels of Education*—Difference in the bureaucratic attitudes of the respondents according to the levels of education attained by them is described in Table 6.

The findings, as presented in Table 6, show that higher the level of education (beyond graduation), the higher the score on rationality and lower the score on rule-orientation. The data did not, however, show that the level of education of civil servants makes for any difference in their attitude of impersonality. We would suggest that the relationship between the educational levels and the degree of rule-orientation deserves careful consideration, especially for policy purposes. (Difference regarding rule-orientation between graduates and non-graduates significant at 0.01 level; *Chi-square*=14.84; *df*-1.)

TABLE 6  
BUREAUCRATIC ATTITUDES AND LEVELS OF EDUCATION

Attitudes Considered	Degree of Bureaucratization			
	Graduates (N=367)		Non-graduates (N=354)	
	High	Low	High	Low
	(per cent)	(per cent)	(per cent)	(per cent)
Impersonality	72.8	27.2	73.3	26.7
Rationality	47.6	52.4	43.5	56.5
Rule-orientation	27.2	72.8	42.1	57.9

*Note*—Data on two respondents were not available.

(3) *Rural/Urban Background*—For the purposes of this study, we considered a civil servant to have either rural or urban background on the basis of his having spent a major part of his adolescent years in either rural or urban areas. The study found that the proportion of more “impersonal” and more “rational” civil servants was higher among the respondents having urban background than among the respondents having rural background. The study also showed that the civil servants brought up in urban environment were generally less rule-oriented. However, only the differences between the impersonality and rule-orientation of rural and urban respondents were found statistically significant. (Impersonality: *Chi-square*=4.45; *df*=1; Rule-orientation: *Chi-square*=5.66; *df*=1; both significant at 0.05 level.) These results are presented in Table 7.

(4) *Upward Mobility*—As regards promotions received by the respondents, it was found that the proportion of highly impersonal civil servants was higher among those respondents who had received one or more promotions than among respondents who have not received any promotions. These results are shown in Table 8.

The data, however, also showed that the proportion of more impersonal respondents tends to be as low among the respondents who received three or more promotions as among the respondents who have not received any promotion. It, thus, appears that promotions do not have a lasting influence on the attitude of impersonality.

TABLE 7  
BUREAUCRATIC ATTITUDES AND RURAL/URBAN BACKGROUND

Attitudes Concerned	Degree of Bureaucratization			
	Rural (N=496)		Urban (N=219)	
	High	Low	High	Low
	(per cent)	(per cent)	(per cent)	(per cent)
Impersonality	70.5	29.5	77.5	22.5
Rationality	43.5	56.5	49.3	50.7
Rule-orientation	37.5	62.5	28.3	71.7

Note — Data on eight respondents were not available.

TABLE 8  
BUREAUCRATIC DISPOSITION AND UPWARD MOBILITY

Attitudes Considered	Degree of Bureaucratization			
	Promotees (N=463)		Non-Promotees (N=256)	
	High	Low	High	Low
	(per cent)	(per cent)	(per cent)	(per cent)
Impersonality	77.7	22.3	67.9	32.1
Rationality	45.5	54.5	47.3	52.7
Rule-orientation	33.8	66.2	38.3	61.7

Note — Data on four respondents were incomplete.

The study also interestingly showed that civil servants less often tend to be highly rule-oriented as they move upwards in the hierarchy. While there were not wide differences between the proportion of the highly rule-oriented civil servants among those who have been promoted and those who have not received any promotion, it was found that among the civil servants receiving three or more promotions, only 27.5 per cent were highly rule-oriented.

(5) *In-service Training*—One of the important findings of the study (Table 9) is that the civil servants who have been exposed to formal in-service training are less impersonal than those who have not received any such training. (*Chi-square*=10.82; *df*=1; significant at 0.01 level.) It was also generally found that greater the length of formal training received by the respondents, lesser did they emphasize impersonal handling of their work. On the other hand, surprisingly enough, the proportion of highly rational respondents was found to be somewhat lower among the formally trained civil servants than among the untrained civil servants. This could be interpreted in two ways. Either that training as a factor has no important bearing on "rationality" or that the present training system does not give adequate attention to aspects which develop the "rational" approach in civil servants.

TABLE 9

## BUREAUCRATIC DISPOSITION AND IN-SERVICE TRAINING

Attitudes Considered	Degree of Bureaucratization			
	Trained (N=230)		Untrained (N=491)	
	High	Low	High	Low
	(per cent)	(per cent)	(per cent)	(per cent)
Impersonality	65.2	34.8	77.2	22.8
Rationality	42.6	57.4	47.1	52.9
Rule-orientation	34.8	65.2	34.6	65.4

*Note* — Data on two respondents were incomplete.

(6) *Parental Occupations*—The study also examined the relationship between the parental occupational background of the civil servants and their bureaucratic disposition.

As shown in Table 10, it was found that the proportion of highly impersonal civil servants was larger among the respondents hailing from business families and lowest among the respondents whose parents were independent professionals, like doctors, lawyers, etc. In this respect, the civil servants coming from the families of Government servants fell between the above mentioned two groups.



TABLE 10  
PARENTAL OCCUPATION AND BUREAUCRATIC DISPOSITION

Parental Occupation of Respondents	N	Degree of Bureaucratic Disposition					
		Impersonality		Rationality		Rule-orientation	
		High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
		(per cent) (per cent) (per cent) (per cent) (per cent) (per cent)					
<i>Group A</i>							
Government service	202	67.8	32.2	44.5	55.5	32.7	67.3
Other occupations	491	74.9	25.1	46.0	54.0	35.4	64.6
<i>Group B</i>							
Government service	202	67.8	32.2	44.5	55.5	32.6	67.4
Agriculture	203	70.9	29.1	47.8	52.2	44.4	55.6
Business and independent profession	288	77.7	22.3	44.8	55.2	28.8	71.2
<i>Group C</i>							
Government service	202	67.8	32.2	44.5	55.5	32.7	67.3
Agriculture	203	70.9	29.1	47.8	52.2	44.4	55.6
Business	198	81.8	18.2	41.9	58.1	31.3	68.7
Independent profession	41	65.8	34.2	53.6	46.4	14.6	85.4
Teaching	49	71.4	28.6	48.9	51.1	30.6	69.4

*Note* — Different groups have been formed in the table to show how parental occupations make for differences in bureaucratic tendencies. Thirty respondents did not reply to the queries in full.

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As regards rationality in decision-making, the results showed that civil servants who are sons of independent professionals scored higher on rationality than those coming from business families. However, the data also showed that the proportion of more rational civil servants was somewhat higher among the respondents, whose parents were Government servants, than that among the respondents belonging to families of businessmen.

The study also significantly demonstrated that the civil servants, brought up in the tradition of independent professions, are least rule-oriented in the sense of over-emphasis on following prescribed rules to the detriment of larger goals. In contrast, it was found that the sons of agriculturists are more often characterized by such a tendency. In this respect, the civil servants with family background of Government service came closer to those coming from agricultural families than to those whose parents were doctors, lawyers and other professionals.

Further analysis showed that parental occupational background of the civil servants has more influence on their orientation towards official rules and procedures than that on their attitudes of impersonality and rationality.

(7) *Class at Present* — Lastly, the study, also analyzed the bureaucratic disposition of the civil servants according to the class of Government service to which they currently belonged. The results of this analysis are described in Table 11.

The study found that the higher class respondents (Class I and II) include a higher proportion of less, impersonal, more rational and also less rule-oriented civil servants than that among the Class III respondents. In other words, the class of service appears to have some bearing on the behavioural patterns of civil servants, though not a major influence.

The bureaucratic disposition of the civil servants of this study was examined above in relation to their background characteristics. Overall, the study found that differences in bureaucratic disposition on account of differences in background characteristics were generally statistically not significant. Nonetheless, the study did reveal certain broad associations between levels of education, rural/urban background, upward mobility and in-service training of the civil servants and the rigidity of their bureaucratic attitudes.

TABLE 11

## BUREAUCRATIC ATTITUDES AND CLASS AT PRESENT

Bureaucratic Attitudes Considered	Degree of Bureaucratization					
	Class I (N=137)		Class II (N=136)		Class III (N=449)	
	High (per cent)	Low (per cent)	High (per cent)	Low (per cent)	High (per cent)	Low (per cent)
Impersonality	70.1	29.9	69.9	30.1	75.3	24.7
Rationality	48.9	51.1	51.5	48.5	42.8	57.2
Rule-orientation	29.2	70.8	33.8	66.2	36.7	63.3

Note—One respondent did not indicate his class of service.

## CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

A basic conclusion emerging out of the study is that the general constructs of bureaucratic theory as evolved by Weber and others provide a useful basis both for practical as well as for broader theoretical and comparative purposes. To the extent that the study identifies the universality of the structural characteristics of bureaucracy, it also supports Heady's thesis that for comparative purposes bureaucratic structure presents a meaningful starting point.

The study, however, reveals that the structural and behavioural characteristics are only moderately related; that the functional content of the bureaucracy, the type of office and its level of mass contact to meet programmatic needs, and the level of its skill composition have a significant bearing on the behavioural characteristics. This finding has rather important theoretical as well as practical implications.

Theoretically, it implies that bureaucracy is not a static phenomenon with certain standard structural and behavioural characteristics in more or less comparable proportions. Bureaucracy is a far more dynamic phenomenon in which its functional content, mass contact inherent in its objectives and several other factors influence its behavioural characteristics. What is more, the behavioural characteristics appear in turn to modify or alter the bureaucratic structure itself as was exemplified by the score of the Office D in the study.

In other words, the existing theory of bureaucracy based essentially on the Weberian model which, though extremely useful as a starting point, appears to be somewhat static. Even Heady's thesis<sup>14</sup> of using the structural postulates of Weberian theory appears to be restrictive. While Heady's approach may make comparative studies in bureaucracy relatively easy, it would not help adequately in the development of a more rigorously based bureaucratic theory either for academic or policy purposes. The main limitation of Heady's approach is that it makes structural postulates of bureaucratic theory independent of the behavioural postulates. The present study suggests that structural postulates are not after all so independent as to build bureaucratic theory around them; that it is necessary to examine structural and behavioural postulates together to formulate a more valid and useful bureaucratic theory, even though this creates many research problems.

The findings of the present study also suggest that what we need is not only a generalized bureaucratic model but also a range of

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<sup>14</sup> Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration", *op. cit.*

sub-models in which its various characteristics play differing roles, some more powerful, some less powerful, in various combinations. The main considerations which appear to necessitate such a range are: (a) the functional content of bureaucracy differs from agency to agency; (b) the degree of mass contact it involves, especially to achieve its objectives, vary; and (c) the skill composition, including the levels of education of the bureaucracy, itself undergoes major alterations between agencies within the same Governmental apparatus.

The present study suggests propositions like : (a) bureaucracies involved in developmental tasks at the field level, such as in agriculture, necessitating mass contact and participation and with more skilled personnel, tend to be less structured and behaviourally more flexible than secretariat-based more remote bureaucracies. Implied is the proposition that (b) bureaucracies essentially in the regulatory and other non-developmental agencies will tend to be structurally more rigid and behaviourally less flexible. In between these would be a whole range of intermediate positions.

While the present findings could be termed at best proposing new hypotheses, it is important to bear in mind that at no time has the bureaucracy in India attempted to deliberately adapt its behavioural patterns to suit the organizational objectives. The changes which are noticeable in the Indian setting have clearly grown out of the natural processes and the administrative compulsions rather than by design. The findings, therefore, are important both for the theoretical as well as for practical purposes.

Does the study suggest any specific modifications in the general bureaucratic model? The answer seems to be : partly yes. In the developmental bureaucracy, at least two modifications seem to emerge. One is more of a traditional equilibrium bureaucracy in which the structural and behavioural postulates are relatively balanced. Such a bureaucracy would be 'secretariat' type with relatively little 'mass contact' for achievement of its objectives. The other would be a 'dynamic' condition where both the structural and the behavioural characteristics are changing as a result, *inter alia*, of the interaction between the bureaucracy and the citizen clientele inherent in the achievement of administrative objectives.

The study, thus, supports to an extent some of the findings of Peter Blau. However, Blau was more concerned with the assessment of 'functional' and 'dysfunctional' adaptation of the bureaucracy

to changing organizational objectives.<sup>15</sup> The present study did not specifically seek to analyze the 'functional' adaptation or otherwise of the Indian bureaucracy. While some degree of change in the direction of functional adaptation is visible, the more important conclusions of the study relate to the basic theoretical framework of bureaucracy itself and the performance of the Indian bureaucracy in terms of this framework.

To sum up, the findings of the study suggest that the existing bureaucratic theory is somewhat 'static' and that it does not take into account forces which tend to change significantly both the structural and behavioural postulates. For applied as well as academic purposes, therefore, we need to build into the theory, factors, such as its functional content, the degree of citizen participation in its operations, etc., which give it a more dynamic character. From a practical point of view, the findings of the study suggest a wide variety of levers which can help utilizing bureaucracy as a more effective instrument of achieving administrative objectives.

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<sup>15</sup> Peter M. Blau, *op. cit.*

## TIME PATTERN OF EXPENDITURE GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES IN INDIA : 1892-1967\*

*K. N. Reddy*

IT is well-known that the administrative services are the life-blood of a country. It is these services which provide main plank to secure to all its citizens 'Justice', 'Liberty', 'Equality' and 'Fraternity' enshrined in our Constitution. It is, again, these services which are more susceptible to criticism and often lead to fervent appeals for drastic cut in their expenditure because of their 'non-development' character. Lack of proper studies on the growth of expenditure, and the extent of utilizing the nation's resources in administering the country may lead to rash conclusions, and sometimes to bad decisions which may prove costly at a later date. Therefore, it is a matter of great interest to the student of public finance as well as public administration to know as to: (1) how the expenditures on administrative services had behaved over a long period, encompassing the periods of war and periods of peace, and (2) what proportions of total government expenditure and national income had been spent on administration during different periods.

In this article, we study the behaviour of expenditure on administrative services in India over 1892-1967, on the basis of historical and empirical facts. Firstly, we explain methods and procedures followed in our study. Secondly, we trace the growth of administrative expenditure in money terms and rural terms, and examine its growth in relation to total Government expenditure and national income. Thirdly, we study the growth pattern of distribution of administrative expenditure by important heads in real terms, and lastly, we note some of the observations.

### METHOD AND PROCEDURE

The period covered in our study is from 1892 to 1967. All the estimates refer to financial year ending 31st March. The expenditure series—administrative expenditure and total government expenditure—vis-a-vis national income figures pertain to British India up to 1946-47,

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\*The author is highly indebted to Dr. I. S. Gulati for his help and guidance.



and Indian Union thereafter. As the area in British India had undergone changes, firstly, when Burma separated in 1937 and, secondly, when Pakistan separated in 1947, the aggregate expenditure figures and national income figures are not strictly comparable. To provide comparability, we assumed that the per capita expenditure of government and per capita national income were same throughout India, both in British India and princely States.<sup>1</sup> The definition of government expenditure adopted in this study is based on the various earlier studies made for the United Kingdom<sup>2</sup>, Germany<sup>3</sup>, and Japan.<sup>4</sup> Government expenditure includes not only the purchase of goods and services but also transfers and subsidies. It excludes all expenditures financed out of proceed to other sectors. Further, any expenditure is included only once, even though in the course of transfers from Centre to States and States to the Centre an item might appear in the accounts of both. This is meant to avoid double counting. Although in the true sense of the term public expenditure includes the expenditure of Central, States and Local authorities, we have excluded the expenditures of local authorities owing to paucity of data.

The 'administrative expenditure' series are arranged in accordance with the reclassification of various expenditure heads introduced in the Union Budget of 1961-62. The expenditure under this group-head relates to administrative and ancillary services and the day-to-day running of the administration at the Centre and in the Union Territories and in the States. It includes expenditure on general administration, audit, administration of justice, jails and convict settlements, police, external affairs, etc., of Central Government; and general administration, administration of justice, jails and convict settlements and police of the State Government.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Such an assumption is not without precedent. See Suphan Andic and Jendrich Veverka, "The Growth of Government Expenditure in Germany Since Unification", *Finanzarchiv*, January, 1964, p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, "The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom", Princeton, 1961.

<sup>3</sup> Suphan Andic and Jendrich Veverka, *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> Kosishi Emi, *Government Fiscal Activity and Economic Growth in Japan : 1868-1960*. (Economic Research Series 6), Tokyo, Hitotsubashi University (The Institute of Economic Research), 1963.

<sup>5</sup> According to the Budget of Central Government for 1961-62, expenditure on revenue account is classified into: (1) cost of collection of taxes, (2) defence services, (3) debt services, (4) administrative services, (5) social and developmental services, (6) miscellaneous, and (7) contributions to States. Prior to 1961-62, administrative services and social and developmental services were combined under one head, viz., "Civil Administration" and it was rather difficult to locate the extent of administrative expenditure. Indeed the classification introduced in 1961-62 marked an improvement. The Reserve Bank of India has made available the data on administrative expenditure in accordance with new classification since 1951. But, for the years prior to 1951, no analysis was made available by any one. Hence, we had reclassified revenue account by referring to the original documents—Budget documents, combined finance and revenue accounts of Central and State Governments—for the period 1892-1950.

The main sources for the expenditure series were: (1) Banking and Monetary Statistics of India (1954) and its supplement (1964) published, (2) Reports of currency and finance published by the Reserve Bank of India, (3) "Combined Finance and Revenue Accounts" issued by the Auditor and Comptroller General, and (4) the budgets of Central Government.

What measure of community output has been chosen in relation to administrative expenditure? Although in almost all the studies of public expenditure, the choice had fallen on G.N.P., we have chosen Net National Product at factor cost as our concept. It is chosen not because of its greater relevance over G.N.P., but because of the non-availability of the latter in continuous series. In presenting the national income estimates, considerable difficulty has been faced as the historical statistics of national income over the entire period are not available officially. Official estimates of national income are available in continuity only since 1949 at current and constant prices in the estimates of national income issued by the Statistical Organization, Government of India. Prior to 1949, whatever estimates are available are only for specific years—barring a couple of recent long-term estimates—and the methods adopted in estimating these differ widely from one estimate to another. Therefore, the problem has been of presenting a series of national income estimates for the period 1892-1948 with reasonable consistency. In view of meeting this requirement, a survey of available information on national income has been made.<sup>6</sup> After careful assessment, although we have constructed our own series of national income in the beginning, we have depended ultimately on M. Mukherjee's estimates (1872-1900)<sup>7</sup>, K. Mukherjee's estimates (1901-1945)<sup>8</sup>, and official estimates (1949-1967).

In view of the fact that the growth of administrative expenditure and national income in money terms gives an imperfect picture, we had to choose suitable price indices to eliminate the influence of price changes. But the elimination of price change confronted us with conceptual and statistical problems. Conceptual problems arose because there was no perfect method of choosing the deflators; statistical problems arose because the data available for constructing the series were scanty. However, we have adopted whole-sale price index

<sup>6</sup> For detailed discussion, see the author's doctoral thesis, *The Growth of Public Expenditure in India: 1872-1966*, Baroda, M. S. University of Baroda, 1963, Chapter II.

<sup>7</sup> M. Mukherjee, "Growth of National Income in India" in V. K. R. V. Rao and Ohkawa (eds.), *Asian Studies in Income and Wealth*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1965, pp. 71-103.

<sup>8</sup> K. Mukherjee: *Levels of Economic Activity and Public Expenditures*, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics (Poona), Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1965, p. 58, Table F.

for the years 1872-1948, and the index implicit in the official estimates of current national income and prices<sup>9</sup> for the years 1949-1967.

#### GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE ALONGSIDE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND NATIONAL INCOME

##### *Administrative Expenditure in Money Terms*

During the period 1892-1967, administrative expenditure, per head of population, increased from 49 Paise in 1892-1900 to Rs. 6.53 in 1961-67 (an increase of 1,234 per cent). It can be seen from Table I and Chart A (see p. 214) that the per capita expenditure on administrative services increased gradually from decade to decade. Within three decades, 1892 to 1920, it increased threefold, while in the next three decades, *i.e.* from 1921-1930 to 1941-1950, it increased twofold. In the period after Independence (1949-1950 to 1961-1967), it again increased by a little more than twofold. It may be noted that there has been a sharp increase in it in the years after Independence. And the increase has been gradual, irrespective of the occurrence of certain social upheavals like World Wars. This gradual increase in expenditure may be explained in terms of ever-increasing number of welfare and developmental functions that the government took on itself.

One may raise a basic question, whether or not a certain amount of increase in expenditure is the consequence of rise in prices. Therefore, let us eliminate the influence of price change along with the population and study the growth. During the first three decades (1892-1920), the price index with base 1948-1949 had risen (from 17.7 in 1892 to 52.5 in 1950) by 200 per cent. In the next two decades, it declined by 47 per cent (*i.e.*, from 54.2 in 1921 to 29.0 in 1940). But in the subsequent decades, it increased continuously. The price index which was 32.2 in 1941 rose to 154.6 in 1967, *i.e.* about 380 per cent in just a period of less than three decades.<sup>10</sup>

##### *Administrative Expenditure in Real Terms*

From Chart B (see p. 214) and Table I, it can be observed that the expenditure per head of population has grown at a slower pace, when the influence of price change is removed, during the period under our

<sup>9</sup> Conventional series with 1948-49=100. Revised series, if adopted, may give better results, but they are still preliminary (see "Economic Survey", *Budget of Government of India*, 1968-69).

<sup>10</sup> Price index, specially constructed for the purpose. It is the wholesale price index up to 1948 and implicit indicator in the current and constant national income figures (conventional series) thereafter.

TABLE I

GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE AT CURRENT AND CONSTANT (1948-49) PRICES: 1892-1900 TO 1961-1967\*


Period	At Current Prices		At 1948-49 Prices		As per cent of Total Expenditure	As per cent of National Income
	Total in Crores of Rs.	Per Head Rs.	Total in Crores of Rs.	Per Head Rs.		
1892-1900	11	0.49	59	2.62	14.57	1.32
1901-1910	14	0.57	65	2.74	13.89	1.23
1911-1920	20	0.80	65	2.63	14.90	1.06
1921-1930	36	1.43	85	3.26	17.21	1.21
1931-1937	39	1.39	155	5.49	21.78	2.05
1931-1940	38	1.34	148	5.21	21.20	1.94
1938-1947	50	1.67	105	3.81	13.80	1.40
1941-1950	66	2.07	103	3.33	11.27	1.24
1949-1950	98	2.81	97	2.78	11.46	1.11
1951-1960	157	4.02	152	3.86	11.93	1.46
1961-1967	305	6.53	237	5.09	8.00	1.70

\*The division of the whole period—1892-1967—is done in accordance with the evolution of financial policy in India: (1) 1892-1921, (2) 1922-1937, (3) 1938-1947, (4) 1949-1967, apart from the point of view of knowing growth of administrative services decennially. It is also our intention to study the behaviour of administrative services during peace times as well as the times of World Wars and Major Social disturbances like Great Depression. Therefore, when we have given the figures for the period 1931-1937, we have had in mind to study the influence of Depression on the expenditure pattern. Similarly, when we have given the figures for the period 1938-1947 our intention is to study the behaviour of administrative services during War time.

study. Between 1892-1900 and 1961-1967, the per capita administrative expenditure in real terms increased by only 125 per cent, whereas it increased by 1,234 per cent in money terms. Barring the decades of 1931-1940, it was varying within the range of Rs. 2.62 and Rs. 3.26 throughout the British period, and Rs. 2.72 and 5.09 in the period after Independence. But such comparison over long period does not give a complete picture. Let us analyze the growth of administrative expenditure in real terms by dividing the whole period into meaningful sub-periods: (1) 1892-1920, (2) 1921-1937, (3) 1938-1947, and (4) 1949-1967,


**CHART - A**  
EXPENDITURE ON ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES  
AT CURRENT PRICES PER HEAD OF POPULATION  
1892 — 1967

INDEX : 1900=100



**CHART - B**  
EXPENDITURE ON ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES  
AT CONSTANT PRICES PER HEAD OF POPULATION  
1892 — 1967

INDEX : 1900=100



The per capita administrative expenditure in real terms remained more or less stable between 1892 and 1920. It almost doubled in the following decades. The per capita level of administrative expenditure was Rs. 5.49 during 1931-1937 which was more than twice the level during the period 1892-1920. During the decades 1938-1947, the per capita expenditure was Rs. 3.81, and in the period immediately after the Independence, it declined further to Rs. 2.78. But it has been on the increase over the past 15 years and was Rs. 5.09 during the period 1961-1967.

Let us now try to see why there was an abnormal increase in per capita administrative expenditure during 1931-1940. During 1929-1935, *i.e.* the period of Great Depression, while the price level declined by 38 per cent and national income in current prices declined by 36 per cent, the administrative expenditure in current prices declined by a mere 5 per cent. Naturally, a decline in the price level unaccompanied by a corresponding cut in the expenses of running the administration was bound to push up the expenditure in real terms. At the same time, the creation of new departments consequent upon the partial provincial autonomy granted under the Government of India Act, 1919, and, again, under provincial autonomy granted under the Government of India Act, 1935, contributed to this increase in per capita real expenditure on administrative services.

Let us also see why in the decades in which World Wars occurred, the per capita administrative expenditure declined. Ordinarily, one would expect a rise in view of the fact that during war time: (1) more departments would be created to tackle the distribution of goods and services, and (2) more police force would be required to meet the increasing problems of law and order,<sup>11</sup> especially when India was under foreign rule.

During World War I, the general price level recorded a rise of 80 per cent whereas the increase in per capita administrative expenditure in current prices in the same period was of the order of 32 per cent. During World War II, the general level of prices recorded a rise of 160 per cent, whereas the increase in per capita administrative expenditure was of the order of 87 per cent. Evidently, the enhanced demands under the exigencies of War on the administrative services could be met without increasing real expenditure on these services. This could have been possible only by not allowing the wage and salary expenditure to rise by the full extent of the price rise. Clearly, wages and salaries of

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<sup>11</sup> For example, there was a three-fold increase in the expenditure on 'Police' during World War II, 1939-1947.



government employees rose so sluggishly in response to price change increases that the administrative services could not meet additional demands on it during the War time and still show decline in real per capita expenditure.

Next is the period 1949-1966. From 1949 to 1966, the per capita administrative expenditure in real terms increased by about 95 per cent (*see* Table in Appendix, p. 220). From Rs. 2.78 in real terms in 1949-1950, it rose to Rs. 3.86 in 1951-1960 and Rs. 5.09 in 1961-1967 (*see* Table I). One would notice that the increase in per capita administrative expenditure was greater between 1951 and 1960 than that between 1961 and 1967. While in the former period it rose by 36 per cent, in the latter period it rose by merely 16 per cent (*see* Table III). On the whole, the period 1949-1967 was marked by an abnormal increase in the administrative expenditure. One may even raise a question as to why was there such a marked rise, especially after the Independence. This may be explained in terms of: (1) increasing activities of the Government in view of welfare and developmental needs of the country, (2) upward revision of pay scales and Dearness Allowance, and (3) increasing law and order problem in the country. We shall know more about these reasons at a later stage when we discuss the distribution of administrative expenditure.

Let us now discuss the proportion of total government expenditure and that of national income which have been devoted to administrative services.

The proportion of administrative expenditure to the total Government expenditure moved interestingly during the period under our review. It increased from 14.57 per cent of total expenditure in 1892-1900—after a decline of 13.89 per cent in the immediately following decade—to 14.90 per cent in 1911-1920, to 17.21 per cent in 1921-1930, and to 21.20 per cent in 1931-1940, and then declined to 13.80 per cent in 1938-1947. This decline continued even during the period after the Independence.

In the period after the Independence, the proportion of administrative expenditure to total expenditure declined further; it declined from 11.46 per cent in 1949-1950, to 11.93 per cent and 8 per cent in 1951-1960 and 1961-1967 respectively. The fall in the proportion of administrative expenditure to total government expenditure may be explained in terms of larger increases in other categories, especially social and developmental services.



As Table I shows, the proportion of national income devoted to administrative expenditure remained around a little more than one per cent with the lone exception of the decade 1931-1940, when the proportion reached 2 per cent. We have already noted the special circumstances which characterized this particular decade and such an increase was only to be expected in those circumstances.

In the period since the Independence, the proportion of national income spent on administration has increased from 1.11 per cent in 1949-1950 to 1.46 per cent in 1951-1960, and 1.70 per cent in 1961-1967, *i.e.* an increase of 53 per cent from that during 1949-1950 to 1961-1967. Thus, since Independence, administrative expenditure has shown a marked increase both in terms of real per capita expenditure and in proportion to national income.

#### DISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE

We come now to the study of the distribution of administrative expenditure. We would, thus, be knowing the items that contributed most to the increase (or decrease) in the expenditure. Table II (p. 218) shows the distribution of administrative expenditure by major heads—general administration, administration of justice and jails, and police—in constant 1948-1949 prices. We can see from the table that up to 1911-1920, the per capita expenditure on all the three categories remained roughly constant.

During the decade 1921-1930, *i.e.* the one immediately following 1911-1920, while there was an increase in the per capita expenditure on general administration, there was a decrease in the per capita expenditure on justice and jails, and police. The per capita expenditure on general administration increased from 44 paise in 1911-1920 to Rs. 1.07 in 1921-1930, and on justice and jails it decreased from 90 paise in 1911-1920 to 66 paise in 1921-1930. The increase in the per capita expenditure on general administration may be explained in terms of semi-autonomy granted to provinces under the Government of India Act, 1919, and the consequent increase in the various activities of Government.

In the rest of the period falling under the British rule, *i.e.* from 1931 to 1947, the per capita expenditure on all the items increased in real terms up to 1940 and declined later on. This may be understood in terms of the depression of the 1930s and War-time inflation in 1940s. For we can see from Table V (*see* p. 229) that during 1931-1937, the expenditure on all the items in current prices remained roughly

constant and increased during 1941-1947. Thus, during the years of depression, though the general price level fell, there was no corresponding cut in the expenditures. Naturally, when expressed in constant 1948-1949 prices, the amount spent on these services would show an increase. Similarly, in the period 1941-1947 we find that, in current prices, there had been an increase in all the three items, but the increase was not as much as the change in price. Consequently, the expenditure showed a decline.

TABLE II

DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE BY  
MAJOR HEADS, FROM 1892-1900 TO 1961-1964 IN  
CONSTANT 1948-49 PRICES

Period	General Adminis- tration		Jails & Justice		Police	
	Total in crores of Rs.	Per capita Rs.	Total in crores of Rs.	Per capita Rs.	Total in crores of Rs.	Per capita Rs.
1892-1900	10.48	0.46	21.31	0.94	21.49	1.03
1901-1910	10.39	0.43	22.82	0.96	24.15	1.02
1911-1920	10.78	0.44	22.07	0.90	26.18	1.06
1921-1930	27.63	1.07	16.56	0.66	25.30	0.98
1931-1937	48.56	1.73	28.49	1.01	45.47	1.61
1931-1940	47.53	1.67	27.73	0.97	44.26	1.56
1938-1947	37.38	1.22	23.58	0.79	39.00	1.31
1949-1950	30.28	0.86	13.20	0.36	38.42	1.09
1951-1960	52.06	1.32	19.10	0.48	62.36	1.59
1961-1964	73.96	1.58	23.06	0.51	95.19	2.12

Broadly speaking, it can be observed that during the British period (1892-1900 to 1941-1947), while the per capita expenditure in real terms on general administration and police showed an upward trend, the per capita expenditure on justice and jails marked a downward trend. In the period after Independence (1949-1950 to 1961-1964), the per capita expenditure on all the items increased, but the increase (94 per cent) on police was greater than the increase (84 per cent) on general administration and that on jails and justice (41 per cent). The per capita expenditure in real terms on general administration increased from 86 paise in 1949-50 to Rs. 1.32 in 1951-1960 and to Rs. 1.58 in 1961-1964. The per capita expenditure in real terms on police increased from

Rs. 1.09 in 1949-50 to Rs. 1.59 in 1951-1960 and to Rs. 2.12 in 1961-1964. The per capita expenditure in real terms on justice and jails increased from 36 paise in 1949-50 to 48 paise in 1951-1960 and to 51 paise in 1961-1964.

#### CONCLUSIONS

(1) During the period under our review, the per capita administrative expenditure in real terms increased from Rs. 2.62 in 1892-1900 to Rs. 5.09 in 1961-1967 (an increase of 125 per cent), whereas it increased in money terms from 49 paise in 1890-1900 to Rs. 6.53 in 1961-1967 (an increase of 1,234 per cent).

(2) As a proportion of total government expenditure, administrative expenditure increased from 14.6 per cent of total government expenditure in 1890-1900—after a decline of 13.9 per cent in the immediately following decade—to 14.9 per cent in 1911-1920, and to 21.8 per cent (highest in the period under review) in 1931-1937. Interestingly enough, it declined to 13.8 per cent in 1938-1947—the period of World War—and declined further to about 12 per cent in the first decade after Independence, and to 8 per cent in 1961-1967.

(3) The proportion of national income to administrative expenditure remained around a little more than one per cent during the period before Independence, with the lone exception of the decade 1931-1940, when the proportion reached 2 per cent. In the period after Independence, the proportion of national income spent on administration increased from 1.1 per cent in 1949-1950 to 1.5 in 1951-1960 and 1.7 in 1961-1967 (an increase of 53 per cent from 1949-1950 to 1961-1967).

(4) With respect to the distribution of administrative expenditure during the British period under our review (1892-1900 to 1941-1947), the per capita expenditure in real terms on general administration and police showed an upward trend, whereas the per capita expenditure in real terms on justice and jails marked a downward trend. In the period after Independence (1949-1950 to 1961-1967), the per capita expenditure in real terms on all the items increased; but the increase (94 per cent) on police was greater than the increase on general administration (84 per cent) and jails and justice (41 per cent).

(5) It might be useful to investigate at which level of Government (*i.e.* Central or States) was the increase of expenditure, under various heads, greater. Still more useful might be the investigation into the various items of each head. Space forbids us to probe further into those aspects, although analysis can be made for a limited period at least.

## APPENDIX

TABLE III

EXPENDITURE ON ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AT CURRENT AND 1948-49 PRICES DURING 1892-1967

(In Lakhs of Rs.)

Year	At Current Prices			At Constant Prices			As per cent of National Income
	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Expenditure per capita Rs.	Index 1900=100	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Per capita Rs.	Index 1900=100	
						Administrative services as per cent of Total Expenditure	
1892	1 033	0.47	92	5 836	2.65	94	14.29
1893	1 055	0.47	92	5 410	2.41	85	14.55
1894	1 094	0.49	96	5 758	2.58	91	15.10
1895	1 135	0.50	98	6 306	2.78	98	15.33
1896	1 137	0.50	98	6 424	2.82	100	14.91
1897	1 155	0.51	100	5 984	2.64	93	14.64
1898	1 159	0.51	100	5 083	2.24	79	13.73
1899	1 132	0.49	96	6 119	2.65	94	14.07
							1.41
							1.28
							1.24
							1.35
							1.31
							1.53
							0.99
							1.25

1900	1 176	0.51	100	6 583	2.83	100	14.55	1.51
1892-1900	1 120	0.49	—	5 939	2.62	—	14.57	1.32
1901	1 182	0.51	100	5 575	2.41	85	12.34	1.12
1902	1 207	0.52	102	6 005	2.59	92	14.31	1.25
1903	1 361	0.58	114	7 052	3.00	106	15.31	1.29
1904	1 258	0.54	106	6 989	3.00	106	12.98	1.30
1905	1 289	0.55	108	6 968	2.97	105	13.29	1.29
1906	1 384	0.58	114	6 886	2.89	102	11.46	1.33
1907	1 481	0.62	122	6 275	2.63	93	13.99	1.11
1908	1 471	0.61	120	6 233	2.58	91	15.43	1.32
1909	1 606	0.67	131	6 373	2.66	94	15.43	1.20
1910	1 455	0.60	118	6 467	2.67	94	14.29	1.11
1901-1910	1 369	0.57	—	6 482	2.74	—	13.89	1.23
1911	1 657	0.68	133	7 430	2.88	102	14.69	1.22
1912	1 822	0.75	147	7 720	3.18	112	16.89	1.30
1913	1 740	0.71	139	6 988	2.85	101	14.84	1.14
1914	1 831	0.75	147	7 042	2.88	102	15.27	1.22
1915	1 927	0.79	155	7 190	2.95	104	16.47	1.19
1916	1 913	0.78	153	6 377	2.60	92	17.22	1.19
1917	1 997	0.82	161	5 822	2.39	84	17.70	0.83

(Continued)

TABLE III—Contd.

Year	At Current Prices			At Constant Prices			As per cent of National Income
	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Expenditure per capita Rs.	Index 1900=100	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Per capita Rs.	Index 1900=100	
						Administrative services as per cent of Total Expenditure	
1918	2 172	0.89	175	5 584	2.29	81	0.81
1919	2 437	0.99	194	5 163	2.10	74	0.88
1920	2 810	1.14	223	5 352	2.17	77	0.77
1911-1920	2 031	0.80	—	6 467	2.63	—	1.05
1921	3 147	1.28	231	5 806	2.36	82	0.92
1922	3 382	1.36	267	7 046	2.83	100	1.03
1923	3 494	1.39	273	7 403	2.94	104	1.08
1924	3 378	1.33	261	7 328	2.89	102	1.15
1925	3 598	1.41	276	7 754	3.04	107	1.11
1926	3 648	1.41	276	8 363	3.31	117	1.25
1927	3 717	1.43	280	9 363	3.60	127	1.32
1928	3 821	1.46	286	9 625	3.68	130	1.35



1929	3 940	1.49	292	10 129	3.83	135	18.20	1.39
1930	4 139	1.55	304	10 950	4.10	145	19.50	1.46
1921-1930	3 626	1.43	—	8 377	3.26	—	17.21	1.21
1931	4 221	1.55	304	13 572	4.98	176	20.24	1.83
1932	4 025	1.46	286	15 661	5.68	201	21.12	2.17
1933	3 782	1.36	267	15 500	5.57	197	21.93	2.15
1934	3 707	1.32	259	15 910	5.67	200	22.54	2.09
1935	3 726	1.31	256	15 589	5.48	193	22.19	2.07
1936	3 854	1.34	263	15 795	5.49	194	21.42	2.06
1937	3 969	1.36	267	16 266	5.57	197	23.03	1.97
1931-1937	3 898	1.39	—	15 470	5.49	—	21.78	2.05
1938	3 568	1.25	245	13 070	4.58	162	20.53	1.64
1939	3 580	1.24	243	14 039	4.86	172	19.72	1.87
1940	3 619	1.23	241	12 479	4.24	150	19.26	1.52
1931-1940	3 805	1.34	—	14 788	5.21	—	21.20	1.94
1941	3 748	1.26	247	11 640	3.91	138	17.44	1.14
1942	3 927	1.31	256	11 000	3.67	130	15.77	1.33
1943	4 525	1.50	294	10 426	3.46	122	9.34	1.26
1944	5 329	1.77	347	8 956	2.97	105	7.53	1.05

(Continued)



TABLE III—Contd.

Year	At Current Prices			At Constant Prices			As per cent of National Income
	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Expenditure per capita Rs.	Index 1900=100	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Per capita Rs.	Index 1900=100	
1945	5 834	1.93	378	8 880	2.94	104	0.97
1946	7 101	2.32	455	10 678	3.49	123	1.32
1947	8 888	2.87	563	12 226	3.95	140	1.58
1938-1947	5 012	1.67	—	11 339	3.81	—	1.40
1949	8 882	2.57	504	8 882	2.57	91	1.03
1950	10 783	3.06	600	10 551	2.99	106	1.20
1941-1950	—	—	—	10 249	3.33	—	1.24
1951	12 569	3.51	688	11 670	3.26	115	1.32
1952	13 075	3.59	704	11 930	3.28	116	1.31
1953	13 149	3.55	696	12 668	3.24	114	1.34
1954	13 527	3.59	703	12 944	3.44	122	1.29
1955	14 628	3.81	747	15 645	4.07	144	1.52
							12.38

Total Expenditure

as per cent

Administrative services

Index 1900=100

Per capita Rs.

Total in lakhs of Rs.

Expenditure per capita Rs.

Index 1900=100

1956	15 597	3.98	780	16 383	4.18	148	11.68	1.56
1957	16 953	4.24	831	16 491	4.12	146	10.64	1.50
1958	18 115	4.45	873	17 318	4.25	150	9.20	1.59
1959	19 316	4.65	912	17 852	4.30	152	9.49	1.53
1960	20 576	4.85	951	18 842	4.44	157	9.49	1.59
1951-1960	157	4.02	—	15 174	3.86	—	11.93	1.46
1961	22 566	5.20	1 020	20 311	4.68	165	9.07	1.60
1962	24 453	5.52	1 082	21 583	4.82	170	9.43	1.65
1963	27 743	6.11	1 198	23 978	5.28	187	8.30	1.80
1964	28 750	6.20	1 216	23 336	5.03	178	7.16	1.67
1965	31 657	6.66	1 305	23 243	4.89	173	7.09	1.55
1966	36 838	7.58	1 486	26 559	5.47	193	7.62	1.81
1967	41 836	8.41	1 649	27 061	5.44	192	7.37	1.81
1961-1967	30 549	6.53	—	23 724	5.09	—	8.00	1.70

TABLE IV  
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE BY IMPORTANT HEADS  
AT CONSTANT 1948-49 PRICE

(In Lakhs of Rupees)

Year	General Administration		Jails and Justice		Police	
	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Per capita Rs.	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Per capita Rs.	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Per capita Rs.
1892	1 011	0.45	2 113	0.95	2 181	0.98
1893	959	0.43	1 949	0.87	1 949	0.87
1894	1 032	0.46	2 063	0.92	2 063	0.92
1895	1 161	0.51	2 211	0.98	2 217	0.98
1896	1 141	0.50	2 288	1.01	2 282	1.00
1897	1 047	0.46	2 161	0.95	2 155	0.95
1898	873	0.38	1 868	0.81	1 855	0.81
1899	1 059	0.46	2 216	0.96	2 259	0.98
1900	1 150	0.49	2 306	1.00	2 378	1.03
1892-1900	1 048	0.46	2 131	0.94	2 149	0.95
1901	948	0.40	2 066	0.89	2 066	0.89
1902	1 015	0.44	2 184	0.93	2 209	0.94
1903	1 176	0.50	2 285	0.97	2 347	1.00
1904	1 244	0.52	2 489	1.06	2 572	1.09
1905	1 195	0.50	2 470	1.04	2 562	1.08
1906	841	0.35	2 388	1.00	2 512	1.05
1907	1 021	0.42	2 153	0.90	2 153	0.90
1908	1 030	0.42	2 191	0.91	2 424	1.01
1909	1 008	0.41	2 194	0.91	2 496	1.03
1910	907	0.37	2 404	0.99	2 813	1.16
1901-1910	1 039	0.43	2 282	0.96	2 415	1.02
1911	1 179	0.48	2 502	1.02	2 928	1.20
1912	1 669	0.68	2 432	1.00	2 924	1.19
1913	1 173	0.48	2 329	0.95	2 807	1.14

(Continued)

TABLE IV—(Contd.)

Year	General Administration		Jails and Justice		Police	
	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Per capita Rs.	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Per capita Rs.	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Per capita Rs.
1914	1 146	0.46	2 350	0.96	2 808	1.14
1915	1 146	0.46	2 414	0.98	2 933	1.19
1916	850	0.34	2 197	0.89	2 677	1.09
1917	910	0.37	2 373	0.96	2 373	0.96
1918	835	0.34	1 722	0.70	2 167	0.88
1919	790	0.32	1 544	0.62	1 941	0.79
1920	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1911-1920	1 078	0.44	2 207	0.90	2 618	1.06
1921	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1922	2 077	0.83	1 460	0.58	2 338	0.94
1923	2 138	0.85	1 282	0.51	2 345	0.93
1924	2 208	0.87	1 482	0.58	2 262	0.89
1925	2 485	0.97	1 487	0.58	2 287	0.89
1926	3 028	1.17	1 647	0.64	2 467	0.96
1927	3 037	1.17	1 806	0.69	2 668	1.03
1928	3 078	1.17	1 836	0.70	2 645	1.01
1929	3 285	1.24	1 895	0.72	2 792	1.05
1930	3 532	1.32	2 008	0.75	2 968	1.11
1921-1930	2 763	1.07	1 656	0.66	2 530	0.98
1931	4 350	1.60	2 463	0.91	3 759	1.38
1932	5 086	1.85	2 728	0.99	4 350	1.58
1933	4 889	1.76	2 824	1.02	4 316	1.55
1934	4 884	1.74	2 824	1.00	4 549	1.62
1935	4 799	1.69	2 736	0.96	4 460	1.57
1936	4 938	1.71	3 184	1.13	5 180	1.79
1937	5 155	1.76	3 188	1.09	5 217	1.78
1931-1937	4 856	1.73	2 849	1.01	4 547	1.61
1938	4 399	1.54	2 608	0.91	4 080	1.43

(Continued)

TABLE IV—(Contd.)

Year	General Administration		Jails and Justice		Police	
	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Per capita Rs.	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Per capita Rs.	Total in lakhs of Rs.	Per capita Rs.
1939	4 756	1.64	2 729	0.94	4 372	1.51
1940	4 276	1.45	2 448	0.83	3 976	1.35
1931-1940	4 753	1.67	2 773	0.97	4 426	1.56
1941	3 798	1.28	2 273	0.76	3 748	1.26
1942	3 554	1.18	2 146	0.71	3 649	1.22
1943	3 094	1.02	1 970	0.65	3 832	1.29
1944	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1945	2 668	0.88	1 666	0.55	3 324	1.09
1946	3 333	1.09	1 914	0.62	3 834	1.25
1947	3 767	1.21	3 466	1.12	4 287	1.38
1938-1947	3 738	1.22	2 358	0.79	3 900	1.31
1949	2 730	0.78	1 254	0.36	3 693	1.06
1950	3 326	0.94	1 387	0.39	3 991	1.13
1949-1950	3 028	0.86	1 320	6.36	3 842	1.09
1951	3 168	0.88	1 385	0.38	4 009	1.11
1952	3 983	1.09	1 707	0.46	5 358	1.47
1953	4 306	1.16	1 841	0.49	5 488	1.48
1954	4 557	1.20	1 842	0.48	5 466	1.44
1955	5 576	1.45	2 013	0.52	6 372	1.65
1956	5 932	1.51	2 022	0.51	6 693	1.71
1957	6 033	1.50	1 962	0.49	6 819	1.70
1958	6 040	1.48	2 024	0.49	7 267	1.78
1959	6 122	1.47	2 086	0.50	7 208	1.73
1960	6 398	1.50	2 217	0.52	7 678	1.80
1951-1960	5 206	1.32	1 910	0.48	6 236	1.59
1961	6 898	1.59	2 298	0.52	8 418	1.94
1962	7 834	1.76	2 336	0.52	9 490	2.14
1963	6 760	1.48	2 410	0.53	10 320	2.27
1964	8 092	1.72	2 190	0.47	9 942	2.14
1961-1964	7 396	1.58	2 306	0.51	9 519	2.12

TABLE V

EXPENDITURE ON IMPORTANT HEADS IN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES  
(CENTRAL AND STATES COMBINED) AT CURRENT PRICES

(In Lakhs of Rupees)

<i>Year</i>	<i>General Adminis- tration</i>	<i>Audit</i>	<i>Jails &amp; Justice</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>External Affairs</i>
1892	179	—	374	386	—
1893	187	—	380	387	—
1894	196	—	392	392	—
1895	209	—	398	399	—
1896	202	—	405	404	—
1897	202	—	417	416	—
1898	199	—	426	423	—
1899	196	—	410	418	—
1900	207	—	415	428	—
1901	201	—	438	438	—
1902	209	—	439	444	—
1903	227	—	441	453	—
1904	224	—	448	463	—
1905	221	—	457	474	—
1906	239	—	480	505	—
1907	241	—	508	554	—
1908	243	—	517	572	—
1909	254	—	553	629	—
1910	248	—	541	633	—
1911	263	—	556	653	—
1912	394	—	574	690	—
1913	292	—	580	699	—
1914	298	—	611	730	—
1915	307	—	647	786	—
1916	255	—	659	803	—
1917	312	—	659	814	—
1918	325	—	670	843	—
1919	373	—	729	916	—

(Continued)

TABLE V—(Contd.)

<i>Year</i>	<i>General Adminis- tration</i>	<i>Audit</i>	<i>Jails &amp; Justice</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>External Affairs</i>
1920	—	—	—	—	—
1921	—	—	—	—	—
1922	997	70	701	1 122	—
1923	1 009	75	605	1 107	—
1924	1 018	75	683	1 043	—
1925	1 153	78	690	1 061	—
1926	1 178	84	702	1 051	—
1927	1 206	85	717	1 059	—
1928	1 222	89	729	1 050	—
1929	1 278	97	737	1 086	—
1930	1 335	102	759	1 122	—
1931	1 353	103	766	1 169	—
1932	1 307	101	701	1 118	—
1933	1 193	94	649	1 053	—
1934	1 138	98	658	1 060	—
1935	1 147	101	654	1 066	—
1936	1 205	108	777	1 264	63
1937	1 258	109	778	1 273	62
1938	1 201	99	712	1 114	57
1939	1 213	99	696	1 115	64
1940	1 240	97	710	1 153	70
1941	1 223	99	732	1 207	70
1942	1 269	93	766	1 303	78
1943	1 343	88	855	1 663	101
1944	N.A.	103	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1945	1 753	119	1 095	2 184	114
1946	2 217	149	1 273	2 550	141
1947	2 739	172	2 520	3 117	438
1948	—	—	—	—	—
1949	2 730	228	1 253	3 693	276

(Continued)



TABLE V—(Contd.)

<i>Year</i>	<i>General Adminis- tration</i>	<i>Audit</i>	<i>Jails &amp; Justice</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>External Affairs</i>
1950	3 400	251	1 418	4 079	306
1951	3 413	350	1 492	4 318	365
1952	4 366	401	1 871	5 873	398
1953	4 470	437	1 911	5 697	419
1954	4 762	481	1 925	5 713	456
1955	5 214	532	1 883	5 958	544
1956	5 648	545	1 925	6 372	599
1957	6 202	599	2 017	7 010	701
1958	6 318	647	2 118	7 602	700
1959	6 625	705	2 258	7 800	744
1960	6 989	751	2 421	8 385	891
1961	7 664	830	2 553	9 352	977
1962	8 877	851	2 647	10 752	1 192
1963	*9 201	909	2 789	11 948	1 288
1964	*9 222	959	2 914	13 223	1 373
1965	—	1 093	—	—	1 468
1966	—	1 267	—	—	1 517
1967	—	—	—	—	—

\*Includes the expenditure of State Governments on Parliament and State Legislatures.

## TOWARD A MODEL OF BUREAUCRATIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

David K. Brown

IT is axiomatic that organizations be constructed to suit the purposes they are intended to serve. Since development is concerned with producing change, its machinery, the bureaucratic planning group, must be designed to accommodate this phenomenon. This point goes to the main contention of this article that government bureaucracy, as a public agency, is continually seeking that combination of roles and role assignment that are conducive to directed development. It is this process of differentiation which requires a constant reassessment of its internal ways of doing things. This may involve the intensive establishment and abolition of offices and managerial techniques. A recent essay bears out the complexity of this process.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, the bureaucracy serves radically different functions than the mere administration of law and order or of a routinization of current leadership or current power configurations. It does not serve merely to facilitate the maintenance of stability and continuity.

In looking at the role of bureaucracy in planning, it will be well to outline the dimensions of our analysis that form the basis of this examination. Firstly, it is recognized that the administration itself can and may be a great obstacle to development as much as economic or ecological deficiencies. Secondly, public administration in underdeveloped systems may lack the expertise demanded of development planning, and technological help from the outside may not overcome this gap at a cost that indigenous people may be willing to pay. Thirdly, the administrator is an intensely political actor, this is so as he designs the plan and more so as he implements it. Donald Stone offers the following prescriptive advice as how to, in his view, best create the parameters of effective bureaucratic planning. He recommends: (1) intensification of research and analysis of the development organization itself, (2) ongoing

<sup>1</sup> Vide Nicholas Georgoulas, "Structure and Communication in a Development Agency in Tanzania", *Occasional Papers*, Syracuse, Syracuse University (Program of East African Studies), 1967. See also Nicholass Luykx, "Rural Government in the Strategy of Agricultural Development" in Montgomery and Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966, pp. 113-131.

educational and training programme, (3) establishment of a central organ in each ministry with the responsibility of improving the administration of development, and (4) the assignment of sectoral specialists and overall generalists to supervise the planning process and to follow through in its actual implementation.

In this framework, the administrator would opt for the widest participation in the fulfilment of the plan which he can best accomplish by directing the organization to the needs of the village, district, and province as well as metropolitan areas. In Stone's view, the mundane and routine procedure of the plan are most crucial. As he illustrates,

"the way in which a farmer tills and fertilizes his soil, or a supervisor in a textile mill trains his subordinates, is part of the development job. The decision made by villagers in respect to bringing potable water to the village, improvement of sanitation, construction of an access road to a market, highway, or building an addition to a village school are vital elements in the development process."<sup>2</sup>

Along with attention to the mundane, the public agency is faced with the problem of the proliferation of plans and concomitantly the rapid increase of agencies to administer them. This process, largely a problem of differentiation, may lead to an overdispersal of responsibility, lack of sufficient public support for all the new agencies, inadequate assessment of resources and manpower, insufficient participation and coordination among the planning agencies, a strain on the communication process between the agency and central government, an increased resistance of headquarters in delegating field authority, and, finally, a lack of thorough follow-up on the outcomes of the plan.

Specific organizational decisions are also crucial for a reasonable expectation of success. If the planning function is assigned to a regular ministry, for example, it is then faced with the problem of planning for its own peer agencies in the government as well as planning for sectoral areas in the society. The agency in this position is not likely to do either job well.

Another organizational hazard, implying a conflict of integration, occurs when the planning function is given to an autonomous group outside the government which has no real norms of accountability to the regime. It is essential that planning officers have the intimate

<sup>2</sup> Donald C. Stone, "Government Machinery Necessary for Development" in Martin Kriesberg (ed.), *Public Administration in Developing Countries*, Washington (D.C.), The Brookings Institute, 1965, p. 55.

confidence of the chief executive to avoid the dysfunction of a breakdown in coordination and integration. Planning should, therefore, be related directly to the center of the power structure of government. Moreover, it should be a balanced effort among and between the agencies.

It is the function of the bureaucracy to provide the tools for the smooth operation of the planning process. It develops as the plan does. The plan is total. The plan is a deliberate, political commitment of government to change.

As it faces further challenges of differentiation, integration and legitimation, it must define the degree of conflict in which it finds itself and reorder its structures to accomplish practical ends. The following criteria are offered by Marceau Long and we offer them as a sample of the readjustments needed in modernizing bureaus, not however as ideal types.<sup>3</sup>

As to recruitment, Long suggests a standard based on merit examination to permit the qualitative selection of candidates, the creation of programmes of pensions and social security benefits, a consistent system of grading and evaluation of performance, a statutory channel for the handling of complaints and grievances, a legal framework for the definition and classification of ranks and grades, clear rules for adjudicating appointments and transfers, and, lastly, a legally defined system governing retirement. Long's system envisages the creation of a career-orientated and professional civil service. Through the routinization of careers, two goals are accomplished: (1) institutionalization and autonomy of the bureau, and (2) reduced likelihood that its prerogatives will be usurped by the government or an overly zealous military group. This scheme assumes that the more complex an organization the more difficult it becomes to disintegrate either from internal or external forces. This is a hypothesis that can well be tested in the field.

The last phase of the discussion deals with a review of some fallacies behind the economic and administrative aspects of planning. The first of these revolves around what Bertram Gross has called the "planners vs. doers illusion,"<sup>4</sup> or the notion that specialized technicians have a monopoly on planning and only the administrators are the doers.

<sup>3</sup> Marceau Long, "Statutes Applicable to the Public Official", Martin Kriesberg (ed.), *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.

<sup>4</sup> Bertram M. Gross, "The Administration of Economic Development Planning: Principles and Fallacies", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. III, No. 5 (1967-1968).

We have already pointed out the necessity of involving all actors in the planning operation as well as indigenous people who probably know best what their needs are. Purely technical concerns are an impossibility and are intimately tied to a whole series of subjective, non-economic variables.

A second fallacy that may well attend the planning function is the obsession with the gadgetry of administrative models. An example of this would be the arbitrary imposition of Western ways of doing and thinking about things and the arrogant assumption that Western norms are successful and 'good' in themselves. This idea can filter into theoretical constructs as well as practical plans.

The national planner would do well to seek to avoid the notion that what worked in other nations will automatically work for him as well. There is no fixed blueprint for planning. Each plan must seek to incorporate those features that it finds unique to the environment for which it is planning. Nor can a plan be devised which can eliminate all uncertainty. Planning for the inevitable is no plan at all, the goal of the plan is to change what is happening in a legitimating manner. Each new round of support that is established is just as important as earlier support and is intimately intertwined with practical goal achievement.

As a part of the integrating function, planners might do well to realize that the basic resources of any plan are the people to which it is directed. Expertise centering around the manipulation of non-human factors to the extent that the politics of the situation are ignored may see planners leading a revolution of rising frustration rather than expectation. Any change, no matter how small, is a real threat to the power position of some elite structure. Not everyone is agreed to the aims of the plan or to the values of the system. A general parameter of developing planning may be regarded as the dynamics of support which the planning group strives to arouse.

Another fallacy that Gross points up is the planners claim to rationality. Error, however, is incipient to all human effort. No amount of theorizing or expertise can circumscribe this fact. Planning is a process of trial and error. A case in point was the villagization programme in Tanzania in 1964 which was committed to relocating large numbers of people into agricultural villages. After much debate and friction and reshuffling of the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation and the disbanding of the Village Settlement Agency, it was decided that the plan itself, not its administration, was undesirable.

Another kind of overselling of development planning that tends to occur is the idea or conviction of the specialist that quantification, graphs, and statistical projections are in and of themselves a plan. We are admonished by Gross to keep in mind that a plan is not merely a feasibility study. Data is in itself a power resource that may be jealously guarded by the holding office and not freely and objectively given to the statistician or technician. The claim to pertinent data may be the only claim to power a department has and it may seek to hoard it.

In short, we maintain that development planning is a national integrating instrumentality seeking to arouse political support. This seems to hold good especially for rural areas which have to undergo the greatest change and, thus, are called upon to make the greatest sacrifices in terms of dislocation that ensues when a rapid departure from traditionalism is effected. Further, what is Western is not automatically the best model for change. The plan must be pertinent to current indigenous needs and not merely imported. Economic measures are only one aspect of a solidly conceived plan. What is of most strategic import from the behavioural and explanatory standpoint are the human conflicts that occur within the processes of differentiation, integration and legitimation.

#### CONCLUSION

Several impressionistic generalizations offer themselves from our initial descriptive effort. They are offered as an attempt to isolate those factors of greatest analytical value from which hopefully interesting (useful for theory building) hypotheses can be drawn as a basis for ongoing research.

The processes of differentiation, integration, and legitimation are societal in scope as well as institutional. Our notion, then, is that bureaucracy is undergoing similar development conflicts as is the general society in which it finds itself.<sup>5</sup>

Differentiation appears as a sub-process of integration working towards a seemingly contradictory end. The former increases specialization, the latter seeks to incorporate and assimilate the specialization process. The greater and more rapid the rate of differentiation, the greater the difficulty in integration.

<sup>5</sup> See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization" in Nimrod Raphaeli (ed.), *Readings in Comparative Public Administration* (Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 354-372, for a view of bureaucracy as a social system.



The extent of legitimation that occurs within a structure is determined by the degree of a lack of dysfunction that occurs between the ongoing processes of differentiation and integration.

Legitimation is not a linear process but is cross-institutional and cross-structural. Support is generated around social institutions in a horizontal manner. This phenomena suggests that legitimation in a developing bureaucracy is generated around functional offices and roles, it does not proceed automatically downward from the top of the hierarchy. Legitimacy must be aroused, it does not appear to be self-generating.

Such organizational devices as line-staff and span of control are utilized not as routinizing factors but as consent-producing devices which assist in the programme of building legitimacy.

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## ROLE OF CIVIL SERVICE IN INDIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM\*

V. Subramanian

THE Civil Service and the Political System have been partners in the "endless adventure of governing men". This partnership has been able to provide an administration which is concerned with the citizen's welfare and has been able to induce in the citizen a respect for discipline and support for the administration. Since antiquity, however, sages like Vyasa of Mahabharata fame, statesmen like Woodrow Wilson, and political scientists like Kautilya or administrative reformers like Appelby have laid emphasis on a civil service dedicated to the citizen's welfare. For example, in the Bhagvadgeeta, Lord Krishna urges upon Arjuna the merit of action designed to enhance the common weal as under:

“ लोकसंग्रहमेव संपश्यन्कर्तुमर्हसि ”

Centuries later, in his celebrated essay on "The Study of Public Administration" President Wilson desired for the United States "an administration at all points sensitive to public opinion . . . a civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigour and yet so intimately connected with the popular thought by means of elections and constant public counsel as to find arbitrariness or class spirit quite out of the question".

### *Administration in the Past*

Government, in some form or another, became necessary as soon as the family transcended its limited frontiers and transformed itself into a tribe and thereafter into a nation. We see an embryo of the civil service in the City Government of the Greeks, in the administration of the Roman Empire, in the tribal system of ancient West Africa and, of course, in the political and administrative system of ancient India. According to Shri K. M. Pannikar:

"The countries of Asia and Africa were from the earliest times administering States. In ancient Egypt, India and China, Government from the earliest times was based on administrative services.

\*This article was awarded First Prize—Rs. 1,000—in the IIPA Annual Essay Prize Competition, 1970.

This was due to the fact that the States of Asia and Africa were based on the land revenue administration which again depended in most cases of high Asian civilization, on the control of river water and/or other forms of irrigation, requiring a large army of officials to administer."<sup>1</sup>

The science of public administration was known as *Rajdharma*, in ancient India. *Dandniti* became a more popular term a little later and *Arthashastra* was suggested as an alternative to it. In course of time, however, the word *Rajanitishastra*, abridged into *Nitishastra*, became most popular and gradually supplanted the other terms.<sup>2</sup> In Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, we get an accurate portrayal of the complete and elaborate system of bureaucratic administration. Even in those days, the main concern of the ruler was the interest of the citizen as would be obvious from the following couplet from the *Arthashastra*:

“प्रजासुखे सुखं राज्ञः प्रजानां हिते हितम् ।

नायमप्रियम् हितं राज्ञः प्रजानाम् तु हितं प्रियम् ॥”

which, in a nutshell, meant that the King or the administrator must regard his own happiness as indissolubly connected with the happiness of his subjects. In fact, both the Ramayana and the Mahabharata are replete with several wise concepts and directions in respect of public administration, both civil and military.

Under the Moghuls, we see in the public service a fusion of some of the principles of the Arabic administrative and the classical Indian administrative systems. The foreign element is illustrated by the separation of financial and executive administration. The Governor called the *Amir* was in charge of military and the police but the *Amil* was the head of the treasury. These two functionaries appeared to provide a check and balance against each other. This principle was carried down to the district administration where the *Subedar* was the provincial Governor and the *Diwan* the revenue chief. The Moghul rulers, however, did not interfere with the system of revenue administration prevailing before their times, though Sher Shah in his times and Akbar, through the agency of Todarmal, completed, consolidated and codified the revenue system.

### *The Civil Services*

Coming nearer to our times, the conception of an organized civil service in India originated with the East India Company. The term

<sup>1</sup> K. M. Pannikar, *Afro-Asian States and their Problems*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1959.

<sup>2</sup> A. S. Altekar, *State and Government in Ancient India*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas, 1955

'Civil Service' was coined by it and applied to that part of the service of the East India Company carried on by the covenanted servants who did not belong to the Army and the Navy. The expression 'Civil Service' has continued to be used in almost all modern countries, whatever their political system, to denote a body of people appointed to carry out the politics of the Government, in the shaping and formulation of which they may have participated to a greater or lesser degree. In view of this participation and contact with the Government, the civil service possesses certain distinguishing characteristics. In the first place, the actions of the civil servants are there for the public to view at all times. In a democratic system of administration, the publicity that the actions might get through the medium of Press or legislature may be out of all proportion to the importance of the actions and may well cause considerable discomfiture to a Minister. Secondly, the civil service must be prepared at all times to anticipate every conceivable question in respect of its myriad activities. This naturally results in the keeping of records, more records and even more records which are the priceless possessions of the civil servant and a heritage he hands over to his successor. Thirdly, the civil servant has sometimes to face considerable embarrassment because the orders, whether given by the Minister or the Parliament, may be in some cases completely unrealistic and almost unenforceable. The civil servant has on such occasions to perform the unenviable task of giving these vague and inchoate decisions a "local habitation and a name". Fourthly, while it is true that all Government are hedged in by Law and are answerable to the Law, the civil servant's scope is even more circumscribed, particularly as in a democracy he not merely cannot do some things which are prohibited by the law but may not be able to do things which are not permitted by the law. Fifthly, like Caesar's wife, the civil service must be above suspicion. It has to hold the scales even between citizen and citizen. It has to be impartial, it has to be guided by precedents and at the same time show that its actions do not constitute a precedent for something that is irregular. In this process, it may not be able to administer an organization entirely from the balance-sheet point of view like a business organization and will not, therefore, be able to cut through red-tape like the business bulldozer. Sixthly and finally, a civil servant is always behind the scene. He is rarely rewarded for what he does and often punished for what he has not intended. He has to be anonymous and yet according to some quarters politically committed. The following humorous but realistic description of the civil service is apposite:

"Government departments have been disrespectfully alleged to resemble a number of State elephants, proceeding more or less in line, in a direction generally predetermined by gentlemen in

howdahs (Ministers) and at a pace not entirely uninfluenced by the proddings of their mahouts (civil servants) and the activities of a swarm of lesser attendants (Politicians). The sight is an awe-inspiring one."<sup>3</sup>

The quandary in which the civil servant finds himself is reflected in the following stanza of the famous Sanskrit poet Bhartrahari:

"If he is silent, he is dumb; if he is articulate, he is contentious;  
If he tries to come in close contact, he is aggressive; but if he keeps aloof, he is immature;  
If he is tolerant, he is timid; but if not he is impatient or illbred.  
Inscrutable is the role of the servant beyond the comprehension of even a Yogi."

#### PUBLIC SERVICES IN INDIA

##### *Till Independence*

The establishment of the public service in India must be dated to the Northcote Trevelyan Committee (1853), which was appointed by Gladstone when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, to enquire into and report on the organization of a permanent civil service in Great Britain. The Committee deplored the fact that the permanent civil service was "eagerly sought after by those whose abilities do not warrant an expectation that they will succeed in the open professions where they must encounter the competition of their contemporaries and those whom indolence of temperament or physical infirmities render unfit for active exertions are placed in the civil service where they may obtain an honourable livelihood with little labour and with no risk; where their success depends upon their simply avoiding any flagrant misconduct and attending with moderate regularity to routine duties". The Committee concluded that the result of this was that the public service "suffers both in internal efficiency and in public estimation. The character of the individuals influence the mass and it is thus that we often hear complaints of official delays, official evasions of difficulty, and official indisposition to improvement". To remedy this situation the Committee suggested as a general principle that "the public service should be carried on by the admission into its lower ranks of a carefully selected body of young men who should be employed from the first upon work suited to their capacities and their education and should be made constantly to feel that their promotion and future prospects depend entirely on the industry and the ability with which they discharge their duties".

<sup>3</sup> Frank Dunnill, *The Civil Service : Some Human Aspects*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1956.

The Committee's report could not, however, be implemented with alacrity by the British Government which found it unable to comb the cobwebs of corruption which had enveloped the public service. However, a system of open-door recruitment was stated as an experiment in the Indian Public Service under the still functioning East India Company. The competitive examinations were, however, applicable only to the higher civil service which was then referred to as the Covenanted Civil Services to distinguish it from the lower services employed in civil administration which was mainly Indian in personnel and was known as the Uncovenanted Civil Service. Thus, by 1858, when the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown became a reality, the foundations of the Indian Civil Service were formally implanted.

The Service, however, had to go through several vicissitudes during the course of which 2 or 3 commissions were appointed to examine and suggest improvements to meet the increasing demand for the Indianization of the Services. During all these years the country was in great political ferment consequent upon the growing and insistent demand for emancipation from foreign rule. The prestigious civil services, namely, the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service were also identified generally in the minds of the nationalists, who were struggling against the British Government, as being the unpatriotic instruments of foreign oppression. This accounts for the fact that all the other All India Services, such as the Indian Agricultural Service, the Indian Forests Service, the Indian Service of Engineers, the Indian Educational Service, which came into existence as complementary to the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service were abolished and at the time of transfer of power from the British to Indians in 1947 there were only two residuary All India Services, namely, the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service, with the dwindling remnants of the other All India Services which had been discontinued earlier.

### *Since Independence*

The immediate effect of Independence on the public service was the drastic depletion of the superior services. For some years, partly on account of the Second World War and partly on account of the desire of the British Government to keep close control over the services, in order to continue its hold over India, recruitment to the Indian Civil and Police Services was sparse. The emergence of Independence resulted in the exist of nearly 600 of the 1,200 British officers of the Indian Civil Service and the exit of another 100 officers to Pakistan. When

free India was being born on August 15, 1947, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, vibrant with emotion, spoke in historic words about the new dawn of freedom. He said:

"Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge not wholly or in full measure, but substantially. At the stroke of the midnight hour when the world sleeps India will awaken to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed finds utterance. It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take the pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and to the still larger cause of humanity."

One day later, the grandeur of the Prime Minister's vision and the wide range of his ideals, again shone in his message to the press on the inauguration of Independence when he said:

"The appointed day has come; the day appointed by destiny and India stands forth again after long slumber and struggle, awake, vital, free and independent. The past clings on to us, still in some measure and we have to do much before we redeem the pledges we have so often taken. Yet the turning point is past; history begins anew for us, the history we shall live and act and others will write about. It is a fateful moment for us in India, for all Asia and for the world. A new Star rises, the Star of freedom in the East, a new hope comes into being, a long cherished vision materialises. May the Star never set and that hope never be betrayed."

While the lamp of freedom was being lighted in several affluent towns and humdrum villages, across the borders of India lamps in millions of houses were being extinguished and the inmates of these houses were being exterminated. A mass exodus of human beings unparalleled in history was taking place from Pakistan to the Indian border and *vice versa* leaving death, ruination, and mangled corpses in its train. Acts of indescribable bestiality and downright moral perversion, disfigured the people and the Governments of those days. In fact, the problem of running of a Government itself was colossal and the political system far from enthusing at the newly won Independence was facing a disastrous collapse, which if it had occurred would have meant not the dawn of freedom but its death knell even before it could be enjoyed. At this moment of history, the depleted civil services and the numerous ancillaries of these services performed miracles of endurance, feats of courage, epics of imaginative behaviour. Never in recent



history has a nation been known to have been saved from a catastrophe of this magnitude by the coordinated effort of the political system and the civil service as in those dark nights following the dawn of Independence. These achievements of the civil servants in the political system of that day did not go without recognition or expression of praise. There may be no better example of political statesmanship than the manner in which Sardar Patel eulogized the efforts of the Services when speaking in the Constituent Assembly about the continuance of the guarantees to the Services:

“I wish to assure you that I have worked with them during this difficult period and I am speaking with a sense of heavy responsibility and I must confess that in point of patriotism, in point of loyalty, in point of sincerity and in point of ability, you cannot have a substitute. They are as good as ourselves and to speak of them in disparaging terms in this House in public and to criticize them in this manner is doing a disservice to yourself and to the country. I wish to place it on record in this House that if during the last 2 or 3 years most of the members of the services had not behaved patriotically and with loyalty, the Union would have collapsed.

“Learn to stand upon your pledged word. Do not quarrel with the instruments with which you want to work. It is a bad workman who quarrels with his instruments. Nobody wants to put in any work if every day he is criticized and ridiculed in public. Nobody will give you work like that. So, once and for all, decide whether you want these services or not. If you have done with it and decided not to have the service at all, even inspite of my pledge to them I will take the service with me and go. I will tell them that the Nation has changed its mind.”

To remedy the disastrous administrative situation in the country created by the partition, the Government of India went in for emergency recruitment to the Indian Administrative and Police Services from the open market and from amongst the State Services of the Part ‘A’ and Part ‘B’ States. The number of officers so recruited is shown in the following table:

<i>Source</i>	<i>I. A. S.</i>	<i>I. P. S.</i>
Open Market	153	142
Part ‘A’ States	131	47
Part ‘B’ States	138	51

(Note—The Special Recruitment Board also earmarked 84 officers for the I.A.S. and 27 officers for the I.P.S. from the Part ‘B’ States as showing promise of attaining the requisite standard in about five years.)



Though the above mentioned arrangement did not completely fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of senior members of the Indian Civil and Police Services, nevertheless the immediate essential requirements were fulfilled and the Government considered that a larger number of recruits through the open competitive examinations in the subsequent years would provide the necessary personnel to man the services. By 1950, the country had attained relative administrative and political stability. In the new Constitution which was adopted on the 26th day of November 1949, special provisions were enacted under Part XIV of the Constitution of India relating to the Services. These constitutional provisions lay down that every person who is a member of the Defence or the Civil Service held office during the pleasure of the President, if he was in the service of the Union, and during the pleasure of the Governor, if he was in the service of the State. No person in such service could be removed until charges were framed against him and he had a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A permissive provision for the creation of one or more All-India Services was made and the conditions of service in respect of remuneration, leave and pension of the covenanted civil services were protected. The Constitution also provided for the establishment of State and Union Public Service Commissions and for the submission of periodical Reports by them to the Governor or the President. At the same time, the Government of India also took several steps for improving and stabilising the public services. At the request of the Planning Commission, Shri A. D. Gorwala, a retired Member of the Indian Civil Service submitted a report on public administration. The Report of the First Five Year Plan published in 1952 also contained important policy statements about the public services. The late Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, got Prof. Paul Appleby to report on the public administration in India in 1953. This was followed by a second report in 1956. At the level of the States, several committees and commissions were appointed for administrative reorganization. The important and delicate role of the public services was recognized and expression was given to it by the Prime Minister, Shri Nehru, in the following words:

“Work for a service has grown greatly in India in two ways, one is, there are entirely new types of work which we have to do and which we did not do before . . . . So this tremendous increase in work. Secondly, the nature of work has changed. It is much more responsible work. Particularly the work has become more and more social, so you see how both quantity and quality of our work has changed and the directions in which it goes has changed.”

## EVALUATING THE SERVICES

Inspite of all this, however, there was a growing feeling about the inadequacy of the Services, particularly in the context of a developmental economy. It was also presumably felt that interaction between the civil services and the political system was resulting in serious embarrassing consequences. It was felt that in the march to economic freedom, and in the achievement of social emancipation, the Services and the political administrators were not marching in step. This was the background for the appointment of a fullfledged Administrative Reforms Commission presided over in the first instance by Shri Morarji Desai, one time Finance Minister to the Government of India, and later, after his re-appointment as Finance Minister, by Shri K. Hanumanthaiya, one time Chief Minister of Mysore State and Chairman of several administrative reorganization committees. The Commission has submitted several reports on various facets of administration, such as economic administration, district administration, State administration, redress of citizens' grievances, personnel administration, etc. In its report on Personnel Administration, the Commission stated that:

"A theoretically perfect administrative structure and unexceptionable methods of work may be devised, but they will be of little or no avail if those who man the administration are either unequal to their task or are apathetic towards it."

The Commission, reviewing the current administrative situation, has stated that administration today is involved "in formulation of policies and implementation of tasks concerned with social welfare and economic growth, that science and technology have projected new tasks on administration and that the enormous growth of personnel has rendered it necessary to devise special measures for ensuring that each member of the public service gives the best that he is capable of".

The changes made by Government to meet the new situation were, however, sporadic and peripheral. Some fundamental and basic recommendations were necessary. Mainly these relate to the method of selection and recruitment to middle management posts in the Government of India from amongst all senior officers who have requisite experience in certain specialized fields, such as economic administration, social and educational administration, industrial administration, agricultural and rural development administration, personnel administration, financial administration, defence administration and internal security and planning. The Commission also suggested a unified grading structure as being more conducive to harmony and contentment among the different Services. The Commission also made significant

recommendations with regard to training, recruitment policy, promotion policy and the conduct and discipline of the Services. In its report on State Administration, the Commission has made far-reaching recommendations in the matters of District and State administration. Considering that there are 10 million people employed in the Public Services of India—roughly one in every 50 persons in the entire country—and considering also that the political system must be made to subserve the canons of public welfare and the citizen's weal, it is imperative to establish the closest harmony and coordination between the civil service and the political system—both of them are the servants of the ultimate master, *viz.*, the people.

#### THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

The Constitution of India provides that India shall be constituted into a Sovereign Democratic Republic. Certain fundamental rights are enshrined in the Constitution and these include equality before the Law, prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth; equality of opportunity in matters of public employment, abolition of untouchability, right to freedom of speech and expression, right to hold personal property, right to practise an occupation or trade, protection of life and personal property, freedom of conscience and free practice and propagation of religion. The Constitution provides remedies for the enforcement of these fundamental rights and enunciates certain directive principles of State Policy. In no written constitution has there been such an eloquent expression of State Policy designed to promote social harmony, political stability and economic contentment. But all these grand eloquent expressions would have no meaning unless they are translated into reality and action. In words pregnant with wisdom, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the First President of the Republic, brought out the same idea. He said:

“Whatever the Constitution may or may not provide, the welfare of the country will depend on the way in which the country is administered; that will depend upon the men who administer it. If the people who are elected are capable and men of character and integrity, they would be able to make the best even of a defective constitution. If they are lacking in these, the Constitution cannot help the country. After all, the Constitution, like a machine, is a lifeless thing, it acquires life because of the men who control it and operate it, and India needs today, nothing more than a set of honest men who will have the interest of the country before them. It requires men of strong character, men

of vision, men who will not sacrifice the interest of the country at large for the sake of smaller groups and areas. We can only hope that the country will throw up such men in abundance."

We shall now examine to what extent the hopes expressed by Dr. Rajendra Prasad have been fulfilled.

### THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The political system that prevails in our country is that of a Federal Parliamentary Democracy. The various States which form part of the Indian Union, have their own legislatures and enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy. They have full freedom for legislating in respect of many important matters and share with the Centre the right to legislate in respect of some other matters. They have their own Governments consisting of the Governor who is appointed by the President of India, and a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as its head, to advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions. All executive action of the Government is expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. The reality, however, is that the Chief Minister and his colleagues are all powerful subject to the vote of the State Legislature. The Government at the Centre consists of the President in whom all the executive power of the Union is vested, the Vice-President (who functions as a President during the casual vacancies in the office or during the absence of the President) and a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as its head. As in the case of the State, all executive action of the Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President but the reality is that the Prime Minister and his/her colleagues are all powerful. Both at the level of State and the Centre, there is the judiciary consisting of the Supreme Court of India and the high Courts of the States. The judiciary is independent of the executive and has the freedom to interpret the legislative enactments of the Union and the States. The Constitution thus provides for a delicate balance of power requiring skill and patience in its actual operation.

The tradition of Parliamentary Democracy in India is an inheritance from the United Kingdom. The political system of the United Kingdom, however, is much more crystalized with two equally strong contending political parties who have shared the task of running the British Government during the past several years. At the time of the birth of Indian democracy there were not, as in Britain, two or more political parties contending for the Government, but one large powerful political party, a few independents elected to Parliament and the State

Legislatures and the makings of miniature oppositions in some of the States. However, thanks to the personality of India's first Prime Minister and the tremendous esteem in which he was held by the whole nation for his colossal contribution to the making of Free India and later to the government of Independent India, as well as to the powerful political machinery possessed by the Indian National Congress which, because of its strength and numbers, was able to exercise a dominant voice in the State Legislatures and in the running the State Governments, there was a considerable degree of uniformity in the administration at the Centre and in the States. Besides, for some years following Independence the men who headed the Government in the States and who constituted the Government in the Centre were the leaders of the Indian National Congress who had gone through the mill of the struggle for Independence, who were nurtured in the finest traditions of the Congress and who generally possessed a character that drew respect from the people. Consequently, it was easy for the Civil Service in the Centre and in the States to carry on the administration under the guidance of the political system. The first flush of Independence undoubtedly produced in the leaders of Government at the Centre and in the States a certain amount of arrogance and impatience which exhibited itself in petty interferences in the administration and in unwarranted criticism against the civil Service, with the notable exception of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and the leaders who had come under his influence. In course of time and with the growing realization of their responsibility by the leaders of the political system, the adjustments between the Civil Service and the Political System worked themselves out satisfactorily. The result was that during the first 15 years after Independence the country made gigantic strides in industrial development. This period also saw outstanding achievements in the field of education and literacy, tremendous improvement in Public health, concrete steps in the field of decentralized democratic administration, significant development in power and irrigation potential and, above all, very greatly heightened political consciousness, thanks to the adoption of universal suffrage. None of these outstanding achievements would have been possible but for the dedicated efforts and the constant energy of the Civil Servants and the responsible motivation of the political system. The harmony with which the Civil Service and the political system worked out was responsible for the stability of the Governments at the Centre and in the States.

The charisma of the immortality or the inevitability of the Congress was first exposed by the formation of a Non-Congress Government in Kerala in 1957 after the Second General Elections. Communists had captured power in the State by Parliamentary means. The political

landscape all over the country was, however, not appreciably affected as the Congress continued to run the Government in the Centre and in all the other States. Undoubtedly, there were differences between the Centre and the Kerala Government which were attributed by the opposition parties to the fact that the Government was run by an opposition party whereas the Congress ruled in the Centre. Kerala alone, among the States of India, has had the misfortune of periodical collapses of democratic Government and the imposition of President's Rule. What President's rule lacked in democracy was more than made up by the provision of political and administrative stability. Unlike the rule, however, of a political party which can technically continue throughout the entire period of the legislature if it retains its confidence, President's rule is very limited in duration, say, six months to an year, and every opportunity is sought not only by the political parties but also by the Government at the Centre to restore democratic functioning. The third General Elections saw the emergence of opposition parties and though no Government was formed in any of the States except Kerala by an opposition party, the increase in the strength of the opposition in the Parliament and State Legislatures led the Congress to be very cautious and more circumspect. Gone were the days when the Congress was riding high and sure of itself. The opposition began to be more and more critical of the Government. Economic discontent added fuel to the fire and all the political parties opposed to the Congress made capital out of this inflammable situation. For a time, the Chinese aggression made various parties sink their differences and espouse the cause of national and emotional integration. But the policies of the Government, particularly the foreign and defence policies, came in for sharp criticism. The years between the Third and the Fourth General Elections, *i.e.* 1962-1967 also saw the decline and the demise of Pandit Nehru who bestrode the political firmament like a Colossus for 15 years and more. There was also the short-lived war between India and Pakistan in 1965, but this was again a blessing in disguise as the danger of foreign aggression once again temporarily united the whole nation. Besides, the infinite patience and tact of Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri who was prepared to sympathetically listen to views other than those of the Congress, enabled him to evolve a consensus of the political parties in respect of major political issues. The unity of the country and the stability of the administration, therefore, continued to be a reality. During all these years, except in Kerala, there was considerable degree of harmony and coordination between the Civil Service and the political system and this was mainly responsible for the emergence of India as a victor in the Indo-Pakistan conflict.

However, things changed completely as a result of the Fourth



General Elections. In the 1962, Parliamentary Elections, the Congress had polled 44.7 per cent of the total vote which dropped to 40.7 per cent in 1967. Though, however, the loss of Electoral strength suffered by the Congress was only 4 per cent yet its seat of strength in Parliament was reduced from 73.01 per cent in 1962 to 54.4 per cent in 1967, *i.e.* as much as 18.7 per cent. As a result of the decisive results of the General Elections non-Congress Governments were voted to power in Tamil Nadu, Orissa, West Bengal and Kerala and Congress Governments in Assam, Mysore, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan. The situation in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Punjab became indeed pitiable and perilous and one had only to open the morning papers everyday in order to find some story or other of defections, desertions, kidnapping of legislators, etc., to understand, the depths to which parliamentary democracy has sunk in India leaving in its train lengthening shadows of political instability and the continual concern of Governments and the Ministers, to remain in power. Government business and the welfare of the people have thus become casualties. In this era of floor-crossings, defections and attempts to topple Governments, the most pernicious and corrupt practices are indulged in by the political system and the Civil Service is also not left far behind. It will be well nigh impossible for the Civil Service to remain steadfast and pure in such a confused and unhealthy climate. Really speaking, in such times, the Civil Service has a responsibility to hold the scales even and do what is good for the common people. In practice, however, as one senior administrator in the Punjab has mentioned, the need for survival itself makes it obligatory for the Civil Service to either initiate or become a party to all these compromises of conscience! The situation has become even more aggravated by the defections within the Congress which has resulted in a wide schism between the two wings of the Congress Party, one vociferous in its advocacy of radical measures for the economic betterment of the masses and the other equally vociferous about the preservation of the Constitution and democratic practices. The struggle between the two wings of the Congress is as lamentable as the struggles and misunderstanding between the several brands of the Communist Party and even more portentous for the country because, in spite of all its imperfections and shortcomings, the Congress so far had provided stable Governments in the States and at the Centre. In such circumstances, when the people's leaders who ought to behave better set such bad examples, is it surprising that the Civil Services have also lost all sense of values, their traditional independence and detachment and all their insight and capacity to advise their Ministers in a proper manner.



## CITIZEN-ADMINISTRATOR RELATIONSHIP

It will be relevant after this description of the political situation to consider some important issues insofar as they affect the role of the Civil Services in the Indian Political System.

Probably the best attempt to conceptualise the citizen-administrator relationship in democratic terms was that of Morris-Janwitz in the unique empirical study in 1958 of public attitude towards the administration in Detroit (Michigan), U.S.A. He was, in this study, particularly concerned with "the democratic components of the Citizen's relationship to the Bureaucracy". He further says:

"A bureaucracy is in imbalances when it fails to operate on the basis of democratic consent. Bureaucratic imbalance may be either despotic or subservient. Despotic implies, that the bureaucracy is too much the master, while subservient implies that it is too much the servant."

He specifies four types of requirements for the achievement of democratic balance:

- "(1) *Knowledge*—The public must have an adequate level of knowledge about the operation of the public bureaucracy.
- "(2) *Self-interest*—The public must consider that its self-interest is being served by the public bureaucracy.
- "(3) *Principlemindedness*—The public must be of the general opinion that the public bureaucracy is guided in its action by a set of principles guaranteeing equal and impersonal treatment.
- "(4) *Prestige*—The public perspectives towards the public bureaucracy must include adequate prestige value towards public employment as compared with other types of careers. Very low and very high prestige values would interfere with the bureaucracy's ability to operate on the basis of democratic consent."

A similar empirical study in our country was made by Samuel Eldersveld, A. P. Barnabas and V. Jagannadham, who have published their findings in *Citizens and Administration in a Developing Democracy—An Empirical Study in Delhi State*. The Study reveals that there is greater criticism in India of the bureaucracy despite basic acceptance of the policy goals and the prestige of Government, a different patterning of the components in the support and hostility syndromes, and

greater hostility and negativism towards the administrative system in the middle and upper social strata.

### *Civil Service Anonymity*

The analysis of the citizen-administrator contact presented above, brings us to another aspect of the Civil Service which is not only important in a developing society but highly necessary in an unstable political system. It is said that one of the greatest virtues of the Civil Service is anonymity. Lord Attlee has stated that:

"In general, the Civil Servant must be content with anonymity and obscurity until, in due course, his name appears in the higher categories of the birth-day honours."

However, this concept of anonymity of Civil Service can be overdone. The Fulton Committee in its report on the Civil Service of the Great Britain has stated that this "traditional anonymity is already being eroded by Parliament and to a more limited extent by the pressures of the Press, radio and television".

In the opinion of the Committee, there should be a progressive relaxation of the convention of anonymity and "Civil Service as well as professional administrators should be able to go further than now in explaining what their departments are doing, at any rate, so far as concerned in executing policies and implementing legislations".

A similar opinion has been expressed by Shri V. Shankar in his dissenting note in the Administrative Reforms Commission's report on *State Administration*. He says:

"The administration must now become more and more open in at least the spheres where it comes closely in touch with the masses. The public must be disciplined and educated into this outlook on the administrative machinery and similarly the latter must concentrate on ever-widening areas of understanding and removal of grievances with a view to maximizing public cooperation and public response."

The administrator and the politician, or better still the Civil Service and the political system, are partners in a common endeavour and nothing brings out more effectively the sincerity of purpose of this partnership as genuine efforts to take the public into confidence rather than taking shelter under the cloak of anonymity. As E. N. Gladden

has said:

“the choice is between bureaucracy by design and bureaucracy by default, the bureaucracy of efficiency and the bureaucracy of incompetence. The former has its dangers and needs careful safeguards, the latter spells inevitable disaster. When Rome declined, its bureaucracy did not disappear, it became an increasing burden upon a dwindling eminence. From an efficient service it declined into an efficient bureaucracy, a cancer absorbing the dwindling nourishment of a dying civilization. Today’s symptoms are not so dissimilar as to encourage complacency.”<sup>4</sup>

The crying need of the day is not an inert, inefficient and impersonal bureaucracy, but a dynamic, diligent and devoted Civil Service.

### *Administrator and the Political System*

What is the role of the administrator in the political system? Is it, in the famous dictum of Sir William Harcourt, that the “Minister exists to tell the Civil Servant what the public won’t stand” or is there a more positive role? I would suggest that the role of the Civil Service in the political system should be direct and positive. There is considerable force in Prof. Appleby’s following statement:

“Every Governmental employee is engaged in political work. Government and politics are synonymous although not identical terms.”

Undoubtedly, the Civil Service should have nothing to do with the parties and politics or with the affairs of any individual political party. The Civil Service should be understanding and appreciative of the politicians’ responsibility and limitations. It is not desirable for the Civil Servants to try to make the political leaders in the Civil Service image. In the actual practice of Government, it would be difficult to conclude that there is a clear-cut division between the functions of the administrator and of the political leader. No doubt, the paramount duty of the Civil Servant is to implement the policy that has been framed by his Minister but, at the higher levels of administration, the Civil Service plays a not inconsiderable part in the shaping and formulation of those policies. In the very interesting study prepared for the Administrative Reforms Commission by Kothari and Ray on *The Relations Between The Administrators and Politicians*, the finding recorded is that in regard to the formulation of policies 45.3 per cent of

<sup>4</sup> E. N. Gladden, *Civil Service or Bureaucracy*, London, Staples, 1956.

administrators and 45.6 per cent of political leaders agree that this responsibility should be shared by both. Contrary-wise, even in matters of implementation of policies, the same Study has revealed that 41.5 per cent of administrators and 30.6 per cent of the political leaders indicate their preference in favour of sharing the responsibility in implementing the policies, such as distribution of loans, grants and subsidies.

The relationship between the administrator and the politician being of partnership needs no better proof. It will be difficult in a democracy to draw an inflexible line as to where the responsibility of the civil servant ends and where that of the political leader begins. Undoubtedly, there are certain conventions in this partnership. These conventions relate to the adherence to rules and regulations without the adoption of an ostrich like attitude of inflexibility, the avoidance by the political leader of personal and parochial considerations in the implementation of public policy and mutual understanding of each others faults and limitations.

### *The Concepts of Neutrality and Commitment*

The British tradition has always been that civil services must be neutral in their attitudes. Insofar as the British electorate has always been extremely enlightened and the British public fully conscious of its rights and responsibilities, the British tradition of neutrality is proper. Britain too have had the advantage of having had continuous political stability and by and large the two-party system has behaved with great responsibility. Many of these conditions do not obtain in a developing country like India inspite of the British influence on India over a long period of 150 years. Since we have adopted public welfare as our goal and planning as our policy, it is necessary for the administrator to have periodical contact with the public. The Civil Services are expected to act in accordance with the laws of the land and detailed instructions formulated by Government for implementation of policies. In implementing policies, the Civil Servant ought not to show partiality towards certain individuals. At the same time, however, he has to be vigorous in implementing the policy and if, therefore, the public feels dissatisfied with a particular policy, the remedy would appear to lie in criticism of the Government and persuading it through constitutional pressure to modify the policy. Neutrality should not be confused with disinterestedness and, therefore, if the civil servant in carrying out a policy appears to be over zealous, the public ought to bring this to the notice of the Government to take proper action. Once a policy has been framed, the attitude of the civil servant undoubtedly has to be like that of Portia but civil servants, particularly in the higher echelons of administration

have to play a part in the shaping and formulation of policy and they are bound to come into contact with various members of public, representative bodies, legislatures and parliaments individually or in committees of such bodies. They may be called upon to ascertain reaction with regard to a projected policy or explain the actions of a Minister in the formulation of a policy. Such contacts cannot, however, be considered by any means to offend the theory of neutrality. On the other hand, there is a good deal of talk these days about a "committed civil service". The expression "committed civil service" has had different connotations to suit the individual views of leaders who preach this philosophy. I would take the view that a good civil servant has in any case to be a committed individual, committed to the Constitution as by law laid down, committed to the programme formulated by the Government in accordance with the mandate of the people by whom the Government has been elected, committed to the common weal and to the welfare of the individual citizen. In this regard, Prof. Appleby has pointed out the following in his *Re-examination of India's Administrative System*:

"... invocation of political neutrality on the part of civil servants insofar as parties and politics is concerned tended to be made to appear to extend to programme neutrality. The result is an excessively and probably modernly unprecedented federal or collective kind of administrative system, cumbersome in manner, requiring too many inter-hierarchical conferences and utilising paper in an unnecessarily burdensome way. Clearance is slow and laborious. Responsibility is diffused and concealed rather than concentrated and clearly identified. Action is retarded before the fact and insufficiently evaluated in course and after the fact."

Sometimes when political leaders, however, some times bemoan the fact that the administration is not committed what they really have in mind is that the administration does not toe its line in the manner of "my country, right or wrong". Political leaders in opposition, however, would feel considerably hurt by an administration which behaves in this parochial, arbitrary and short-sighted manner. In fact, even the party in power would share the same view if tomorrow it goes out of power. It is, therefore, the essence of political democracy that the Civil Service should be committed to the nation, to the people and not to any political party.

#### *Elected Officials*

It has been discussed in some quarters whether, as in the American model, civil servants may be selected for short periods and changed with

the change in the incumbency of the President. The U.S. Civil Service is an open civil service, in that entry can take place at many levels. Although statistically most of the higher civil servants enter at relatively low levels, nevertheless the intake of the services direct to the higher levels and at later ages was on a significant scale.

"In the U.S. civil service, there is no sharp distinction such as prevails in Britain or India between the political head of a department and the top official, between the Minister who publicly speaks on policy issues and the officials who do not. The 'Minister' is not a member of Congress and may not even be a professional politician. In this country, we occasionally bring in outsiders to head departments as Ministers but when we do, they have to become politicians and be provided with a parliamentary seat."<sup>5</sup>

The suggestion at first sight appears not only fascinating but also feasible. It is argued, if it is possible to inject into the wooden-headed and precedent-ridden bureaucracy a direct dose of dynamism by lateral entry of persons who are committed to a particular programme and operating on the same 'Wave length' as the elected political executive, the administration will benefit and so will the citizen. But one has also to contend with the stage of development of democracy in our country. It may sound an unpleasant fact to us, but it must be admitted that we still have to become more responsible, more tolerant and more restrained in our personal ambitions before we can call ourselves fully developed democratically. Some of the results likely to ensue on the adoption of such a suggestion have been forcefully brought out by E. N. Gladden in his *Civil Service or Bureaucracy*. He says:

"There is one final problem to be touched upon, namely, the tendency of all communities, and particularly democratic communities, to regard the public service as an incomparable dumping ground for those to whom the State owes a debt, a cheap way of meeting the nation's obligation to individuals. It is this tendency that has elsewhere greatly assisted the development of spoils methods of meeting old party debts, with a consequent grave devaluation of public office and depreciation in public efficiency. For the individual patronage of oligarchy is substituted the group patronage of democracy."

I would suggest that an eminently practicable method of bringing the civil servant in close touch with the political system and enabling administrators to participate actively in the functioning of democracy

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<sup>5</sup> *The Civil Service*, Report of the Fulton Committee on Civil Service, 1966-68, London, H.M.S.O., 1968, Vol. I.



would be by the provision of special representation or nomination of the Civil Services in the Legislatures and in Parliament. There is today provision for fragmentary nominations to the Legislatures and to Parliament but such nominations generally go to people in other walks of life, some undoubtedly distinguished for particular work, but others more often than not as a reward for past behaviour or as a "retainer fee" for future conduct. By this method of bringing in close association between the administrator and the democracy not only will the civil servants acquire first hand experience of democratic practices but their wisdom and experience can be channelized into fruitful legislative or parliamentary activity. Such nominees would become intensified in their commitments to the cause of the people as a result of their association with the people's bodies and this will, in turn, pave the way for a more intimate and healthy relationship between the civil service and the political system.

### *A Democratic Holiday*

The conflicts between various political parties, the scandalous infightings within the political parties themselves, the break up of political parties not on grounds of principle but on grounds of selfishness and personal aggrandisement, the shameful spectacle of floor crossings and defections resulting in processions of "Aayarams" and "Gayarams" and the efforts in toppling Governments by resort to corrupt and dishonest practices, and the tremendous social as well as monetary costs of mid-term elections which also do not yield definite results, have set in motion a thought about a democratic holiday or 'a party holiday'.

It is argued by those who preach a 'democratic holiday' that, even today, it is a misnomer to say that ours is a political democracy. With an electorate which is substantially illiterate, with the compelling pull on their preferences by irresponsible demagogues on the one hand and by feudal loyalties on the other, with less than 50 per cent of the electorate exercising its franchise in elections, no wonder political scientists and administrators may become pessimistic about the future of democracy in India. But as Reinhold Niebuhr stated : "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary." Besides, the abolition of democracy and its substitution by administrative government will surely have the effect of making the citizen more remote from the seat of authority and lead him to the senile position of unquestioning compliance or making him embrace the 'dangers of obedience.' The rapport between the ruler and the ruled, which is provided by the representatives elected by the



people will disappear. Good Government is no substitute for self-government and bureaucratic administration does not necessarily mean a good government. "The modern Civil Service", as pointed out by Frank Dunnill<sup>7</sup>, "is a leviathan of immense power tremendously dangerous and seldom conscious of all the implications of its actions on the lives of individuals and on the shape of Society". It has to be restrained in order to be useful because "absolute power corrupts and prolonged authority encrusts". In such a system of Government, the individual becomes crushed completely. The impersonal, institutional, decisional process combined with the omniscience of the administrator relegates the individual to a distant position of uncomplaining obedience. The abolition of democracy is also likely to lead to the revival of the personality cult. There is enough evidence of this personality cult in the nascent totalitarianism of all political parties. The cult of personality will also increase the despotism of the administration. I would, therefore, not favour the suggestion about giving the country a 'democratic holiday' as it is fraught with dangerous consequences.

Somewhat different, however, is the conception of 'party holiday'. The experience of President's Rule in some States of the Indian Union after the defeat of the elected Ministries has been generally satisfactory. Political and administrative stability prevails during President's Rule, factionalism and communalism are absent from administrative decisions, parochial considerations do not find encouragement and the 'party holiday' gives the people respite from an inconvenient political honeymoon. But President's rule or Civil Service Rule has its limitations, in that the liaison between the people and the Government is still very indirect and neither the aspirations of the people will evoke direct response from the Government nor will their hopes have a chance of fulfilment. A representative democracy implies a party system of Government. The remedy lies in humanizing the party machine, in educating political parties to their responsibility and in the formation of a code of conduct for the observance of healthy democratic practices. With a wide awake press, an enlightened Civil Service, and more responsible attitude by political leaders, it is not beyond our reach to make representative democratic Government a success in India.

#### *The Civil Servant and the Minister*

The harmony between the Civil Service and the political system depends to a considerable degree on the relations between the administrator and the Minister or between the Civil Servant and the political executive. The embarrassments that this relationship, when not

<sup>7</sup> Frank Dunnill, *op. cit.*

squarely defined, can cause, were highlighted in the Mundhra Scandal. Even to this day, it cannot be stated that the relations between the Civil Servant and the Minister have been defined with any degree of precision. In refreshing contrast to this is the practice followed by Sardar Patel. The practice was expressed by him in the following words:

“If you want an efficient All India Service, I advice you to allow the Services to open their mouth freely. If you are a Premier, it would be your duty to allow the Secretary or the Chief Secretary or other servants working under you to express their opinion without fear or favour. But I see a tendency today . . . no, you are a serviceman, you must carry out our orders.”

A good administrator, in a democratic Government, as Prof. Appleby used to point out, is one who needs to have a high respect and sympathy for political processes and political leaders. This does not, however, mean that the Civil Servant should be the alter-ego of the Minister. If Civil Servants find that the frank advice given by them is unpalatable to the Minister, they will be tempted to adopt the line of least resistance because after all they are human. Instances are not wanting of the administrators being made scapegoats for the failures or wrong policies of a Minister even though the policies have been formulated by the Minister. The establishment of cordial relations between the administrative and the political wings of the Government and the proper demarcation of the responsibilities of the two wings is a *sine qua non* of good democratic administration. It is worthwhile in this connection to stress the observance of the following principles governing the formal position of the Minister *vis-a-vis* his department, which have been stated with great clarity in what is now famous as the *Crichel Down Affair*:

- (1) Where a Civil Servant carries out an express order of a Minister, the Minister must protect the Civil Servant concerned.
- (2) Where a Civil Servant acts properly in accordance with the policy laid down by the Minister, the Minister must equally protect and defend him.
- (3) Where a Civil Servant makes a mistake or causes some delay but not on an important issue of policy and not where a claim to individual rights is seriously involved, the Minister acknowledges the mistake and he accepts the responsibility, although he is not personally involved. The Minister must state that he will take corrective action in the department.
- (4) Where action has been taken by a Civil Servant of which the Minister disapproves and has no prior knowledge and the

conduct of the official is reprehensible, then there is no obligation on the Minister to endorse what he believes to be wrong or to defend what are clearly shown to be the errors of his officers.

It will be a healthy practice in Indian Democratic Administration if the above principles are followed.

It now remains to tackle some general points which have a great deal to do in determining the proper role of the Civil Service in the political system. These points relate to:

Leadership of the Public Servant;

A proper understanding of the Civil Servants' Role; and

Action-oriented administration.

#### *Leadership of the Public Servant*

Before the advent of the professional political leader, which is a comparatively recent phenomenon, the School Teacher, the Post-Master, the Panchayat Secretary, the Secretary of the Cooperative Societies and even the Revenue Officials used to be leaders of the public. One of the qualities looked for in a public servant, particularly in one occupying higher post in administration, is capacity for leadership which consists inability to get the most of his men, ability to exercise influence over those who will be affected by his decision and also an ability to radiate their desires and translate them into action. The public-servants in India today are, by and large, responsive to the opinions of the Government under which they serve and we find much conformity even in the fields which have little to do with Government, such as mode of personal dress. The Indian Public Servant has indeed a large scope for the exercise of leadership. By virtue of his position, he has a certain amount of authority both over the subordinates and in the general public. If, by his forbearance, his inclination to justice and his concern for the people, he is able to win the confidence of the public, the implementation of Government programmes becomes very smooth. This can be seen in the tremendous differences in mass response and public contentment in areas in which the public-servants behave arbitrarily, with lack of concern and without humanity, and in other areas in which the public-servants behave in a just and understanding manner and with humanity. Shri Y. B. Chavan, in his inaugural address at the Conference on Training (held in Delhi at the Indian Institute of Public Administration on February 24, 1969), has expressed this point beautifully.

He said:

"To the various virtues of Civil Servants enumerated by theorists from time to time we have to add one more in our environment, that of humanity. We must realise that for a large number of our rural masses, a little glow of welcome in the eyes of the public-official spells the difference between the disappointment and exhilaration."

### *Understanding the Civil Servant's Role*

The ultimate effectiveness of democratic Government depends largely upon the understanding of the people. The image of the Civil Servant as well as of the politician will have to be properly represented. Too often, there is a tendency on the part of the political leaders to be contemptuous about the role of the Civil Servants. Too often also, there is a tendency on the part of the interested sections in the press to paint the image of the Civil Service and the political system in lurid colours. Sensationalism and scandalising are the order of the day. Good, honest work, amelioration of distress, and positive achievement in welfare administration do not get any recognition in the press whereas minor deviations from established procedures are magnified beyond all proportion. Official arrangements for propaganda are treated with scorn and the press which should have really been a powerful medium for the formation of such opinion as well as for the radiation of such public opinion plays to the gallery to get cheap popularity by contemptuous comments on administration and scurrilous attacks against the political and administrative executives. The same is true in the references made to the Services in Parliament and in the State legislatures. The Civil Service ought to be nameless and faceless so far as the legislature is concerned, but it is a matter of disappointment that in this country ill-informed and irresponsible criticism of the Civil Service, which is not in a position to answer back, is indulged in the legislatures. Parliamentary and Legislative immunity are excellent principles but our democracy must also learn that irresponsibility and impunity in criticism of administration is likely not only to lead to a weakening of initiative and develop frustration among the administrators but also to ineffectiveness in the political system to translate the ideals of democracy into practice.

### *Action-Oriented Administration*

One of the primary characteristics of democratic administration is action, organized action. As Prof. Appleby has said, persons in high position must have a sense of action. They must have a feeling of the

need for decision to get things done. Willingness to assume responsibility on the part of the administrator must find a response on the part of the political system by adequate delegation. In the matter of delegation, however, there is considerable contradiction between profession and practice. The Political parties swear by delegation but when it comes to the field of implementation, it is tardy and hesitating. Prof. Appleby has brought out this situation in the following words:

“The Parliament is the chief citadel of opposition to delegation of powers, the need for which is the worst shortcoming of Indian Administration. Parliament’s reluctance to delegate its powers in detail, discourages the Ministers from delegating powers, discourages Secretaries from delegating their powers and the Managing Directors from delegating their powers.”

The antidote against the negativism, the barrenness in thought and action, the slowness of achievement and trapidation about consequences lies in purposeful and effective delegation at all levels. Only such delegation will clear the “administrative jungle” which Pandit Nehru used to bemoan but which continues to be dense and thick.

#### CONCLUSION

All around us, we see uneasiness, lawlessness and lack of discipline. An anxiety neurosis about the future has brought on us a feverish averice to hold on to what we have and to grab today what we have not, because tomorrow it may be too late. But we cannot despair or lose hope. Our ‘Prachinata’—the quality of antiquity—and ‘Mrityunjayata’—the quality of enduring vitality—which has enabled our nation to last all these centuries will save us. The secret of our staying power is tolerance and understanding. Our motto should be “service at any cost, not power at any price”. When at some future date, history sits in judgment on our actions, our success or failure will be measured as the late President Kennedy has stated in immortal words by the answers to four questions:

- “(1) Were we truly men of courage?
- (2) Were we truly men of judgment with perspective judgment of the future as well as the past of our own mistakes as well as the mistakes of others, with enough wisdom to know what we did not know and enough candour to admit it?
- (3) Were we truly men of integrity?

- (4) Were we truly men of dedication with an honour mortgaged to no single individual or group and compromised by no private obligation or aim, but devoted solely to serving the public good and the national interest."
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## FIVE-DAY WEEK IN MYSORE GOVERNMENT OFFICES—AN OPINION SURVEY

*Study Circle, Bureau of Economics and Statistics,  
Government of Mysore*

[This opinion survey, perhaps the first of its kind on the subject in India deals with 5-day week in Mysore Government Offices (as also staggering of office timings in Bangalore city to help ease difficult transport situation) in terms of convenience to the employees and increase in disposal of work. The findings of the study based on 333 responses are of limited value, particularly since they further suffer from limitations enumerated by the authors in the report itself. The most important aspect of the study, however, is that such a welcome attempt has been made by a *study circle of government employees* themselves within few months of introduction of the innovation (May 10, 1971) and the report, completed so soon.

—Editor]

*"The feeble tremble before opinion, the foolish defy it, the wise judge it, the skillful direct it."*

—Mme Jeanne Roland

*"Public Opinion, though often formed on a wrong basis, yet generally has a strong underlying sense of justice."*

—Abraham Lincoln

THE Government of Mysore introduced five-day week system of working in all Government offices in the State with effect from May 10, 1971. Under this pattern, Government offices work only five days from Monday to Friday and every Saturday and Sunday are holidays. The working hours are from 10.00 a.m. to 5.45 p.m. with half-an-hour lunch break from 1.30 to 2.00 p.m. Earlier, the offices used to work from 10.30 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. with a lunch break from 1.30 to 2.15 p.m. from Monday to Saturday, except on the second Saturday of the month which was a holiday. The decision to adopt the five-day week followed by two week-end holidays was taken in order to follow the international pattern. The main idea behind the introduction of the five-day week was that it would provide the employees with a real week-end rest, relaxation and recreation. This novel method introduced by the State



Government was also commended by the President of India who felt that it will certainly improve the efficiency of the Government employees.

In Bangalore city, the pattern of working hours is slightly different. While the Secretariat and other offices situated around Vidhana Soudha work from 10-00 a.m. to 5-45 p.m. (hereafter referred to as Category 'B' offices) the working hours of all the other offices are from 9-15 a.m. to 5-00 p.m. (hereafter referred to as Category 'A' offices), with half an hour lunch break between 1-15 and 1-45 p.m. This arrangement has been introduced with a view to relieving the pressure on city transport services during the peak hours.

Mysore is the first state in South India to adopt the five-day week. The system is now being tried as an experimental measure and has been under operation for nearly two and a half months now. It is, therefore, appropriate to analyze how the system has been working and to know what the employees themselves and also the public at large are feeling about the novel experiment. The members of the Study Circle of the Bureau of Economics and Statistics, therefore, conducted an opinion survey to study the reaction of the Government employees as well as others regarding the advantages or disadvantages of the five-day week. This survey is confined only to Bangalore city and hence the opinions expressed here may be taken to reflect the thinking of Government employees working in Bangalore only.

### *Objectives of Survey*

The objectives of this opinion survey are to study the opinions about the following:

- (i) easier availability of transport facilities after the introduction of the new system,
- (ii) convenience or otherwise of the change in the working hours,
- (iii) the way in which the two week-end holidays are being utilized,
- (iv) the impact on the disposal of work,
- (v) inconvenience to the public, and
- (vi) desirability or otherwise of the continuance of the present system.

*Method*

The opinions of both the Government employees and also some others were elicited with the help of a questionnaire. In order to have a cross section of Government employees, it was decided to select some offices from each of the two patterns of working hours and to include employees belonging to different classes and residing in different areas of the city. Some members of the public also were interviewed. In all, 333 opinions were collected. The details regarding the number of persons selected for collecting opinions are as follows:

**Number of Persons Selected for Collecting Opinions**

<i>Categories of Respondents</i>	<i>Category 'A' Offices</i>	<i>Category 'B' Offices</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Officers and Heads of offices	25	18	43	12.9
Managers/Superintendents	29	17	46	13.8
Class III employees	77	70	147	44.2
Class IV employees	25	18	43	12.9
<i>Total</i>	156	123	279	83.8
<i>Others</i>	...	...	54	16.2
<i>Grand Total</i>	...	...	333	100.0

Out of 333 persons from whom opinions were gathered, 279 persons (83.8 per cent) are Government employees of different categories, while 54 persons (16.2 per cent) are members of the public. Of the 279 Government employees, 156 persons are working in Category 'A' offices and the rest (123 persons) belong to Category 'B' offices. The largest number of employees covered belong to Class III Service. Their number is 147 or 44.2 per cent of the total number of respondents. The category "others" includes wives of Government employees, and persons who frequently visit Government offices, such as P.W.D. contractors, transport operators and businessmen. The numbers selected in each category are not proportionately representative of that category of people. They are persons selected in order to ensure that

opinions of different categories of Government employees as well as opinions of people who have transactions with Government offices are adequately represented. Strict statistical procedure could not also be adopted in the selection of such a small number of employees to be interviewed from each category. It is hoped that this deficiency will be made up to some extent by the total number of persons interviewed. It is to be borne in mind that the results based on the opinion survey are not meant to be conclusive but only indicative.

#### ANALYSIS OF OPINIONS

An analysis of the opinions expressed by the respondents to different questions is made here.

##### *Transport Facilities*

Different timings for Government offices in different parts of Bangalore have been effected with a view to relieving pressure on transport services during peak hours and thereby providing easier transport facilities to those employees who come by bus to reach offices in time. A considerable number of employees in the city depend on the BTS (Bangalore Transport Service) buses for going to offices and the number of buses is not enough to take the concentrated peak hour traffic in the morning when Government offices, colleges, banks and offices of private companies begin their work almost simultaneously. In order to overcome these shortcomings, different timings were introduced for Government offices in different parts of the City. Out of 279 Government employees covered in the survey, as many as 217 persons (77.8 per cent) use the public transport bus as a mode of conveyance to and from their offices and most of them are residents of the distant extensions, like Rajajinagar, Jayanagar, Basavanagudi, Malleswaram and Ulsoor. They were asked: "*Do you, by your experience, feel that the recent change in working hours has resulted in easier transport facilities?*" Their responses are as follows:

<i>Responses</i>	<i>Category 'A' Offices</i>	<i>Category 'B' Offices</i>	<i>Total</i>
Easy	22	38	60
Difficult	97	60	157
<i>Total</i>	<u>119</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>217</u>

Out of 217 employees who go to their offices by bus, as many as 157 persons (78.4 per cent) have expressed that the transport facilities have not become any easier after the introduction of different timings for different offices. The percentage of such opinions is as much as 82 in the case of employees who have to reach their offices at 9.15 a.m. As many as 102 persons (47 per cent) have expressed that they have to wait at bus stops for nearly half an hour; about 25 per cent of the respondents have stated that they wait for more than half an hour. Among those, who have stated that the transport problem has now eased, are mostly those who take the bus at the starting points. There is another aspect to this matter. The period during which the new experiment has been under implementation happens to be the period of vacation for schools and colleges. Even at the time of conducting this opinion survey, the admissions to the colleges were not yet over. As such, the flow of students into buses in large numbers had not started. After the schools and colleges commence their normal functioning, it can be easily visualized that travel by buses in Bangalore may then become much more difficult. Thus, the results of the survey indicate that the staggering of working hours and the introduction of different timings for different offices has not resulted in providing easier transport facilities for Government employees.

#### *Convenience of Working Hours*

The respondents were then asked about the convenience or otherwise of the present working hours. They were asked: "*Do you feel that the recent change in the working hours is convenient or inconvenient?*" The responses are noted below.

<i>Responses</i>	<i>Category 'A' Offices</i>	<i>Category 'B' Offices</i>	<i>Total</i>
Convenient	34	68	102
Inconvenient	122	55	177
<i>Total</i>	<u>156</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>279</u>

Significant differences are found in the opinions of the two sets of respondents regarding the working hours. Out of 156 employees who have to go to office at 9.15 a.m., as many as 122 persons (or 78 per cent) are of the opinion that the working hours from 9.15 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. are not convenient. The inconvenience is caused by the fact that they have to take their food by 8.00 a.m. and that food will not be ready by that time. Added to this, there are no proper canteen facilities

also. But among those who attend the offices at 10.00 a.m., only about 45 per cent have stated that the working hours from 10.00 a.m. to 5.45 p.m., are not convenient. In this category also, the respondents have stated that it would be difficult to take food and reach the offices by 10.00 a.m. Some of them have also stated that it is difficult to get the buses, some others have opined that they do not get any time for evening sports, etc.

Quite a good number of respondents have suggested that the working hours from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m., would be ideal from all points of view.

### *Utilization of Holidays*

The Government employees are now having the benefit of two consecutive week-end holidays. Generally, it is thought that this reform has given the employees an opportunity to enjoy rest and also attend to their private work at home. Some can even enjoy short week-end sojourns. It is, no doubt, true that all the employees cannot enjoy such trips and a large number of employees with small pay packets and soaring prices may not be able to enjoy real rest and recreation. Therefore, it would be interesting to know the opinions of employees themselves regarding how they have been utilizing the leisure on Saturday and Sunday. They were asked: "*How do you spend Saturday and Sunday?*" They were provided with possible alternate answers. Their responses are presented below:

<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>Responses</i>	<i>Number</i>
1	Going on picnics	11
2	Going to native places	22
3	Visiting friends and relatives	56
4	Shopping and attending to other household work	111
5	Visiting picture houses or other places of recreation	27
6	Engaged in studies or reading	56
7	Not doing anything specifically	4
8	No opinion	26

Some respondents have stated more than one way in which they have been utilizing the two consecutive holidays. A good number of the employees have replied that they devote their attention to such items of domestic affairs as shopping and other household work. This group is followed by those who have stated that they arrange to visit friends and relatives and an equal number of persons have expressed that they engage themselves in studies or reading. The number of respondents who have stated that they go out on weekly picnics is quite small. Some have found it convenient to go to their native places during the holidays. It is difficult to believe that all these opinions are truthful, as people do not always give considered views in matters like this. Moreover, it is not possible to give precise answers to such questions.

The employees were also asked whether they find it difficult to spend two consecutive days in the week in a useful manner. As many as 192 persons (68.8 per cent) have stated that they do not have any difficulty in spending two days. But 87 persons (31.2 per cent) have felt that it is difficult to spend two consecutive holidays.

#### *Increase in Daily Turnout of Work*

The Government offices in the erstwhile Mysore State used to work from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. from Monday to Friday with half-an-hour break from 1.30 to 2.00 p.m., and from 8.00 a.m. to 12.00 noon on Saturdays. In order to cope with the increased work in the wake of the formation of the present enlarged State, the working hours were changed from 10.30 a.m. to 5.30 p.m., from Monday to Friday, while the working hours on Saturdays remained the same. Afterwards, the offices worked from 10.30 a.m. to 2.00 p.m., on Saturdays for some-time before switching over to the system of working from 10.30 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. from Monday to Saturday except on the Second Saturday of the month which was declared as a holiday.

The introduction of the five-day week, therefore, should mean that, with the increase in working hours, the daily turnout of work should also increase and that the volume of work that is being turned-out in five days should be at least the same as what was being done in six days earlier. It is, therefore, necessary to assess the impact of the new system on the disposal of work in Government offices.

In our country, the working conditions in Government offices are not as good as in the advanced countries. Apart from the climatic conditions which are not conducive for sustained work, the physical



environment in the offices is also not such as to help people work continuously. Hence, the employees were asked *whether they feel it difficult to sit in the offices from 9.15 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. or from 10.00 a.m. to 5.45 p.m. or feel fatigued because of longer hours of work.* Their replies are as follows:

<i>Responses</i>	<i>Category 'A' Offices</i>	<i>Category 'B' Offices</i>	<i>Total</i>
Difficult	69	39	108
Not difficult	87	84	171
<i>Total</i>	<u>156</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>279</u>

Out of 279 employees, 171 persons (61.3 per cent) have stated that it is not difficult to sit for nearly 8 hours in the office and that they do not feel fatigued, while 108 persons (38.7 per cent) feel that it is not easy to sit in the office for such long hours. But among those who attend offices at 9.15 a.m., the percentage of employees who find it difficult to sit in the offices for about 8 hours exceeds 44.

In respect of the daily turnout of work, 236 Government employees (eliminating 43 Class IV servants) were asked: "*Do you feel that, with the increase in the working hours, more work is being turned out daily?*" Their replies are:

<i>Responses</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Daily turnout has increased	134	56.8
Daily turnout has not increased	102	43.2
<i>Total</i>	<u>236</u>	<u>100.0</u>

The responses indicate that the majority of respondents (56.8 per cent) feel that the daily turnout of work has increased with the increase in daily hours of work.

It is more important to seek the opinion of heads of offices and other supervisory staff who are responsible for extracting work from the subordinate employees regarding the impact of the new system on the punctuality of the employees and on the disposal of work. Such officers numbering 89 were asked: "*Have the employees in your office been attending the office in time after the introduction of the change in*



working hours?" Their replies regarding punctuality in attendance of employees are presented below:

<i>Responses</i>	<i>Category 'A' Offices</i>	<i>Category 'B' Offices</i>	<i>Total</i>
Satisfactory punctuality	40	28	68
Unsatisfactory punctuality	14	7	21
<i>Total</i>	54	35	89

Out of 89 heads of offices and other supervisory staff who were interviewed, only 21 persons constituting 23.6 per cent have stated that the officials are not punctual and are late in coming to the offices, while 68 persons (76.4 per cent) are of the opinion that they are satisfied with the punctuality of the employees. In Category 'A' offices, the opinion regarding unpunctuality amounts to be 26 per cent, whereas it is only 20 per cent in Category 'B' offices.

The heads of offices and other higher supervisory staff were also asked: "*Do you feel that the employees have now been clearing six days' work in five days? or do you feel that the disposal of work has suffered after the introduction of five-day week?*" Their replies are as given below:

<i>Responses</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Weekly turnout of work has suffered	37	41.6
Weekly turnout of work has not suffered	52	58.4
<i>Total</i>	89	100.0

Out of 89 officers, 52 (58.4 per cent) are of the opinion that the weekly turnout of work has not suffered after the introduction of five-day week, while 37 (41.6 per cent) feel that the clearance of work has suffered. It is to be mentioned here that, in Government offices, it is difficult to have a precise idea regarding the disposal of work as most of the work is not measurable. Moreover, it is to be expected that all the respondents may not be truthful in answering such questions. Rationalization and falsehood inevitably occur, especially when the attitudes studied touch upon the respondents' capacity for work and also for extraction of work from the subordinates. Lack of insight into the purpose of interview, suspicion, fear or a sense of guilt may

invalidate an enquiry of this type. A few of the highly placed and responsible officers of the State Government who were also included in this survey are of the opinion that the disposal of work has not suffered after the introduction of the five-day week, while a few others are of the view that a large number of Government employees have yet to prove worthy of this reform by putting forth harder work and thereby increasing the output of work in the offices.

### *Continuance of Five-day Week*

The five-day week system in Government offices is being tried on experimental basis and a decision on the continuance or otherwise of the system is yet to be taken. Therefore, the employees were specifically asked the question: "*Do you suggest that the present arrangement (i.e., five-day week) should continue? Or, do you suggest that we should revert to the earlier system?*" The responses to this question are varied and are as follows:

<i>Responses</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Present system to continue	148	53.0
Reversion to earlier system	104	37.3
Other opinions	27	9.7
<i>Total</i>	<hr/> 279 <hr/>	<hr/> 100.0 <hr/>

Out of 279 employees, 148 persons (53.0 per cent) are fully in favour of continuance of the five-day week with working hours from 9.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. or from 10.00 a.m. to 5.45 p.m. while 104 persons (37.3 per cent) are of the opinion that we should revert to the earlier system. The views of other 27 persons are also interesting. While they are in favour of five-day week, they feel that the working hours should be from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. Thus, the results of the survey indicate that about 63 per cent of the Government employees are in favour of continuance of the five-day week.

### *Public Attitude*

Apart from the opinions expressed by the employees themselves, it is also desirable to gather the reactions of others who are associated with Government employees like the wives of the employees and those who have dealings with Government offices, such as P.W.D. contractors, transport operators, merchants and village officials—patels and

Shanbhogs. For this purpose, 25 wives of Government employees, 8 contractors, 8 transport operators, 8 merchants and 5 village officials were also interviewed. They were asked the question *whether the introduction of the five-day week with changed hours of work has inconvenienced them in any way*. Out of 59 respondents, only 42 persons reacted either positively or negatively. The other 12 persons have other views. The responses to this question are as given below:

	<i>Not Incon- venient</i>	<i>Inconvenient</i>	<i>Total</i>
Housewives	12	3	15
P.W.D. Contractors	4	4	8
Transport Operators	2	4	6
Merchants	6	2	8
Village Officials	5	—	5
<i>Total</i>	<u>29</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>42</u>

In the category of housewives, those who have stated that the changed timings are inconvenient are the wives of those employees who have to attend office at 9.15 a.m. Among those respondents who have dealings with Government offices, the opinion was divided. The transport operators are of the view that the offices should work on Saturdays also. The merchants feel that their business would improve if Saturday is a holiday for Government offices as it would give more time to the employees to do more shopping. The village officials are of the opinion that the holiday on Saturday does not affect them in any manner. Thus, out of 42 respondents, 29 persons have stated that they are not inconvenienced by the new system.

Among 25 wives of the Government employees interviewed, ten have other views regarding the working hours. They are also wholly in favour of five-day week, and in addition, favour that the offices which commence work at 9.15 a.m. should also work from 10.00 a.m., as otherwise it is difficult to cook food so early in the day. Preferably, they would like the working hours in all Government offices to be from 11.00 a.m. to 5 p.m.

#### CONCLUSION

The opinions expressed by Government employees and others in regard to the introduction of the five-day week and changed timings

of work and their impact on the turnout of work have been analyzed and presented in the preceding paragraphs. In this context, we will do well to bear in mind some limitations present in opinion surveys. The questionnaire may not give the respondent an opportunity to express all his views in a consistent manner and hence the opinions expressed by a person in respect of different questions will be contradictory, inconsistent and confused. Further, the respondent may not talk to the interviewer who is a stranger in a truthful manner. He may suspect the purpose of the interviewer and may give wrong answers. Particularly, in attitudes relating to the respondent's personal life or efficiency, rationalization and deception inevitably occur. Another limitation is that by asking the respondent to give his answers in a set scale (yes or no), we may be forcing him to give an inadequate or even false account of his feelings. At the same time, it is difficult to frame questions in such a manner as to give the respondent an opportunity to provide reliable answers in all cases. It is also possible that the participation of the interviewer and his influence may introduce bias in the attitude of the respondent, because the interviewer himself may be having biased opinion on the issues about which he is collecting opinions.

It is, therefore, difficult to attach much value to the findings of surveys concerned with assessment of opinion on any issue. As such, the opinions may not be a reliable guide to actual action. The analysis of opinions made in this report is, thus, subject to so many defects which are present in opinion surveys. Therefore, as already pointed out, the results arrived at on the basis of the opinions expressed by the employees are to be taken not as conclusive but only as indicative. Subject to all limitations present in the opinion survey, it is clear from the opinions expressed that the transport facilities have not become easier even after the introduction of different timings for Government offices in different areas of the city. The results also indicate that the turnout of work has not suffered because of the five-day week. It is also clear that the majority of employees are in favour of continuance of the five-day week.

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## COMMENTS

*[In this feature, we give comments received from the readers on the articles published normally in the previous issues of the Journal. The comments should be critical and thought-provoking and confine to the major points made by the author(s), inadequacies in reasoning of data or any new solution to the problem which suggests itself to the reader. These should not normally exceed 1,500 words.—Ed.]*

### UNION-STATE RELATIONS : ADMINISTRATION OF LAW AND ORDER\*

"The relations between the Centre and the States in the field of law and order", to repeat the expression employed by the Administrative Reforms Commission in their report on Centre-State Relationships, "have generated an acute controversy in recent months". Naturally, therefore, a learned and illuminating discourse on the administrative and legal aspects of the matter like the one presented by Shri Dass is most welcome.

Particularly appealing are three very pertinent observations made by Shri Dass. They are:

- (1) "It should be noted here that the armed forces of the Union include not only the military (Army, Navy and the Air Force) but also its armed police forces, such as the Central Reserve Police, and the Border Security Force" (p. 337)<sup>1</sup>.
- (2) Apropos the Union's intervention in law and order matters in States, Shri Dass says that it "should take place only rarely and in extreme cases" and also that it "should be withdrawn at the earliest possible moment" (p. 339)<sup>2</sup>.
- (3) "Thus, the force which should, as far as possible, first be used in the maintenance of law and order is the Home Guards or similar formations. Next should come the civil police, followed by the armed police, then the State Armed Constabulary, then the armed police force belonging to the Union and last of all the Military" (p. 339)<sup>3</sup>.

\*The original article of this title by Shri K. K. Dass was published in the Journal in Vol. XVI, No. 3 (July-Sept.), 1970.

<sup>1</sup> This observation owes its origin to the fact that "Naval, Military and Air Forces; and any other armed forces of the Union" forms Item 2 of the Union List in the Constitution of India. The CRP and BSF, being the armed police forces of the Union, fall in the domain of the 'Union List'.

<sup>2</sup> This indeed is a wise counsel of caution. For the Centre's intervention in State's affairs should be the minimum necessary and not the maximum possible.

<sup>3</sup> "Delegation of authority, however temporary, by a Civilian government to the army ... if resorted to often, denigrates the notion of civilian government and may finally erode it"—Frank Moraes in the Indian Express.

While the author deserves to be congratulated for high-lighting the above well-known and almost axiomatic truths which, unfortunately, are little recognised and still less pursued, it shall, with due deference to the author, have to be conceded that some of the medicines, which he has prescribed, appear to be too strong for the ailment they are supposed to cure.<sup>4</sup>

Adverting to legislation for coordinating the powers of the Union with provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the author contemplates two lines of action comprising "either to remove the Union forces from the jurisdiction of local magistrates or to empower the Union to appoint magistrates whose orders would override those of the senior-most magistrate of the State Government". And the author is "not in favour of the first alternative" (p. 338). Frankly speaking, both the alternatives when pursued are likely to undermine the authority of the State Governments and would not be in consonance with either the letter or the spirit of the Constitution of India according to which the subjects 'public order' (but not including the use of naval, military, and air forces of the Union in aid of the civil power), 'police' (including railway and village police) and 'administration of justice' pertain to the 'State List' of the Constitution. What needs be viewed with considerable circumspection is the fact that the Union's armed forces come to the aid of the civil power of the States,<sup>5</sup> and as such are and shall have to be subject to the jurisdiction of the local magistrates of the States. Similarly, vesting of magisterial powers in individual officers also is and shall continue to be within the domain and competence of the State Governments only.<sup>6</sup>

The author, further, pleads that "the Union can, even without invoking Article 356, direct its armed police forces or the military to protect its installations by virtue of Article 355" (p. 340). 'Property of the Union' is a Union List subject (Item 32) but as regards property situated in a State, the power to legislate is subject to legislation by the State save insofar as Parliament by law otherwise provides. Therefore, undeniably, the Union can, by law, make due provision for the protection of its property as contemplated by Item 32 of the Union List. The moot point which needs be underscored, however, is, how does this power vest in the Union by virtue of Article 355 of the Constitution of India as indicated in the article.<sup>7</sup>

"Cases may also arise", the author further argues, "where the State uses its powers to stop the functioning of the Union Government's installations. This can be done either by the use of police force or by an 'order' under Section 144 of Cr. P.C. . . . However, such an order whether under Section

<sup>4</sup> For, in reality, a State can afford to defy the Union only to the extent for political or other reasons, as may be tolerated or condoned by the Union.

<sup>5</sup> Even the Parliamentary legislation envisaged by Shri Dass (p. 338) shall have to restrict itself to legislating on the use of the armed forces of the Union in aid of the civil power of the State Governments.

<sup>6</sup> Things would naturally and understandably be entirely different if the subjects 'public order', 'police,' and 'administration of justice' are decided to be transferred from the 'State List' to the 'Union List'.

<sup>7</sup> Article 355 of the Constitution of India merely lays down a duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance as also to ensure that the government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It is, thus, a duty which has been cast upon the Union.



144 of Cr. P.C. or otherwise is unconstitutional and void *ab initio*. Therefore, an officer incharge of a Union Government installation can and should reject this order and carry on" (p. 340). I am afraid, if the officers incharge of Union's installations resort to such flouting of legal authority of the States, they would do so at their own peril.<sup>8</sup>

What inevitably follows, therefore, is that as long as the subjects 'public order', 'police' and 'administration of justice' continue to adorn the State List, 'prevention and detection of offences,' 'prosecution of offenders' and 'maintenance of public order (peace and tranquility)' shall be the primary duty and responsibility of the States. To discharge this duty and responsibility—onerous as it is—the States have been vested with corresponding rights and powers also. And, the Union should not hobnob with these rights and powers for, in that event, it would adversely reflect upon the discharge of the duties and the responsibilities by the States in this behalf. Such overtures are moreover likely to erode the authority of the States which will do nobody any good. If, however, the Union finds that a truant State is not 'behaving', they have more than adequate provisions in the Constitution which could be invoked to set such a State right. These provisions are:

- (1) The Union could issue necessary directions to a State for exercising its (State's) executive power in such a manner: (i) as to ensure compliance with Parliamentary legislation and any existing law applying to that State (Article 256), and (ii) as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union [Article 257 (i)]. Similar powers of issuing directions are available to the Union in regard to measures to be taken for protection of the railways [Article 257(3)] as also in regard to construction and maintenance of communications declared to be of national or military importance [Article 257(2)]. Perhaps, it is time the scope of paras 2 and 3 of Article 257 is so enlarged as broadly but specifically to cover protection of Union's property, offices, public sector projects and, above all, personnel posted therein.
- (2) The Union could also consider issuing proclamation of emergency in any part (say a State) of the territory of India (Article 352 of the Constitution). The effect of proclamation of emergency will be that the writ of the Union would extend giving directions to the State as to the manner in which the executive power thereof is to be exercised. Similarly, the Parliament will also have a power to make laws on any subject notwithstanding that it is the one which is not enumerated in the Union List (Article 353 of the Constitution). Thus, by resorting to proclamation of emergency which essentially is a Union's prerogative (and an overriding power), the Union can protect even a non-cooperative or recalcitrant State from internal disturbances, etc.
- (3) "Article 365 provides that where a State defaults in complying with any directions given in the exercise of the executive power of the Union on the above mentioned matters, the President may

<sup>8</sup> Such an action would not be in keeping with the concept of the 'Rule of Law' which governs our free society, would most certainly render the individuals taking law into their own hands liable to face unpalatable legal consequences and finally would, in no insignificant way, contribute its mite to confusion.



declare that the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The emergency provisions of Article 356, applicable in case of failure of constitutional machinery in the States, can then be brought into force. Thus, consequence of disobedience or non-compliance with the directions of the Centre by a State is the assumption of the governance of the State by the President".<sup>9</sup>

With these identified, potent and powerful Constitutional weapons<sup>10</sup> available in the armoury of the Union, one would be inclined to think that any further addition is hardly called for. The Administrative Reforms Commission have also not been in "favour of establishing alternative machinery for ensuring compliance with" the Union government's orders by the State Governments "or for the running of its writ without resorting to or making use of the State Government's machinery". This predictably would "not only entail enormous increase in expenditure but also act as a constant irritant" between the Union and the State authorities, which will not be conducive to ensuring cordial, fruitful and harmonious relations between the Union and the States.

—G. C. SINGHVI

#### Author's Rejoinder

The first point made by the writer is that since magistrates appointed by the Centre would not be answerable to the State Governments, this would undermine the authority of the latter. I feel that since the Union has over-riding powers and duties to maintain law and order, the authority of the State Governments is already subordinate to that of the Centre. Provided the Centre uses its powers with tact and discretion, friction should not arise.

The second point made by the comment writer is that Article 355 does not empower the Union to direct its armed police force or the military to protect its installations. A reading of Article 355 shows that the Union has this power. It reads:

"It shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that the government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution."

Both external aggression and internal disturbance imply the use of force. To protect the State against force, some counter-force must be used, and as Shri Singhvi points out, this duty has been cast upon the Centre. Therefore, it is the Centre's forces that have to be employed in case the State is unable to or fails to fulfil its duties.

The third point made by the writer is that an officer incharge of Union Government installations should not reject an order which is void *ab initio*.

<sup>9</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission (Government of India), Report on Centre-State Relationships, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1969, p. 37.

<sup>10</sup> In the fitness of things, the use of these weapons should be very rare and always be preceded by consultation, discussion and persuasion.

There are numerous judicial and other pronouncements all over the world to the effect that it is the right of every citizen to resist illegal orders. This has been again forcefully brought out in the My Lai massacre case. Much more is it the duty of an officer of the Central Government when that Government is itself responsible for ensuring that the work is carried on according to the Constitution. To take an extreme example, suppose, during war time, a magistrate passes an order which causes some armament factory to shut down. What advice would the comment writer give in such a situation?

Apparently, the comment writer's view is that the provisions of Article 365 should be invoked. It may not always be possible or expedient or necessary to resort to this Article when lesser remedies are available. This is in keeping with the axiom that the minimum force shall be used to attain the desired object.

—K. K. DASS

### UNION-STATE FINANCIAL RELATIONS\*

In an article published in the April-June 1970 issue of this Journal, Shri J. Shivakumar has made a critical review of the Union-State financial relations in India. In the course of his review, he has made certain observations which appear to me arbitrary and unrealistic.

The author has maintained:

"The terms of reference (of the Finance Commission) are unilaterally drafted by the Union Finance Ministry and it is common knowledge that there is no institutional arrangement by which the President makes an independent appraisal of the suggested terms of reference. An arrangement by which the States are consulted beforehand would be a step in the right direction but so far this has not been attempted" (p. 207).

Theoretically, this suggestion is sound. But it ignores the reality of the situation in the country. If the States are asked to reach an agreement over the terms of reference to be made to the Finance Commission, it will have to enquire into innumerable problems of federal finance and make recommendations which will be simply impossible for the present type of Finance Commission within its short duration of existence. If an attempt is made to reduce the number of terms of reference, such a process will involve time, energy and expenditure on the part of the Union Government. Further, such a process of consulting the States and persuading them to reach a consensus on the terms of reference will involve excessive delay. This is more so in the context of the changing political scene at the State level. Therefore, the suggestion, though theoretically sound, is practically unrealistic and administratively cumbersome. Instead, what is required is that the Union Government itself should identify the common problems and ask the Finance Commission to examine and make recommendations to solve them. This procedure has been in practice for a long time.

\*The original article of this title by Shri J. Shivakumar was published in the Journal in Vol. XVI, No. 2 (April-June), 1970.

The author has observed:

"The hard choice before a Finance Commission is really between adoption of sound principles for the allocation of resources between the States and the Centre which do not lend themselves to equitable and uniform application when quantification is attempted and the adoption of distinctly less scientific and acceptable principles which nevertheless have the advantage of being amenable to precise and unquestioned transformation into reliable figures" (p. 208).

This is a defeatist view and factually incorrect, because he has not proved (or even shown) how the adoption of sound principles do not lend themselves to quantification and fails to treat all the States uniformly and equitably. Also, he has tried to defend the arbitrary principles adopted by all the previous Finance Commission on the ground that they are quantifiable. So far, the Finance Commissions appointed under the Constitution have not at all attempted to formulate any principles. Their principles are those of Otto Neimeyer plus their arbitrary twists and nothing more. I want to state here that I have examined this issue in detail in my book<sup>1</sup> and I have shown there how sound principles can be easily quantified and also that only sound principles can be equitable and can be applied uniformly to all the States. Therefore, I consider his above-quoted observation as contrary to facts.

The author states:

"... Finance Commissions are compelled to take into account all additional taxation measures during the quinquennium preceding the period covered by the report. This may not have large impact on the States which are surplus but on the States which are eligible for deficit grants, this has an adverse impact. There is no incentive at all for such a State to tax because if it refrains from imposing taxes, it could pass on its burdens in due course to the national tax-payers, rather than impose levies on its own tax-payer. A possible solution for this problem is to permit States to retain, for financing their plans, receipts from additional taxation measures enforced by them for at least a period of ten years. Unless this is done, one cannot blame the States for their reluctance to levy taxes" (pp. 209-210).

This statement assumes that the Finance Commissions have distributed in the past the grants-in-aid of States' revenues, at least partly, on the basis of the tax-efforts of the States. This implicit assumption is wrong. It is true that if a State runs a deficit without raising sufficient tax revenue it may be (and, in fact, it is) entitled for higher grants from the Finance Commission. But it will have to accept a small State plan and, therefore, it will lose proportionately to that extent Central assistance for its plan. And, if the surplus State gets less revenue grants from the Finance Commission, it may defend its big plan before the Planning Commission and hence may

<sup>1</sup> G. Thimmaiah, *An Approach to Centre-State Financial Relations in India*, Mysore, Ganga Tharanga Publishers, 1968. Besides, K. V. S. Sastry and V. V. Bhatt have also attempted to suggest quantifiable, uniform and equitable sound principles. See K. V. S. Sastry, *Federal State Fiscal Relations in India*, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1966, and V. V. Bhatt, "On the Magnitude and Allocation of Federal Assistance to the States in India : Some Rational Criteria", *Public Finance*, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, 1969.

get more Central assistance for its plan. Further, the solution suggested by Shri Shivakumar requires that the revenue from additional taxation should be allowed to be used for only plan purpose and for nothing else. This can only be a pious hope and not a practicable proposition. It creates administrative complications in the context of the fact that plan grants are commended by the Planning Commission and the revenue grants are recommended by the Finance Commission. Furthermore, it assumes that the Finance Commission must measure the potential tax-effort of each State and compare that with its actual tax-effort and thus the gap, if any, between the two should be estimated. Such a procedure will certainly enable the Finance Commission to arrive at a potential revenue gap of each State and to recommend grants to fill it, besides compelling the States to tap their tax-potentials. But, so far, no Finance Commission has attempted to do so. The Second Finance Commission tried but it simply compared the promised additional taxation targets under the First Plan with the actual realization by the end of the Plan and did not take into account even that gap while estimating the revenue gaps of the States. The later Commissions have openly accepted their inability to develop any technique of finding out the relative gaps in the States' tax-efforts. Therefore, in the absence of estimates of their relative gaps in tax-efforts, mere promise that the additional tax-revenue will be allowed to be used for Plan purposes, will not induce the States to exploit their tax-potentials. Because, even then the complacent States may obtain more grants from both the Planning Commission and the Finance Commission by a simple promise of raising more revenue without keeping it up. Consequently, his solution ceases to be a solution.

Apart from this, his solution overlooks the fact that there are some States in India which cannot raise additional taxation substantially owing to their general poverty. These have got to be looked after by both—the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission. If the Finance Commission devises a method of finding out the relative gaps in tax-efforts of the States, then such gaps will be less in the case of poorer States and hence they will be entitled for more grants-in-aid of their revenues.

Shri Shivakumar has maintained:

“It will, therefore, be pointless in the present circumstances for a Finance Commission to take upon itself the task of eliminating regional disparities. It should instead concentrate on the absolute needs of the States with reference to the levels already reached and leave it to the mechanism of the Plans to eliminate regional disparities” (pp. 211-212).

This observation lacks clear understanding of the problem of growth and the problem of regional inequalities and the relative roles of the Planning and the Finance Commissions in the context of these two problems. After examining this issue, I have suggested in my book, referred to earlier, that the Planning Commission should try to allocate efficiently scarce resources in the country with a view mainly to maximising output and the Finance Commission should try to enable the poorer States to save financial resources on their revenue accounts and divert them for development purposes. Thus, it is the Finance Commission which can assess the regional disparities in economic and social services and thereby enable the Planning Commission to

use some portion of the Plan grants for reducing regional disparities. This means that the problem of regional disparities has got to be tackled by both the Planning Commission and the Finance Commission. But Shri Shivakumar has suggested that it should be the task of the Planning Commission alone. The Planning Commission cannot afford to tackle it alone at this stage of our economic development even if the political circumstances compel it. But in that case, it will not succeed in both the fields of maximising growth and reducing regional inequalities.

The author has recommended:

"... that Article 263 of the Constitution visualizes the setting up of an Inter-State Council and it should be possible, if necessary through a minor amendment to the Constitutional provision, to set up a national body for planning of which the Planning Commission can be an executive organ. Such a set-up would ensure that the States participate in crucial decisions regarding the resources available for the Plan, the size of the Plan and the sectoral allocations" (p. 215).

And he has maintained that:

"... once a constitutional status is accorded to the Planning Commission and the Government of India's hold over the Commission weakened, a measure of acceptability will immediately be accorded to any recommendations by the Planning Commission" (p. 216).

The above mentioned recommendation and its accompanying optimism are not at all new. Besides, this very old recommendation has been all along considered dangerous for India and it is more so today when the political turmoil is weakening the Planning Commission and its grip over the States' policies. Many experts on administration and economic planning, notably A. H. Hanson<sup>2</sup>, S. R. Sen<sup>3</sup> and Albert Waterston<sup>4</sup>, have studied this issue in detail, both in theory and in practice, and they have come to the conclusion, on the lessons of experience of many countries of the world, that the present position and set-up of the Planning Commission are the best for the conditions (administrative, economic and political) obtaining in India. Therefore, Shri Shivakumar's recommendation is a stereotype textbook suggestion which ignores the reality of the conditions in India and is totally blind to the experiences of other countries.

After criticising rightly the biased and imperfect process of transferring the capital resources from the Centre to the States through the Planning Commission, the author has seconded another already old suggestion to create

<sup>2</sup> (a) A. H. Hanson, *The Process of Planning*, London, Oxford University Press, 1966.

(b) A. H. Hanson, "The Administration of Planning", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. IX, No. 2 (April-June), 1963.

(c) A. H. Hanson, "Power Shifts, and Regional Balances", in Paul Streeten and Michael Lipton (eds.), *The Crisis of Indian Planning*, London, Oxford University Press, 1968.

<sup>3</sup> S. R. Sen, "The Planning Machinery in India", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. VII, No. 3 (July-September), 1961.

<sup>4</sup> Albert Waterston, *Development Planning: Lessons of Experience*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.



an "... autonomous banking organization ... which would regulate the flow of credit to the States. This is indeed a welcome suggestion, because not only would it enable objectivity to be brought to bear on decisions regarding the apportionment of limited resources but also because this would enable a more careful investigation to be made of the purpose for which investments are proposed" (p. 217). I have examined this issue also in greater detail in my book referred to earlier and elsewhere.<sup>5</sup> The proposal, that a National Development Bank (NDB) be established for the purpose of distributing Central assistance, was first made by the Study Team on Financial Administration (*Venkatappaiah Study Teams*) set up by the Administrative Reforms Commission. Later, it was supported by *D. T. Lakdawala*, *Khatkhate* and *V. V. Bhatt*. After a careful study of their proposals, I have come to the conclusion that in an attempt to achieve efficiency in utilization of Central assistance, the proposals might halt economic progress at the State level for want of funds besides rendering the Central control over State policies ineffective. Further, the transfer of this part of the resource-transferring function to the proposed NDB would render overall economic planning ineffective by weakening the position of the Planning Commission. The transfer of this responsibility may further create the problem of coordination between the functions of the Planning Commission and those of the NDB. It may also create additional problem of coordination between the NDB and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Lack of required coordination between these two institutions, particularly the loan policies of the proposed NDB and the monetary policy of the RBI, would create many other economic problems in the country and would weaken the position of the RBI in the field of monetary management. Finally, the establishment of a NDB would involve additional burden of annual expenditure for the Union Government which will be a waste in the context of already existing innumerable banking and financial institutions in the public sector besides a permanent Planning Commission and a quinquennial Finance Commission.

The above quoted observations and recommendations of Shri Shivakumar on the problems of Union-State financial relations in India are, therefore, not well-conceived and are not based on a detailed dispassionate study, and hence, they are arbitrary.

—G. THIMMAIAH

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<sup>5</sup> (a) G. Thimmaiah, "Planning and Federation", *Eastern Economist*, August 29, 1969.

(b) G. Thimmaiah, "Does India Need a National Loan Council?", *Capital*, July 17, 1969.

(c) G. Thimmaiah, "Centre-State Financial Relations : A Comment", *Economic and Political Weekly*, October 17, 1970.

## INSTITUTE NEWS

President of India (Rashtrapati), *Shri V. V. Giri*, has graciously agreed to be the Patron of the Institute.

Prime Minister of India (Pradhan Mantri), *Smt. Indira Gandhi*, has acceded to the unanimous request of the Institute's Executive Council to be the President of the Institute.

\* \* \*

The Institute, during the quarter (April to June, 1971), conducted the following courses for senior and middle-level officers of Central and State governments, union territory administrations, municipal committees and corporations, public sector undertakings, etc:

(1) Third Course on Modern Aids to Management, April 13-24 (at New Delhi);

(2) Course on Introduction to Computers, April 26-May 1 (at New Delhi);

(3) Third Course on Personnel Administration, May 11-22 (at New Delhi);

(The Course included a three-day "Human Relations Laboratory" comprising sessions in sensitivity training, games, exercises, etc. The Course concluded with a valedictory address by *Shri R. N. Mirdha*, Union Minister of State, in-charge of Department of Personnel.)

(4) Second Special Course on Performance Budgeting, May 17-27 (at Panaji);

[Inaugurated by the Lt.-Governor, *Shri Nakul Sen*, this exclusive course for officers

of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu Administration was attended by Secretaries, heads of Departments and select personnel from field Staff.]

(5) Course on Municipal Administration for University Teachers, May 20-29 (at Jaipur); and

[The Course was undertaken at the request of the Rajasthan University. Teachers from the Departments of Jodhpur and Jaipur Universities also participated in the Course.]

(6) Tenth Course on Performance Budgeting, June 7-18 (at New Delhi).

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Besides the courses, the following seminars were also organized by the Institute:

(1) Seminar on Financial Management for University Teachers, April 22-May 4 (at Ootacamund);

(2) Seminar on Performance Budgeting for Central Public Works Department, May 6-7 (at New Delhi);

[The Seminar was designed for Chief/Superintending/Executive Engineers, etc., from CPWD. Senior officers of equivalent rank from other Central departments also participated in it.]

(3) Seminar on Municipal Personnel Systems, June 7-8 (at New Delhi);

[It was inaugurated by *Shri Hans Raj Gupta*, Mayor of Delhi.]



- (4) First Seminar on Family Planning—Policy and Administration, May 19-21 (at New Delhi); and

[The Seminar was inaugurated by *Prof. D. P. Chattopadhyaya*, Union Minister of State for Health and Family Planning.]

- (5) Second Seminar on Family Planning—Policy and Administration, June 17-19 (at New Delhi).

[The second Seminar was inaugurated by *Shri A. K. Kisku*, Deputy Minister in the Union Ministry of Health and Family Planning.]

A Meeting of 40 experts (belonging to various disciplines) on Planning and Administration of Integrated Services for Children and Youth in Urban Areas was organized in relation to the UNICEF Project undertaken by the Institute's Centre for Training and Research in Municipal Administration on April 14 and 15 at the headquarters of the Institute. The object of the Meeting was to seek suggestions as would be helpful in working out plans for action projects in selected urban areas on the basis of studies and surveys of the existing services for children and youth and their institutional and administrative framework.

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A group comprising administrators, leading cooperators, professors and others met at the Headquarters on April 19 to discuss various aspects of Consumer Cooperative Movement in Asian Countries. The basic paper for discussion entitled "Consumer Movement in Asia—Some Socio-Administrative Aspects" was jointly prepared by *Dr. S. Dandapani* of the Railway Board and *Mr. R. Arbidsson* of the International Cooperative Alliance.

*Dr. Edward McCrensky*, Inter-Regional Adviser in Public Administration, the United Nations, visited the Institute on May 4. He also addressed members of IIPA's faculty on "Recent Trends in Development Administration".

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At the invitation of the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA), *Prof. G. Mukharji*, Director, attended the Sixth General Assembly of EROPA, and Conference, held in Manila, from May 8 to 14. The theme of the Conference was: "The Administrative Implications of Rapid Population Growth in Asia".

*Shri Deva Raj*, Joint Project Director at the IIPA's Centre for Training and Research in Municipal Administration, has been named member of a Committee, appointed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, to suggest amendments in the Acts relating to local bodies in the State.

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*Dr. M. J. K. Thavaraj*, Professor & Head of the Financial Management Unit, left Delhi on June 25 to take part in the 8th International Summer Seminar on Problems of Reproduction and Development Countries, June 28-July 16, organized by the University of Berlin (GDR). Later, he will attend the Congress of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, to be held in Rome sometime in September. While abroad, *Dr. Thavaraj* will visit the East European and the Scandinavian countries to study, *inter alia*, their budgetary systems.

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The IIPA Regional Branches conducted the following seminars during

the quarter:

(i) Some Aspects of Public Sector Enterprises

The Seminar was conducted on April 24 at Chandigarh by the Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh Regional Branch. The participants mostly comprised the officials connected with the various State Undertakings in Punjab and Haryana. It was inaugurated by *Dr. L. M. Singhvi*, Executive Chairman, Indian Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies. *Shri Tejinder Khanna*, Managing Director of the Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation, prepared the Working Paper.

(ii) Role of Specialists in Public Administration

The Madras Regional Branch conducted a seminar on the subject at Madras on May 2 and 3. *Shri S. Ramachandran*, Minister for Transport, Government of Tamil Nadu, inaugurated the Seminar. The Presidential address was delivered by *Mr. Justice K. S. Venkataraman*, ICS, Judge, Madras High Court.

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The Madras Regional Branch brought out, in book form, proceedings of a seminar conducted by the Branch earlier. The book entitled *Perspectives on Employee Assessment* was released on May 2 by *Shri S. Ramachandran*, Tamil Nadu Minister for Transport.

## RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Reallocation of work under the various Control Ministries and changes in nomenclatures of some Ministries have been made vide a Presidential Notification, issued on May 4.

To the Ministry of Education the Department of Social Welfare has been added. This Ministry will now be known as "Ministry of Education and Social Welfare". It will also have under it the new Department of Culture.

The new Ministry of Planning has been invested with the functions hitherto assigned to the Planning Commission. The heading "Planning Commission" and the entries thereunder in the existing rules "shall be omitted", says the Notification. It lists the following functions under the Ministry of Planning: (1) Assessment of the material, capital and human resources of the country, including technical personnel, and formulation of proposals for augmenting such of these resources as are found to be deficient; (2) Formulation of Plans for the most effective and balanced utilization of the country's resources; (3) Definition of stages in which the Plan should be carried out on a determination of priorities and allocation of resources for completion of each stage; (4) Determination of the nature of the machinery necessary for the implementation of the Plan in all its aspects; (5) Appraisal from time to time of the progress achieved in the execution of each stage of the Plan; (6) Public

Cooperation in National Development; and (7) Perspective Planning.

The Department of Science and Technology, to be under the charge of the Planning Minister, will be responsible, *inter alia*, for matters relating to the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Survey of India. Zoological and Botanical Surveys of India, Ecology, and Futurology.

In place of the old Ministry of Food and Agriculture, there will be a Ministry of Agriculture with four Departments—Agriculture, Food, Community Development and Co-operation.

The Ministry of Steel and Mines will have two departments, one for Steel and another for Mines. The Department of Steel will incorporate the functions of the erstwhile Ministry of Steel and Heavy Engineering.

The Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals will have two separate Departments for Petroleum and Chemicals respectively.

The Department of Justice in the Ministry of Law and Justice will be concerned with the appointments and service conditions of the Supreme Court and High Court Judges and all other relevant matters which were hitherto a part of the responsibilities of the Home Ministry.

The Cabinet Secretariat will now have four Departments instead of five, namely, Cabinet Affairs, Electronics, Personnel and Statistics.

Pursuant to the recommendations of the Bhagvantam Committee on organization of Scientific Research, three new autonomous research institutes in the field of meteorology started functioning from April 1. These are: (i) Indian Institute of Astrophysics at Kodaikanal, (ii) Indian Institute of Geomagnetism at Colaba, Bombay, and (iii) Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology at Poona.

These Institutes have been formed out of the present Astrophysical Observatory at Kodaikanal, the Colaba and Alibagh Geomagnetic Observatories at Bombay and the Institute of Tropical Meteorology at Poona, all of which are at present part of India Meteorological Department.

Under the new set-up, these national institutes will be under the Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation but managed by autonomous governing councils. Each of the Councils will consist of eminent scientists in the respective field, besides the Director General of Observatories, the Directors of the respective Institute and two representatives of the Government. The Council will direct the research work. The autonomous status is expected to give a new impetus to scientific research in the field of meteorology.

The Estimates Committee of Lok Sabha, in their report (132nd) on "Ministry of Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation (Department of Labour and Employment)—Employees' Provident Fund Organisation" have again called for appointment of an Investment Committee, as early as possible, for advising the Central Board of Trustees in matters relating to the investment of its funds. The same recommendation made by the Estimates Committee in their earlier report (116th) was, however, not implemented on the grounds that as

the existing arrangements for the purpose were adequate, setting up of such a committee will not serve any useful purpose.

The Committee have also expressed their unhappiness over the delay in the implementation of the proposal for administrative merger of Employees' Provident Fund Scheme and Employees' State Insurance Scheme, mooted as far back as in 1962. The Committee have asked the Government to lay down a target date by which the merger of the two Schemes would be completed and all legal and administrative steps required for that purpose finalised. (The Government have accepted the merger proposal in principle based on the report of a Working Group appointed for the purpose. As the first step towards the merger, it is proposed to appoint a Special Officer to consider the practical issues and to work out the essentials of an Integrated Scheme. Further action will be taken after the Report of the Special Officer becomes available.)

Among the Committee's recommendations accepted by the Government are: (i) as the Fund is made up of contributions of both the employers and employees exclusively, there should be parity of representation between the officials and non-officials on the Central Board of Trustees; (ii) the field of selection of officers on deputation to the post of Central Provident Fund Commissioner and other posts in the Organization should not be confined to officers belonging to IAS and Central Services Class I only but should be enlarged to include officers of equivalent status belonging to other Central offices.

Forty cities have been newly classified for purposes of city compensatory and house rent allowances to Central Government employees. Nagpur and Lucknow have moved from 'B-2'

to 'B-1' and six cities—Patna, Indore, Jabalpur, Sholapur, Amritsar and Coimbatore from 'C' to 'B-2'. Thirty two cities have been classified, for the first time, into 'C' category.

This regrouping, based on the population of the cities, has been done following a request by the employees' representatives at a meeting of the National Council of the Joint Consultative Machinery held in January 1971.

With a view to effecting economy in the expenditure on the staff in the various departments in the State, Government of *Haryana* have constituted a Retrenchment Committee under the Chairmanship of *Shri B. S. Grewal*, ICS, Financial Commissioner, Haryana.

The Committee will examine the strength of the staff in each department one by one and make recommendations to the Chief Secretary regarding reduction in the staff. The Administrative Secretary and the Head of the Department concerned will be coopted as members.

The Government of *Haryana* have constituted the Publicity Coordination Committee in the Public Relations Department under the chairmanship of *Shri Bansi Lal*, Chief Minister, Haryana. The functions of the Committee will be to draw up a coordinated programme of publicity for all the departments of the State Government.

The Government of *Maharashtra* has reorganized the Food and Drugs administration so as to establish seven circles in place of the existing four regional offices corresponding to four Revenue Divisions, namely, Bombay, Poona, Nagpur and Aurangabad. Each circle will be in the charge of an Assistant Commissioner with ancillary staff.

The powers of the Licensing Authorities to issue selling licence under Parts VI and VI-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1946, and to refuse to grant or renew such licence, to suspend or cancel such licence, and all other powers incidental to the exercise of these powers have been delegated to the Assistant Commissioners incharge of the Circles in Maharashtra State.

The Government of *Maharashtra* has appointed *Dr. A. S. Naik*, I.C.S., as Special Secretary in the General Administration Department for examination/implementation of the report on Reorganization of Administration recently submitted to the Government by *Shri M. N. Heble*.

The Government of *Rajasthan* have constituted a State-level committee to bring about proper coordination between the Home and Social Welfare Departments in regard to the implementation of the provisions of the Untouchability (Crimes) Act, 1955.

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The number of Central Government employees in the country on March 31, 1969, was 28,07,400 (26,08,800 regular and 1,98,600 non-regular), according to the Central Government Employees Census Report released by the Directorate General of Employment and Training. The overall increase during the year 1968-69 was only 0.5 per cent—the lowest during the decade.

The bulk of concentration of regular employees was in the Ministries of Railways—51.9 per cent; Defence (Civilian)—17.9 per cent; Communications—13.6 per cent; and Finance—4.4 per cent. Other Ministries together accounted for 12.2 per cent.

Of regular employees, only 1.9 per cent (49,821) were gazetted. The



proportion of non-gazetted employees to a gazetted officer worked out to 51. A majority of regular employees were holding either class III or class IV posts, the percentage being 46.9 and 48.9 respectively. Only 2.5 per cent were in class I or class II posts. Women employees numbered 61,936 (2.4 per cent of regular employees). Nearly three-fourths of the regular employees were permanent in their posts or in a lower post.

On the basis of salary, 51 per cent of the regular employees drew a basic pay of less than Rs. 100 and upto Rs. 199, and 41.8 per cent from Rs. 200 to Rs. 499. The percentage of employees getting Rs. 500 and above per month was 1.7 per cent. About one-fifth of the employees were stationed in metropolitan class 'A' cities of Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and Madras; 13.4 per cent in 'B-1' and 'B-2' class cities; and 23.8 per cent in class 'C' cities. In the States of Maharashtra, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Union Territory of Delhi, the respective percentages being 15.8, 14.7, 14.1, 7.8 and 7.6.

Medical expenses incurred by Central Government employees and their families in hospitals run by Railways and Cantonment Boards will be reimbursed without being subject to a limit; earlier there was a limit of Rs. 100 in respect of these hospitals. Heads of Departments have now been authorised to permit reimbursements accordingly.

The new rules apply to pending cases as well.

Reiterating its earlier recommendation that the feasibility of creating a separate all India Cadre of ESI (Employees' State Insurance) Medical Officers on the lines of Central Health Service with an earmarked quota for each State be examined in consul-

tation with the State Governments, the Estimates Committee of Lok Sabha has, in its 133rd Report, urged the Government that the question may be looked into again in detail. The report also states that if necessary, the opinion of the All India Medical Council and other recognized bodies of medical profession may also be elicited.

The Committee feels that the creation of an all India Cadre under the overall control of the Employees State Insurance Corporation would inculcate a sense of belonging to the Scheme in the minds of those serving it and also enable the Corporation to have an effective control over the administration of Medical Care.

The Government of India have sanctioned a special allowance of Rs. 150 per month for doctors belonging to the Central Health Service posted to difficult stations, lacking urban facilities. All stations on the Indo-Tibetan border and 148 other stations in the States of Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan and Union Territories of Manipur, Tripura, Dadra Nagar Haveli, North East Frontier Agency besides the Dandakaranaya Project are covered under this scheme.

The Government of Haryana have decided to set up a machinery for joint consultation with the object of: (a) promoting the welfare of its employees, (b) increasing the efficiency of the public service, and (c) securing the greatest measure of cooperation between the Government (in its capacity as employer) and the general body of its employees, in matters of common concern. The scheme will cover most of the regular civil employees of the State Government except those belonging to Class I and Class II services or those governed by the Industrial Disputes Act. There will be a joint

Council at the State level and also at the Departmental level. These Councils would have equal number of representatives from the official side and the staff side. The Chief Secretary to the Government of Haryana would be the Chairman of the State Council. The staff side will consist of the nominees of recognized associations of the employees.

The scope of work of the Councils will include all matters relating to the conditions of service, work of the employees and their welfare, improvement in efficiency, and standards of work. In regard to recruitment, promotion and discipline, consultation will, however, be limited to matters of general principle only, and individual cases will not be considered.

In pursuance of the provisions of rule 6 of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970, the Lt. Governor of the Union Territory of Delhi has, in consultation with the High Court, initially constituted the Delhi Higher Judicial Service. The effect of this step is that Delhi will now have its own senior cadre of judicial officers and will no longer have to call officers from elsewhere on deputation to man these posts.

A lower Judicial Service (sub-judge-cum-Magistrate) is also expected to be created very soon.

The Government of Assam have decided to appoint a Pay Committee, to be headed by a serving Judge or retired Judge, to examine the questions of pay structure, dearness allowance, interim relief, etc. The terms of reference have not yet been finalized.

The Government of Gujarat have liberalized the existing orders for voluntary retirement of Government servants. Under the new rules, all Government servants, including Class

IV employees but excluding technical officers, shall have an option to retire (with 3-month notice) after completion of 25 years of qualifying service.

On reviewing the workload of school teachers, the *Deve Gowda Committee* on Vacations, Working Days and Co-Curricular Activities, appointed by the Government of Kerala, have reached the conclusion that the number of working days in a year may be fixed at 210 including examination days and the number of working hours in a day may be fixed at 5 hours and 20 minutes, divided into 8 periods of 40 minutes each. The Committee was set up in August 1970.

The Government of *Madhya Pradesh*, have decided that prior to leaving their charge due to leave, transfer or retirement, Secretaries in the Secretariat and Heads of Departments in the field should each leave a charge note for the guidance of their successors. Such a system already exists in the State in the case of Collector/Commissioner of a district/division.

The charge note of a Secretary should cover the following topics: (i) General remarks; (ii) An appraisal of the officers posted in his charge with reference to competence displayed in the disposal of assigned work; (iii) Departmental policy and schemes under consideration or operation; and (iv) Cases or schemes requiring immediate action along with the line of action proposed. (Routine and miscellaneous unimportant matters need not be included in the charge note.)

The charge note of a Head of Department should be drawn up under the following headings: (i) Introduction; (ii) Office organization and assessment of the officers posted in the office with reference to individual competence in the disposal of



assigned work; (iii) Implementation of departmental policy—impediments faced therein; (iv) Departmental schemes provision in the budget progress in execution; (v) Main problems relating to the charge; (vi) Conditions of service and problems connected therewith; and (vii) Miscellaneous remarks.

The charge note will be treated as a confidential document and a copy of it forwarded to the Secretary of the department concerned and the Chief Secretary for information.

The Government of *Madhya Pradesh* have decided to raise age limit to 28 years in respect of those services where the maximum age limit of 25 years had hitherto been prescribed for purposes of recruitment.

The Government of *Madhya Pradesh* have with effect from February 1971, decided to grant personal pay equal to the last increment drawn in the respective pay scales to those Government servants of Class II, III and IV service having a maximum pay scale of Rs. 500 or less, who have been drawing the maximum for two years and above or would be drawing it for two years in future. The personal pay will be reckoned as "pay" for all purposes under the rules, including duty, and also entitlement to the class of rail accommodation on transfer.

A single Medical Service entitled the *Maharashtra* Medical and Health Services came into existence on June 7, 1971, replacing and combining the two independent services, namely, the *Maharashtra* Medical Service and the *Maharashtra* Public Health Service. This is a step further towards the integration of Medical and Public Health Services to achieve greater coordination and more effective health services in *Maharashtra* State.

The *Bombay Labour Welfare Fund (Amendment) Act, 1970*, came into force from May 7. The Act provides for contributions to be made to the *Maharashtra Labour Welfare Board* by employers, employees and the Government of *Maharashtra* every six months. The contribution payable by the employee is 25 paise each and for every such employee the employer's contribution is 50 paise. Every employer is required to pay to the *Maharashtra Labour Welfare Board* these contributions before July 15 and January 15 every year. The Act applies—besides factory, tramway or motor omnibus service—to any establishment within the meaning of the *Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948*, which employs or on any working day during the preceding twelve months employed ten or more persons.

The Government of *Rajasthan* have allowed to their retired employees continuance of medical facilities in Government hospitals to which they were entitled before superannuation. They will, however, not be entitled to get any medical reimbursement for expenses incurred on medicines and house visits by doctors.

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Enhancement of punishment in cases involving untouchability has been unanimously recommended by the Conference of State Ministers in-charge of Backward Classes Welfare and Social Welfare, held in New Delhi on May 21, under the chairmanship of *Shri Siddhartha Shankar Ray*, Union Minister of Education and Social Welfare. The Conference has recommended that the punishment should range from a minimum period of three months' imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 50 to a maximum of two years with a fine of Rs. 1,000 depending on the number of times the offence has been committed.

The Conference further recommended that liberal credit facilities should be provided to persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by financing agencies at subsidized rates of interest for agriculture and minor industries. It also emphasised the need for strengthening of pre-examination training Centres established in various States to ensure that more Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates qualified in competitive examinations for recruitment to Government services.

The Union Ministry of Irrigation and Power has asked the State Electricity Boards to give proper attention to the need of extending benefits of rural electrification to Harijans and the poorer sections of the community living in the vicinity of electrified villages.

The Union Government have asked the Boards, to ensure that: (i) in villages already electrified, at least a few street light points are provided in the areas occupied by such weaker sections at the earliest opportunity, at the most within the Fourth Five Year Plan, and (ii) where further electrification of the villages is taken up, such areas are always covered. The Boards should also examine the question further and prepare schemes for extension of electricity to rural areas inhabited by Harijans and the poorer sections of the people.

The Government of India have set up a Committee which would mainly recommend suitable measure for ensuring that the cotton textile mills in the country fulfil their obligations regarding production of controlled varieties of cloth for the weaker sections of community. *Shri C. S. Ramachandran*, Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, is the Chairman of the Committee.

The Government of Mysore have established a corps of voluntary workers—"Mysore Development Corps"—to provide for a deeper and more meaningful involvement of young people in the challenging task of developing the State. The corps consisting of suitably trained young and dedicated people shall initially consist of the following six Units of 25 each: (i) Unit for Adult Literacy; (ii) Unit for maintenance of Agricultural Machinery; (iii) Unit for Backward Tribes; (iv) Unit for Training Farmers; (v) Unit for Hospital Services; and (vi) Unit for Youth Services.

The post of a Special Officer in the Directorate of Youth Services has been created to assist in the administration of the Programme.

The Government of Mysore have appointed a ministerial Committee (Chairman *Shri Virendra Patil*), till recently Chief Minister to examine as to how far the constitutional requirements regarding reservation of posts for weaker sections of society in the state government have been implemented.

An Ordinance amending the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950, was recently promulgated by the Governor of *Uttar Pradesh* in order to provide 'abadi' sites for the housing of the persons belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as well as agricultural labourers and village artisans all over the rural areas of the State. Such earmarked land will be allotted by the Land Management Committee of a village with the previous approval of the Sub-Divisional Officer and in such allotment scheduled castes or scheduled tribes, agricultural labourers and village artisans residing in the village shall be given top most preference.

According to the amendment, the expression 'village artisan' will include carpenter, potter, ironsmith, silver and goldsmith, barber, washerman and cobbler. It has also been made clear that a person belonging to the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes who has built a house on any land in the village and is in its occupation will be held to be the owner of the land on which the house exists.

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The Law Commission, in its report submitted to the Government in June, have made recommendations aimed at streamlining the Indian Penal Code. The changes suggested by the Commission include, among others: (1) Redrafting of the definition of "murder" and "culpable homicide amounting to murder", (2) severe sentences for gheraos and attempted self-immolation for political purposes, and (3) a time-limit for the prosecution of minor offences. Headed by *Shri K. V. K. Sundaram*, the Commission, which was set up by the Union Government in March 1968, had earlier submitted another report on the Indian Criminal Procedure Code.

In revising the Penal Code the Commission has laid special emphasis on anti-social offences which, according to it, constitute major impediments to the building up of a welfare State. Another objective is to bring the law in conformity with the Constitution, following the judgments and observations of the Supreme Court as guidelines. The Commission has also sought to moderate the penal aspects of the law in recognition of modern principles of punishment. The definition of "public servant" (Section 21) has been recast expressly so as to include members of Parliament and of the State legislatures.

As regards a comprehensive law dealing with treason, sedition and other allied offences affecting the

security and integrity of the country, the Commission has urged a redefinition of Section 124A of the Code, and has called for replacement of the present punishment for sedition (imprisonment for life or imprisonment up to three years) by rigorous imprisonment up to seven years.

The Commission has recommended relaxation of the principle of "ignorance of law is no excuse" for certain classes of offences, such as offences arising out of contravention of subsidiary legislation, for example, rules, orders, bye-laws, notifications, etc. It has also asked for raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility from seven to ten years.

The Commission feels that a new chapter should be inserted dealing with the violation of personal privacy. With a view to checking the widely prevalent practice of issuing false medical certificates, it has proposed that a special provision may be made rendering it penal, not only for the medical officer but also for the person who uses the false certificate.

Following receipt of assent by the Governor of *Maharashtra*, the *Maharashtra Public Security Measures Act* has been enforced. The Act will remain in force up to December 31, 1972.

Among other things, the Act empowers Government to make orders restricting movements or actions of persons likely to do any subversive act. It also controls the movement of commodities which are essential to the life of the community in the State. The Act empowers Government to prevent the entry of unauthorized persons to certain protected places or areas. Under the Act, a person committing any subversive act will, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term extending to five years or with fine, or with both.

The inhabitants of the *Maharashtra* towns or areas affected by communal violence will be required to pay the cost of the additional police which will be stationed at those towns or areas to restore order. This is provided for by Section 50 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, and the State Government has decided to take recourse to the provisions of this section whenever communal disturbances occur in future.

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The President of India promulgated on May 13, the General Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance, 1971, nationalizing General Insurance business, Indian as well as foreign, in the country. This is the first and preparatory step towards nationalization of general insurance. The next step will be legislation vesting the ownership of the insurance undertakings in Government and establishing Corporations to transact general insurance business in the country. The Bill for the purpose is expected to be introduced during the next session of Parliament.

The Ordinance provides for payment of compensation to about 107 insurers whose management is being taken over.

The Ordinance empowers Government to appoint Custodians to manage the business. Till such time as Custodians are appointed and begin to function, the existing managements will continue to be in charge but as agents of Government.

The future organizational set-up will be dealt with in the proposed Bill. The Bill will provide for the vesting of the ownership of the undertakings of insurers in Government and the establishment of autonomous Corporations. The present thinking in this regard is to have four Corporations competing with each other for business all over India.

The Government of India, on May 1, announced the formation of an autonomous Ordnance Production Board. The Board would formulate policies and direct their implementation and has been vested with full financial and executive powers of the Government of India, within the limits of the budget provision approved by the Parliament for the Ordnance Factories.

The Board is headed by the Secretary, Department of Defence Production, and has the following as Members: Secretary, Department of Defence Supplies; Financial Adviser, Defence Services; Additional Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs; Director-General of the Ordnance (Army); Chief of Logistics (Navy); Air Officer—Maintenance (Air Force); Joint Secretary (Planning & Coordination), Department of Defence; Director-General Technical Development; and Joint Secretary (Factories), Department of Defence Production—Member-Secretary. Chief Controller of Research and Development and the Director-General of Inspection of the Ministry of Defence are to function as advisers.

The Board is competent to decide, within the framework of Government's Industrial Policy, whether the requirements of the Defence Services projected on the Ordnance Factories, are to be executed by the Ordnance Factories or whether they should be partly or fully farmed out to other Government undertakings or to the private sector.

Union Ministry of Supply has set up a Study Team to consider measures for effective provisioning of scarce and short supply materials for manufacturing stores needed by the Directorate General of Supply and Disposal.

The Study Team has also been entrusted with the task of making

an appraisal of purchase techniques and to inject some vitality in the procurement system.

The team has invited various Engineering Associations and Chambers of Commerce to offer their comments and suggestions in regard to raw materials in short supply and the measures necessary for ensuring their continuous supply.

In a letter addressed to the Ministers in-charge of Cooperation in all States, the Union Minister of State for Agriculture, *Shri Annasahib P. Shinde*, has advised the States to give priority to their consumer co-operative programme.

The advice is based on the findings of a Sub-committee, which was set up in November 1969 on the recommendation of the Central Advisory Committee on Consumer Cooperatives. The Sub-committee, after studying the working of consumer cooperative institutions in Maharashtra, Mysore, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Bihar have submitted five reports on each of the five States, together with a general report based on these studies.

In their reports, the Sub-committee laid stress on the need for closer integration within the consumer cooperative movement including amalgamation and merger of societies, standardization of inventories and pooling of purchases. While recommending measures for streamlining of administrative and accounting procedures, including a regular system of inventory control and stock verification, the Sub-committee had also laid stress on training of employees, formation of cadres, development of salesmanship and adoption of modern retailing techniques. The Sub-committee recommended that the consumer cooperatives should diversify the range of their business, instead of depending largely on

controlled commodities and food-grains. They should aim at increasing popular participation and build up a good image for consumer co-operatives by efficient service.

The Sub-committee had also recommended that a consultancy organization, built around a nucleus of experts should be set up at the centre to provide expert guidance to consumer cooperative institutions and organizations in the country.

The Union Ministry of Mines and Metals have appointed a Fuel Policy Committee to: (i) undertake a survey of the fuel resources and the regional pattern of their distribution, (ii) study the current trends in exploitation and use of fuels, (iii) estimate the prospective demand by sectors and by regions, with particular reference to transport generation industry and domestic fuel, (iv) recommend the outline of a National Fuel Policy for the next 15 years, a pattern of consumption and measures to promote the optimum efficient use of fuel, and (v) suggest fiscal and other steps which would ensure the best use of available fuel resources.

The Committee has set up four Working Groups to study the various aspects of energy consumption in the country.

A 6-member *ad hoc* Committee representing concerned Central Government Departments has been set up by the Government of India, to assess the quantum of subsidy payable to the indigenously constructed fishing vessels. The subsidy is to be paid on the basis of the principle that it will be 27½ per cent of the c.i.f. cost of a corresponding imported vessel restricted to the difference between the costs of the indigenous and imported vessels, taking into consideration the corresponding fair prices of the vessels as obtained in India and abroad.



The Government of India, in June 1970, had sanctioned the scheme to encourage construction of fishing vessels in Indian shipyards.

The Ajudhia Textile Mills, Delhi, has been taken over by the Government of India under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, with effect from June 7, 1971. The National Textile Corporation has been appointed the Authorized Controller of the Mill. The Mill is now expected to re-open before the end of July.

The Government of *Maharashtra* have appointed a State Level Accounts Committee in order to prevent occurrence of irregularities committed by the office bearers of the Cooperative societies. The Committee will be an independent body on the lines of the Public Accounts Committee of the Legislature and will be nominated by Government for a period of one year in the first instance.

The Committee will scrutinise the audit reports and special reports of the cooperative societies and suggest ways and means of rectifying various irregularities pointed out in the audit reports. The Committee will also watch the follow-up action taken on audit reports and on its reviews and recommendations made from time to time and advise the Registrar on scrutiny of the audit reports or the special reports or any other information called for from the societies.

The Committee will cover the following classes of societies: (i) Apex level institutions; (ii) Cooperative Sugar and Spinning Mills; (iii) District Central Cooperative Banks; (iv) Marketing Societies; (v) Consumers Cooperatives, and (vi) Other cooperative societies with a paid up share capital of Rs. 5 lakhs and above.

The Government of *Rajasthan* will appoint two Directors each to the Boards of Management in three of its enterprises from amongst the workers. These representatives will be elected by all the workers of the concerned undertakings through secret ballot. The step is being taken in the hope that workers' participation will not only lead to more efficient working of these enterprises but will also insure improved labour-management relations.

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If each branch of a bank can entertain about 50 proposals for assistance from the unemployed in a year, about 3 million jobs can be created by all commercial Banks in the next 5 years on the basis of the existing network of branches of banks besides substantial indirect employment. These are the findings of the Committee on Special Credit Schemes which was appointed by the Reserve Bank of India to review the existing institutional arrangements for the Schemes of Commercial Banks—particularly those in public sector—for meeting credit requirements of various categories of self-employed persons.

The Committee has pointed out several deficiencies in the execution of these Schemes, such as lack of proper coordination, with various relative agencies in the field, lack of proper training to the personnel, including reorientation of their attitudes, inflexibility in catering to the special needs of individual entrepreneurs, etc.

The Committee has recommended that in order to evolve a coordinated arrangement for helping the professional and self-employed categories, a multi-services agency should be established which will make arrangements for collection of information on the prospective borrowers. The

agency will have no financing function but will only be a coordinating/planning/advisory body. It will provide guidance regarding availability of raw-materials, marketing prospects, labour laws, taxation and accounting problems, etc. Such agencies should function in various parts of the country as self-contained independent unit.

In the view of the Committee, employment potential including self-employment, exists in the following: (i) farmers, owners of dairies, poultry and other farm animals, (ii) small-scale industries, (iii) household and cottage industries, (iv) professional groups, such as, doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, architects, carpenters, electricians, tailors, small building contractors, etc., (v) small traders, and (vi) other small business enterprises, such as, transport operators.

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Kerala legislators recently established a Housing Board for having an organized direction and planning in the preparation and execution of housing and improvement schemes in the State. The Board is to consist of a non-official Chairman to be appointed by the Government of Kerala. The Housing Commissioner to Government will be *ex-officio* member Secretary of the Board. Four officers and nine non-officials (including one Architect or Engineer, and two belonging to Scheduled Castes and Tribes) will be nominated to the Board by the Government.

The Board can take up various types of housing or improvement schemes which include housing accommodation schemes for the poor sections of the people having income not exceeding Rs. 2,000 per annum and especially for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is competent to sanction schemes costing up

to Rs. 10 lakhs and in respect of schemes costing more than Rs. 10 lakhs, approval of Government is contemplated. The Board will have its own fund and it is envisaged that the Board will raise funds for its schemes by floating debentures. Raising of loans from Life Insurance Corporation of India and other financial institutions is also contemplated.

The Government of *Maharashtra* have designated the site for the proposed new town near Bombay to be called "New Bombay". It will spread over the area having 86 villages, 24 from Thana taluka of Thana District, and 34 from Panvel taluka and 28 from Uran taluka of Kolaba district.

The Government has declared the City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Limited to be the New Town Development Authority for the area.

The Government of *Maharashtra* set up Nasik Regional Planning Board on April 3. The region comprises 2,300 sq. km. area and contains six urban centres and 240 villages. The Board consists of experts from various fields having bearing on regional planning. The Chairman of the Board is *Shri R. C. Joshi*, Commissioner, Bombay Region.

The Government of *Maharashtra* has dissolved the Bombay Metropolitan Regional Planning Board. The Board, which was constituted for preparation of the regional plan for the development and use of land in the Bombay Metropolitan Region, submitted its draft regional plan to Government in December last.

The Government of *Maharashtra* have directed the Municipal Councils, which have not framed building by-laws or undertaken preparation of Development Plans for their towns, to follow the building regulations in



the Maharashtra Land Revenue (Conversion of use of land and non-agricultural assessment) Rules, 1969 while granting permission under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 for disposing of the cases referred to them.

The Government of *Uttar Pradesh* have appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Minister for Local Self-Government to: (a) consider proposals for amendments in the corresponding Acts relating to Municipal Corporation, Municipal Boards and Town Area Committees; (b) give such suggestions, as are considered necessary, for amendments to these Acts; (c) make recommendations for improvement in the administration of these local bodies; and (d) consider whether a single legislation for all these local bodies is feasible.

The Committee is expected to give its report within a period of three months.

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The Chief Secretaries of all the States and the Union Territories met in New Delhi on April 12-13 to discuss the Crash Scheme for Rural Employment. Convened by the Cabinet Secretariat, the Conference also reviewed the progress of some of the other important employment-oriented schemes, such as rural works programmes in chronically drought-affected areas, development of dry farming, multiple cropping, the agro-service centres, etc.

The Scheme, as decided, would remain effective from April 1971 to March 31, 1974. Though centrally-sponsored, the Scheme would be implemented through the agencies of the State Governments and Union Territory Administrations. It contemplates to provide employment through the execution of projects which are essentially labour intensive,

in all the districts of the country. The scheme has a two-fold purpose: (i) Each project should provide employment for 1,000 persons on an average continuously over a working season of ten months in a year in every district; and (ii) Each project should produce works or assets of a durable nature in consonance with local development plans.

The Expert Committee on Assessment and Evaluation of the Intensive Agricultural District Programme set up in 1961 has been reconstituted. *Prof. M. V. Mathur*, Director, Asian Institute of Educational Planning and Administration is the new Chairman of the Committee.

The main function of the Committee will be to provide guidance in the organization of surveys, collection of data, conducting research studies and preparation of assessment reports in respect of the Intensive Agricultural District Programme and such other special agricultural development programmes as may be entrusted to it for evaluation from time to time by the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development & Cooperation. The Committee will meet as often as necessary.

The Government of *Haryana* have floated "Haryana State Minor Irrigation (Tubewells) Corporated Ltd." to promote and operate, among other things, schemes for the development of minor irrigation in the State of Haryana. The Corporation will take over from the Government of Haryana the existing system of State-owned irrigation and augmentation tubewells alongwith their assests and liabilities.

The Indian Council of Agricultural Research has set up a Committee, headed by its Joint Director, *Dr. K. Kanungo*, to find out the extent of indebtedness of small farmers due to low productivity of land.

\* \* \*

The Department of Adult Education of the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) has been converted into the Directorate of Adult Education with effect from March 1, 1971. The Directorate will act as the technical and academic wing of the Ministry of Education and Youth Services for Adult education and adult literacy programmes, help in formulation and implementation of these programmes and undertake any work assigned to it by the Ministry from time to time.

This conversion is based on the recommendation of the Review Committee appointed by the Government of India in 1968 to review and evaluate the activities and programmes of the NCERT.

The Union Ministry of Education has laid down certain norms to be fulfilled by social research institutions for eligibility to Government grants. These are: An institution should be a registered society or a public trust functioning for more than five years to be eligible for the grant. The institution should also be of an all-India character engaged in work of national significance. Its excellence will be determined by a committee of social scientists consisting of representatives of Government, University Grants Commission (UGC) and the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR). Aid will be given for development, research fellowships and capital expenditure for constructing buildings and purchasing equipment. Maintenance grants for recurring expenditure on posts and fellowships continuing for more than five years will be available on the basis of a percentage to be fixed by Government, subject to a ceiling of 50 per cent of the approved expenditure but not exceeding Rs. 2.5 lakhs. Grants for capital expenditure will be 50 per cent of the total cost subject to a maximum of Rs. 1 lakh. For

administrative establishments, grants will be given up to 25 per cent of the approved expenditure, subject to a maximum of Rs. 10,000 per month.

Institutions receiving assistance from the University Grants Commission and research projects which can get aid under schemes of the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) are excluded from the purview of the rules.

The setting up of a national agency "to help author, publishers and printers to play a more substantial and effective role in the production of science and technical literature for university-level consumption and to improve its standard" has been recommended in a report on "Books on Science and Technology: Publishing, Printing and Demand" submitted to the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare recently. The Report, which is based on a nationwide survey and which examines the present and future demand for science and technical literature in the country, has been prepared by *Shri U. S. Mohan Rao*, former Director, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

The Government of *Maharashtra* will try this year an experiment to admit blind children in ten selected regular primary schools in order to create self-confidence among these children and enable them to face the problems more competently. At present, education is imparted in special schools exclusively for blind children.

Special teachers will be provided to the schools admitting blind children to teach these students with special aids.

\* \* \*

Pursuant to the recommendation of a Committee, appointed in 1967 to advise the Government of *Kerala*

on the question of reformation of "Malayalam" script, news items in the important dailies and periodicals of the State and Government advertisements will henceforth appear in the new script. The Committee had suggested reduction of about 75 per cent of the total number of existing characters in the language to facilitate printing and typewriting. Another committee, set up in 1969, made slight modifications which were subsequently approved by a conference of Managing Editors of newspapers, convened in January this year.

The Government of Mysore has constituted "The Mysore Official Language (Legislative) Commission", consisting of a Chairman (a retired High Court Judge) and two non-official Members (Advocates with good knowledge of 'Kannada' and Hindi).

The Commission will: (i) make arrangements for Kannada translation (including its scrutiny) of the Acts, Rules, Ordinances and Regula-

tions passed or promulgated by the State Legislature or the Governor, as the case may be; and (ii) scrutinise the translations in Hindi and the glossary of legal terminology prepared by the Central Official Language (Legislative) Commission for being adopted for use into all official regional languages and to suggest modifications, if any, with a view to its suitability for being used in 'Kannada' (the official language of the State).

The Government of *West Bengal* have constituted a four-member Committee, with the Director of Information & Public Relations as Chairman, to prepare the media list for the purpose of issuing Government advertisement.

While preparing the list, the Committee will be guided by the objectives of the Government, namely, to carry its policies, measures and messages to the majority of the population of the State.

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## DIGEST OF REPORT

*INDIA, REPORT OF THE CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS INQUIRY COMMITTEE*, Madras, Government of Tamil Nadu, 1971, p. 282.

The Government of Tamil Nadu constituted a Committee on September 22, 1969, to examine the entire question regarding the relationship that should subsist between the Centre and the States in a federal set-up, with reference to the provisions of the Constitution of India, and to suggest suitable amendments to the Constitution so as to secure to the States the utmost autonomy. The Committee comprised the following: (i) *Dr. P. V. Rajamannar* (Chairman), (ii) *Dr. A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar*, and (iii) *Thiru P. Chandra Reddy*. The Committee desired assistance from eminent public men and jurists like *Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar*, *Thiru N. A. Palkhivala*, *Thiru K. Santhanam*, *Thiru M. Bhaktavatsalam*, *Dr. A. Krishnaswami*, *Thiru M. P. Sivagnana Gramani*, etc., who replied to the questionnaire\* issued by the Committee.

The Committee took up the following topics for consideration with reference to the provisions of the Constitution, relevant factors, events and circumstances bearing on those topics, keeping before it the main objective, viz., to secure for the States fullest extent of autonomy within the general framework of the Constitution, without in any way impairing

the integrity of the country:

- (i) The Federal system set up by the Constitution;
- (ii) Unitary trends in the Constitution and its working—reasons for such trends;
- (iii) Provisions of the Constitution affecting the State autonomy in administrative and executive fields;
- (iv) Distribution of legislative powers contained in Lists I, II and III (Union, State and Concurrent) in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution;
- (v) Legislative powers conferred on Parliament (Centre) inconsistent with State autonomy;
- (vi) Division of taxing powers as between the Union and the States;
- (vii) Distribution of revenues as provided in the Constitution;
- (viii) Statutory grants from the Centre to the States;
- (ix) Discretionary grants from the Centre to the States;
- (x) Finance Commission;
- (xi) Loans from the Centre to the States (indebtedness of the States to the Centre);

\*Questionnaire was sent, among others, to Chief Ministers and Chief Secretaries of all States in the Indian Union; Leaders of Parties in Parliament (both Houses) and State Legislatures (both Houses); Chairmen, Finance Commissions; Members of Planning Commission; Cabinet Ministers at the Centre; Chief Justices of all High Courts; Advocate Generals of all States; retired Supreme Court Judges; selected Members of Parliament; 35 eminent individuals; 13 Editors of dailies and periodicals (besides all dailies of Tamil Nadu); etc.

- (xii) Central Planning and Planning Commission;
- (xiii) Supreme Court and High Courts;
- (xiv) Role of the Governor—extent of, and limitation on, his powers;
- (xv) Emergency Provisions—
  - (a) Articles 356 and 357;
  - (b) Articles 352, 353 and 354;
  - (c) Article 360;
- (xvi) Public Services;
- (xvii) Territorial integrity of States;
- (xviii) Representation of States in:
  - (a) Rajya Sabha, and (b) Lok Sabha;
- (xix) Language Question;
- (xx) Provisions relating to Trade and Commerce, intra-State and inter-State;
- (xxi) Deployment of Central Reserve Police Force in States;
- (xxii) Elections;
- (xxiii) Inter-State Water Disputes;
- (xxiv) Sea-bed;
- (xxv) Union Executive; and
- (xxvi) Amendment of the Constitution.

A summary of the recommendations of the Committee is reproduced below. The material given in the parenthesis is taken from the body of the Report. It is hoped that this might help readers in following the context of the recommendation a little better.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS

(1) *Issue of directions to the States by the Union:* Articles 256, 257 of the Constitution, which empower the Union executive to issue directions to the State Governments to ensure that the latter comply with, and do not impede or prejudice, the laws of

the Union or the Union Executive in the exercise of its authority) and 339(2) (which enables the Union to issue directions to a State as to the drawing up and execution of schemes specified in the direction to be essential for the welfare of the Scheduled Tribes in the State) should be omitted. [According to the Committee, these Articles, with the support of the provisions of Article 365 (which highlight the subordinate position of the States) constitute a serious intrusion into the executive field of the States.] Alternatively, it may be provided that no direction under any of those Articles should be issued except in consultation with, and with the approval of, the Inter-State Council.

*Article 344(6)* (which empowers the President to issue directions based on the report of the Official Language Committee of Parliament) should be omitted (as issue of directions in this regard to language is bound to create disharmony between the Union and the States).

The Committee further clarifies that (failure to implement any direction issued under any article should not result in the imposition of President's rule by invoking Article 365).

(2) *Inter-State Council:* The Inter-State Council should be constituted immediately. It should consist of all the Chief Ministers or their nominees, with equal representation for all the States, and the Prime Minister should be its Chairman. No other Union Minister should be on the Council.

Every Bill of national importance or which is likely to affect the interests of one or more States should, before its introduction in Parliament, be referred to the Inter-State Council and its views thereon should be submitted to Parliament at the time of the introduction of the Bill.



No decision of national importance or which may affect one or more States should be taken by the Union Government except after consultation with the Inter-State Council.

Exception may be made in regard to subjects like defence and foreign relations.

The recommendations of the Inter-State Council should ordinarily be binding on the Centre and the States. If, for any reason, any such recommendation is rejected by the Central Government, such recommendation together with reasons for its rejection should be laid before Parliament and the State Legislatures.

#### LEGISLATIVE FIELD

(3) On the subject of distribution of legislative powers after a good deal of discussion which includes references to positions and experiences in the U.S.A., Canada, Australia, and Switzerland, the Report says: "It may be observed from the foregoing that some matters which were within the legislative sphere of the constituent units have now been placed in the Union field, completely shutting out the State from having anything to do with those items. The Committee, therefore, recommended that a High Power Commission should be constituted for a re-distribution of the entries of Lists I and III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Committee's recommendations regarding the three Lists are as follows:

##### *List I (Union List):*

*Entry 7*—This entry should be made more precise by confining it to armament industries proper.

*Entry 32*—Article 285 exempting Union property from the imposition of tax by the States should be repealed.

*Entry 40*—Lotteries organized by the States should be omitted from this entry and included in the State List. When including this item in the State List, it should be specifically provided that the States will have the power of prohibiting or regulating any activity in connection with, or relating to, a lottery organized by the Government of another State.

*Entry 48*—Future markets should be transferred to the State List.

*Entry 52*—This should be restricted to industries of national importance or of an all-India character or to industries involving a capital of more than one hundred crores of rupees.

*Entries 53, 54 and 55*—These three entries should be transferred to the State List.

*Entry 67*—This entry should be transferred to the State List.

*Entry 76*—The audit of the accounts of the States should be transferred to the State List.

*Entry 84*—The power to levy excise duties on medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol, etc., should be transferred to the State List.

##### *List II (State List):*

*Entry 23*—This should be modified to include oilfields also.

*Entry 51*—This should be altered so as to empower the States to levy excise duties on medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol, etc.

*New entry*—A new entry should be inserted providing for the making of laws relating to inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the matters in the State List.

##### *List III (Concurrent List):*

*Entries 5, 8, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38,*

39, 40 and 42—These entries in their entirety should be transferred to the State List.

*Entry 45*—The reference to State List should be omitted.

*Consultation with States before legislation by Parliament*—Before any Bill is introduced in Parliament in relation to any entry of the Concurrent List, the Inter-State Council and the States should be consulted. At the time of introduction of the Bill, the remarks of the Inter-State Council and a brief resume of the opinions, if any, of the State Governments should be placed before Parliament.

#### *Residuary powers:*

The residuary power of legislation and taxation should be vested in the State Legislatures.

#### *Other legislative provisions:*

*Articles 154(2)(b) and 258(2)*—No law should be made by Parliament conferring powers or functions or imposing duties upon a State or its officers or authorities without the consent of the State.

*Article 169(1)*—The power to abolish or create Legislative Councils should be vested exclusively in the State Legislative Assemblies without the necessity of any Parliamentary legislation.

*Article 249*—This article should be omitted.

*Article 252*—The State Legislatures should have the power to amend or repeal an Act passed by Parliament under this article.

*Reservation of State Bills for consideration by President*—All provisions regarding the reservation of State Bills for the consideration and assent of the President, except the provision in Article 288(2), should be omitted.

*Promulgation of Ordinances by Governor : Need for previous instructions from the President*—The proviso to Article 213(1) should be so modified as to restrict it to cases falling under Article 288(2).

#### FINANCIAL RELATIONS

(4) The Report says that the (practical effect of the division of financial resources has been the increasing reliance of the States on the Centre). It further adds that the allocation of finances made by the Constitution between the Centre and the States has given rise to two main complaints:

(i) Constitutional division of finance is not fair to the States; and

(ii) In the distribution of the taxes collected on behalf of the States and also in the matter of discretionary grants by the Union to the States, there is scope for discriminatory treatment. In this context the Committee, therefore, made the following recommendations.

*Corporation tax, customs including export duties and tax on the capital value of assets*—The base of devolution of revenues on the States should be widened by including

(a) corporation tax,

(b) customs and export duties, and

(c) tax on the capital value of assets, in the divisible pool to be shared by the Centre and the States.

*Excise duties*—All excise duties and cesses, special regulatory or otherwise, which are shareable at the option of the Union, should all be made compulsorily divisible between the Union and the States.

Additional duties of excise should be continued only with the concurrence of the States.



Even if the additional duties of excise are abolished and they are replaced by the levy of sales tax by the States, the restrictions now imposed on the levy of sales tax by Sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Central Act 74 of 1956), as regards the rate of levy and the stage of levy should be totally repealed.

The power of Parliament under clause (3) of Article 286 should not be exercised except in consultation with the States.

*Taxes levied and collected by the Union but assigned to the States under Article 269*—Every one of these taxes should be levied by the Centre, though the collection may be left to the States.

*Surcharge on income-tax*—The surcharge should be merged with the basic rate of income-tax so that it can be shared with the States.

In future, no surcharge should be levied except with the consent of a substantial majority of the States.

*Restrictions on the power of the States to levy tax on the consumption or sale of electricity*—Article 287 should be omitted.

*Grants*—Grants by the Centre to the States, both for Plan expenditure and non-Plan expenditure, should be made on the recommendation of an independent and impartial body, like the Finance Commission or similar statutory body.

*Finance Commission*—It should be expressly provided in the Constitution that the recommendations of the Finance Commission shall be binding on all the parties—Centre as well as the States.

The Finance Commission should be a permanent body with its own secretariat.

A member of the Planning Commission may be appointed as a member of the Finance Commission.

*Loans and indebtedness of States*—A committee of experts may be set up to consider the entire issue relating to the indebtedness of States. The Committee, to be set up, may also consider the desirability of constituting an authority analogous to the Australian Loan Council or forming a development bank on the lines of the World Bank to deal with applications made to the Centre by the States for loans.

*Relief Fund*—There should be a fund for each State for the relief of distress arising out of natural calamities. The Fund may also be utilized for ameliorative measures.

#### PLANNING

(5) The Report states among other things that there was no legislative entry in the Government of India Act, 1935, relating to Planning and that there is no provision in the Constitution for the establishment of a body, like the Planning Commission, similar to Article 280 which provides for the appointment of a Finance Commission. On the basis of the discussion under this head, the Committee made the following recommendations:

*Planning Commission*—The Planning Commission should be placed on an independent footing without being subject to control by the Union Executive or to political influences. To secure this objective, it should be placed on a statutory basis by Parliament enacting a law providing for the establishment of a Planning Commission.

The Planning Commission, to be established by law, should consist of only experts in economic, scientific, technical and agricultural matters

and specialists in other categories of national activity. No member of the Government of India should be on it. The law to be made in this behalf should deal with the tenure, term of office and conditions of service of the members of the Planning Commission which should have a secretariat of its own. The existing Planning Commission should be abolished.

The duty of the Planning Commission should be to tender advice on schemes formulated by the States.

It will also have the responsibility of making recommendations for consideration by the Finance Commission regarding grant of foreign exchange to States for industrial undertakings started by or in the States.

Each State may have a Planning Board of its own.

*Planning and Development*—The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (Central Act LXV of 1951), should be repealed and replaced by an Act providing for the control by the Union of such industries only as are of national importance or of all-India character or which have a capital of more than one hundred crores of rupees.

The provisions relating to grant of licences should be completely omitted.

The State should have the power to grant licences to start new industrial undertakings within the State either in the private sector or in the co-operative sector.

The State should also have the power to start and carry on industrial undertakings in the public sector (except in fields reserved for the Union) with or without foreign collaboration.

Where foreign exchange is needed for any industrial undertaking licensed or started by a State, it should be provided by means of block grants to be allocated to each State on the recommendation of the Finance Commission made in consultation with the Planning Commission.

#### THE JUDICIARY

(6) In relation to the judiciary, the Committee's recommendations are:

*The Supreme Court*—No appeal from the High Court should lie to the Supreme Court in ordinary civil, criminal or other matters, whatever the pecuniary interests involved and whatever the sentence imposed, except in a case involving constitutional issues or the interpretation of a Central Act.

In appointing Judges of the Supreme Court, it is desirable to secure, as far as possible and without detriment to efficiency, representation for the High Courts and the Bar of the different parts of the country.

*High Courts*—The power to present an address to the President for the removal of a Judge of a High Court from office should be vested in the State Legislature itself, subject to the substantive and procedural safeguards now embodied in the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (Central Act 51 of 1968).

The power regarding the salaries and allowances, leave and pensions of High Court Judges should be vested in the State Legislatures, subject to fixation in the Constitution itself of minimum salaries.

*Article 222* (which provides for the transfer of the High Court Judges from one State to another without seeking their consent) should be omitted (as it seems to be derogatory

to the dignity and prestige of the office of Judge of a High Court).

*Articles 223, 224 and 224-A*—These three Articles (which provide for the appointment of an acting Chief Justice, additional or acting Judges of High Courts and retired Judges at sittings of High Courts) should be so amended as to expressly provide that the President will act always in consultation with the Governor who will have to be guided by the advice of his Council of Ministers.

Whenever any particular provision of a State Act is challenged before a High Court on the ground that the provision is unconstitutional, the State Government concerned should have the power to move the High Court for referring the question to a Full Bench of three or more Judges of whom one should be the Chief Justice. The Bench so constituted should consider each and every provision of the Act concerned and once its decision is rendered, no provision of the Act should be challenged thereafter on the ground of unconstitutionality.

The Governor should be empowered to refer any question of law or of the fact of public importance to the High Court for its advisory opinion.

#### THE GOVERNOR

(7) The recommendations of the Committee in relation to the institution of Governors are:

The Governor should be appointed always in consultation with the State Cabinet. The other alternative will be to make the appointment in consultation with a high body specially constituted for the purpose.

The Governor should be rendered ineligible for a second term of office as Governor or any other office under Government. He should not

be liable to removal except for proved misbehaviour or incapacity after inquiry by the Supreme Court.

A specific provision should be inserted in the Constitution enabling the President to issue Instruments of Instructions to the Governors. The Instruments of Instructions should lay down guidelines indicating the matters in respect of which the Governor should consult the Central Government or in relation to which the Central Government could issue directions to him. Those instructions should also specify the principles with reference to which the Governor should act as the head of the State including the occasions for the exercise of discretionary powers.

The provision in the Constitution laying down that the Ministry holds office during the pleasure of the Governor should be omitted.

In particular, the Instruments of Instructions should provide as follows:

(a) The Governor should appoint as Chief Minister the leader of the party commanding an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly.

(b) Where the Governor is not satisfied that any one party has an absolute majority in the Assembly, he should of his own motion summon the Assembly for electing a person to be the Chief Minister and the person so elected should be appointed by the Governor as the Chief Minister.

(c) The advice of the Chief Minister to the Governor to dismiss any Minister should be accepted by the Governor.

(d) Where it appears to the Governor at any time that the Chief Minister has lost the confidence of the majority of the Members of the Assembly, the Governor should

immediately and of his own motion summon the Assembly and direct the Chief Minister to secure a vote of confidence in the House.

(e) If the Chief Minister fails to seek the vote of confidence, or having sought it fails to get the necessary vote, the Governor should dismiss the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers headed by him.

It should be made clear that Article 163(1) confers power on the Governor to exercise discretion only in relation to matters in respect of which the Constitution makes express provision, e.g., Article 239(2), 371(2), 371-A(1) and (2).

#### EMERGENCY PROVISIONS

(8) With regards to emergency provision, the Committee recommends:

*Emergency confined to a State—Articles 356 and 357*—The provisions may be totally omitted.

In the alternative, sufficient safeguards should be provided in the Constitution itself to secure the interests of the States against the arbitrary and unilateral action of the ruling party at the Centre.

If the provisions are to remain—

(i) the only contingency which may justify the imposition of President's Rule under Article 356 is the complete breakdown of law and order in a State, when the State Government itself is unable or unwilling to maintain the safety and security of the people and property in the State;

(ii) the words "or otherwise" occurring in clause (1) of Article 356 should be omitted; and

(iii) a proviso should be added to Article 356(1) requiring the President before issuing the Proclamation to refer to the report of the Governor to the Legislative Assembly of the concerned State for expressing its

views thereon within such period as may be specified in the reference.

*Article 365*—This Article should be omitted.

*National Emergency—Article 352, 354, etc.*—These drastic provisions, such as those relating to financial allocation, should not be put into operation, unless there is war or aggression by a foreign power.

The expression "internal disturbance" occurring in Article 352 should be interpreted to mean that it must be comparable in gravity to the repelling of external aggression.

*Article 353 (a)*—No direction under the Article should be issued except after consulting, and with the approval of, the Inter-State Council. In cases of emergency, directions may be issued under the Article, but the Inter-State Council should be consulted at the earliest possible opportunity and further action taken in accordance with the recommendations of the Council.

*Financial Emergency—Article 360*—This article should be omitted.

#### PUBLIC SERVICES

(9) On the Public Services, the Committee makes the following recommendations.

*All-India Services*—Recruitment to the all-India services should be either by transfer of members of the existing gazetted services under the control of the States or by direct recruitment or by a combination of both these methods, if need be by holding an examination confined to each State under the supervision of the Union Public Service Commission, if deemed necessary or expedient.

Article 312 (which empowers Parliament by law to create new all-India services) should be so amended

as to omit the provision for the creation of any new all-India service in future.

Preferably English may be the medium of examination for the all-India services, although recruitment may be on a Statewise basis.

*Increase in emoluments of Central employees*—As far as possible, emoluments of Government employees—Central and State—should be uniform throughout the country, making due allowance for local or special conditions.

*State Public Service Commission*—Article 317 should be so amended as to vest in the State itself the power of removing from office the Chairman or a Member of the State Public Service Commission subject to inquiry by the High Court.

#### TERRITORY OF THE STATE

(10) The Committee recommends:

It should be expressly provided in the Constitution itself that the territorial integrity of a State should not be interfered with in any manner, except in accordance with any one of the following three alternatives:

- (i) The consent of the State concerned should be obtained.
- (ii) The issue should be referred to, and decided by, a high level judicial tribunal, to be constituted for the purpose and its decision should be binding on all the parties.
- (iii) The opinion of the people of the area or areas concerned should be ascertained by holding a special poll.

#### REPRESENTATION OF STATES IN PARLIAMENT

(11) On representation of States in Parliament, the Committee's recom-

mendations are:

*Council of States*—There should be equal representation for each State, that is to say, each State should have the same number of representatives irrespective of population.

There should be no nominations to the Council of States.

*House of the People*—The number of seats fixed for each State in 1951 should remain unaltered except where there is increase in population in which case the number of seats may be increased subject to a maximum. However, in no case should the number of seats fixed for each State in 1951 be reduced.

#### LANGUAGE

(12) Members of Parliament should be given the option of addressing the House either in English or in any of the languages specified in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution.

The link language between the Centre and the States and States *inter se* should be English.

English should continue to be the language of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

The offices of the Central Government situated in any State should use the official language of that State for transaction of business in those offices with the public. All communications by and between Central Government offices in the State and the Government of the State and its offices should be in the official language of the State.

Members of the Central Services employed in a State should be well conversant with the official language of the State.

#### TRADE AND COMMERCE

(13) *Article 302*—This Article (which empowers Parliament to

impose such restrictions on trade between States as may be required in the public interest) should be so amended as to omit the reference to intra-State trade and commerce.

It should be expressly provided that the restrictions which Parliament may impose on inter-State trade and commerce should be reasonable.

*Article 304(b)*—The proviso to this article should be omitted.

#### PUBLIC ORDER

(14) The Central Reserve Police Force should not be deployed in any State except at the request or with the consent of that State. Article 355 should be amended accordingly.

#### MACHINERY FOR CONDUCTING ELECTIONS TO THE STATE LEGISLATURES

(15) The delimitation of constituencies made in 1951 should continue.

Both the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (Central Act XLIII of 1950), and the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Central Act XLIII of 1951), should be amended so as to confine their provisions and the rules made thereunder to elections to Parliament. The State Legislatures must be left free to enact laws in relation to elections to the State Legislatures.

#### INTER-STATE WATER DISPUTES

(16) All disputes relating to inter-State rivers should be decided by the

Supreme Court and satisfactory provisions should be made for implementing its decisions.

#### SEA-BED UNDER TERRITORIAL WATERS

(17) Article 297 (which vests in the Union all lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the ocean within the territorial waters of the country) should be amended so as to vest in the State itself all lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the ocean within the territorial waters adjacent to that State.

#### UNION EXECUTIVE

(18) Conventions should be established regulating the formation of the Union Cabinet in such a way as to secure, consistent with the parliamentary type of Government and all that it involves, representation for the various regions of the country.

The number of Central Ministers of Cabinet rank belonging to any one single State should not be more than one-fifth of the total number.

#### AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

(19) Every amendment of the Constitution, irrespective of the provision involved, should need ratification by the Legislatures of three-fourths or at least two-thirds of the States representing three-fourths or at least two-thirds of the total population of all States.



## BOOK REVIEWS

*TENSION AREAS IN INDIA'S FEDERAL SYSTEM*, By AMAL RAY, Calcutta, World Press, 1970, p. 152, Bibliography and Index, Rs. 15.

During the past few years, a vast amount of periodical literature on Centre-State relations has rained upon us and federalism has been threatening to become one of the 'constants' of Indian scholarship. In this slender book are brought together essays on this theme and most of them have appeared in print before. The author explains that he has not been able to revise the essays with a view to removing the repetitive portions as a result of the heavy teaching load at the University. However, this is not a very serious defect in this volume of federal studies. Shri Ray directs the reader's attention on some of the trouble spots in our federal arrangements. What these are, the informed reader will straightway guess, and guess them correctly. Included are topics, like planning, the presidency, the office of the governor, public service, and the language problem. The first two essays which examine the constitutional strains in the system and the political environment in which it functions serve to provide a sort of introduction to the analysis of the themes which follow. The content of the introductory essays would be familiar to most students of Indian federalism but this is no fault of the author. Shri Ray argues that Indian planning and the specific use made of the grant-in-aid provisions in the Constitution have been the

cause of considerable tensions and that these did not break into major conflicts because of the dominance of a single party in the Centre as well as the States since Independence. Differences could be settled within the Congress Party. The Fourth General Election which brought about, for a time, a major landslide in the fortunes of the Congress, appeared to set the stage for a new style in federal politics. For a moment, it looked as though one-party dominance had become a thing of the past and even before Indian scholars could arrive at new lines of interpretation, they were in for another surprise in the 1971 elections. Since Mr. Ray's essays were all written before the *Annus Mirabilis*, they wear an ancient look. I wonder how any author can be held responsible for not being able to anticipate the twists and turns of political fortunes. But there are minor points in his interpretation which are open to criticism and I shall deal with them here briefly.

Shri Ray examines the suggestions often made for laying down broad guidelines for the use of their discretionary powers. Every one has spoken of this except the governors' themselves, who probably know that discretionary powers, by their very nature, do not lend themselves to



doctrinaire hedging. Shri Ray seems to have an inkling of the practical problems here and at one stage admits the only solution seems to lie in selecting the right people for the gubernatorial office. But having safely arrived at what seems to me a correct position, he runs headlong into a suggestion which may leave the reader stunned. He conjures up the possibility of selecting governors from those who have been Speakers. "Surely", he seems to say, "Speakers are the best people to depend upon, for their office has a way of inculcating in the incumbent the quality of impartiality." The argument is fine so long as one does not take a close look at the record of Indian Speakers. In his inaugural Speech to the Conference of Presiding officers (New Delhi, April 6, 1968), Shri N. Sanjiva Reddy, Speaker of the Lok Sabha said: "Unfortunately, in this political turmoil, some of the Speakers have been caught in the whirlwind of struggle for power by the contending political parties." The interested reader may want to look into the thoughtful and informed essay on the "Speaker" in A. G. Noorani's *India's Constitution and Politics*.

Again, Shri Ray suggests that the President ought not to depend upon ministerial advice because this "is bound to create, in the altered political landscape, profound strains and stresses in the machinery of Indian federalism". He would rather have the President act on the advice of an Inter-State Council set up under Article 263 of the Constitution. Once again, he is quick in telling us how this can be done and he fixes the composition of the Council to be presided over by the Vice-President. It would include two former judges of the Supreme Court selected from a panel prepared by the Chief Justice of India. He also thinks it necessary to include, as permanent

invitees, "a few genuine scholars in the fields of constitution, government, and planning". "The President", he adds, "should ensure that extra-academic considerations do not enter into their selection". But on whose recommendations would the President act? Further, would the advice of the Council be the result of majority opinion or of unanimous agreement. But Shri Ray may well protest that all these are matters of detail! On the controversial role of the Central Reserve Police, Shri Ray observes that it is "constitutionally and politically improper for the Central Government to try to deploy, irrespective of State wishes, its police force in any part of the country for the protection of law and order, *including safeguarding of its installations State*". (Italics mine). I find it hard to accept this position. Although federalism involves a system of 'parallel government,' the Union Government is not merely one of the 'levels' of the system; it is the vital centre of the nation and is responsible for the stability and progress of the whole country. Shri Ray's concern to isolate the constitutional system from political influences stems from his anxiety to ensure the effective working of federal government. But this may well end as an exercise in futility. The problem of keeping politics in 'check' is an old one in the history of constitutionalism and there is no escape from the gradual evolution over time to accepted conventions. The invisible lines of conduct and political behaviour have to be drawn by the 'actors' themselves and these do not easily lend themselves to formal codification. Shri Ray's essays are well-written though there are a few inaccuracies. On the whole, these essays are to be welcomed as useful addition to the existing literature on Indian federalism.

—S. P. AIYAR

1. *FIVE YEAR MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS* (*Proceedings of the Seminar March 11-13, 1968*): Centre for Training and Research in Municipal Administration, New Delhi, IIPA, 1970, p. 140, Rs. 5.

2. *CABINET SYSTEM IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT* (*Proceedings of the Seminar September, 15-16, 1969*): Centre for Training and Research in Municipal Administration, New Delhi, IIPA, 1970, p. 84, Rs. 10.

Problems of urbanization in India are receiving serious attention of the government, the planners, the leaders of public opinion and the academicians. Urban population in India is nearing 100 million, and the problems of living of these millions of people are to be tackled by the public authorities. The public authorities cannot neglect, for long, problems of public health, public transport, public education, public housing, etc., facing urban communities. The specific problems posed by urbanization, their long-term implications, and various strategies for resolving them were the theme of discussions at these two Seminars and their excellent resume has been published in the two booklets under review. Though the Seminars were held on two different occasions, there is a thematic unity in their discussions. The participants were concerned with the problems of health of local urban institutions: what these institutions are doing, what they are not able to do, and what they should do to face the challenges of the future. The participants, who were a mixture of local leaders, civil servants and academicians, concentrated on the diagnosis of the issues and challenges facing the urban local bodies; and also suggested prescriptions for improving the institutional and organizational vitality of local government in India.

It is worthwhile to highlight the special points brought out during discussions in the Seminars.

The Seminar on "Five Year Municipal Development Plans" was con-

cerned with problems of population, expenditure planning, planning of resources, material and manpower planning. The need for formulation of five year plans by the municipalities was emphasized, and the various questions regarding this were discussed in details. The three-day discussion revolved round the following papers presented by the various speakers. It is essential to refer to them to reveal the focus of the Seminar. They were: (1) Shri Govind Narain, "Planning for Urban Development"; (2) Dr. Ashish Bose, "Urbanization in Perspective"; (3) Shri J. P. Sah, "Resource Planning—Fiscal"; (4) Shri J. Madhab, "Expenditure Planning"; (5) S. P. Agrawal, "Manpower Planning"; (6) Shri A. P. Saxena, "Resource Planning Materials"; (7) Prof. H. K. Paranjape, "Machinery of Planning in the States"; and (8) Shri M. Bhattacharya, "Planning and Implementing Agencies".

The headings of the papers show that the participants in the Seminar were concerned with the theoretical and operational aspects of urban planning which have assumed great importance because of the following facts as pointed out by Govind Narain and Ashish Bose: (a) an excessive migration to the urban centres accompanied by growing volume of unemployment and underemployment; (b) growing shortage of housing accommodation; (c) growing traffic and transport bottlenecks; and (d) deficiency of water supply and inadequacy of drainage system.

As Govind Narain observed: "An important matter so relevant to the fast expanding urban situation, is the phenomenon of haphazard growth and uncontrolled land use in the absence of advance planning. There are no priorities on which land use must be regulated" (p. 30).

In the same vein Ashish Bose remarked: "Every body talks of the population explosion these days; but if there is truly a population explosion it is in the urban areas which face the dual problem of a high rate of immigration from rural areas. When we turn to the problem of the urban labour force and the shortage of jobs in the cities, the problem becomes truly explosive and it has all the political overtones" (p. 52).

The problems of urbanization were ably posed by Govind Narain and Ashish Bose, and there was a consensus among the participants that the challenges of urban development could be managed by planning and not in a casual haphazard fashion.

Some of the leading observations and comments of the participants in the Seminar are as follows: (a) The municipal development plans should form part of the state plans, and they should be ultimately integrated with the national plan. (b) The municipalities should have technical competence to formulate plans for their cities. The other specialized bodies, like the City Improvement Trusts, Water and Electricity Boards, and Development Authorities, could also sit together to formulate plans for the city. (c) There should be concerted efforts to check speculation in land in urban areas to provide cheap housing facilities. (d) City Master Plans should be formulated to regulate future expansion of the cities. Phased Planning for the programmes of public health, education, housing, slum clearance and

other spheres of urban development should be prepared. (e) Municipal Finance Commission may be set up to examine the financial requirements of water supply, sanitation, health and other obligatory services. (f) Urbanization and migration are interrelated and the processes cannot be reversed. (g) Mobilization of resources is handicapped, according to one of the participants, because "the economic base of our cities and towns is very weak". A study was quoted to prove that "it was inefficiency that led to financial handicaps . . . municipal licences had not been issued to all these units which were licensable under the Municipal Corporation Act" (p. 74). (h) It was suggested that the municipal trade could be very remunerative. As an illustration, it was suggested that practically all municipalities had a large number of primary schools under them and many had even middle and secondary schools. The school text-books were sold in the market at fancy prices. If municipalities run their own printing presses, they could very well afford to bring out inexpensive text-books. They could also undertake the job of printing municipal stationery and perhaps, do outside jobs as well.

Thus, the techniques of planning for urban development were dilated upon, and obstacles in the way of proper planning at the urban municipal level were highlighted.

It is surprising that the problems of municipal personnel were not discussed in detail in a Seminar on planning for urban development. Any scheme of planning for urban development depends on the type of personnel employed by the municipal authorities. Problems of personnel are intertwined with the problems of lack of planning in the municipalities. The type of personnel who opt for municipal services at present

and their training and equipment are hardly conducive to the growth of plan consciousness at the local level. It is a truism to say that the under-developed countries have an under-developed administration. And much of the malaise of the municipalities is because of their incapacity to attract talent in their employment.

While the Seminar was rich in the discussion of technical and operational problems of planning for urban development, and the content of discussion was of a high order because of the narration of experiences of the actors who were involved in running and managing the local bodies, the framework of discussion for the problems of the seminar was quite limited.

Anger was expressed at speculation in land is quite rampant, housing is costly, slums are spreading; but these experiences were not related to the broader framework of social philosophy pursued by the top policy-makers in India. In India, Centre is the centre of real authority and fundamental social choices are made at the top. The lower echelons of government—State and local—are generally implementing agencies. The country has accepted that private individuals have a right to purchase and sell property, and the so-called speculation in land is inherent in this national decision. The country has accepted that an individual can construct a living house, hence luxury houses can and shall be built. Public housing has been given priority in societies where ownership of the main means of production and distribution is concentrated in public authorities.

The participants complained that lack of resources was responsible for lack of public amenities in urban areas. It is stating a cliché that a poor country lacks in resources. But, are all our ills due to the lack of resources? A participant remark-

ed that construction of an average house costs one lakh of rupees in Delhi. Is it lack of resources? What prevents the local bodies in entering lucrative trades like milk supply? Instead of improving public hospitals, the government started the scheme of medical reimbursement to its employees. It is common knowledge that this scheme of reimbursement has led to a collusion between the doctor, the patient and the chemist. One can logically find answers to the many ills, as pointed by the participants in the seminar, in the social philosophy pursued by the country. The evaluation of this reviewer about the seminar proceedings on Development Planning is that what was discussed for three days was discussed very competently, but sadly enough what was not discussed was fundamental and absolutely relevant to the problems under discussion. Hence, the Seminar was able to throw light on limited segments of social reality, but vast and complex social reality impinging on urban development remained unanalyzed and undeciphered.

While the Seminar on Planning for Municipal Development was exciting and invigorating, the same cannot be said about the Seminar on *Cabinet System in Municipal Government*. All the eight papers presented in this Seminar and the discussions that followed concentrated on arguments for or against cabinet government in municipalities. From the beginning of the Seminar, it was assumed that executive and deliberative wings of the municipalities were not working smoothly, and restructuring was imperative, and the most handy device was the Cabinet system. Since this system was operating both at the Central and State government levels, why can it not function at the local government level? No evidence was marshalled to prove the inadequacy of the present structure, and no

real points of conflict between the deliberative and executive wings were put forward. The Seminar started its discussions about the pros and cons of an alternative model without any serious attempt at proving the irrelevance of the existing model. There is no quarrel about an intellectual exercise to discuss merits of various competitive models; but such an exercise must be based on a sound theoretical framework and on hard data. Unfortunately, both of these pre-requisites for a scientific discussion on social problems were missing in the Seminar.

The organizers of the Seminar said: "The present Seminar was organized on the assumption that urban local government in India needs to be radically reformed to make it a fit agency of local public administration" (p. 1). This assumption should have been proved with some data on the basis of the actual working of a small sample out of more than 2,000 urban local bodies in India.

One participant brought evidence to support his argument for cabinet system in municipal government. He observed that the experience of the Varanasi Municipal Corporation was that "both efficiency and revenue of the Corporation went down under the Administrator's control and both showed an improvement when the elected representatives had taken over" (p. 46).

This solitary evidence could be the basis of an exciting discussion because there are counter facts to disprove what the above mentioned participant said. Instead of grap-

pling with reality of the municipal governments, arguments were advanced in an ivory tower fashion.

The protagonists of the new model thought it to be more democratic than the existing structure. Further, political parties were exhorted by the participants to fight elections to the municipalities on party basis. Is it not too late to tell the parties about their role in municipal institutions? Are they not already quite active in these institutions? If at some places they are not active, it is not because of any lack of desire on their part, but because of their lack of strength in these areas. The Maud Committee Report on *Management of Local Government*, Report of the Rural Urban Relationship Committee of the Government of India, etc., were referred to in a casual manner by the participants without taking advantage of the rich material contained in these reports.

Seminar discussions have thrown many ideas of researchable value. Empirical studies should be conducted in pursuance of the ideas contained in the Seminar discussions. More hard data should be collected by the Centre for Municipal Research; only then can a meaningful debate on the health of municipalities be conducted. No scientific thinking is possible without data and evidence, and more seminars and rigorous studies are needed for grappling with the challenges of urbanization. Public policies cannot be formulated without field investigations, surveys and other techniques of data collection. These seminar publications are a right step in this direction.

—C. P. BHAMBHRI

**URBAN GOVERNMENT, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT;** By ABHIJIT DATTA. Calcutta, World Press, 1970, p. 174.

Shri Abhijit Datta's book entitled *Urban Government, Finance and Development* is a collection of papers

presented to different seminars and conferences or incorporated in books of edited essays. As these papers



were written on different occasions, they contain repeated and overlapping material here and there. But apart from this inherent shortcoming, the papers are marked by a fresh approach to the problems of urban government in the country. The essays emphasize an integrated approach to the planned development at the levels of the central, State and local—specifically urban—governments. The book also bears out a composite approach to the routine administrative and developmental functions of the urban local bodies.

The author throughout the book favours the administration of urban development schemes and programmes through the urban local Governments. He has put forward a strong plea for giving a better deal to the municipal governments in the existing scheme of distribution of financial resources in which the Union and the State Governments have so far secured a lion's share. Further, the State Governments have been taking over from the municipalities diverse functions on grounds of technical efficiency, economic viability or financial need. The author's case is strong and it has found and would find advocates among supporters of strong local governments. But the author does not seem to have paid any heed to the defective working of municipal governments in matters, such as mobilization of financial resources or organization of efficient services in vital fields—like water supply, drainage or sewerage—which do not depend much on the availability of more resources. The difficulties in efficient working posed by the political aspect (the term 'political' to be taken in a broad sense) of the operations of municipal governments has been completely overlooked in the papers included in the books. The author has criticised the Zila Parishad experiment on the

ground of exercise of the State Government controls. On account of operation of political factor, the system of dichotomy between policy-making and execution is to be preferred in the municipal government to the cabinet system. In case the cabinet system is introduced, it would have to be accompanied by a scheme of controls by the State Government. The reviewer is all in favour of stronger local governments, but holds that the vesting of additional functions and financial resources in local governments would have to be balanced by a system of built-in controls, checks, and balances.

Of the fifteen papers included in the book, nine are on municipal finance and urban economics, five on urban development and one on municipal administration. Not that the papers discuss exclusively one of these three aspects; as observed above, the author's perspective encompasses the three aspects.

The longer and more exhaustive papers are "Municipal Administration in West Bengal" (p. 139-172), "Financing Municipal Services" (pp. 51-70), "Financing Urban Development" (pp. 75-88) and "Administration for Urban Development" (pp. 1-23).

Having exposed numerous shortcomings in the functioning of the municipal administration in West Bengal, was the author justified and just to his own analysis in inserting a testimonial in conclusion that the municipal Act in force is a remarkable piece of legislation in terms of its flexibility and broad sweep?

The analysis in the two papers, "Method of Rent Fixation under Controlled Conditions" (p. 125-132) and "Rent Control and Maintenance of Housing Stock" (p. 133-138), is abruptly ended just at the point where it is about to take off.

Several constructive suggestions have been offered by the author in the course of the analysis in different papers.

The book is, on the whole, a notable contribution to the scarce literature on urban development administration.

—N. R. INAMDAR

*STATE AND RIGHTS OF MEN*, By R. G. CHATURVEDI, Delhi, Metropolitan, 1971, p. 247, Rs. 20.

The publisher's note on the dust cover of the book claims that "the present work (produced from the pen of a promising jurist) proposes to be a prismatic purview of the institution of state based on the phenomena of rights". It goes on to say, "Begot of the brain of this philosopher-lawyer (the author), the present work has prognosticated the State through broad spectrum and furnished a psychological answer to the enigma of statecraft. Profounding in Plainest language a new theory of political consciousness, he asserts the right of self determination and grasps the wide range of men's rights providing a modern outfit tailored out of the old theories of State." Unfortunately, however, the claims of the publishers are baseless and indeed exaggerated for the book on a closer reading turns out to be a mere juxtaposition of the various theories and views of eminent thinkers (both classical and modern) on the origin and basis of state and the rights of men, without it even having a semblance of a consistent and systematic framework to establish an overview about the purpose and authority of the state, or of the complex relationship between the individual, his rights and the sovereign power of the state.

As a student of philosophy and a former member of the judicial service in India (now a practising lawyer), the author's intention is to inquire into one of the most controversial problems of recent times, *viz.*, "whether the State can abridge or take away all the rights of men, including those claimed to be funda-

mental and inviolate". He proceeds to answer this query by tracing, first, the political consciousness in man, which gives rise to the institution of state, and then goes on to investigate what the state as an institution is and the location of sovereignty in it. He further examines the basic principles on which a constitution of state is based and operates, and affirms that "such an investigation should itself unravel the clue to arriving at the power working as the ultimate govern, guarantor and ordainer of rights". However, even after traversing the long, tedious, confusing and an arduous account covered in first 14 chapters, we are still unable to discern the power, which works as the "ultimate govern, guarantor and ordainer of rights".

At one stage, he contends that "the civil rights are the creation of state" but the natural rights are the possession of humanity. Through the institution of State, man has gained the first and preserved the second". This centuries-old struggle of mankind proved that the rights of men are an asset of humanity and a liability of the State. The rights which are vested in man not as a citizen but as human beings must always belong to him. They are not created by State; they are inherited: attribute of man *qua* human being. The State shall not take away or abridge such rights but shall treat them as inviolate. The postulate of inviolability of the rights of men compels the political power of the state in favour of such rights. "The institution of state is a pledge for the sanctity of such rights.



The State cannot take away what it has not been able to give. One cannot destroy what one cannot create." The author, has however, failed to identify such rights which he considers as inviolate, beyond describing the contractual obligations of state as advocated by Locke and Rousseau. Only when he comes to an examination of fundamental rights, which he thinks are not in the giving and taking of the ordinary law-making body but in the giving and taking of the people acting both as sovereign and subject, that he mentions that they are "extensions, combinations, or permutations, of the three natural rights of life, liberty and equality, which are inherent to the people. The three natural rights are the essence of the sovereign power. It is these rights that the basic right to make a contract of state, *i.e.*, the constituent power to give a constitution, is constituted".

Again, when he discusses the question of loss and limit of rights, the author believes that like "the rights of life, liberty, property and equality, all other fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the sovereign to the individual, can be made subject to social control". At the same time, however, he maintains, that "it is far from correct to say that the subjection of rights to social control may extend to their being taken away or destroyed. The state cannot be permitted to make the limitation of rights a negation thereof. The state cannot and must not exceed the precincts of power to impose reasonable restriction in order to dig out a right wholesale." The author at this juncture fails to discuss a relevant and an important question, whether there can be a right to "Resist the State". His comments would lead us to believe that there can be such a right, yet he doesn't define in what circumstances and how such a right can be exercised.

The book, on the whole, is a product of confused thinking. Apart from the author's style of quoting Adeimantus, Socrates and various other luminaries in an inappropriate manner, there are inconsistencies of statements. Witness, for example, the following statement: "The essential attribute of political administration resides in the political consciousness of the people, and can be conceived independently of society and state both" (p. 68). It is inconceivable how political consciousness can emerge within a group of people prior to the foundations of the society. Similarly, his contention that "the four dimensional expression defining the state as an assemblage of human beings occupying a definite territory organized under a government, and who are subject to no outside control, has failed to prove that either of these four incidents is an essential attribute of the term state" (p. 71) is open to question. However, further on, this contradicts the author's subsequent statement that "the absence of outside control or, to speak positively, the presence of the right of self-determination, is not an attribute but is the manifestation or assertion by State of its essential attribute which is political power" (p. 71). One fails to understand what the author means by denying "sovereignty" to the concept of statehood in one breath, while conceding that political power is an essential attribute of the state in the second.

Similarly, we find a considerable amount of superfluous material repeated again and again which has no relevance either to the theme or to the arguments discussed in the chapter. To quote one example, the discussion in chapter "The State for Human Good" is totally irrelevant to the main theme of that chapter. Incidentally, there are many outrageous comparisons. His

contention that Plato's *Republic* was nearer to the *Prince* of Machiavelli, or Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is closest to the *Will to Power* by Nietzsche are, to say the least, gross distortions and betray a lack of comprehension of these great works.

Apart from a bad style of writing and many printing errors, the greatest single weakness of the present study is the failure to examine an issue like the "Rights of Men" with reference

to an adequate and coherent philosophical and theoretical perspective. The book is disjointed in its approach and does not evince the author's view on the subject. The book, at best, demonstrates author's familiarity with the writings of distinguished philosophers in the field, which he fails to expound or interpret in a systematic and coherent manner.

—R. B. JAIN

**DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN INDIA**, By K. C. PANCHANADIKAR and J. PANCHANADIKAR, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1970, p. 241, Rs. 32.

Sociologists and social anthropologists, both in India and abroad, have for some years devoted considerable attention to problems of structure and change in Indian society. The University of Chicago has hosted, in the past years, two major conferences to review research done in this field. The results of the first conference held in 1955 were published by McKim Marriott in the book *Village India : Studies in the Little Community*. The results of the second conference held ten years later in 1965 have also been published in a book *Structure and Change in Indian Society* edited by Milton Singer and Bernard S. Cohn. And, there has appeared recently an important study by David G. Mandelbaum entitled "Society in India" (two volumes). On this subject the literature seems to be proliferating rapidly.

Panchanadikars, both working in senior positions in Department of Sociology, M. S. University, Baroda, have chosen to produce a book on this theme of considerable current interest. This book, in fact, is a collection of ten papers written by them during 1962-66. Six of these papers, originally contributed to four Indian journals of sociology,

appear here with some modifications. Not all of these essays are the product of the joint effort by the two authors: Dr. K. C. Panchanadikar has contributed three articles, all by himself, and one of the essays in the book is Dr. (Mrs.) J. Panchanadikar's own contribution. It is the second essay that gives the book its title "Determinants of Social Structure and Social Change in India". But this has been authored by Dr. K. C. Panchanadikar alone.

The authors, in these essays, attempt to identify and explicate concepts and propositions that together articulate the more significant determinants of social structure and social change in India. They realize that integrating diachronic and synchronic analyses here is the problem which can adequately be met by a genetic-historical method with cross-sectional research.

In the first chapter, the authors indicate their approach towards the study of Indian society. Chapter 2 to 4 analyse, mainly in historical perspective, the determinants of structure and change in Indian society. Change in modern India, particularly since the advent of the British, is analyzed in chapters 5, 6

and 7. Results of research conducted in villages of Gujarat are reported in the following two chapters. The tenth and the last chapter discusses at length the whole gamut of problems that confront the researcher in his village study.

Reliance on historical sources for an understanding of Indian society, as advocated by the authors, is understandable. It is usual for sociologists to turn to this source material in their analyses. Anthropologists are more down-to-earth in their approach, and depend chiefly on empirical studies based on their field-work. In their analysis of determinants of social structure and social change in India, the authors of this book seem to have drawn rather too heavily on historical sources. This gives these essays a stamp of Indological rather than sociological scholarship, particularly the opening chapters which attempt to develop the main theme of the book. It is important that a line separating Indological studies and sociology is not allowed to become invisible. Sociology in India pursuing the aid of studying Indian society need not become totally indistinguishable from Sanskritic, scriptural, and Indological studies. There undoubtedly is a lot to be gained from these sources, but the attempt should be to integrate the Indological concepts into the framework of contemporary sociology as it has matured into a distinct discipline. Such an attempt has not been successful here. The authors do appear to have succeeded in compiling considerable, though diffuse, unconnected material. But this material could have been made better use of and surely requires sociological underpinning.

A point intruding in here at this stage is about the presentation of the material. Certain of the points are pressed in rather too repetitively. Perhaps this could not have been

helped by the authors. They have not written a compact book. It is their essays written at intervals in early sixties that have been brought together here. Then, most of the space in the third chapter is occupied by the paradigm that is supposed to give gist of institutional, and structural features of Indian society! Also, the authors simply do not seem to have any use for simple words and brief, direct language. Maybe, they wish to sound more "sociological" in this way. Chapter 10 entitled "Problematics of Social Research in the Rural Setting in Gujarat, India" would not have appeared less sociological if instead of "problematics" the authors had used the simple word "problem". And surely it does not make any greater sense to describe the scope of chapter 9 in a rather longish sentence that runs as follows: "Constituted Structure and Adjustment Process in Panchayati Democracy in a Rural Community in South Gujarat, with reference to Leadership Roles". The fact that many sociologists can and do convey clearly in much easier language even the most abstruse sociological concepts detracts from the arguments that a scholarly work would appear less scholarly if written in simple and direct language.

In the concluding essays, the authors deviate from the approach that characterizes most of this work and present their findings that are based on empirical research done in the rural areas of Gujarat. But how these two approaches combine and contribute to a unified theme is not made explicit.

Those in government, wishing to gain an understanding of sociological dimensions of the change process in India today, will find the book a bit relevant only from chapter 5 onwards. It is the need of students of sociology in Indian universities that the authors

perhaps have in their view and the book is likely to be of some use to

them. But to the administrators, its value is only marginal.

—H. M. MATHUR

*INDIAN FEDERAL FINANCE AND BUDGETARY POLICY*, By Dr. B. N. GUPTA, Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad, 1970, p. 467, Rs. 35.

During the last few years, a great deal of thought has been given to the question of Centre-State financial relations and to the financial procedures of Government. The book by Dr. B. N. Gupta comes as a useful addition to the thinking on this subject. Dr. Gupta deals with: federalism and the theory of federal finance; growth of federal finance in India, and fiscal relations between the Union and the States; Union finances; State finances; railway finance and the finances of public undertakings; budgetary policy and the Indian economy; and financial administration and procedures in India and their reform. This appears to be quite a mixed bag, but Dr. Gupta appears to have succeeded in weaving these different topics, or most of them, into an integrated whole.

On the question of fiscal relations between the Union and the States, Dr. Gupta, in line with current thinking on the subject, lays stress on ensuring adequate finances to the States for the performance of their functions, or, as an alternative, reducing the functions of the State Governments. For example, he suggests that certain subjects now in the State List, such as higher education, should be transferred to the Union List of the Constitution. He even goes to the extent of advocating temporary transfers of subjects from the States to the Centre! Perhaps he recognizes that these proposals are not feasible and, therefore, lays emphasis mainly on the need for additional devolution on funds from

the Centre to the States. He thinks that this can best be done by a permanent Finance Commission, whose task would be to examine continuously the financial relations between the Union and the States. Even here, however, he does not appear to be sure whether his proposal is a practicable one, for he adds: "As an experimental measure, the Finance Commission may be made a continuous body for a period of 5 years. If its results are useful, and if need be, the Constitution may be amended."

He echoes the views of Dr. Rajmanner (in his supplemental note to the Report of the Fourth Finance Commission) that the States' share of divisible taxes should be prescribed in the Constitution itself. Thus, the principal tasks of the Commission would be to recommend grants to the States and to take care of their borrowing needs.

He does not want the Planning Commission to have any say in the matter of grants. The Planning Commission's functions should be only the drawing up of national Plans and fixing priorities. The Finance Commission should determine the principles and quantum of grants on the basis of the priorities laid down by the Planning Commission. It is doubtful, however, if this, like many other suggestions on this question which are floating around, provides a solution to the problem of Plan grants to the States. Once the Plans, including State Plans, are finalised by the Planning Commission, the

determination of grants is a secondary matter.

Dr. Gupta thinks that the permanent Finance Commission would also be able to keep watch over the utilization of funds by State Governments. Whether or not the Finance Commission can *keep watch* over the utilization of funds, it is certainly necessary to make sure that the States do make good use of their resources. This will be easier for a permanent body to ensure.

Dr. Gupta has dealt at length with financial administration and financial reforms. He has given a detailed account of the financial procedures followed in the government and this is bound to be of great use to anyone who wishes to have a knowledge of the subject. He has made a number of suggestions also. The very first suggestion, which is of great importance, is the need to integrate annual planning with the annual budget. He rightly points out that the annual plan should provide the necessary framework for the preparation of the annual budget.

An interesting suggestion made by him is the introduction of a multiple budget system, *i.e.* there should be several budgets instead of one main budget. Just as there is a separate railway budget so there may be several other budgets, *e.g.*, Defence, P. & T., and State enterprises. Still another interesting suggestion is that the Estimates Committee should get the benefit Public Accounts Committee of an expert in the same way as the Public Accounts Committee gets the benefit of the advice of the Comptroller and Auditor General.

Dr. Gupta has strongly argued the case for performance budgeting and for an 'efficiency audit' to test the standard of performance and toning up the efficiency of the government and of the administration.

Several chapters have been devoted to Union Finances and Indian budgetary policy. Considerable factual information has been provided regarding budgetary policy over the Plan years. He has brought out the fact that continuity has not been one of the features of Indian budgetary policy. Also, some of the stated objectives of budgetary policy have not been attained.

Dr. Gupta has great faith in balanced budgets. Against the background of continuously rising prices in recent years, it was perhaps necessary to point to the danger inherent in large scale deficit financing. But he appears to have made a fetish of the doctrine of balancee budgeting: "Budgetary and financial discipline are more important than development itself." He cites the experience of Spain, Portugal, Greece and the Philippines to buttress his case for balanced budgets (the experience of these countries presumably being, in his opinion, of relevance to Indian conditions).

Dr. Gupta feels that India's budgets have been 'resource oriented'. He finds fault with "large scale taxation, borrowing and deficit financing to meet the government's mounting expenditure". He thinks that the story of development expenditure during the Plans has been a "tale of grandiose schemes, prestige and show-piece works and costly structures". This, he feels, has "bled the country white and put heavy strain on the economy which it cannot bear". In this, he is, of course, reflecting the views of many others who have thought along similar lines. But he has not cared to examine the strategy or rationale of the Indian Plans within the framework of which this expenditure has taken place. He criticizes, again without examining the rationale, "the development of heavy industries ahead of consumer



goods industries and both at the expense of agriculture". Incidentally, some of his own suggestions are no less 'grandiose': "Instead of constructing big dams, had we linked all the rivers of the country..."

Dr. Gupta is on slightly firmer ground in his study of State finances. He has recognized the fact that State governments have not made full use of the tax resources allotted to them by the Constitution. In particular, they have not taxed agriculture and agricultural incomes adequately. He thinks that agricultural taxation should be so devised as to raise agricultural productivity. The agricultural tax system must be incentive-oriented while at the same time it should penalize the poor utilization of land and other agricultural resources. He suggests that land revenue on uneconomic holdings or holdings yielding a bare subsistence to the farmers should be given up. Alternatively, the revenue collected from such land should be credited to a fund to which the State should also contribute—the fund being utilized for the benefit of such farmers through schemes of minor irrigation, etc. Land left uncultivated or land poorly cultivated (he does not explain how this is to be established) should be taxed heavily. Land scheduled for sub-division should be heavily taxed. A sur-charge of 25 to 30 per cent may be imposed on the land cultivated by persons other than land owners. To provide an incentive for bringing more land under the plough, cultivable waste land, on being brought under cultivation, should be exempted from land revenue for a period of 5 years.

Many of these suggestions may not be practicable in the way the author has formulated them. However, some variants of these may be usefully attempted by State governments (depending on conditions pre-

vailing in the different States).

Dr. Gupta has made some interesting suggestions for raising financial resources. At the Centre, he suggests increasing resort to social security funds. The public provident fund, started recently, is a step in this direction. For the States, he has advocated resort to crop insurance schemes.

Dr. Gupta is sharply critical of what he calls India's dependence on the advice of foreign experts (like Professor Kaldor) who are not familiar with Indian conditions and whose prescriptions, therefore, being based on the experience of advanced Western countries, cannot be of any use to India. Incidentally, he himself leans heavily on the support of foreign economists (including Kaldor) and foreign experience. The guidelines that he has approved for budgetary policy in India are those laid down for the Philippines by President Marcos in 1966! The book is littered with quotations, some from Indian writers, but mostly from foreign writers. These are not always necessary for the argument and in many cases hold up the argument.

The size of the book could have been cut down considerably without affecting the substance. This might have brought down the price too!

In spite of these shortcomings, the book is on the whole an informative and useful one, particularly where it deals with questions of federal finance and financial administration. Financial administration, indeed, appears to have been the original subject of the author's study and, as he points out in the Preface, the wider coverage in this volume is the result of a suggestion by his research guide, the late Prof. P. J. Thomas.

—P. C. MATHUR



*INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE FOR BUSINESS;*  
By BLAIR J. KOLASA, New Delhi, Wiley Eastern, 1970, p. 654, Rs. 9.

In the post World War II period, behavioural sciences have come to dominate the management thought and practice especially in business. During the early period of industrialization and consequently the industrial organization, most of the attention of even management experts was on technological structures, and work procedures. Fredrick Taylor, Henri Fayol and others were the high priests of the movement in which time and motion studies etcetera were the popular management technology. In the thirties, Luthor Gulick and Col. Urwick popularized the structural aspects of organization which together with Taylor's concepts virtually ruled management thinking until the late forties. Elton Mayo and Herbert Simon, amongst the large number of other researchers, brought to fore what McGregor later called the "human side of enterprises".

The dominant influence in this post-1950 period on the management thinking has been influenced by the role that man plays in the achievement of organizational objectives. The focus, therefore, has been on the man and the organization and their interaction in the organizational setting. Inevitably, sociologists, social psychologists and anthropologists have been in the forefront of contribution to management thinking and research in recent years. The contributions naturally have been varied and voluminous. They range from the studies of organizational health to motivation of the men who work in it.

To the students and practitioners of business and also public administration, the important question is how far does this knowledge of behavioural science finding help in understanding practical organizational problems and

also help in resolving them. Particularly, what steps should they take to use existing knowledge effectively for practical results, including how they should avoid making mistakes that reduce organizational effectiveness.

The present book by Prof. Kolasa of Duquesne University is an ambitious attempt to provide an introduction to behavioural science for practitioners of business administration. The book is "an attempt to provide a basic introduction to the breadth of the field, some concept in behavioural science, and some of the results of research activity".

Prof. Kolasa has tried to examine the basic issues in behavioural sciences, especially in anthropology, psychology, sociology, economics, law, political sciences, etc., the development of behavioural thought, the various constituents of organizational behaviour, both individual and group, and specialized problems of organizations, including issues relating to leadership and behaviour, legal as well as economic. The book has 20 chapters extending to well over 625 pages of text alone.

Prof. Kolasa has made a successful effort to bring together the most important developments in behavioural sciences in a single publication—an effort which is reflective of his scholarship. He has admirably summarized the various stages of development, new concepts and their findings in behavioural sciences which have a relevance to business management. It is futile to summarize the text of the volume since it has no research theme or angle. Suffice it to say that the book is most handy to a lay student or a practitioner of business and even public administration desires of familiarizing himself

with the broad strands of the behavioural sciences relevant to management thought and practice.

However, if the reader expects to find answers to specific business problems and how to apply the available behavioural science findings to resolve them through the use of this book, he would probably be disappointed. The book is hardly meant for the practitioner to apply concrete concepts or approaches to real life problems. Nor has Prof. Kolasa made any effort to evaluate existing body of knowledge to develop any new research perspectives. Perhaps it would also be unfair to expect this type of coverage from Prof. Kolasa. His effort is much more to provide an introduction

rather than a manual of behavioural science or a perspective on research frontiers.

This book is an extremely useful addition to management literature, especially to practitioners who would like to familiarise themselves with key and important developments in behavioural sciences. It is also useful for researchers in social sciences who might wish to familiarise themselves with development in other branches with implications for management theory and practice. Finally, a word of praise to the publishers and the scheme of publishing such books in India which places them within the reach of an average reader.

—V. A. PAI PANANDIKER

*PROBLEMS IN MANAGEMENT—ASCI CASE COLLECTIONS*; (Second Series), Hyderabad, Administrative Staff College of India, 1967, p. 244.

As a continuing effort to develop and present selected Case Studies in Management, the Administrative Staff College of India has brought out the Second series of Case Collections containing 45 problems in Business Management under seven broad categories. The Case Studies are essentially the outcome of the Case Workshops organized from time to time by the College. The cases describe real situation and problems as faced by Indian managers in the recent years under a variety of categories ranging from Structure of Organization to Financial Management.

Importance of development of case studies as a training aid and a major tool for Management Development is being increasingly recognized in the country. In fact, the Administrative Staff College of India and the Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, have been active in developing cases for purposes of instruction and

management development. The latest Annual Report (1969-70) of the Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, reports the number of cases collected so far at 1,100. Some time back, the Training Division in the Department of Personnel, Government of India, issued a Monograph listing 1,183 Cases from 19 different institutions in the country. The Indian Institute of Public Administration has for several years promoted a Case development programme. These facts may indicate the modest effort currently under way at various places in the country for the development and preparation of suitable case studies.

Today, one of the most widely used methods of training in Management is the case method. A good case can enable the manager undergoing training to make use of past experience to promote discussion and to generate the learning process.

The discussion following a case study helps take stock of what *has to be* learned from it, in the first instance, and following on from there what *has been* learned from it. In the long run, therefore, the real criterion is what the participants have learnt from a case because they must be able to relate it back to the problems in their own jobs. A Case Study, thus, would seek to sensitize the manager in situations in which he is involved and thereby seek to involve him in situations in order to sensitize him in Management problems. Any attempt, therefore, to prepare a Case Study to meet even a few of its objectives, as indicated above, is necessarily detailed and time-consuming. Lack of preparation and effort in the selection of the problem often promotes a degree of criticism and not without reason. 'The preparation and presentation of a Case Study is an art in itself, requiring a systematic approach. Indeed one may liken the Case Study to preparation and presentation of a Case in a court of law.' If the effort is to concentrate on a Case Study as a training aid, it is useful to remember that it cannot be a training method in itself. Even though the Case Study has a wide variety of possible uses, these are not limitless. As a training aid, it must also be stated that the Case Study can even be sometimes disappointing and unsuccessful because too much is expected of it. Perhaps, the term 'Case Study Method' is an unfortunate one in its context as a training aid. While the great advantage of

a Case Study is that it is flexible, yet its flexibility is not sufficiently appreciated. Thus, while it is important to know what the Case Study can do, it is equally important to know what the Case Study cannot do.

The publication of the second series of Cases by the Administrative Staff College, even if viewed primarily as a training aid, is an important and pioneering contribution. A casual perusal of the volume of Cases may erroneously convey an impression that the studies are rather short in size and content. As any student of Case Study would know, in sheer size a case may run into a considerable number of pages. Yet, if the Case Study is to be used for the illustration of a specific point, or appreciation of a position involving an area of management, it can effectively accomplish the objectives in only a few pages. The present collection evidently stresses on such facets of a Case Study as a training aid for management development. The specific points which each of the 45 cases in the collection highlight, are well brought out and appear meaningful, more so as they emerge from an indigenous situation with its own overtones of problems in organization and communications. The volume is bound to prove of immense value to all those interested in the effective use of Case Studies as a training aid in the field of Business Administration and Management Development.

—A. P. SAXENA

***THE EMERGING DIMENSIONS OF INDIAN MANAGEMENT;*** By A. N. AGARWALA, Bombay, Asia Publishing House.

During recent years, many studies of Indian Management and Indian Business enterprises have been published. This is symptomatic of the awakening among businessmen,

management specialists, management executives and management educationists in India to the need for building up adequate literature on Indian Management. Dr. Agarwala's

book is among the better ones that have appeared so far and he should be congratulated for making a significant contribution to the literature on Indian Management and particularly for analysing what he calls the "Emerging Dimensions of Indian Management".

Dr. Agarwala feels quite rightly that "the dynamics of management has lately been noticeably active against the backlog of the past history though its action has been slow in the context of the desired order of management change". By and large, the business economy, according to him, is under-managed. In the business environment, one notices the slow and progressive disappearance of the owner-manager and managing-agency system and its replacement by a new set-up of executives imbued with an understanding of management technology for "redeeming the humanity from want". Nevertheless, the rule of thumb methods continue in Indian Management and unless management change is brought about at an accelerated pace, it will be a long time before India could catch up with the progressive management of the West, particularly the United States. The type of society, which is emerging in the Western nations is not one, committed so much to any particular ideology as to a central objective, viz., "rapid economic growth", so that the "poverty which envelopes the major part of the globe can be relieved". Business is realizing its social responsibilities and business executives are realizing that they should behave ethically because "good ethics is good business". Dr. Agarwala would want such an image to be reproduced in India. At present, businessmen are thought "to be impervious, to the upsurge of new social forces and are, in fact, a drag on progress. They monopolize politics and economy and are con-

temptuous of scholarship and intellectuals". Dr. Agarwala, however, feels that this is far from being an objective assessment of the average Indian businessman. It must be said to the credit of Dr. Agarwala's sense of objectivity that, while he has not hesitated to blame the business leaders for emphasizing their own difficulties and for constantly criticizing the Government as being the villain of the piece, he has nevertheless made deliberate mention of outstanding instances of Indian business leaders who have displayed intense nationalism and social responsibility of the highest order. On the other hand, Government has also been unduly suspicious of the intentions of private business. Government has been hugging to doctrinaire ideas and outworn philosophies. The emphasis on the removal of the concentration of economic power, the proliferation of controls, the imposition of regulative practices, etc., are not, according to Dr. Agarwala, conducive either to the development of a progressive business ideology or to the emergence of a healthy business environment.

Dr. Agarwala's comments on the management of big business in India are indeed apposite and timely. "The central feature of the top management of big business in India is the fact of proprietorship management. Ability to invest is associated with ability to manage." Marginal changes are being noticed particularly because of the impact and influence of management methods and techniques borrowed or reproduced from the Western nations, particularly the United States of America. Even the hereditary owner-managers consider it worthwhile to acquire management training and study management technology in foreign universities before they succeed to the parental business. The Chief Executives of these big business houses, where

they are not the representatives of the family, are delegated with too little authority and cannot possibly do anything to alter the profile of management. Fortunately, Dr. Agarwala concedes, the situation is now changing for the better. The change is occasionally in evidence in some progressive concerns where consultative and participative management is in the process of developing.

The managing agency system also comes in for objective treatment at the hands of Dr. Agarwala. This system is, however, now a relic of the past and has been bundled into oblivion because of the various misdeeds perpetuated by the highly selfish representatives of that system. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that quite a number of managing agents supplied not only the managerial but also promotional and financial resources which are scarce. "Managing agents", Dr. Agarwala explains, "are known to convert once tottering concerns into flourishing enterprises by dint of hand work and personal care and by pouring in finances sometimes borrowed on their personal security." Dr. Agarwala feels that before the system was given a burial, endeavours should have been made by intimate personal contact and constructive measures to make them see the far-sighted wisdom of changing their ways and the style of their management and to encourage and help them in their self-improvement.

Is there or has there been a managerial revolution, in India, asks Dr. Agarwala and answers quickly that such a revolution is in the offing. The emergence of planning, the development of new technology, the development of technical know-how required for running business enterprises and expertise which the management executive has to possess in regard

to labour legislation, trade practices, etc., have inevitably resulted in the emergence of a new style of running business enterprise. "Management methods, traditionally practised in this country, are beginning to change both technique-wise and in terms of realization of social responsibility." However, one cannot but share Dr. Agarwala's lament that the rate of change is slow. The future depends upon the acceleration of this change.

Dr. Agarwala has taken great pains in prescribing formulas for bringing about the acceleration of management change in less developed countries, particularly in ours. Here, the predilection for American Management Methods and techniques gets the better of Dr. Agarwala for a moment, and he becomes the complete and impassioned advocate for the importation of such techniques. It is heartening to see, however, that he administers one caution and that is the transplantation of the modern management techniques from American soil into Indian Soil without adaptation or without considering certain local peculiarities would be fraught with disaster. This caution needs to be repeated quite often considering that the management specialists and management educationists in this country, *ad nauseam* repeat American phrases, worship American methods and refer to American management techniques with indiscriminate adoration. In this regard, it is good to see that Dr. Agarwala has emphasized the role of universities not only in the spread of management education but also in the acceleration of the rate of management change. For this purpose, he argues that academic discipline and autonomy should not be corroded by interference from Government.

A perusal of this book is indeed refreshing. One must compliment



Dr. Agarwala for his objective presentation of the present management situation in India, his penetrating analysis of the prevailing methods of business, and his stimulating treatment of the Business-Government relationship. Many of the suggestions made by him for changing the

business environment and bringing about a better management climate in this country are worthy of being accepted. The book is eminently readable and deserves wide circulation.

—V. SUBRAMANIAN

*PANCHAYATI RAJ IN INDIA*; By RAJESHWAR DAYAL, Delhi, Metropolitan, 1970, p. 315, Rs. 20.

True democracy begins when the common people are convinced that the principal activities of the State are geared to the promotion of their well-being and when they feel obliged to participate in and cooperate with the efforts of the latter for the fulfilment of the set goals. It starts from the 'grass-roots' and will never flourish and prosper if imposed from above. The inauguration of the Indian Constitution, in the wake of Independence, embodying (among other principles), the ideals of a Sovereign Democratic Republic and the Directive Principles of State Policy, has given a new impetus to the growth of democratic institutions in this country. For the last two decades and more, we have been experimenting with democracy—the biggest of its kind installed so far. The acceptance of the concepts of Welfare State, Planning and Socialistic Pattern of Society, has helped to accelerate the course of this experiment. Panchayati Raj is a timely device introduced in the operation of this process. It (Panchayati Raj) is, perhaps, the most noteworthy innovation effected in the post-Independence era for reforming the administrative machinery. Panchayati Raj institutions which delineate the past traditions from the present practice, give a 'wholesome' look to the long-neglected rural administration. They not only make a blending of local-self government with rural development, but also create new centres of power

and influence. It is in this context that Shri Rajeshwar Dayal's book on *Panchayati Raj in India* deserves the attention of and penetrating study by students, experts and others interested in local self-government and public administration. The book, which is arranged in 10 chapters, dealing with different aspects of the subject in a reasonably detailed manner, is no doubt a welcome addition to the available literature on the subject.

The opening chapter of the book under review begins with an exposition of the concept of Panchayati Raj and examines its implications on and applicability to rural India in a changed context and changing conditions. After Independence and more particularly subsequent to the establishment of the new Constitution, the Government of India made explicit its policy to wage a relentless war against poverty, hunger, disease, squalor and illiteracy and set to work to obliterate these blemishes on the face of the country through a series of socio-economic plans. In 1952, a few Community Development Blocks were launched as pilot Plan projects. Though these agencies were expected to work hand in hand with local self-government institutions for eliciting public cooperation and participation, after some time, the initial interest evinced by the people in these projects declined considerably and their enthusiasm waned. This made it imperative on



the part of the Government to go deep into the problem of evoking people's participation in increasing degrees in Government programmes and, in 1956, they appointed a Committee (Study Team) headed by Shri Balwantrai Mehta for the purpose. The Mehta Committee arrived at the conclusion that only if people could be given a share in the decision-making process, their interests in or enthusiasm for the implementation of the decisions can be roused. The Committee, therefore, suggested that the only solution to the problem could be found in democratic decentralization or Panchayati Raj. These aspects have been covered in Chapter I of the book.

The central theme of Chapter II of the book is the varying forms and patterns of organization of Panchayati Raj bodies obtaining in different States in India while Chapter III, IV and V are devoted to a descriptive and analytical study of the composition, powers, functions, working, etc., of Panchayati Raj institutions at different levels—from Gram Panchayat to Zila Parishad. The role of the District Collector in relation to the Panchayati Raj units, particularly Zila Parishads and Panchayat Samitis, is emphasized in the last of these chapters.

India is a predominantly agricultural nation. More than 80 per cent of her population live in villages, of whom over 72 per cent are in pursuit of agriculture as their main occupation. The importance of agriculture in the context of deficiency in food and other agricultural products, experienced by India, deserves emphasis. In Chapter VI of the book, the author rightly stresses the significance of agriculture in Indian rural life and the specific, positive, definite and vital role of Panchayati Raj bodies in expediting the process of agricultural production.

The knotty problem of personnel administration, which higher levels of Government find hard to tackle, pervades the realm of local institutions as well. In recent times, a series of difficult and highly complex problems have cropped up in the sphere of personnel administration, which no institution—public or private, big or small, national, provincial, local or even international—can ignore save at its own peril. The efficiency of an organization is hardly detached from that of its personnel. As far as Panchayati Raj bodies are concerned, there prevails a significant measure of inter-State diversity in matters of personnel policies and practices. Further, in most States, the local bodies have taken up the question of personnel administration in a piece-meal manner, giving it the semblance of an ill-assorted and stopgap arrangement. Though, Panchayati Raj institutions visualize a new approach and are expected to perform entirely different types of functions under the changed social and political set-up, which call for more flexibility, vision and dynamism as well as expertise in administration, there is a persistent tendency on their part to retain the old practice of utilizing the services of the general administrative staff borne mostly on State cadres. Shri Dayal has dealt with important aspects of personnel administration under Panchayati Raj in Chapter VII of the book. He has justifiably laid emphasis on 'training', which is very important in personnel administration.

Finance and administration are so inextricably intertwined that it is hardly possible to think of the one without the other. Every administrative act has its financial implication. In fact, administration has to work within the limit set up by the available financial resources. In Chapter VIII, the author rightly brings out

the importance of finance, pointing out the extreme inadequacy of financial resources of Panchayati Raj bodies (which actually retard their progress and efficient operation) and stresses the urgent need of improving their financial position. However, the author's apprehension that the "trend is such that local bodies will always be put on a strict diet and as a class they may never see days of plenty (p. 225) seems to be a pessimistic overstatement in view of the reasonably liberal measures taken, recently, by at least some of the States to better the financial status of these agencies. Nevertheless, he is right when he deprecates the tendency of State Governments to delegate functions and responsibilities to Panchayati Raj bodies without proportionately increasing their resources.

Leadership and party politics form the theme of Chapter IX. The age-old pattern of leadership based mainly on caste and creed is now being replaced by that founded on wealth, power and political influence, educational background, etc. Among the other characteristics discernible in the merging local leadership are a gradual growth of secondary and multiple leadership replacing the primary and simple type and the selection of leaders, by the local people, irrespective of caste, creed or religion. The process of politicization of the local people is progressing rapidly and politics has a preponderant role to play in effecting social change and economic development. The phenomenon of factionalism is on the increase and is extensively pervasive (though not solely due to the impact of politics on local administration) and the leadership based on power politics is incapable of winning the confidence of the

people. About the role of political parties in local government, the author, after rejecting plea for a 'partyless democracy', advocated by Shri Jayaprakash Narayan and others who attack political parties for every ill of Panchayati Raj bodies, expresses doubts about the feasibility of such thinking.

The concluding chapter discusses in detail official-non-official relationships and the problem of training non-officials. He then offers a few suggestions for improving the tone of relationships and the methods of training the non-officials.

On the whole, the book under review is written in simple style and is made attractive by the lucidity of expression, comprehensiveness of information presented, and the reasoned and balanced judgment. It is both instructive and informative. However, one who goes through it comes across numerous spelling mistakes and other printing errors. A few factual errors also have crept into the book (either on account of using false sources of information or due to oversight on the part of the author), which is a distressing feature that detracts the quality of the book. To cite one example, on p. 73, the average population per Panchayat in Kerala has been given as 1,474 whereas the fact is that the Kerala Panchayat, noted for its large size and teeming population, has on an average 15,474 people (*i.e.*) above fifteen thousand and not below two thousand as given in the book). Barring these few drawbacks, the book is a readable one and will be useful to the general reader and the specialists in local government.

—N. R. VISALAKSHI

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## THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

## SPECIAL NUMBER

on

RECENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN  
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA

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Indian Institute of  
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October 22, 1971

Dear Reader,

The Indian Journal of Public Administration (IJPA) has been acknowledged as a pioneering journal in the field of public administration in our country. It is also looked upon as an important source of useful material on study and research in public administration, particularly relating to India.

It is our opinion that the Journal could be further improved. The Editorial Board has given some thought to this problem in its recent meeting. The Journal could have new features. More articles based on empirical research by scholars could be secured for it. Senior retired administrators could throw light on administrative processes by writing memoirs or reminiscences. The Journal could also deal with areas of administration which have been untouched or inadequately covered, so far. Your suggestions would help us to locate such areas and we would try to approach experts and scholars for appropriate contributions. We are particularly desirous to provide ample opportunities to young scholars in our universities and other organizations for expression of their views on problems of administration in which they might be interested.

We think that the esteemed readers of the IJPA like you would be having valuable suggestions to make for improving the Journal in all its aspects. The suggestions shall receive our best consideration. Action on some of the suggestions at our end may result in further improving the quality of the Journal. The Journal might then serve us all much better.

We take this opportunity to thank you for the sustained support you have given to the Indian Journal of Public Administration all these years and look forward to your suggestions and continued cooperation.

Thanking you and with Season's Greetings,

Yours sincerely,

*T.N. Chaturvedi*

(T.N. Chaturvedi)

## Editorial Note

This year the theme for the special number is "Recent Trends and Developments in Public Administration in India".

Not only the context of public administration in India is changing fast, but new social forces and aspirations of the people are bound to condition the scope and style of public administration itself. The progress made by science and technology is making impact on administration. Innovations not thought of earlier are being introduced in many spheres of Public Administration. New plans and programmes are calling for new administrative procedures and practices. Findings of research in social and natural sciences are being utilized for improving public administration which is increasingly looked upon as management in government or administrative management. Under the circumstances, it is all the more necessary to follow trends and developments in public administration with a view to keeping oneself abreast and in order to identify new directions for policy and action. There is increasing interest not only in problems of administrative reform but also in the field of study, research and training in public administration. The theme of this Special Number is in this sense topical and attempts to cover a wide field.

In response to our request, quite a large number of articles were received and we would take this opportunity to express our gratitude to all those who so very kindly responded to our request. We, however, regret to state that it has not been possible for us to include in this issue all the articles we received, for various reasons. We propose to devote the next issue of the Journal also mainly to the theme of the present issue in view of its vast and varied nature. We hope that the next issue will be found by our readers equally interesting and useful.

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We are aware that in spite of our efforts some of the areas have still remained uncovered in this number. In future, we would make earnest efforts to get these areas explored by knowledgeable people.

We take this opportunity to invite our readers to suggest areas in public administration which ought to be considered while selecting the theme of the next special number.

—*Editor*

# THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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## POLITICAL CONTEXT OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

*S. P. Aiyar*

ADMINISTRATION is a crucial factor in the political development of States and cannot be studied apart from the political processes which enable it to function. Politics is the life-blood of administrative systems, part of their physiology and circulation. The purpose of this metaphor is not to suggest an organic theory of administrative bureaucracies in order to balance the bloodless creations of the model-builders but to emphasize the importance of viewing politics and administration in the totality of their interacting influences.<sup>1</sup> The 'Politics-Administration' dichotomy has been given up long ago and we have travelled a great distance from the days of Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow. The experience of developing countries has reinforced the links between administration and politics and there are several reasons for this. The most important of these, perhaps, is the anxiety of leaders in the new States to ensure that government reaches out to every level of society in order to accelerate economic development, and social change, heighten the sense of participation and close the gap between government and people. There is, thus, a problem of 'penetration' as well as of 'participation' and these, doubtlessly, provide the rationale for administrative decentralization and its variant, *i.e.* decentralized democracy. Speaking specifically of the Indian situation, the extensions of community development administration and the creation of Panchayati Raj provide apt illustrations of the close interaction of politics and administration.

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<sup>1</sup> In the seminar organized by the Indian Council of Social Science Research to discuss the trend reports in Political Science (August, 1971), compartmentalized thinking was apparent both in the papers and in the discussions.



Yet the main problem of democratic government remains: there is need for a balance between administration and politics, for the hypertrophy of politics is as undesirable as the bureaucratic bulge. Nor should it be assumed that a balance once attained remains for ever. If the essence of politics is power, so is it of bureaucracy; the human factor being the same in both drawn as it is from the same society. The men who function in both spheres would be less than human if they did not cherish ambitions and build little empires over which they can preside. In realizing this ambition, administrators need politicians as much as the latter need the administrators.

In our system of government, the instrumentalist character of the administration is specially emphasized and it is the task of administrators, ultimately, to carry out the policies hammered out by deliberative bodies. Civil servants, of course, contribute in a big way to policy-making by making available to ministers their practical wisdom but they are *administrators and not policy-makers*. The growth of harmonious relationship between them and, particularly, between civil servants and ministers through accepted conventions internalized in both has been one of India's chief administrative difficulties since Independence. It has figured so prominently in recent Public Administration literature that it is unnecessary to cover the ground again. But a few observations seem pertinent for the understanding of the political contest of Indian administration today. The 'instrumentalist' role of the civil service and its spirit of neutrality have been part of the Westminster tradition and they came to us rather late in the evolution of our administrative system. Shri P. R. Dubhashi is not quite correct when he speaks of this as the "traditional concept of civil service in India."<sup>2</sup> The essence of the colonial bureaucracy was the identification of administration with government and it was not till the introduction of dyarchy in 1919 that the ground was prepared for the functional distinction between the temporary and the permanent executive. But by this time, the country was on the threshold of a new phase of nationalism under the influence of Gandhi. In the intensity of the new political environment, nationalist leaders viewed civil servants as the paid agents of the colonial bureaucracy, while they appeared, in their own eyes at least, as the true representatives of the masses. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, officials often showed contempt for the newly emergent class of politicians who appeared to them as mere upstarts; it was they who knew about the real problems of the country through their close and often intimate contact with people in the districts.

<sup>2</sup> P. R. Dubhashi, "Committed Bureaucracy", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (January-March, 1971), p. 33.

The mutual dislike of administrator and politician for each other has been one of the most unfortunate legacies of our struggle for freedom. Sardar Patel's heroic efforts to smoothen the transition from the period of freedom struggle to a new phase in which the rights of civil servants were protected in the Constitution were successful for a time. But the introduction of universal suffrage and five general elections have enabled the emergence of politicians with new ideas and attitudes. Asok Chanda has noted that the relations between Deputy Ministers and the Permanent Secretaries were frequently strained because the former—often young politicians—were never given the opportunity to understand that as political neophytes they would need the help and guidance of the senior officials in acquiring a grasp of the intricacies of administration. They came to their tasks “with an attitude of superiority bordering on arrogance towards the civil servants”.<sup>3</sup> Better understanding between civil servants and ministers would probably have emerged given time and continued political stability. But the increasing uncertainties of politics since the last few years of the Nehru era once again strained relationships and there were signs of anxiety among civil servants. A newspaper report on October 28, 1963, drew attention to the disturbed morale of ministers and civil servants in the capital and mentioned that it was becoming fashionable to speak of “a Kamraj Plan in the offing for senior civil servants as well, in the name of a reorganization of the various central ministries”.<sup>4</sup> From 1964, gnawing doubts about the viability of the political system only deepened and instability in the States was beginning to tell on State administration. It would be wrong, however, to assume that the civil service played a passive role in this period and was merely at the receiving end of the consequences of political uncertainties. Bureaucracy enfolds power-clusters and faction groups and it probably sought ways and means not merely for survival but for getting entrenched in a new situation.<sup>5</sup>

#### ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Talking to probationers in the Indian Administrative and Central Services, one is struck by the idealism of youth as well as by the anxieties which they entertain about politicians with whom they would have to work throughout their careers. The reactions are expressed

<sup>3</sup> Asok Chanda, *Indian Administration*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1967, p. 84.

<sup>4</sup> *The Times of India* (Bombay), October 28, 1963.

<sup>5</sup> There are few studies on this aspect of the Indian Bureaucracy. A lot of useful information is contained in C. P. Bhambhri, *Bureaucracy and Politics in India* (Delhi, Vikas, 1971). This is the only full-length study I have come across but it seems to me to be vitiated by the writer's somewhat rigid preconceptions of the Indian bureaucracy.

in different ways. Talking to one of them about the need for courage and conviction in the tasks of administration, I received the sudden but not totally unexpected reaction: "It is all very well to speak of these qualities but the price we may be called upon to pay is too heavy. What if we are penalized for our views?" Many others have expressed similar reactions. A bright young lady determined to make a career for herself in the service had this to say: "Let me be frank. I am not interested in politics and what politicians do. I do not even aspire to be the great administrator whose qualities you emphasize. I am just interested in having security in my job and I am determined to stick to it any way." The statement brought home to me, in a poignant way, the crisis in the morale of civil servants about which so much is written in an unrealistic and high-falutin way. When one meets some of these probationers again after a few years and inquires what they think of their job, their sense of disillusionment and shock at the political realities of India is unmistakably communicated. I am fairly confident that this is a widespread feeling among administrators in all the services.

The effects of political instability on State administrations, apart from the attitudes of civil servants themselves, has often been mentioned but it is far from clear as to what forms bureaucratic reactions assume. In his *Tenth Feroze Gandhi Memorial Lecture* on the "Role of Services in Parliamentary Democracy", Dharma Vira spoke of the timidity and servility in State services and its effect on the speedy implementation of policies. "They have become more or less incapable of taking any decisions. Practically everything has to be referred to the Ministers and in any case, because of the indiscriminate use of organizations, such as the Central Vigilance Commission and the Central Bureau of Investigation and the terror they have created in the hearts of the government servants, they prefer to involve in any important decision, if possible, the Minister, and, in any case, some of their colleagues. A sort of debility has overtaken the administration and even speedy disposal of cases has become a matter of suspicion." He referred further to the fact that civil servants were hesitant to take decisions as a result of "the uncertainty in their minds as to who their new political masters would be".<sup>6</sup>

Where caste and regional rivalries have been factors in the machinations of State politicians, these are bound to create factional groups within the bureaucracy itself. Speaking of Madhya Pradesh in the

<sup>6</sup> Dharma Vira, "The Services in Parliamentary Democracy"—lecture delivered under the auspices of the Feroz Gandhi Smarak Samiti, September 12, 1970. Reproduced in the I.I.P.A. (Maharashtra Regional Branch) *Quarterly Newsletter*, January, 1971.

end of 1968, one commentator observed, probably with a touch of journalistic exaggeration: "There is hardly a government office in the whole sprawling State that is not riven by regional rivalries and political animosities".<sup>7</sup> Similar situations have been reported from other parts of the country. Writing about the fierce in-fighting in Uttar Pradesh between the Vaisya, C. B. Gupta, and the Brahmin, Kamlapati Tripathi, *The Times of India* observed editorially: "During this entire period, there has been no administration worth the name, at the ministerial level, in the country's most populous State."<sup>8</sup> Since political factors in such situations enter into the dynamics of cabinet government and the distribution of portfolio, the departments of agriculture and community development could not be given to the same person through fear of making him too powerful and so they had to be split. To make matters worse, the Minister of Agriculture, who was responsible for this surgical operation, had little acquaintance with his colleague in the Ministry of Community Development. We have here an important dimension to the difficulties of coordination in the Indian bureaucracy.<sup>9</sup>

#### POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE BUREAUCRACY

The Indian administration functions in the context of politics and in some ways this has been detrimental to administrative efficiency. Politics tends to enter into every nook and cranny of the bureaucracy and has often vitiated administrative rationality. What a contrast the situation now presents to the relatively sheltered world of the Indian district officer in pre-Gandhian British days! "Political interference" is now one of the central themes of comment among citizens although students of Public Administration have not given it all the attention it deserves. The problem of political interference has been long with us. In 1946, when Congress took office, ministers and party leaders sought to "give a twist to administrative matters so as to prevent decisions purely on merits".<sup>10</sup> As one moves down the structure of governmental arrangements, the effects of political interference seem to increase. It is in the districts that one observes

the most unlovely features of this new ecology of Indian administration. The strained relations between officials and the elected members in Panchayati Raj are now a common feature of district administration.

<sup>7</sup> V. T. Joshi, "Regionalism—Bane of M.P.", *The Times of India* (Bombay), December 10, 1968.

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in Gilbert Etienne, *Studies in Indian Agriculture*, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 181-82.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 181-82.

<sup>10</sup> A. D. Gorwala, *Of Matters Administrative*, Bombay, Popular, 1958, p. 77.

all over the country. But local politicians view 'interference' from a different angle. They believe that without some kind of political pressure, officials would continue to be indifferent. Viewing themselves as representatives of the people, they hold the view that they must intercede on their behalf and force officials to dispose of work efficiently. It was a member of a subject committee in one of the many studies on Panchayati Raj who observed: "These officers are as elastic as rubber. One can stretch them to a great extent to get work out of them, but as soon as one removes the pressure they return to their original mentality of not doing any work themselves. That is why it is necessary to coax them and stretch them every time for work."<sup>11</sup> Officials, on their side, have often expressed dissatisfaction with the operations of politicians and their public morals. In the same study cited, a class I officer said: "Government programme is good but so long as the people are power-hungry nothing could be done. Today, we do not see the proper type of leadership coming up. Those in power are only after power and enjoy the support of political leaders at the higher levels. In other districts, many office bearers are corrupt, some are even having a criminal record. The officials of the Zila Parishad are like police keeping a watch on these people. It is often said that many government officials are also corrupt; but while their corruption is individualistic in nature, the corruption among the non-officials... is often organized corruption."<sup>12</sup> From a purely theoretical point of view, the conflict between politicians and officials need not necessarily be detrimental to administrative efficiency and may even provide a sort of unofficial framework of checks and balances. But such a framework is loosened when officials and politicians come to an understanding with each other in a common cause in a manner beneficial to themselves and detrimental to the public interest.

The observation that as one moves down the governmental levels, political interference seems to increase is not one which can stand without qualification. Perhaps, the techniques of interference vary at different levels and, where organized interests operate, they are probably more subtle and sophisticated. Business houses, which maintain contact-men in New Delhi, usually find it necessary to 'cultivate' relations with politicians and civil servants separately and use politicians to speed up matters concerning the issue of licenses and such other matters. Politics is power and influence wherever it operates and, where there is money, the operations can be slick but it is unfair to single out any section of the bureaucracy's clientele for

<sup>11</sup> V. R. Gaekwad, *Panchayati Raj and Bureaucracy*, Hyderabad, National Institute of Community Development, 1969, p. 34.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

special condemnation, as it is often done. The role of 'contact-men' in the capital is not functionally different from that of politicians at the district level. But at both levels, there is probably also another common factor. The dislike of officials for politicians often springs from their feeling of superiority in education and social background; the feeling is perhaps more pronounced at the district level. To a point, this is inevitable and hardly a serious one so long as it does not blur the role-perception of administrators.

### *Other Aspects of the Political Environment*

There are two extreme positions taken on the relationship between officials and politicians in the specific political environment of India. One view maintains that bureaucrats are involved in a sinister conspiracy with businessmen and other organized groups and use their powers for personal advantage. The conclusion which seems to flow from this position is that ministers, who ought to know what the public interest is, are often at the mercy of civil servants who can sabotage their great plans of public welfare. It has been suggested that if every minister can bring into his secretariat outside experts and personal advisers and party technocrats, this will enable him to 'supervise' the operations of his ministry. A minister would then be able to confront his secretary with the counter proposals of his outside advisers.<sup>13</sup> It may be added that a remedy of this kind may be worse than the malady it seeks to cure and only provide a new pipeline for political interference.

The other view, equally extreme, regards civil servants as being completely under the influence of their political bosses. If the latter have neither character nor competence, the only remedy left for the civil servant, so the argument runs, is to "come to terms" with the situation. In any case, the doctrine of political neutrality and anonymity provide a convenient shell into which he can retreat and re-emerge only when the political climate is more favourable. This is a kind of cynicism subtly blended with cowardice and officials sometimes exaggerate their vulnerability. A civil servant with considerable experience has recently reminded public servants that a minister's capacity to harass government servants is considerably circumscribed; that their tenure and pay are protected and that it is for them, particularly those in the higher echelons, to build up the capacity to resist pressures.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> C. P. Bhambhri, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

<sup>14</sup> P. V. R. Rao, *Red Tape and White Cap*, Bombay, Orient Longman, 1970, pp. 125-26.



An unusual and tactless way of dealing with political pressures was provided by a young IAS officer in Kerala some years ago. An MLA one day burst into his room in order to intervene on behalf of a junior employee and get the transfer order cancelled. This greatly annoyed the IAS officer who brusquely asked the MLA to get out of his room. There was much criticism of the officer's conduct at that time and it was being demanded that he should apologize to the MLA. But nothing happened, the storm blew over, the officer continued in his office and the MLA stopped coming to the Secretariat.<sup>15</sup> This is an extreme instance and hardly the ideal mode of administrative behaviour for such situations, however lofty the administrative norms of the officer concerned. An attempt has been made to frame a code to regulate the relations between politicians and officials. The draft Code, prepared for this purpose a few years ago, stated that an officer should make every effort to help MLAs and when it is not possible to do so without transgressing the rules, the situation must be courteously explained to them. But the Code probably went a bit too far in recommending that officers must stand up when MLAs enter their rooms and see them off when the work is over.<sup>16</sup> But correct administrative and political behaviour cannot be achieved by drafting up codes. Conventions have to grow over a period of time and both administrators and officials must acquire a proper appreciation of the respective roles they have to play in our system of government. Politics means power and influence and it is too much to expect that ministers and others would leave administrators alone. But it should not be assumed that what they do in such matters is always detrimental to good administration and the working of the political system. Undoubtedly, MLAs and others perform a useful function when they bring citizen grievances to the notice of officials. In the absence of continuous and more effective channels for bringing the difficulties of citizens to the attention of officials, it would seem obviously unwise to close the existing informal avenues provided by politicians in the pursuit of an abstract ideal of administrative rationality. The possibilities of political interference have greatly increased with the new functions of the state. The setting up of public corporations have led to new forms of interference which are successfully concealed by the theory of corporation autonomy. At a small meeting, a minister was recently asked why the Government did not set up a corporation for the All India Radio which many people believe has become an organ of government 'propaganda'. The minister very rightly countered the question observing that if Government really wanted to interfere with AIR's programmes, the best thing for them

<sup>15</sup> "Kerala Newsletter", *The Times of India* (Bombay), July 11, 1963.

<sup>16</sup> *The Times of India* (Bombay), February 28, 1966.

to do would be to set up a corporation in which directives can be issued and its policies defended in the name of autonomy ! The issuing of verbal directives is one of the principal avenues of political interference wherever corporations have been set up. In an interesting passage in *Government and Parliament—A Survey from the Inside*, Herbert Morrison wrote:

“It is very necessary, however, that the Minister should not be drawn into acquiescence in policies which he would find difficult to defend in public, and that a Board should not take a course which it believes to be wrong and against the interests of the undertaking or the public merely because the Minister asks it to oblige him. The Board has a perfect right to say to the Minister, ‘Give us a general direction in writing which will be published and we will obey, but otherwise we are sorry that we cannot act as you would wish’. What is wanted is friendly co-operation without prejudice to the rights and responsibilities of either the Minister or the Board.”<sup>17</sup>

Political interference takes many other forms: official decisions may be turned down by ministers acting on narrow political considerations; subtle pressures may compel officials to suddenly quicken administrative procedures in order to favour particular persons in whom the minister or other higher-ups might be interested as documented in the *Report of the Commission of Inquiry* in the Kairon Case; ministers and other politicians may manipulate the transfer of officials to less favourable places, causing considerable hardship to the official's family, including the education of his children. New assignments may be cancelled in the last minute for one political reason or another and, finally, ministers could be rude and resent honest advice tendered by the civil servant.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, it is naive to assume that officials are mere passive creatures who lend themselves easily to manipulations and can be cowed down by ministerial frowns. The episode described by A. D. Gorbala in the above mentioned citation provides an excellent example of what a civil servant can do in such situations. It has been recorded that when Sir Austin Chamberlain over-ruled the Secretary of the Post Office on a matter of policy and went a step further telling him how to implement the policy, the latter gently told his political master that he was taking a damn silly decision but that it was not

<sup>17</sup> Herbert Morrison, *Government and Parliament—A Survey from the Inside*, London, Oxford University Press, 1954, pp. 264-65.

<sup>18</sup> A. D. Gorbala, “An Independence-Day Tale”, *Opinion*, August 10, 1971—a valuable piece of writing which deserves to be widely read.

necessary to implement it in a damn silly way ! Such men would be rare in any civil service system in the world and no country can have too many of them. But the more we have, the better will the civil service ethos be. By and large, however, civil servants, like most career men who enter a service in their twenties, have ambitions and the higher they get in the hierarchy, the closer are they to the political masters on whom they depend for the fulfilment of their ambitions. Taking a line of least resistance or resorting to skilful manipulation of rules in order to bask in the sunshine of ministerial favour comes easily to those whose ambitions are not made of sterner stuff. The more 'human' of them may write letters to ministers, nostalgically recalling old associations and school ties to further their ambitions. Political intervention may be sought for quite harmless benefits at one end and softening of disciplinary proceedings at the other. From civil service gossip, one gathers that such things happen all the time. Asok Chanda has drawn attention to the practice, among civil servants making representations, of endorsing copies to Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament and other high officials who are in no way directly concerned with their problems and to the latter often taking more than ordinary notice of these.<sup>19</sup>

All this merely points out to the fact that although the bureaucracy functions, as it should, in a political context, civil servants and politicians constantly over-step their bounds. To speak of politics and administration as being closely linked together is not the same as asking that there be no distinction between the two processes. A line has to be drawn by the actors in every situation and it cannot be reduced to writing in any code of conduct. The worst feature of political interference is the effect it has on the morale of the better type of civil servant; the common species has, of course, learnt to live with it and even profit from it. A. D. Gorwala has aptly described the evil effects of political interference:

"The effect of interference generally, and interference on personal grounds in particular, on the official is even more damaging. It deprives him of that certainty in behaviour which is one of the principal needs of the good civil servant. It causes him to be always looking over his shoulder instead of going straight ahead with his job. He has to ask in connection with every matter not what he ought to do on merits but what it will pay him to do in the light of the views of his political master. Briefly, it tends to obliterate the dividing line between the civil servant and the politician, a course never intended in any

<sup>19</sup> Asok Chanda, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-40.

reasonable country, for one of the principal grounds for having the civil servant at all, especially the high-ranking civil servant, is the need for a permanent instrument, different from the politician and in many matters with judgment independent of the politician, who can be relied upon to keep the administration going honestly and straight-forwardly, whatever the movements and vicissitudes of politics."<sup>20</sup>

### *Tempering with Files*

A totally different dimension to the political context of administration is provided in the maintenance of files. This is one of the little known areas of public administration and, perhaps, only the historian of the future would be able to tell the whole story of what politicians do to files in the secretariat.<sup>21</sup> David Potter has suggested the hypothesis that there is some relationship between periods of rapid political change and the destruction or removal of confidential files in the secretariat. He illustrates this hypothesis with reference to three major political landmarks in recent Indian History, 1937, 1947 and 1967. After the elections of 1967, when the Congress in Madras was swept off from office and the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham took over, confidential files were destroyed. The former Chief Minister of Madras openly declared that files relating to the 1965 anti-Hindi agitation in the State were destroyed on his written orders. Similar things have happened in West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. In Lucknow, a rickshaw going out of the Secretariat was found to contain confidential files relating to the work of the out-going Minister for Education.<sup>22</sup> Such things do happen during a major historic event like the transfer of power by Britain to India but that they should also occur when one party replaces another in a democratic country is not a matter which one can countenance with satisfaction. However, it illustrates in a glaring way the extent to which political considerations may affect administrative continuity—one of the major characteristics of the bureaucracy.

### ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICAL GOALS

In recent years, the 'colonial' character of the Indian bureaucracy has come in once again for attack from the ideological extremes of Left and Right, although it must be added that these words lack

<sup>20</sup> A. D. Gorwala, *Of Matters Administrative*, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>21</sup> David Potter, "Political Change and Confidential Government Files in India", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, July 1970, p. 135.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

clarity in political discussions. Before Independence, the bureaucracy was regarded by nationalist leaders as the administrative arm of the foreign power with few interests beyond the maintenance of law and order and the collection of revenues. The charge against the bureaucracy now is that it aligns itself surreptitiously with business interests and that civil servants have no genuine concern with the problems of development. On the other hand, those who take the 'rightist' position argue that civil servants are so much under the spell of 'leftist' ideologies and so bureaucratic in their methods of work that matters relating to the granting of licenses are delayed over long periods of time, dampening the entrepreneurial spirit. Both positions have an element of truth which are exaggerated intentionally from given angles. But we still know very little of the attitudes and beliefs of our top civil servants to be in a position to blame them entirely for the tardiness of administration or to exonerate them. He is a bold man who can say that civil servants in India have no concern whatsoever with the country's development programmes. Among them are to be found some of the best products of our universities and speaking to them one notes their awareness of the limitations of the bureaucracy in which they have to work and their sense of frustration in being unable to widen their spheres of administrative competence in the realization of developmental programmes. What these practical limitations are, from the point of view of the rules and procedures of work, the political culture enveloping the bureaucracy and the prevailing standards of administrative morality are too well-known to need restatement here. What is difficult to ascertain is whether awareness of the problems of development is merely a spot on the cognitive maps of civil servants and expressed in conversation to show how dedicated they are. Civil servants are not different from others in this respect, caught as they are in all the ambivalences of the transition from tradition to modernity.

That our plans of development have suffered a great deal in implementation, no serious student of administration can deny, what is difficult is to discover the causes for this failure and the allocation of blame. The word 'allocation' is perhaps a wrong one to use, for it seems to suggest that responsibility for failures in plan-implementation can be easily pinned on to one set of people or another. The bureaucracy is a part of the political system and its failures, in some measure at least, are those of political leadership. Not enough attention is given to the nature of policies which often contain the seeds of their own failure, brought to surface in implementation. Prohibition is a classic instance. Consider again the implementation of land reforms for which the bureaucracy has often been blamed. Pattern

of land ownership are embedded in a whole complex of traditional styles of living and there is insufficient awareness of the fact that land reforms can sweep away a whole system of social relationships and undermine established social security without providing adequate services through the government channels. There are also the crevices in the law (I hate to use that ugly word loop-hole!) which landed interests can make use of in nullifying the very purpose of the legislation.<sup>23</sup> A sharper criticism has been that these interstices in law were deliberately provided to nullify their implementation. Whatever the substance of this allegation—and there is an excellent parallel in the recent history of land ceilings in West Pakistan<sup>24</sup>—I mention it here just to show that the laws themselves may often be responsible for their poor implementation. It may be interesting to look at the five year plans from this angle for the euphoria of planning has usually out-stripped our grasp of social realities.

### *The Problem of 'Commitment'*

But we need a scapegoat for administrative failures and civil servants, whose professional ethics prevent them from answering back, lend themselves easily for this purpose. So we blame them for their lack of 'commitment' and in our eagerness for quick change we dismiss civil service neutrality as irrelevant for a developing economy. The logic of parliamentary democracy renders political neutrality indispensable and it is even more necessary in the Indian context characterized as it is by frequent ministerial changes, particularly in the States. It may be added that to insist on commitment to party positions would only serve to widen cleavages of opinion within the civil service, increase factionalism and, worse still, strengthen the belief that some are rewarded and others penalized because of their political views. Nothing could be more detrimental to civil service morale than the existence of such feeling among civil servants.<sup>25</sup>

Much of the current discussion on the political 'commitment' of civil servants has been futile and unrealistically ideological in character. Since Smt. Indira Gandhi has often been mentioned in this controversy, it would be worthwhile examining her position at some length here.

<sup>23</sup> Guy Hunter, *Modernizing Peasant Societies*, London, Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 150-51.

<sup>24</sup> S. P. Ayar, *Commonwealth in South Asia*, Bombay, Lalvani Publishing House, 1969, p. 254.

<sup>25</sup> Masterman Committee Report on the Political Activities of the Civil Servants. Cmd. 7718, 1949. The Report advanced a similar argument.

Speaking at the Institute of Engineers on February 9, 1970, Smt. Gandhi said:

“Recently, my remarks that we needed Government Servants with commitment have been, perhaps deliberately, misrepresented to mean that I wanted civil servants to support me or my political ideology. On the contrary, I do not want politically convenient or servile civil servants. Their job is to give frank advice, *but they must feel committed to the Objectives of the State which have been approved by Parliament.* (Italics mine). They should have unreserved faith in the programmes which they administer. An official who has no active faith in secularism cannot deal with the communal problem. We must all have a commitment to the development of the country and a sense of personal involvement with the welfare of our people.”

Again, in her reply to the President's Address in the *Lok Sabha* on March 4, 1970, Smt. Gandhi said:

“It has been said in this House and outside that we are, or perhaps I am, planning to use the civil service for political purposes . . . I can say that my remark about committed civil servants has been twisted. I have always held the view that the duty of the civil servants is to give frank and honest advice and not let their judgment be cramped by fear or favour. I certainly do not want civil servants who are in any way servile or politically convenient, *because if they are so, they would not be helpful to the Government or to the administration.* (Emphasis added.) However, I do think that all people who are in charge of the administration or of projects should have a commitment to the service of the people and their welfare. They should think of people as individual human beings, not merely as statistics. Therefore, when I used the word ‘commitment’, what I meant . . . is that they should be loyal to the guiding principles of our Constitution and the objectives which have been adopted by Parliament.”

In response to an intervention by a member, “Are they loyal?” Smt. Gandhi was quick to observe that in the past not much stress was laid “on attitude, because government did not have the great problems of development and change before it”. And she added: “By and large, I have found these qualities of courage and conviction at all levels of the civil services”.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> I am thankful to Shri M. S. Menon, Additional Private Secretary to the Prime Minister for promptly making available the relevant texts of the Prime Minister's speeches on this point.



The position has been put forward with admirable clarity and one wonders how the controversy arose at all. To some extent, the Press must share the responsibility for only truncated reports which appeared in most newspapers. But a more important reason is that apart from the Prime Minister's utterances, there were others in the ruling party who expressed a different view on the question of civil service neutrality. Thus, in their note on "Basic Economic Issues" to the requisitioned meeting of the All India Congress Committee (AICC), Sarvashri Chandra Shekhar, Mohan Dharía and others said:

"The present bureaucracy under the orthodox and conservative leadership of the ICS with its upper class prejudices can hardly be expected to meet the requirements of social and economic change along socialist line. The creation of an administrative cadre committed to national objectives and responsive to our social needs is an urgent necessity."<sup>27</sup>

Again, in his Presidential address to the Bombay session of the AICC, Shri Jagjivan Ram had observed:

"In a country which has stagnated for centuries and where centuries of delayed progress are sought to be compressed into decades, where the pace of economic change has to be accelerated beyond measure, the so-called neutral administrative machinery is a hindrance, not a help. The theory, moreover, is hardly relevant to Indian conditions."<sup>28</sup>

From a specific standpoint, this is a possible position to take but it hardly fits in, as argued above, with the logic and dynamics of parliamentary democracy. With the Prime Minister's clarification, the controversy, one hopes, may be laid to rest. In the language of the debate, however, one gets the impression that the word 'commitment' is sometimes used as a synonym for dedication to work and loyalty to professional ideals. One does not speak of a 'committed' surgeon when one has in mind a dedicated member of that profession. Likewise, we speak of a dedicated teacher, not of a 'committed' one. In the usage of these words, the dictionary is a poor guide and the use of Roget's *Thesaurus* can only make matters worse. However, it must be noted that there is a pronounced opinion in the country which insists on the desirability of having civil servants committed to a specific political programme and they are fully aware of the implications of their view for political democracy.

<sup>27</sup> Cited by C. P. Bhambhri, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

<sup>28</sup> As quoted by V. A. Pai Panandiker, "The Role of the Civil Service", *The Times of India*, Bombay, January 15, 1970.

The problem of getting the best talent for the administrative services of the country is a serious one in view of the more lucrative careers open to the best products of Indian universities in the private sector and it is unfortunate that working conditions within the administration are not always conducive to the maintenance of the morale of civil servants. In his study of IAS Officers in Orissa, Richard Taub found that 25 of the 28 officers had entered the service either because they had no alternative or had been pushed into it unwillingly by their parents. How poor their job satisfaction is, may be inferred from the fact that less than a third of the officers interviewed wanted their sons to enter the IAS!<sup>29</sup> But we still need further studies on the morale of civil servants to know what steps can be taken to improve the working conditions of the civil service. To speak of dedication to the great ideals of development is yet, perhaps, no more than a beautiful dream.

Finally, even when we speak of dedication and social commitment as essential qualities in the administrator, we must not lose sight of the fact that ultimately the civil servant is required to follow the goals of policy laid down by political leaders. It is curious that there is little or no reference in current discussions to the importance of 'social commitment' on the part of leaders. Politics in India has yet to become a profession with its own norms and ethical standards. As one commentator has correctly put it, the "new concept of a politically conscious and committed civil servant with a sense of deep emotional involvement in the processes of social change has little relevance in present-day Indian conditions, unless it is matched by an equally dedicated political system in which ministers are obliged to place public interest well above party requirements. The politicians should be able to inspire greater confidence among the civil servants—and encourage them to commit themselves more enthusiastically to the task of national development by setting a better example of their own commitment and devotion to those very objectives of social justice and public welfare."<sup>30</sup>

#### NEED FOR A NEW POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION SYNDROME

Although the experience of contemporary bureaucracies has undermined the Politics-Administration dichotomy, we still do not have a comprehensive approach to the study of the administrative and political problems of developing countries. The relevance of

<sup>29</sup> See Richard P. Taub, *Bureaucrats Under Stress*, Calcutta, K. L. Mukhopadhyay 1969, Chapter V.

<sup>30</sup> G. K. Reddy, "Civil Servants and Social Commitment", *The Hindu*, February 10, 1970.

competitive politics for development administration is seen in the fact that we do not yet know for certain what specific strategies or plans are best suited for dealing with the social and economic problems of developing countries. Every political party tends to become dogmatic on this point and claims to have found the master-key to the problems of poverty. A civil service, ideologically neutral, can make available to rival political bosses the actual difficulties of implementing their plans. This notion of 'neutrality', which involves a scientific temper in 'administering situations', is different from the common belief that a politically neutral civil servant must approach his work with a mental *tabula rasa*. Such a concept of 'neutrality' is not only irrelevant but even dangerous. As Professor Chapman has remarked: "Neutrality in public office tends in the end to moral corruption. If all governments are to be served with equal impartiality and loyalty, there are no grounds at all for criticizing the German official who served Hitler to the best of his ability. In any profession, other than government, such people would be regarded as dangerous cynics or weaklings."<sup>31</sup> Civil servants at the policy-making levels must be well-acquainted with the strength and weaknesses of rival political manifestoes which necessarily contain the vote-winning element of exaggeration. But they must not bring politics into their professional role as advisers. They ought not to get too deeply involved with day-to-day political controversies, with matters on which the dust has not yet settled. But they must be concerned with the ends of development and with the quality of those ends. These are ethical questions which lie at the heart of the administrator's concerns. It has rightly been said that the civil servant may be a statesman in disguise but he must never be a politician in disguise.

The Constitution of India provides for a framework of government with a pronounced emphasis on justice—social, economic and political—and its federal character is intended to provide a decentralized arrangement enfolding the variety and diversity of India. Seen in this context, the emphasis of our economic plans has been on *development through democracy*. In the long-run, the maintenance of the democratic system is, therefore, as important as dealing with India's economic problems. During the two decades which have elapsed since the Indian Constitution came in force, the masses have become increasingly aware of the possibilities of change in their stagnant lives. The general elections and the extensive use of the channels of communication provided by the mass media have led to a qualitative change in the political environment of the Indian bureaucracy and ever-growing

<sup>31</sup> Brian Chapman, *The Profession of Government*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1959, p. 275.

demands on the political system. More than ever before, the bureaucracy and political system of this country will be judged by its performance. But one cannot judge the performance-effectiveness of the political system apart from the bureaucracy or judge the latter without reference to the political system of which it is a part.

More than this, the civil service has yet to develop the resiliency to adapt itself to a rapidly changing society and develop the capacity to foresee difficulties and prepare to meet them. But this is hardly possible unless there is close and continuous exchange of experience between officials and politicians. From this point of view, the informal approaches made by politicians at all levels might be an advantage and what appears to be interference may be converted into an avenue of contact with the people.

The administrator is really an amphibian living in two worlds in close contact with each other. There is, on the one hand, the little world of his office with its files and rules and routine jobs it carry out which he must adhere, as far as humanly possible, to the ideals of justice and impartiality. On the other hand, is the outer world of men and women and their manifold problems, their growing aspirations and demands. With this outer world, he must be in continuous touch, if he is not to become submerged by the organization in which he works. This is true of administrators at all levels and, in developing countries, it is specially true of those countless humble but important officials who come into daily contact with ordinary citizens. It is at this point that the image of administration is built up or destroyed. In the language of Strauss, the administration "is not a self-contained and self-regulating mechanism but an instrument for the furtherance of specific social interests, and, therefore, intimately concerned with the World at large and its problems".<sup>32</sup> The contact between these two worlds is suggestive of the relationship between administration and politics and on the nature of that contact rests both the character and the stability of the state.

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<sup>32</sup> E. Strauss, *The Ruling Servants*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1961, p. 45. This paragraph is influenced by his observations on the Bureaucratic Mind.

## POLITICAL POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF BUREAUCRACY

*Satish K. Arora*

NO consideration of contemporary political life and bureaucratic styles can claim seriousness and relevance until there is a deep and pervasive realization of the obsolescence of many of the prevailing modes of thought and action. An obsessive concern with immediate pressures, when coterminate with promiscuous ideological predilections, can pose awesome difficulties.

Under societal conditions perceived as threatening to the viability of the state, it is not unusual for political and bureaucratic elites to oscillate between moods and behavioural patterns that are, on the one hand, rooted in a largely obsolete past, and, on the other, erratically reaching out for temporary techniques and palliatives. The escalation of pressures can facilitate regression, but it can also create conditions under which large-scale self-scrutiny becomes permissible.

We would suggest that it is rarely, if ever, possible to intelligently analyze the bureaucratic apparatus of a state without concurrently relating it to the political arena. In turn, both the bureaucratic and the political apparatuses are intimately related not only to the dominant technological patterns prevalent at the time in that particular society, but also to contemporary technological patterns available in the more advanced and creative centres of the globe. With the current rates of diffusion of technological patterns and the ideas associated with them, we can assume that the slow tempo so central to our value system will invariably condition us to a perpetual state of surprise and incapacity to control large-scale societal shifts. The first-order priority for us is the rigorous analysis of the wide-ranging revolutionary developments of our time in order that we may locate ourselves in the global context.

Perhaps of even greater importance, the present bureaucratic malaise is not likely to be diagnosed properly if we merely concentrate on the bureaucracy as a discrete sector. An appropriate diagnostic exercise would call for greater specification of the polity's values and goals. Failing this, the likelihood will be the necessity of conceiving of bureaucracy in pathological terms. Where politics is not conceived

as collective therapy, where political reconstruction degenerates into mass manipulation, the bureaucratic phenomenon may accurately be identified as pathological—inflexible, repetitive, in short, irretrievably condemned to a routinized pattern of behaviour.

The bureaucratic and the political elites of this country have been extraordinarily fortunate inasmuch as the most deprived of our citizens—who also happen to be the majority—have in this first quarter century of Independence been among the most restrained and undemanding part of the citizenry. A deadening numbness induced by economic poverty has been correlated with socio-political isolation. A significant fact for the emerging future is the rapid replacement of this socio-political isolation by a multiplicity of channels that carry a variety of messages. So far, these deprived masses have been the targets of essentially bureaucratic and political exercises in manipulation and mobilization for goals that have been predetermined for them. But, the messages have been contradictory enough in their profusion so that they have been permissive of comparison for authenticity.

Out of this situation, we suggest, the majority of our population receives unintentional political socialization. Increasingly, the target-audience develops the skills to differentiate between the various flows of symbols available to it. The mood then tends to oscillate between credulity and cynicism. And interestingly enough, the cynicism and distrust tend not to be correlated with some personality characteristic but rather with the socio-economic conditions which validate the reality-orientation of such reactions.<sup>1</sup>

We cannot ignore the fact that larger and larger sectors of our people are affecting an entry into the hitherto highly restricted national communication networks. The still muffled entry of quiescent masses into such political communication relationships with those who command the bureaucratic and political apparatuses is pregnant with a variety of unanticipated consequences. There seems to be little evidence that this qualitative shift in the political position of the citizenry has received adequate attention either from the bureaucratic or political elites. There is only evidence to suspect that there is unease about it.

There is good reason for uneasiness, if we are to judge from what little evidence is available to us. Resentments against the bureaucracy are legion. A study recently completed in Orissa reveals that 70 per

<sup>1</sup> See data presented in my article, "The Political Relevance of Social Values: A Cross-National Comparison", *Behavioural Sciences and Community Development*, Vol. 3, March, 1969.

cent of the community have negative views about the IAS.<sup>2</sup> Another study, conducted in Uttar Pradesh, presents evidence to suggest that district level politicians bear heavy resentments against their administrative counterparts.<sup>3</sup> While all the evidence is not negative—Eldersveld and his colleagues found a much more congenial image of the administrator among their respondents in rural and urban Delhi<sup>4</sup>—there is enough of such data to at least raise the question of the necessity for deeper self-examination.

Nor is a negative image of the bureaucrat simply a rural phenomenon, or characteristic of the growing pains associated with retarded growth and development. The same disillusionment characterizes populations throughout the world. It lies at the heart of the current discontent in France and Germany, not to speak of the United States as well. "We are witnessing not the triumph, but the breakdown of bureaucracy," writes Alvin Toffler.<sup>5</sup>

In our country especially, there is a necessity to face up to the fact that the great dependency upon government administration attributed to the Indian people by colonial administrators, like Hunter and Woodruff, now remains something of a myth—if it ever was quite that apparent. Political leaders, even at the Panchayat level, now express confidence that "the people", or at most government "with the people's help" should be responsible for changes at both the village and national levels.<sup>6</sup> This lessening of feelings of dependency at the very time when governmental power is increasing must surely influence the bureaucracy's self-confidence, and its capacity to administrate effectively, especially when faced with increasing political competition as well.

Confronted by gnawing self-doubt, and perceiving a variety of aspirants to its monopoly of the commanding heights of the administrative apparatus, the bureaucracy can scarcely continue in quite the

<sup>2</sup> See Richard P. Taub, *Bureaucrats under Stress: Administrators and Administration in an Indian State*, Berkley, University of California, 1969, p. 168. But note also that almost three-fourths of the same have negative views of politicians as well.

<sup>3</sup> See Shanti Kothari and Ramashray Roy, *Relations Between Politicians and Administrators*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1969, especially Chapter V. In almost all cases, the differences in the views which administrators had of themselves and the views which politicians espoused about them were statistically significant. It should be noted that this was the reverse of the results of questions dealing with images of politicians—perhaps because more often politicians tended to be self-deprecating in their image of themselves.

<sup>4</sup> Samuel J. Eldersveld, et al, *The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy: An Empirical Study in Delhi State*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1968.

<sup>5</sup> Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock*, London, Bodley Head, 1970, p. 113.

<sup>6</sup> This is based on the preliminary results of a national survey directed by the present author under the auspices of the National Institute of Community Development.



same manner as it has in the past. Nor can it depend on attracting as many of the same high-calibre aspirants to its ranks. Not only has competition for IAS posts declined among first-class graduates;<sup>7</sup> but there is also some evidence to suggest that even those who join the Service make their choice rather unenthusiastically.<sup>8</sup>

If we are to avoid further decline in the calibre, morale and functional capabilities of our administrators, it is obvious that the bureaucracy must renovate itself. Several modes are currently under discussion, and some have to a degree been put into effect. We discuss below some suggestions, none of which are necessarily mutually exclusive, some of which have been tried, others which we feel need to be given more attention than hitherto accorded to them.

*Management Studies*—In existing circumstances, when ascendent tasks, to which it is called, are the operation of complex enterprises, the inevitable drift, at least in India, has been in the direction of management studies. Since the bureaucracy itself has been incapable of generating institutional structures that would answer to *its* specific needs, there is no alternative to accepting instruction at those institutions which are exogenous to it. There is, furthermore, a perceived affinity with the viewpoint that to run an enterprise really amounts to the same thing, whether in the private or the public sphere, that "scientific" management principles are applicable to all large-scale organizations.

This technicalizing and depoliticizing is a seductive way-out of the present quandary in which the bureaucracy presently discovers itself. Already, a handful of management centres provide training jointly to private and public bureaucrats who, through this process, presumably become transformed into managers. In fact, techniques apart, there is no doubt that a common pool of perspectives is facilitated by this training. Clearly, one can perceive the advantages accruing from such shared perspectives; clearly, also, there are political implications

<sup>7</sup> Bishwanath Prasad, *The Indian Administrative Service*, Delhi, S. Chand, 1968, p. 119; and M. Pattabhiram, "Fall in Quality of I.A.S Candidates", *The Hindu*, May 3, 1969. This has occurred at the time when the number of first-class graduates has increased fourfolds between 1950-55 and 64, according to Pattabhiram. He also notes that in 1959, 3.8 first-class graduates competed for each vacancy in the combined Central Services; in 1964 it was 1.25 for each vacancy.

<sup>8</sup> Richard P. Taub, *op. cit.*, p. 74. When asked why they chose the IAS as a career, half of Taub's Orissa sample answered, "It was supposed to be the best available. I didn't have a choice; there was no other alternative." Another quarter replied, "I planned to do something else but family and/or circumstances forced me into it". When asked, "Would you choose the same job again", only eight out of the 28 gave a positive "yes" reply; and only another eight said "maybe". The sample is admittedly small, but the results are worth verifying elsewhere.

involved in an increasingly fraternal co-mingling of personnel and perspectives. But, beyond this, we must note that the management sciences as specifically imported into India decidedly reflect milieus and orientations which need more validation before such ready emulation. Surely, the literature on the subject, since James Burnham, is cognizant of the very real ideological implications involved in management perspectives!

*Information and Social Indicators*—The Indian bureaucratic apparatus, despite some decline, continues to be manned by individuals of exceptionally high calibre. In addition, more often than not, the higher-level bureaucrats are drawn from what may be presumed to be politically aware personal backgrounds. Nearly three-fourths of the IAS, for instance, are from urban areas.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, approximately half are sons of government servants; and another ten per cent each belong to such families where the father was either a teacher, or advocate.<sup>10</sup> Such background facts tend to be unreliable for predicting the types of attitudes conducive to administering in a democratic developing country.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, such backgrounds do tend to facilitate an alertness to political developments and changes in the environment, if only from the sheer exposure to these phenomena.

In addition, and perhaps more to the point, the educational qualifications of the Indian bureaucrat are exceedingly high—even by international standards. For instance, 95 per cent of all direct recruits to the IAS, and even about a third of class I and class II officers have masters degrees.<sup>12</sup> About half of the IAS officers are first class graduates; another 41 per cent graduated with a second class degree; and over 15 per cent have also had research experience prior to joining the IAS.<sup>13</sup> All these facts tend to indicate that given the appropriate job training and stimuli, the administrative cadres are potentially capable of handling advanced technological and communication techniques and information. Given such skills, they could then, presumably far more

<sup>9</sup> R. K. Trivedi and D. N. Rao, "Higher Civil Service in India: A Sample Survey", *Journal of the National Academy of Administration*, Vol. 6, July, 1961, p. 50; and C. P. Bhambhri, "The Administrative Elite and Political Modernization in India: A Study of the Value Attitudes of IAS Probationers 1970-71", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (Jan.-March.) 1971, p. 50.

<sup>10</sup> Trivedi and Rao, *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> See C. P. Bhambhri, *op. cit.*, and V. A. Pai Panandiker and S. S. Kshirsagar, *The Civil Service and Development Administration* (forthcoming), for data—sometimes contradictory—correlating background with attitudes.

<sup>12</sup> R. K. Trivedi and D. N. Rao, *op. cit.*, and V. A. Pai Panandiker and S. S. Kshirsagar, *op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> Trivedi and Rao, *op. cit.*

adequately, scan and deal with the environment within which they operate.

While fairly high levels of economic surveillance have been developed, this cannot by and of itself be of more than limited utility. More than any other administrative system, the Indian one has to develop at a faster pace since it is the only large-scale economically underdeveloped system which simultaneously cultivates the socio-political ideals of democracy. Socio-political intelligence capacities must be developed so that state policies are not only increasingly responsive to existing needs but also capable of anticipating emerging constellations of societal demands and preferences. It will be necessary to develop sensitive measures of public satisfaction and discontent, of incipient needs. Policy-making will have to be informed of both articulated public preferences as well as of as yet unarticulated demands. Neither bureaucratic apparatuses nor political machines can afford to ignore the socio-political intelligence being generated by the social sciences. In fact, a central fact of our times is the increasing and simultaneous indispensibility of social sciences for acquisition of power, for governance, and for displacement of regimes.

The world only now is beginning to awaken to the potentialities of computer-based information systems.<sup>14</sup> Yet it is just this type of system which our researchers should be developing in the area of administration. This is necessary not only in order that we keep abreast, and prevent our being permanently relegated to the 'backward' end of the spectrum. The development of such a system, supported by a rich, informed input bank of social indicators, could produce a massively effective application of knowledge in the service of administration. Needless to add, this could have potentially powerful effects upon both our governance capacity as well as the more accurate—and humane—accommodation of the citizens' needs.

Nor need we assume that such a system will lessen still further the bureaucrat's role at levels below the Centre. On the contrary, a computer-based information system can provide, more readily than perhaps

<sup>14</sup> See Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Political Information Systems", in Erich Jantsch, *Perspectives of Planning: Proceedings of the OECD Working Symposium on Long-Range Forecasting and Planning*, Paris, OECD, 1969, p. 319, who suggests: "The computer makes possible complex data management systems that will store, retrieve, organize and purge enormous bodies of information drawn from a multitude of sources in a variety of formats . . . that would permit many users to store, retrieve and analyze information of whatever sort might interest them in whatever format they choose . . . Despite its promise and potential social significance, no such computer-based comprehensive information system now exists. There are, of course, many special-purpose computer-based information systems."

any other information system available to date, extensive data at widely dispersed levels, thereby contributing to intelligent, informed decision-making even at local levels. As one scholar has noted:

"The power of top leadership today is very largely the power of an information monopoly. Only they are served by the armies of clerks that compile the records of what is going on. A society with computerized information facilities can make its choice between centralization and decentralization, because it will have the mechanical capability of moving information either way."<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, under our current system of administration, the high educational qualifications of our bureaucratic personnel seem of dubious benefit to their effective administration. Partially, no doubt, this is due to the type of education imparted by our educational system—a subject which obviously lies outside the scope of this article. But partially too, the demands of administration roles are not in consonance with the degree of education possessed by those who man these roles. If, on the other hand, we were to seriously launch a system of administration based upon extensive and comparatively easy availability of economic, social and political indicators, the length of exposure to education—if not the content—would be a considerable asset to our bureaucrats—and one not given to many of their counterparts in developed nations.<sup>16</sup> The challenge of an administrative post might also be such that the IAS might again be able to attract the type of high-calibre, technically educated personnel who currently prefer, apparently, to veer more into the swelling technical professions, like engineering, medicine, and even into agriculture.<sup>17</sup>

*Principles of Hierarchy and Accountability*—Increasingly developed polities are becoming less dependent upon organization of labour and management along traditional lines; they are evolving patterns for the organization of intellectual skills along non-hierarchical lines, involving a multiplicity of decision-centres. There is a ground swell of demand for greater *participation* in the shaping and sharing of crucial goals and values at differing levels. Several attempts have been in the offing in recent years. Perhaps one of the more politically astute, but ill-timed,

<sup>15</sup> Ithiel de Sola Pool, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

<sup>16</sup> For comparative data see, for instance, Lloyd W. Warner, et al, *The American Federal Executive*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1963, p. 11. For an exceptionally informative analysis of how one highly educated bureaucracy—the Chinese mandarin—served administrative interests through the direct application of their scholarly talents, see Etienne Balazs, *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964, especially Chapter 10 on "History as a Guide to Bureaucratic Practice".

<sup>17</sup> See statistics cited in M. Pattabhiram, *op. cit.*

was de Gaulle's endeavour to create an increasingly participatory polity simultaneously with an extensive re-organization of the regions of France. This notable effort failed largely because it never really came to terms with the problem of the bureaucratized environment and the necessity for evolving new control mechanisms.

Considerable verve is also being evinced in the current 'public choice' movement in the United States. Its advocates, critical of Weberian and Wilsonian assumptions about the necessity for a single, integrated bureaucratic hierarchy, advocate the establishment of competing hierarchies—"multiorganizational arrangements in the public sector that tend to take on the characteristics of public service industries composed of many public agencies operating with substantial independence of one another".<sup>18</sup> The 'public choice' advocates are also very concerned with the problem of how bureaucrats can give attention to the needs of the citizenry. Their solution—reminiscent of the Madisonian treatment of the political sector—is a vision of "rational, self-interested public administrators consciously bargaining among themselves and monopolizing political support from their clientele in order to avoid political stalemate and sustain the political feasibility of their agencies".<sup>19</sup>

An equally impressive intellectual liveliness characterises the thought of one of Europe's most distinguished Marxist theoreticians, Roger Garaudy, of France. He also is convinced that "the problem of adapting to the newscientific and technological revolution . . . demands participation on the widest scales as well as responsibility and creative initiative on the part of all".<sup>20</sup> He feels that the centralized bureaucratic state does little to help solve the problem of alienation of the worker—"since the worker in such a system is once again turned into a wage-earner, albeit as a State, and not a private employee". Garaudy is attracted to the organizational models currently evolving in Yugoslavia, such as self-management by workers councils.<sup>21</sup>

As an aside, we might note that the American public choice group predictably cannot release themselves from the fascination with market

<sup>18</sup> Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, "Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 31, 1971, p. 212.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Roger Garaudy, *The Turning Point of Socialism*, London, Fontana, 1970, p. 142.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180. Garaudy notes that "the fact that over the last fifteen years, Yugoslavia has ranked among the group of countries having the fastest rate of development, in spite of her heavy initial handicap, is the best indication that self-management, far from being a hindrance to technical progress, in fact, creates the most favourable conditions for it".

models; similarly the Marxist thinkers equally predictably find it almost impossible to re-conceptualize the role of the working class. Nonetheless, from both sides of the ideological spectrum emerges anxiety regarding the increasing irrelevance of existing modes of administering collectivities.

In India, decentralization has had a particular political vogue, from Balwantrai Mehta to Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan. The modes of conceptualization have always been oddly blind about the problem of bureaucracy, assuming somehow that democratic decentralization would automatically meet both local and national goals, political as well as bureaucratic. The reticence to come to grips with the bureaucratic phenomenon is lamentable, for obviously serious problems present themselves when we attempt to reconcile commitment to the growing participatory patterns with the current bureaucracy's feelings and needs. There is some evidence to indicate that Indian bureaucrats are not very receptive to intensifying modes of participatory political behaviour. When confronted with the statement, "Politicians do nothing but create trouble for the administration", 70 per cent of a sample of district-level administrators agreed.<sup>22</sup> Another study reveals that 87 per cent of a wide-ranging sample of bureaucrats ranked low on a scale of attitudes towards participation.<sup>23</sup> Obviously, much more work is required in this area of investigation.<sup>24</sup> But there is little doubt that political participation—perhaps even at the expense of the bureaucracy—will increase in the future. The bureaucracy will have to evolve ways of more gracefully functioning in this changing political environment.

It is also not difficult to conceive of the possibility of organizational shifts within the major political parties—shifts which call for, on the one hand, greater ideological fidelity and, on the other, the ability to directly affect decisions. Cadre-based political organization has been discussed with seriousness in the New Congress policy-making circles. Elsewhere, we have elaborated on the consequences of such reorganization.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Shanti Kothari and Ramashray Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

<sup>23</sup> V. A. Pai Panandiker and S. S. Kshirsagar, *op. cit.*, p. 55. The authors also found that the higher the economic class background the lower the urge for participation; similarly, sons of government servants (as already noted above, about half of the IAS) and sons of agriculturists and businessmen, were less likely to score high on participation orientation than, for instance, sons of professionals.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* This same study, for instance, indicates that almost three-fourths of the sample scored high on "change orientation" (p. 45), and that it was the younger officers, and especially Class III officers who were most inclined in this direction (p. 48). Also see data presented in C. P. Bhambhri, *op. cit.*

<sup>25</sup> See my article, "The 1971 Elections: Vested Interests Overrated", *Seminar*, August, 1971, pp. 27-30.

But we need to underscore here that out of a tightly organized and increasingly capable political party apparatus that simultaneously exercises dominance in the legislatures as well as over the governmental machinery, can arise the administrative capacity, will, and personnel that can drastically affect the bureaucracy's role. There is scant doubt that the strength accruing to the political apparatus will be so impressive that the bureaucracy will be forced to concede increasingly larger areas of the resource-allocation which it currently monopolises.

Unmediated political-cum-administrative power certainly has its dangers; but it also holds undeniable fascination for all who wish to direct the course of power. The primacy of the political element can be facilitative of either coercion or the liberation of latent energies, but it is only sufficient to draw attention here to the political configurations that are foreseeable and which can impinge upon existing bureaucratic patterns.

*Public Policy Goals*—Carl Friedrich once wrote that to discuss bureaucracy without referring to the pattern of objectives toward which its functioning is directed "is like discussing plant growth without taking the sun into account". The Indian polity is ideologically committed to transforming the *quality* of national life, to transforming this peasant-based inegalitarian society into a more technically oriented and egalitarian society. In this sense, the idea of a total transformation of the national community receives support amounting to a national consensus. But such a policy commitment has serious implications for the nature and functioning of a bureaucracy, and especially for one which is heir to a colonial service whose tasks rarely included programmes involving intensive or extensive change. A total restructuring of the national community within a short span of time has been achieved most often in authoritarian states. In such states, the demand for total national reconstruction has been understood in its manifold complexity. They have been extraordinarily sensitive to the importance of intervening fairly drastically into arenas, such as the family, training of children, adult socialization, mass communications, and secondary associations. These inter-relationships have been perceived with clarity in every instance of a dynamic authoritarian regime—regardless of the political ideology espoused.

While we find that in India a commitment, or desire at least, exists to transform the quality of national life, there is not in existence either the appreciation, but more so the will to come to terms with the implications of this commitment, and the fact that drastic social intervention is necessary to alter existing society. To alter radically the social arena



and concomitantly the concomic arena and, thus, to seek to alter the status arrangements of society is to clearly rendezvous with enormous political instability, the control over which may or may not be possible. It is this uncertainty of managing society under dislocated conditions that inspires rationalizations for proceeding carefully, of going slow, and inevitably, the political conservatism that seeks system-maintenance as an end in itself. Such fears, however, have always been with politics, and at some point, authoritarian regimes themselves express identical concerns when they themselves freeze the revolution with a rhetoric that alone maintains its dynamism.

It would appear to be elementary wisdom to calibrate control mechanisms if such magnitudes of societal change are to be directed or guided from the top. Effective bureaucratic and political instrumentalities can, however, be devised only where there is an ideological clarity. In our country, populist political rhetoric seems to merge imperceptibly with statism, mindless of the contradictions involved. Initiatives from below need to be somehow related to direction from above and it is here where the centrality of politics has to be grasped. Pending a resolution of these problems, neither the role nor the functions of bureaucracy can be clearly perceived.

The shape of our future is confused only because of our intellectual incoherence. Our political formulas and our administrative capacities are not complementary; our national aspirations are egalitarian though their formulation is elitist; our administrative framework is presumed to assist in the making of a future, when it lacks even the rudimentary skills of self-scrutiny. A considerable degree of confusion is built into the kind of polity we live in—the enormous differences in the levels of technology and culture contribute to this. The simultaneity of the presence of the most primitive and the most advanced technological levels implies a situation of tension and a lack of synchronized movement. On the one hand, there are the state directives that push this society to repeat the phases of industrialization which other societies have gone through in an anguished way; on the other hand, India has already made a significant entry into the cybernetic phase of society—among the developing nations of the world she has, for example, the largest number of computers. If this meant only that there was a wide diversity of levels of skill and its utilization it would not concern us here. The relevance is for other reasons: we inhabit a universe in which technological break-throughs have qualitatively altered the meaning and content of industrialization as conventionally understood. There is, thus, an obsolescence about the sequences normally associated with industrial development and its accompanying organizational forms of private and public bureaucracies.

The clearest casualties of this new technological revolution are the nature of work, the principles of hierarchy, and the role of information. Each of these central concepts of organization are being violently transformed—but the message has not apparently yet reached us. And, although this is not the place to elaborate upon emergent technologically dependent social forms, we would nevertheless draw attention to the fact that organizational forms dictated by the new technology of information-processing make redundant several of the classical Weberian formulations of the role of bureaucracy and the processing of information. Similarly, significant shifts towards automation demand both qualitatively and quantitatively different control mechanisms. The cybernetic notion of 'feedback' has both technical as well as social referents. Consequently, mechanistic models, of which bureaucracies are a classic example, become increasingly irrelevant and, indeed, positive brakes to societal transformation.

It would be unfair to comment upon the pressures for performance upon the bureaucracy and its decreasing capacity to match expectations of it without simultaneously acknowledging the fact that the forging and restructuring of the bureaucratic instrument is primarily a political responsibility. To conceive of the bureaucracy as an autonomous entity is to lose sight of origins and prevailing power constellations.<sup>26</sup> While it is true that the bureaucracy at the highest levels can facilitate the creation of mechanisms for self-scrutiny and readjustment to evolving socio-political milieus, it is also abundantly evident that its mandate is limited, and that qualitative transformation will have to be politically stimulated. Bureaucracies are not especially prone to innovation and change; political elites should be, and often are, more responsive to societal demands. In the ultimate analysis, bureaucratic failure is an attribute of a political system whose arteries are hardened, and whose radar mechanisms have failed to operate.

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<sup>26</sup> Much of the intellectual confusion here can be traced directly to the reinterpretation of Max Weber by Parsonian sociologists. In their uncritical acceptance of the virtues of "differentiation", they often overlook the resultant analytical impoverishment.

## A STUDY OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND BUREAUCRACY IN INDIA

C. P. Bhambhri

IN all political systems, the various centres of power are involved in competition against each other, with a view to exercising more power than legally belongs to them. All centres and sub-centres of political power are keen to extend their zones of influence in the corridors of the government. This kind of competition is very commonly found between the political leadership and bureaucracy. In democracy, the functioning of bureaucracy is conditioned by the operations of the party system. Where the party system is unable to produce a stable government, the bureaucracy may acquire an especial position or become a victim of various organized powerful pressure groups.<sup>1</sup> A very important variable determining the behaviour of bureaucracy is the political effectiveness of the political leadership. If political leadership is weak or is uncertain about its base of support, under such circumstances, the bureaucracy becomes either a victim of indecision or arrogates more powers to itself than formally it is entitled to have. The hypothesis is, in a struggle for power between public bureaucracy and political leadership (elected representatives), the former thrives if the leadership authority is weak. Closely connected with this is also the hypothesis that the bureaucracy gets immobilized if political leadership is sharply fluctuating or unstable. To put it differently, the degree of political hegemony is inversely proportional to the degree of bureaucratic hegemony; and the reverse of it is also true. To illustrate it:

$$P \times B = K$$

The product of  $P$  (politics) and  $B$  (bureaucracy) is constant. Thus  $K$  is constant. This broad framework of relationship between political leadership and bureaucracy is helpful in understanding the dynamics of relationship between Indira Gandhi and the bureaucracy.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This can be illustrated from the French experience. "The weakness of the party system, moreover, made it possible for powerful interest groups to colonize the bureaucracy and to utilize it for their purposes. In other words, the French bureaucracy was not able in any significant way to use its power to pursue a coherent and directed political course." Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1966, p. 150.

<sup>2</sup> For earlier period, see C. P. Bhambhri, *Bureaucracy and Politics in India*, Delhi, Vikas, 1971.

There are three distinct phases of the tenure of Smt. Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister which need to be underscored for properly appreciating her political position in her party and the country. These phases are:

- (1) When Indira Gandhi was elected as Prime Minister on January 19, 1966, it was a pre-election year. For many of the important leaders in the Congress party, she was a make shift pre-election arrangement, to be replaced by a permanent incumbent to be elected after the general elections of 1967.<sup>3</sup> Its evidence is found in the fact that Morarji and his followers again threw the challenge to her leadership, after the general elections of 1967, and ultimately a compromise was evolved and a contest was avoided by making Morarji as the Deputy Prime Minister. Thus, from 1966 to 1967 was a period of 'Probation' or apprenticeship for the new Prime Minister. In this period, she was trying to find her way. The fact that Indira Gandhi had yet to emerge as an effective leader of the party and of the government influenced her relationship with the higher echelons of bureaucracy.
- (2) Her second phase of power starts with 1967 and ends with 1969 when the Congress party was split into two factions now known as Congress (R) and Congress (O). During this phase, she was searching for issues to establish an independent identity of her own. This search for 'self-identity' brought her into clash with the entrenched leadership in the party. The Prime Minister got involved in very serious political issues and conflicts with other leaders of the party. Since the picture of the conflict was confused for quite some time, and the results were unpredictable, she could not be very sure about her political position. It is worthwhile to examine her relationship with bureaucracy during this period of acute intra-party conflict.
- (3) After the Congress split starts the phase of the consolidation of power by the Prime Minister. In this phase of consolidation, she made her politics issue-oriented and the large mass of people identified their aspirations with the new policies of the Prime Minister. This issue-oriented politics earned for her a new legitimacy in the Indian political system, and it made her one of the very effective and powerful Prime Ministers of India. From the post-split period to the fifth Lok Sabha elections, she occupied a position of definite primacy both in the party

<sup>3</sup> For details and manner of succession, see Michael Brecher, *Nehru's Mantle : The Politics of Succession in India*, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, pp. 190-241.

and in the Cabinet. She was the real leader, and effective power resided in her. What was her relationship with bureaucracy in this period? This needs an analysis.

The above mentioned description shows that Smt. Indira Gandhi has emerged as a very strong Prime Minister, but this journey towards power has been full of political struggles and ups and downs. The Prime Minister's control over bureaucracy is dependent on her own political position. When her own political position was shaky, her relationship with bureaucracy was one of dependence on the latter. When she emerged as an unchallenged leader of the party and the country, she started using bureaucracy as a dependable instrument in the exercise of power. These statements that the Prime Minister in her initial stages of power was dependent on bureaucracy, and now she is effectively using it as an instrument, need to be proved in the light of her relationship with her secretariat and other members of the bureaucracy.

#### *Prime Minister's Secretariat*

One of the most important innovations in the field of public administration made by Lal Bahadur Shastri was the establishment of a powerful Prime Minister's Secretariat, which, in due course of time, became the nerve centre of political and administrative power in the country. On July 13, 1964, L. K. Jha, ICS, was appointed Secretary to the Prime Minister and head of this secretariat. Smt. Gandhi accepted this legacy and continued with this institution. She was also advised to continue with this set-up. *The Times of India* in an editorial "New Leader" wrote:

"As Prime Minister she will have to have a grip over complex economic and foreign policy issues. This can be possible only if she develops a style of work which leaves her enough time to concentrate on major policy decisions. Mr. Shastri had begun the task of building up a strong secretariat of his own. Mrs. Gandhi will have to strengthen it further so that it can be in a position to process all the proposals that come to her and enable her to take quick decisions."<sup>4</sup>

After Shastri's death Shri L. K. Jha continued to be Smt. Indira Gandhi's Secretary also. Before becoming Prime Minister, Smt. Gandhi had a very limited administrative experience. She was a Minister of Information and Broadcasting in Lal Bahadur Shastri

<sup>4</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, January 20, 1966.

Cabinet.<sup>5</sup> Since it was her probationary period, her dependence on her Secretary and other administrative advisers was quite great. Shri L. K. Jha was conspicuous by his presence in all important and crucial meetings of the Prime Minister with foreign dignitaries. He accompanied the Prime Minister in her all important foreign visits and participated in deliberations and discussions with the leaders of the foreign countries. He was referred to in the communiques issued after the visits of the Prime Minister. In domestic affairs, he was present in all important meetings addressed by the Prime Minister. Whether she held a meeting with other secretaries of the Government of India or important leaders of industry and business, L. K. Jha was always there. His position became so important that he overshadowed his other peers, and performed jobs which should have been entrusted to other civil servants. Before any evidence to prove L. K. Jha's prominent role in public affairs is presented, it is important to refer to a serious problem of relationship that developed between the bureaucracy and political leadership in the first year of Smt. Gandhi's rule.

A serious conflict occurred between the Home Minister and the Home Secretary; and the former charged his secretary with non-cooperation. He also complained that the Prime Minister did not accede to his request to transfer the Secretary. Whatever be the merits of the case, and irrespective of the interpretations of the issues involved, the situation developed in such a way that a politically weak Cabinet Minister wanted the Prime Minister's support against the alleged acts of omission and commission of the Home Secretary. Was the Prime Minister in a position to help her Home Minister? In case of a serious deadlock between a minister and his secretary, it is generally the latter who becomes the scapegoat. But this depends on the political strength of the minister, and his political standing with the Prime Minister. The hypothesis is that the authority of a minister depends on his political strength or strong support of the Prime Minister who should be himself or herself politically strong to defend the colleagues and pull up the erring bureaucrats. In this case (Home Minister-Home Secretary conflict of 1966), both these variables were missing. Hence, the Minister had to go and not the Secretary.

Coming to the role of Shri L. K. Jha, the Prime Minister's Secretary, there is ample evidence to prove that he had acquired a special position in the hierarchy of bureaucracy in the country. The following evidence will prove it.

<sup>5</sup> For her profile, see M. Chalapati Rau (ed.), *Indira Priyadarshini*, New Delhi, Popular Book Service, 1966; and Khwaja Ahmed Abbas, *Indira Gandhi: Return of the Red Rose*, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1966.

(1) Mr. Hubert Humphrey, the United States Vice-President came to India and met the Prime Minister on February 17, 1966. The Indian team consisted of:

- (a) The Prime Minister, (b) Shri Dinesh Singh, (c) Shri C. S. Jha, Foreign Secretary, and (d) Shri L. K. Jha, Prime Minister's Secretary.<sup>6</sup>

(2) During her first visit to foreign countries (U.S.A., U.K. and U.S.S.R.) as Prime Minister in March, 1966, the team included the following:

- (a) The Prime Minister, (b) Shri L. K. Jha, Secretary to the Prime Minister, (c) Shri C. S. Jha, Foreign Secretary, (d) Shri P. N. Haksar, Deputy High Commissioner in U.K., (e) Dr. I. G. Patel, Economic Adviser to the Government of India, and (f) Shri Pitamber Pant, Member, Planning Commission.<sup>7</sup>

This pattern of L. K. Jha accompanying the Prime Minister in her important foreign visits continued.<sup>8</sup>

The role of secretary to the Prime Minister was commented upon in the press and Parliament.

Inder Malhotra, in his commentary on 'Journey to Russia', observed:

"In fact, the point might be made that the Prime Minister's speech writers tend to tailor her speeches too much to suit the audience. During her visit to the U.S.A., the theme always was democracy and the large scope in India for private enterprise, local and foreign. There was only a fleeting mention of the public sector, and even less of socialism. In Moscow, socialism and the public sector were played up. There was some mention of the 'Indian brand of democracy', but none whatever of private enterprise."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, February 18, 1966.

<sup>7</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, March 24, 1966.

<sup>8</sup> The Prime Minister's foreign tour of Cairo, Moscow and Belgrade from July 7 to 16, 1966, *The Statesman*, Delhi, July 17, 1966; Prime Minister's visit to Nepal, October 4, 1966, *The Times of India*, Delhi, October 1, 1966. Mr. Averall Harriman came as President Johnson's representative to discuss Vietnam. He held discussions with L. K. Jha also. *The Times of India*, Delhi, November 1, 1966. President Novotny of Czechoslovakia came to Delhi. Shri L. K. Jha was in the official team of the Government of India. *The Times of India*, Delhi, November 21, 1966.

<sup>9</sup> *The Statesman*, Delhi, July 20, 1966.



When Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister, she was faced with acute economic problems facing the country. The first censure motion against Indira Gandhi Government was discussed in August, 1966;<sup>10</sup> and decision of the Government to devalue the rupee in June, 1966, was criticized by the opposition parties in Parliament. Some members of Parliament also referred to the role of bureaucracy in rendering wrong advice to the Prime Minister on important national issues.

In his political commentary, after the no-confidence motion, Inder Malhotra observed:

“Professor Hiren Mukerjee’s harsh phrase about the Prime Minister being surrounded by ‘political upstarts and slimy bureaucrats’ summed up the mood of a large section of political Delhi pretty accurately, although this reporter considers it unfair that rather than blame the Prime Minister for choosing wrong advisers or accepting wrong advice, her advisers should be attacked and abused in season and out of season.”<sup>11</sup>

(3) The growing influence of Shri L. K. Jha was visible when he was appointed Member of the Atomic Energy Commission. On this, *The Statesman* commented that this was a departure from the convention that only the Cabinet Secretary is appointed to the Commission.<sup>12</sup>

(4) A very important conference held in Delhi during this period was of the non-aligned nations—India, Egypt and Yugoslavia. The Ministers and the officials of the Ministry of External affairs were meeting frequently to finalize the briefs on various subjects of the conference. In this task, they were assisted by the Prime Minister’s Secretary, Shri L. K. Jha.<sup>13</sup> For the summit conference of the non-aligned nations which was held in Delhi from October 21 to 24, 1966, the following was the official team:

- (i) The Prime Minister, (ii) Shri Swaran Singh, and (iii) Shri Dinesh Singh constituted the political side of the team; and the official side consisted of: L. K. Jha, C. S. Jha, T. N. Kaul, Azim Hussain, K. B. Lal, J. K. Atal, A. B. Pant, I. J. Bahadur Singh, B. G. Verghese (Press Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat),

<sup>10</sup> See *The Statesman*, Delhi, August 2, 3, 4, 5, 1966.

<sup>11</sup> *The Statesman*, Delhi, August 12, 1966.

<sup>12</sup> *The Statesman*, Delhi, July 2, 1966. This practice was continued, and Shri P. N. Haksar, who succeeded Shri L. K. Jha as Secretary to the Prime Minister, was also appointed Member of the Atomic Energy Commission. *The Times of India*, Delhi, September 7, 1971.

<sup>13</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, October 18, 1966.

J. S. Mehta, A. N. Mehta, S. Vikram Shah, Mrs. K. Rukimini Menon, M. L. Bhardwaj, Natwar Singh, and S. M. S. Chadha.<sup>14</sup>

To highlight the multi-dimensional role of the Prime Minister's Secretary, two more facts need to be mentioned.

(a) Not only Shri L. K. Jha accompanied the Prime Minister in her foreign visits, or participated in discussions and deliberations which the Prime Minister had with foreign dignitaries, he also acted as a trouble shooter for the Prime Minister. The following illustration helps us in proving the point.

When Smt. Gandhi reshuffled the Cabinet, after Shri G. L. Nanda's resignation in November 1966, the then Finance Minister, Shri Sachindra Chaudhari sent his resignation letter to the Prime Minister. He had sent this letter on the basis of rumours (that he had heard) that he would be dropped from the Cabinet.

Smt. Gandhi did not send a reply to that letter but assured Shri Chaudhari, through her Secretary L. K. Jha, that she was no longer thinking of dropping him from the Cabinet.<sup>15</sup>

This illustration can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation can be that Shri Jha was just acting as a messenger. The other interpretation can be that the Secretary to the Prime Minister had obtained important place in the estimation of the Prime Minister, and she trusted him for a very sensitive political assignment. The second interpretation seems more plausible in the light of the totality of circumstances of that period.

(b) The Prime Minister entrusted Shri L. K. Jha with a very important diplomatic assignment, which, under ordinary circumstances, was beyond his jurisdiction of normal responsibilities. He was sent to Moscow, Berne, Paris, Washington and London to discuss proposed nuclear non-proliferation treaty with the leaders of these countries.<sup>16</sup> Shri C. S. Jha, Foreign Secretary, was also sent for a fortnight to discuss

<sup>14</sup> *The Times of India*, October 20, 1966. The same pattern of functioning continued when Shri P. N. Haksar succeeded Shri L.K. Jha as Secretary to the Prime Minister. In September 1970, a Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations was held at Lusaka; and Shri P. N. Haksar accompanied the Prime Minister and participated in the discussions with leaders of other non-aligned nations, like Egypt and Yugoslavia. For details of delegation for Lusaka Summit Conference, see *The Times of India*, Delhi, August 17, 1970, and *The Indian Express*, Delhi, August 17, 1970.

<sup>15</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, November 16, 1966.

<sup>16</sup> *The Statesman*, Delhi, April 2, 1967,

nuclear non-proliferation treaty.<sup>17</sup>

This role of Shri L. K. Jha was commented upon. Inder Malhotra wrote:

"It does seem curious, to say the least, that a permanent civil servant—admittedly a man of Mr. L. K. Jha's ability but a civil servant nonetheless—should be negotiating with Mr. Kosygin and President Johnson, while the country's foreign Minister should be trudging the corridors of the Palais de Nations in Geneva in order to discuss the same subjects with Mr. William Foster, Mrs. Alva Myradal and other delegates to the eighteen nation Disarmament Committee which, incidentally, is in recess."<sup>18</sup>

To sum up, L. K. Jha played a very important role in negotiations, decisions and deliberations in domestic and foreign affairs of the country during the first year of the Prime Ministership of Smt. Indira Gandhi. On January 4, 1967, his appointment as Governor of Reserve Bank was announced.<sup>19</sup> He handed over the charge to Shri P. N. Haksar on May 1, 1967. Haksar was educated in the London School of Economics and was member of the Indian Foreign Service. His administrative experience was in the field of foreign affairs. The important assignments he had held were: Deputy High Commissioner to London; High Commissioner in Nigeria; Ambassador in Vienna; Joint Secretary in charge of administration in the Foreign office and Director of External Publicity. Like Shri Jha, Shri Haksar also continued to play important role in administrative and political affairs of the country.

After the split of the Congress party in 1969, the Prime Minister started taking more initiative in policy matters and administration. She also strengthened her Secretariat by inducting an eminent economist into it.<sup>20</sup> The latest attempt seems to be in the direction of making the Prime Minister's Secretariat a kind of 'brain trust' for policy making to be manned by persons who seem to be committed to the broad policies of the Prime Minister. So called 'committed experts' are being brought into it.

This has attracted criticism of the opposition parties in Parliament.

<sup>17</sup> *The Statesman*, Delhi, April 18, 1967.

<sup>18</sup> A joke in the corridors of the Secretariat was: "In the matter of nuclear policy Shri L.K. Jha is the Government's right hand, and Shri C. S. Jha the left one; neither Jha knows what the other is doing." *The Statesman*, Delhi, April 28, 1967.

<sup>19</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, January 4, 1967.

<sup>20</sup> Reference is to P. N. Dhar's appointment in the Prime Minister's Secretariat.

Participating in the Lok Sabha Debate on the Home Ministry's demands for grants, Shri S. N. Mishra, leader of the Congress (O) group, accused the Prime Minister of rendering the cabinet form of government 'vacuous' by concentrating vital organs of government in the cabinet secretariat or the Prime Minister's own Secretariat.

He said that there were, within the Prime Minister's Secretariat, economic experts, academicians and bureaucrats. Economic policy measures were no longer taken in the Finance Ministry. These were being taken by the economic experts in the Prime Minister's Secretariat.

Shri Mishra thought attempts to 'refashion the Planning Commission' were aimed at making it respond to the tune of these experts in the Prime Minister's office. He also alleged that the expenditure on the Prime Minister's Secretariat had grown threefold.<sup>21</sup>

To sum up, new teeth have been added to the Prime Minister's Secretariat and its role and functions are not merely to 'advise' the Prime Minister. In the course of time, it has become the nerve centre of power and deals with important politico-administrative problems.

## II

After examining the role of the Prime Minister's Secretariat, and its relationship with Smt. Gandhi, we now turn to some other aspects of the problem of relationship of bureaucracy with Smt. Gandhi. After the split of the Congress party and the nationalization of banks,<sup>22</sup> Smt. Gandhi started consolidating her position both in the party and in the government. Slowly and gradually, she consolidated her power so much that her writ ran in an unquestioned manner both in the party and the government. Its most important evidence was that she shifted Shri Y. B. Chavan from the Home Ministry and herself took over its charge.<sup>23</sup> Except for temporary purposes, no Prime Minister before Smt. Gandhi took over the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Home

<sup>21</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, June 25, 1971.

<sup>22</sup> Smt. Gandhi faced opposition from the bureaucracy in her desire to nationalize banks in August 1969. T. P. Singh, the then Finance Secretary, 'expressed unhappiness'. L. K. Jha, at that time Governor of the Reserve Bank argued that nationalization of banks was neither 'feasible' nor 'desirable'. See Kuldip Nayar, *India: The Critical Years*, Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1971, p. 67. She had too many political stakes at that time to accept such an advice. She overruled them. Writing on this *Link* (a Delhi Weekly with a slant) informed: "Finance Ministry officials and the Reserve Bank Governor were against the measures she wanted to take. She had, therefore, to devise other means and use officials sympathetic to her point of view to clear the decks for bank nationalization." *Link*, Delhi, July 27, 1969, p. 8.

<sup>23</sup> *The Hindustan Times*, Delhi, June 27, 1970.

Affairs. Knowing the crucial and critical position of this Ministry in the administrative complex of this country, Smt. Gandhi's critics saw some design in this operation. She also took over the charge of the Intelligence Bureau, Central Bureau of Investigation and the Directorate of Economic Intelligence. The press comments were that it was great concentration of powers in the hands of the Prime Minister. *The Statesman*, in an editorial entitled "The Boss's verdict", described it as "concentration of power" in the hands of the Prime Minister.<sup>24</sup> *The Hindustan Times*, in an editorial under the title "What Is It All About?", wrote:

"Mrs. Gandhi has seemingly demonstrated that it is she who cracks the whip in the party."<sup>25</sup>

In another editorial, under the caption of "Not The Best Recipe", it again wrote:

"One of the principal outcomes of the cabinet reshuffle is the enormous concentration of work and power, patronage and punishment in the hands of the Prime Minister. To the burden of Home has been added Revenue Intelligence. The CSIR and Electronics have both been brought under the Cabinet Secretariat (together with the Department of Personnel). Additionally, the Prime Minister is to oversee industrial licensing. Mrs. Gandhi is not going to have the time to attend to all this. The result could either be hopeless accumulation, delay and drift or a transference of direction, and control from ministerial to bureaucratic hands."<sup>26</sup>

Participating in a discussion on a No-Confidence motion against the Government, Shri Madhu Limaye criticized this reshuffle of cabinet and alleged that an overbusy Prime Minister cannot look after all these Departments. He said that her work of administering the several departments and agencies under her charge has necessarily to be carried on by the bureaucracy in the Cabinet Secretariat.<sup>27</sup>

Replying to the debate on the No-Confidence Motion, Smt. Gandhi defended the reshuffle of the Cabinet, and transfer of some departments under her direct responsibility. She said neither the Cabinet Secretariat nor the Prime Minister's Secretariat had been invented by her. The Prime Minister's Secretariat in its present form had been designed by

<sup>24</sup> *The Statesman*, Delhi, June 27, 1970.

<sup>25</sup> *The Hindustan Times*, Delhi, June 27, 1970.

<sup>26</sup> *The Hindustan Times*, Delhi, June 29, 1970.

<sup>27</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, July 29, 1970.

her predecessor, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri. There had been no additions to it since then because no extra work of responsibility had been entrusted to it.

She said that in the U.K. and elsewhere, the intelligence departments were the direct responsibility of the Prime Minister. Hence, she had not done anything unusual.<sup>28</sup>

An analysis of the reshuffle of the Cabinet, and its end result, shows clearly that the Prime Minister emerged politically very strong and an unquestioned leader of her party and the Cabinet.

By taking over direct responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs and other allied functions, she assumed direct control over the huge bureaucratic apparatus of the country. The Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible for running the administration of the country. Now the Prime Minister by taking over the Ministry of Home Affairs herself assumed effective administrative and political leadership of the country. The Prime Minister drew two distinct advantages from this new arrangement. They are:

- (a) By being her own Home Minister, she would get all the information directly about the critical sectors of politico-administrative life of the country. All nerve centres of communication came under her direct control. This would help her in decision making about crucial issues facing the country.
- (b) For providing effective leadership to the country, she now had all the instruments of power under her direct control. She would decide the functioning of bureaucracy. By assuming personal responsibility of controlling the bureaucracy of the country, she would be able to ensure effective implementation of her policies. This reshuffle of the Cabinet clearly showed that Smt. Gandhi desired to use bureaucracy as an effective instrument for achieving public goals.

After consolidating her position in the party, and by assuming the responsibility of Home Ministry, she paid great attention to the top echelons of bureaucracy in the country. Since bureaucracy was her main instrument for achieving politico-administrative goals, she paid great attention to its personnel and functioning. Within a few months of the cabinet reshuffle, she reshuffled Secretaries of ten Departments of

<sup>28</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, July 30, 1970.

the Government of India. The Secretaries of all the important Departments were reshuffled at one stroke. The Departments affected were:

- (1) Ministry of Industrial Development and Internal Trade,
- (2) Ministry of Steel and Heavy Engineering,
- (3) Ministry of Foreign Trade,
- (4) Ministry of Defence,
- (5) Ministry of Irrigation and Power,
- (6) Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,
- (7) Department of Health and Family Planning,
- (8) Ministry of Education and Youth Services,
- (9) Department of Personnel, and
- (10) Ministry of Home Affairs.<sup>29</sup>

On the reshuffle of Secretaries, *The Statesman* commented:

"The reshuffle—the biggest shake-up in recent years—affects all important Ministries and gives a new look to the administrative hierarchy at the top. Like the reshuffle of the cabinet, today's changes have the imprint of Mrs. Gandhi's instinct for sweeping changes."<sup>30</sup>

Not only she changed the Secretaries of the various Departments, she also changed the Secretary of Home Ministry, which she took in her charge a few months back. These sweeping changes at the Secretariat level proves the hypothesis that a politically strong Prime Minister exercises effective control over the bureaucracy, while a politically weak Prime Minister may create a situation in which real power comes to lie in the hands of bureaucracy. The new situation in the Indian politics, *i.e.* increase in the political power of the Prime Minister, does not mean that the role and importance of bureaucracy has decreased. It only means that a stage of equilibrium in the political system has arrived and the bureaucracy, both in form and in reality, is under the effective control of the political leadership.

### III

With the growth of Smt. Gandhi's political power, her relationship with the bureaucracy underwent a sea change. From dependence on

<sup>29</sup> *The Statesman*, Delhi, December 2, 1970.

<sup>30</sup> *The Statesman*, Delhi, December 2, 1970.



bureaucracy, she started using it as an instrument for achieving her goals. Here, a pertinent question arises: What are her views about Indian bureaucracy? A related question is: How far her views have conditioned her relationship with the bureaucracy?

When Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister, she committed herself to pursue the ideals of the builders of the nation—*i.e.* democracy and socialism, planned economic and social advance, and friendship among nations. But she, like her predecessors, thought that administration was a great bottleneck in economic and social development of the country. In her first Republic Day broadcast to the nation, she said:

“In economic development, as in other fields of national activity, there is a disconcerting gap between intention and action. To bridge this gap we should boldly adopt whatever far-reaching changes in administration may be found necessary. We must introduce new organizational patterns and modern tools and techniques of management and administration. We shall instill into Governmental machinery greater efficiency and a sense of urgency and make it more responsive to the needs of the people.”<sup>31</sup>

To clearly understand her views about bureaucracy, her two opinions, in brief, are worth mentioning. The first is her general criticism of the bureaucracy and, secondly, her demand that the bureaucracy should have ‘commitment’.

In a convocation address, at the University of Roorkee on November 18, 1967, she said about administration:

“Administrators sometimes lag behind the situations they are supposed to administer. If a large proportion of the investment we have made under the plans remains unutilized, the cause is to be found in administrative shortcomings.”<sup>32</sup>

Talking about the role of generalist in the Indian administration, she observed:

“I have no doubt that our present administrative system uses the expert inadequately and indifferently. It gives undue weight to the generalist and persists with criteria of competence developed in times when the range of government decisions was very limited

<sup>31</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, January 28, 1966.

<sup>32</sup> *Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi 1966-69*, New Delhi, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1971, p. 198.

and was unrelated to the demands of economic management and growth.”<sup>33</sup>

Replying to the five-day debate on the President’s address, Smt. Gandhi said:

“What India needed today was a ‘revolution in the administrative system’ without which no enduring change could be brought about in any field.”<sup>34</sup>

When the Prime Minister completed her hundred days in office, in an interview to a UNI (United News of India Ltd.) correspondent, she said:

“The problem of administration had added to the difficulties of the country. All along the line administration had deteriorated—at the Centre, in the States, and even in the lower rungs of the governmental set-up.

“Toning up would have to be done, new procedures might have to be evolved, and even fresh recruitment at all levels would have to be considered.”<sup>35</sup>

Not only Smt. Gandhi expressed her dissatisfaction with the performance of bureaucracy, she also expressed doubts about the relevance of the basic assumptions underlying the Indian bureaucracy—like that of political neutrality, anonymity, impartiality, etc. And she alleged that the bureaucrats lacked in ‘commitment’.<sup>36</sup>

These opinions of the Prime Minister in no way hindered her working with the bureaucracy. Her working relationship with Shri L. K. Jha and Shri P. N. Haksar, both civil servants, was based on great mutual trust. An important evidence to prove that Smt. Gandhi did not develop any bias against the civil servants in her working relationship is that she continued the old practice of appointing civil servants to the important offices of Ambassadors and Governors of the States. Many civil servants were appointed as Governors by her; the important being Shri Dharma Vira, Shri S. Chakravarty, Shri A. L. Dias, etc. Shri L. K. Jha was appointed Ambassador to the U.S.A. and Shri L. P. Singh was appointed Ambassador to Nepal. Whatever her criticism against bureaucracy, she realises its importance for governing the

<sup>33</sup> *Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi 1966-67*, op. cit., pp. 196-97.

<sup>34</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, March 2, 1966.

<sup>35</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, May 3, 1966.

<sup>36</sup> *The Hindustan Times*, Delhi, December 1, 1969.


country. Otherwise, she would not have taken the charge of the Ministry of Home Affairs and other Intelligence Departments. By strengthening her Secretariat and the Cabinet Secretariat, she has brought the top hierarchy of bureaucracy under her direct control. No doubt, the election results of the Fifth Lok Sabha have given her effective political power in the country; and this has also resulted in the situation where she is in supreme command of the bureaucracy. But that does not mean that she is not aware of the fact that in a developing country, whatever the faults of the bureaucracy, it is the only well-organized sector of government through which public policies can be concretized and implemented. In the light of the evidence cited above, the conclusion that emerges is that the Prime Minister recognizes the crucial role of the bureaucracy in implementing public policies, and she is making full use of it and has not done anything to disrupt its functioning. To this generalization, only one recent action of the Prime Minister becomes difficult to explain. The appointment of Shri D. P. Dhar as Chairman of the Policy Planning Committee in the Ministry of External Affairs can be interpreted as an attempt of the Prime Minister to induct experts from public life to various crucial positions in the administration. It happens in administration that an organization is created with innocuous statements, but it gathers great authority in due course of time. This has been seen in the growth of the influence of the Prime Minister's Secretariat in India. Shri Dhar is expected to coordinate all government activities in regard to the Bangla Desh problem.<sup>37</sup> If this is his function, he need not have been appointed Chairman of the Policy Planning Committee. His activities are going to be very far-reaching in the shaping of foreign policy of the country. To us, its relevance is that Prime Minister has done an innovation by inducting a public man to perform 'expert functions' in the Ministry, an area of activity which was always the preserve of the permanent civil servants.

To conclude, the relationship between Smt. Gandhi and bureaucracy has evolved around dependence-independence curve. The various phases of her political journey had a clear impact on her relationship with bureaucracy. When she was politically weak, she was dependent on bureaucracy; when she became politically powerful, she started guiding the bureaucracy and laid down its directions of activities. If she had not got a clear verdict from the voters in 1971, her relationship with bureaucracy might have been different. Hence, the hypothesis that a politically strong Prime Minister can effectively deal with bureaucracy gets confirmed on the basis of evidence given above. The stability of relationship between political leaders and bureaucracy depends on

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<sup>37</sup> *The Indian Express*, Delhi, August 18, 1971.

the political stability of the leaders. When bureaucracy knows that the leaders with whom they are working have a political base of their own, and there is a reasonable stability in their (political leaders) career, it extends full cooperation to them.



## GENERALIST AND SPECIALIST IN ADMINISTRATION

*B. Sivaraman*

'GENERALIST' and 'Specialist' are well-understood terms in science and technology. Generalist is one who has a bird's-eye-view knowledge of science or technology and is in a position to allot a problem to any particular branch or sector of science or technology. He can take a comprehensive view of the problem in science or technology and can progress the research or give advice. He provides the bridge between the various branches and sectors of science or technology so that the labourers in the various branches or sectors can work towards a concrete progressing of science or technology as a whole. Specialist, on the other hand, knows science or technology in depth in one particular branch or sector. His work is, generally, further probing in depth in his limited field. He cannot normally see the place of his work in science or technology as a whole; nor is he normally interested in that. As science or technology gets vaster and vaster in spread, the Generalist finds the entire field too vast for comprehension by one mind. Science or technology has then to be split into fairly large and reasonably compact sectors, each of which can then be a field for a Generalist to conquer with effort. In such fields, the Super Generalist who can see the entire field of science or technology will be a rare bird. In such vast fields of science and technology, the bird's eye view, when necessary, has to be taken by a Committee approach where the Generalists in the broad sectors may be concerned. What is relevant, is that the Generalist in such vast fields is really a Specialist in a sector of the field. The Specialist in the field is the worker in a microcosm of the field which is developing in depth. Though both the Generalist and the Specialist in such fields can be brought technically under the nomenclature 'Specialist', there is a fundamental difference in their approach to science or technology. The specialist, by the nature of his work, is 'myopic'. His interest is in a small sector of science or technology and he probes that sector in depth. He is not looking at science or technology from a broad angle at all. He cannot do so. He can rarely be useful or be a good adviser in a get-together where the problems of science or technology as a whole have to be considered. He can see problems only from his limited angle. The approach of a Generalist, on the other hand—though in the expanding fields he is only in touch with a

broad sector of the field—is always comprehensive. He goes down from the whole to the part. His training is in overseeing and not in specialization. He must cultivate the art of understanding what is going on in the smaller sectors in depth and how it affects the sector he is handling, or the whole field. He has to see the interplay between several sectors that is to be developed to utilize the findings in any one of the sectors. The Generalist is, thus, ingrained in the coordination approach as against the intensive approach of the Specialist. The Generalist sometimes takes to the study in depth of some particular sector of his field. He may also make a good job of it, but thereby he does not change his normal approach from the coordination to the intensive angle. On the other hand, there are some Specialists who have an inborn aptitude to keep themselves abreast with what is going on in the world. By such extra-curricular interests they acquire the coordination approach of the Generalist. Such Specialists are rare. What has been stated here about the Generalist or the Specialist in science or technology will generally be accepted as a fair statement of the existing situation in other areas too. There is no controversy raging over this.

The controversy is over the role of the Generalist and the Specialist in administration. This is not a new controversy. It is as old as the administration itself is. It always arises with regard to what are called prestige positions—positions which are supposed to give one power and the right to distribute largesse. What is the controversy now? The Generalist in administration is a member of the administrative service. We have systematized our services and service conditions. This is an approach we have accepted from the experience of the British in India and our own assessment of our predilections. The Generalist cadres can be identified as the Indian Administrative Service which is an all India cadre, the State Administrative Service of the various States and Union Territories and the State Subordinate Administrative Service of the various States and Union Territories of India. In the controversy, the rest of the Services—State and Central—are classified as functional services or to follow our nomenclature 'Specialist Services'. The positions which are coveted are the posts in the Central and State Secretariats rising up to the Secretary in the Departments and Ministries of Government. The general impression is that Secretaries to Government are in a position to distribute largesse in the nature of posts and perquisites. They are supposed to be in a position to get the Ministers to approve policies which may give power and prestige to particular Services or parts thereof. Their capacity to stop or harass any sector is supposed to be large and this power is coveted to enable one to use such arbitrary powers of destruction against one's enemies. We have

an apocryphal story of the "Ek din ka Sultan" in the *Arabian Nights*. It is the contention that all Specialist Services must have equal opportunities to occupy these posts along with the Administrative Services. The Administrative Services shall not have any special weightage in this matter. To enable this to be done, various formulations of service conditions are proposed and various selection processes which do not give the Administrative Services any advantage are to be tried out. In older times, we hear, the problems were much more easily resolved. We have heard the story of the petty king who was so pleased with his barber who could shave him in his sleep without disturbing him, that he made him a *tehsildar*—a Generalist post in those days! Our complicated administrative processes require a clearer statement of Service rules and conditions; but it is generally agreed to by the sponsors of the theory that any Specialist is as good as any other in this matter.

There is another sector where this controversy is no less strident, *i.e.* the public sector enterprises—both industrial and service. Here, the competition is for the senior management posts and the top management posts. The technical services at the lower levels of the organization claim that they should have preferential selection to these posts as against management personnel that may be inducted temporarily from other services in the Centre and in the States. The principle enunciated is that a regular employee of the organization, who has more stake in the prospects of the organization than a temporary interloper, is expected to look upon the interests of the organization better in these management assignments. The argument as to who may be more competent to give results in the post, provided the psychological commitment is there, is normally underplayed. Here, the bifurcation is between all the services in the regular employ of the undertakings as against all the services of the Centre and the States inducted into these undertakings. In this context, we have to notice that many senior management and top management posts in public undertakings have been filled up by contract personnel drawn from the private sector. These are generally people in management posts in the private sector. It is necessary to record that nobody has so far raised any voice as to the temporary nature of these assignments or the basic qualifications of these personnel vis-a-vis the services in the organization.

A new dimension has been added to this old controversy of Generalist and Specialist. The Administrative Reforms Commission (appointed by the Government of India in 1966) has advised that the Indian Administrative Service shall no more be a generalist service but shall have a purely functional role. This role has been identified as revenue administration. If the logic of the argument is translated into practice at

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the State level, the State Administrative Service and the State Subordinate Administrative Service should also be restricted to revenue administration. The basic presumption behind this recommendation appears to be that in the State or Central administration, there is no more need for a Generalist. If the proposition is correct and is accepted, then there will no more be any controversy regarding Generalist and Specialist in administration. There will be only Specialists and no Generalists. On the other hand, those who know about State and Central administration in the field quite strongly feel that this proposition is not sustainable in administration today. Is there a place for the Generalist in administration in the State, Central and public sector fields and is it large enough to warrant maintenance of the various administrative cadre services?

Administration is like a woman's dress. However beautiful the model, it may look completely incongruous on the wearer who may not have the frame to carry off the dress. To be most effective and to fulfil its basic function, which is to beautify the female form, a woman's dress has to be designed for the frame and made to measure for the best effect. The purpose of the dress is to tone down the deficiencies in the body frame wearing the dress and accentuate the better points so that the overall effect is pleasing. Administration similarly has to be made to the measure of the people who are to be administered. It has to fit the frame of the social and political order of the people. It must underplay and suppress the bad parts of the system and use and accentuate the better parts of the system for the greatest effect. The ultimate objective is to produce a well-ordered people who can impress the world community. In our rambles in search of an administrative structure that will be a tribute to our people, we have been so apt to look for nice models in other lands. It is like a man admiring a dress with a lot of ventilation on a 34-24-34 frame and trying to see it on his wife who is of a 32-40-38 frame. It is, no doubt, true that some times the man seeing the incongruity of the wish, may also dally with the idea of borrowing the frame with the dress! That is why we sometimes see the more perspective of the well-wishers of our country also wishing to borrow the social and political set-up of the other country along with the administration, for the best effect. A social system is like an iceberg; it shows only the tip above water. Below the water is the long past history of development of the social structure, its strength and inhibitions. Unless there is a cataclysm wiping out all traces of the old order, a social structure is the most difficult to change overnight. The political structure arises out of the social and economic forces in the country. A revolution can change the political hierarchy and system, but in the long run the basic genius of the people will assert

itself whatever the structure. Instead, therefore, of trying to change the world overnight, it is always wise to adjust the administration for the best effect under the social and political conditions prevalent in the country. This is not to say that ideas of administration and changes in structure cannot be taken from other systems. Learning by other peoples' experience is a wiseman's approach to life. A borrowed part of a system or a method or arrangement may be better able to solve a particular problem of our administration than the present arrangement. Such borrowing must fit the general concept of our administrative frame and not be a mis-fit. It must harmonise.

Order, peace and a goal must be available to any social order for fulfilment. Though we say India, that is Bharat, and claim that the concept of a united India has been there from the dawn of time, we conveniently forget that the Bharat we talk of is said to have had 64 kingdoms and the concept was much vaster than the present India, but much more loosely built and without a cohesive thought. Critics of our country tell us, probably with a good deal of truth, that we have survived and absorbed other cultures by a pure negativism. The caste system kept up the society under the greatest vicissitudes and ensured continuance of a local order, however great confusion these may have been in the whole order. All this does not make the social order of the modern concept and of an Indian people. Order and peace which only give the scope for unification and the emergence of a national objective, we have to admit, is a phenomenon which has come to exist for the first time in the 19th century in this sub-continent. British liberal thought brought order and peace to this country. In our Constitution we have, as the people of India, opted to continue this concept and work for the objective of social justice where every human being will have a value. Our administrative system is built for this purpose. It must fit our requirement.

Land and its production is the most important part of our economy. Orderliness in land is, therefore, essential. The system of recording land and its ownership, it is said, started during Sher Shah Suri's regime and developed by Todarmal during Akbar's regime, is still the outline for our land system. Land ownership is recorded and maintained. The administration has to do this. It is to solve the land disputes. It is to look into water rights and adjust water routine. The State levies revenue on land for its administration. Scheduling of water supply and collection of levies are part of the work of the administration. All this goes by the nomenclature of revenue administration.

Peace has been the greatest boon which administration can give to the people. Law and order has been the important function of the

administration in the British times and now. Though it is sometimes argued that with the separation of the judiciary, the administrator's work has gone down in this sector, it is forgotten that even now the preventive authority under law is vested in the administration and not the judiciary. Here, the Specialist service of the police has to work in close collaboration with the administration for the best results.

Famine has been a recurring nightmare in the 19th century and it had its final fling in 1943 in Bengal. Feeding the needy is a duty cast upon the community in our *Shastras*. When large areas are famine-stricken, this dictum cannot work. The super-power—the State—has to look after the needs of the people. Famine relief has been an important part of the administration. Finding work for the beneficiaries so that they may not be demoralized is the duty cast on the administration. This expertise developed into food control and rationing during the Second World War period and later. The technique of organizing work in famine relief has been utilized for our new schemes of chronic drought relief and similar schemes.

Local self-government was a concept introduced from the top by the British to enable the local community to order itself and find resources for its own development. We pursued this idea to its ultimate logic by institution of Panchayati Raj with its 3-tiers based on the Village Panchayat. Though we compare this Village Panchayat with the Panchayat system said to have existed in the hoary past, we can say categorically that there is no comparison of the two. The context and the society are completely different. Local government develops local parochialism and in a large sprawling country like ours, these forces are strong. When the community is not homogeneous and many interests are concerned, strong factions develop. The administrators were given the duty to ensure that the franchise in local self-government is not misused. They were the eyes and the ears of the State to take and to advise the State to take corrective action in time. Even though the role of the administrator in Panchayati Raj has been theoretically discounted in the thinking, even now the administrator is the eyes and the ears of the government to keep order in this sector. If things go seriously wrong, it is the administration which is blamed, rarely the local self-government institution. The Calcutta Corporation has mismanaged its affairs for half-a-century or more, but it is always the Commissioner who gets it on the neck.

Development has been a part of the administrator's role. In the beginning, it was very much of a hobby which the old Collectors of British Raj used to take up according to their capacity and predilections.

But it was part of a Collector's job to know the district, its potential for development and the problems of development. Whenever any other department wanted to organize any developmental project, the Collector was an adviser. When the Linlithgow Commission recommendations were followed by steps to improve the rural sector, the Collector and the Sub-Divisional Officer were involved in the programme. After Independence, when the State opted finally for a welfare concept, the administration was brought firmly into the development sector. It became the most important part of a Collector's work and in this he is being helped by the Sub-Divisional Officers. When Community Development was introduced, the Block Development Officer, who was from the subordinate cadres, was fully involved in the coordination of development in the Block. The Community Development programme was based on self-help. The villagers had to be induced to take an active part in the programmes. The role of adviser was cast on the administrator at various levels.

Whilst trying to cover this broad field of responsibility in his career, the administrator has to understand and learn to allow for and, where necessary, scotch, in the public interest, the various social forces which go against our concepts of order and development. The social order, the caste system and untouchability which all went towards survival of the people in spite of more than a thousand years of unrest, pillage, and arson with few periods of safety and that too only in regions, have in them the seeds of disruption of all new ideas of progress. The village community according to our ideas of equality and progress must be developed in the face of strong opposition by the vested interests of caste and economic interest built-in for centuries in the system. The administrator faces these forces in many forms in his work in various fields. He has to learn from experience the methods to circumvent all these forces and get results. Of course, in this he is helped by the political thinkers who tried to evolve a system of government based on adult franchise which may help in neutralizing these forces. The administrator has to understand men and the milieu. This is the most difficult part of his training and expertise.

The Generalist administrator is trained to handle this vast and varied field and he has to learn the art of managing men and the social forces to achieve results. He has, in the various sectors, the help of Specialists in the particular field to help him. There are pure revenue experts in the revenue administration. In law and order, he is helped by the police which is a Specialist service. In local self-government he is helped by a cadre of local self-government experts. In development, he coordinates the work of various Specialists in the field ranging

from agriculture to public works and cooperation. From this field he gravitates towards the State Secretariat or the Central Secretariat or Department.

There are Specialists of many kinds in the States and the Central Services. In the State, we have the medical, educational and public work Services which all perform one or the other of the essential services for the people. We have agriculture, animal husbandry and cooperative services which deal with rural areas and their development. We have the Forest Service and the Police Service which are specialized Services. The financial Service and the commercial tax Service deal with finances and a particular type of taxation and tax collection. These are the large State Services. We have also got a large number of small groups of specialization in narrower fields. We have the Registration Service and the Excise Service. Broadly, the Services are divided into two classes, *i.e.* those which require a technical qualification before recruitment and those where the training after recruitment from the general educational field is considered sufficient. The former are highly specialized services of a technical nature. Nobody else can do their basic work. The latter being a service training imposed on general education is not so highly technical. These latter Services are specialized only in the sense that they restrict their activities to one field of specialization in their service career. Similarly, at the Centre, we have all these State Services repeated, but the emphasis is different and the relative size of the Services are different depending on the work to be handled. On the other hand, the Centre has got several Specialist Services which are peculiar to the Centre. These are: the Defence Service, Railway Service, the Industrial Service, Communications, and the large Information Services which include the Broadcasting Service. There are also large Scientific Services in the Centre, like the Service in Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Defence Services. The variety at the Centre is much more than that in the States. But the Services can again be divided into two broad classes—those which require a technical qualification before recruitment and those that require only a training after selection from the general educational field. We may broadly classify the Specialists into Technical Specialists and Non-technical Specialists.

In the State Sector, most of the Technical Services generally have no contact with the masses, nor do they deal with mass problems. They are also normally away from the interplay of social and political forces though occasionally they have to face the backlash of these forces in their work. On the other hand, some of the Technical and Non-technical Specialists Services, like the Police, Cooperative, Agriculture

and Animal Husbandry, do come across the social and political forces in their work in varying degrees and have to learn to live with the same and/or find remedies to the problems created by them. In their work, they see something more of the general field than what a Specialist normally is expected to see. On the other hand, opportunities to use their talents to counter the bad social and political forces may not be as much as in a Generalist Service. In our federal structure, there is a division of functions and responsibility between the States and the Centre. The subjects dealt with and the responsibilities undertaken by the States have direct relevance to land and property, law and order and area development. The State Government is in direct touch with people and the masses and their day-to-day problems. The first impact of all agitations has to be borne by the States. The subjects handled by the Centre are all of inter-State interest and broad national interest. Defence, Commerce, Finance and Industries along with Transport (rail and sea) and Atomic Science are of national interest but they have no direct impact on the local masses in their day-to-day functioning. Even if at the Centre there are Services, like agriculture, public works, police, cooperation and so on, the Centre never deals directly with the masses in any of these fields. The direct contact with the masses is the responsibility of the State. As a result, at the Centre, the Services of either Technical or Non-Technical Specialist, are generally isolated from the people as a mass and the social and political problems rarely come up in their day-to-day handling of affairs.

The first controversy is over the relative rights of the Generalist and the Specialist to the Secretariat and high departmental posts in the States and in the Centre. These are the posts of advisers to the elected Government. The State field of responsibility is directly connected with the lives of the people in the mass. The State programmes of welfare have to be carried out directly in the field under the local environment. The adviser must know the whole spread of the problem before he dares to advise the Government on important policy matters. Unless the adviser has the experience and the knowledge of the field at grass-roots and at the same time has a broad grasp of administration as a whole in the State, his advice is valueless. There are very few Specialist fields in the State where the adviser need know only his field of specialization and none other. Appointing Chief Engineers as Secretaries to Government has been tried out. The Generalist seeped in the lore of the area and who understands the inter-play of social and political forces in the various parts of the State, and who has varied experience in the Generalist field of work in the State and, therefore, has certainly a better base for giving advice than a Specialist in the State Services.



It is pointed out that the Central ministries not having to deal directly with masses, the argument that the adviser must know the field at the grass-roots does not appear to be valid. Ours is a federation with a division of responsibility. But the objective of the federation is the ultimate welfare of the people. There is a growing resentment in the States that Central policies are not caring for the local difficulties and problems and are not attending to area disparities. Can a federation work in a vast country like ours when the adviser at the Centre does not have any idea as to the conditions in the field in his portfolio in any part of the country and the forces that work against order? Can he be a good adviser by seeing things only at third-hand? It was a realization of this possibility that made us opt for an all-India cadre approach in administration. It may be argued that the fields where such detailed knowledge of the field may be required may not be as comprehensive at the Centre as in the States. There may be fields where the Specialist may be a better adviser because of his special knowledge. Such fields do exist and we already see the principles of the right man with the right background occupying such posts at the Centre. Such fields are also limited.

We may now touch upon the second controversy which is a much more limited one and relates to management positions in public sector enterprises. Management in public sector enterprises is one type of management of man and material. Administration is the biggest of management problems. It deals with the mass over whom the Manager has no control. It deals with the related Services over whom also the Manager has no control. It finally deals with the Service in the structure itself over which the Manager has control. The administrator learns to control by law, rules, coordination and that nebulous quality called "the Art of Management". The Manager in the public sector does only a fraction of this administrative jugglery. It is, therefore, not correct to say that our administrator is a mis-fit in a management position in a public sector enterprise. He will certainly be more committed than a private sector entrant on a term contract. Will he be better than a Specialist in the organization pushed up to a management position?

A critic points out that the dispute may not be about theoretical competence but the practical situation of today. Is it reasonable to expect that in the vastly proliferating fields of administration in a Welfare State, the Generalist of the old concept will be able to grasp the structure of the comprehensive State or Central field of administration? Are we not unduly nostalgic and sentimental in talking of an all-India cadre where an administrator, tried in the State in the field, gravitates



slowly towards the Secretariat and the Centre, getting on the way a wealth of varied experience of men and affairs that will stand him in good stead as a top adviser at the Centre? Both these observations have some truth and need a thorough scrutiny. The field of Generalist today is certainly getting vaster. The Welfare State concept has added many responsibilities to the administration and the Government. By the time an administrator becomes mature enough to become an adviser to Government, he may not have any experience in several important Generalist sectors. The saving grace is that at the level of Sub-Divisional Officer and the Collector, the administrator deals with most of these fields of administration either directly or as a co-ordinator. Therefore, if he has a really long-term as Sub-Divisional Officer and Collector, he has a reasonable chance of getting a bird's eye view of problems. Meanwhile, he gets in touch with the men and gets a feel of the affairs in the raw. Unfortunately, there are many cases where administrators skip these posts or have very short tenures there and stick to Secretariat or headquarters jobs where the comprehensiveness of approach is lacking and departmentalism predominates. Senior administrators have pointed out the weaknesses and have asked for better cadre management so that every administrator gets the necessary basic training in the field. When we look at the Centre, this picture is still more alarming. Administrators have managed to stick to Central posts almost the whole of their life-time and by sheer continuity in the Centre, gravitated to the posts of top advisers to Government. The critic points out that if these people can be classed as good advisers to Government, why should not other Specialists, who at least have their own specialization and are tops therein, be similarly good advisers? There is no argument against it. A theory is effective only as long as it is practised. If it is not to be practised, the theory has no meaning. The Cadre Managers have to take a firm view as to the validity of the theory and the need to observe it. The Service cannot both have the cake and eat it.

Protagonists for the Specialist point out that the Specialist has trained himself to deal with his specialization in depth. He has learnt the art of analysis and synthesis and can, therefore, deal with problems effectively. On the other hand, the Generalist has no training in depth in any part of his field. After a college education and a brief training in a training school, he has learnt his work by trial and error in the field. There is no depth of study and no grappling with details. How then is he capable of analyzing the problems of Government and synthesising the various parts and finding the correct advice? Firstly, we must say that this concept of a Specialist does not apply to all Specialists. It may apply to a Technical Specialist. The non-technical Specialist is

no better than the Generalist in this matter, the only difference being that his field of vision is narrower than that of a Generalist. This criticism again has a lot of truth. The Generalist field of operation is spreading day by day. The method of learning as you go along, may have worked in the more spacious yesterday. The senior administrators have realized the needs of the times. Purposeful in-service training is the answer. Obviously, there may not be training in all the fields that a Generalist may have to handle. There should be a selectivity. Generalists must choose at a certain period of their service to concentrate in particular branches of their service. It should certainly be possible to organize purposeful in-service training to meet this need. This applies also to the non-technical Specialists. In their case, the training may have to include further practical handling of mass problems in the field.

The controversy is really not about the theory but about personalities and facts in the field. Dr. Bhabha was a great administrator and he could put the Atomic Energy Commission on its feet and build up an organization we are all proud of. Government listened to administrator 'A' and formulated a policy of taxation from which they had to back out due to the scheme being impracticable to administer. Administrator 'A' was, therefore, a bad adviser. It is, therefore, argued that Specialists are the best administrators, and the Generalist is generally a flop. One swallow does not make a summer. What we have to examine is the validity of the theory and the practical deviations in the field which make the theory unworkable. We may go back to the beginning of this article where we had analyzed the merits of Generalists and Specialists in science and technology. The Generalist is one who has a bird's eye-view of the entire science or technology and is able to take a comprehensive view of science or technology. For this, he must know, in broad principles at least, the various parts of science or technology. When the field of science or technology becomes vast, he will not be able to grasp more than one sector of science or technology. Even then, his approach is from the comprehensive to the intricate. The same principles apply to a Generalist in the administrative field. If the administrative field spreads out and proliferates, the administrator's grasp has to be limited to a sector. But, his approach has always to be that of a Generalist, namely, from the comprehensive to the intricate. The analogy will be complete only if the Generalist in administration has the same grasp of the subject in the various parts of the field or the sector of the field with which he deals. For example, a Generalist Physician knows the various disciplines in the medical study and he goes through a general course in most of them. Similarly, unless the Generalist knows the various Specialist constituents in his

field and has a general grasp of each of such specialities, he cannot call himself a Generalist in administration. It is the comprehensiveness of knowledge which is essential. When the various Specialist constituents of the field become complicated to the extent that it is only by a purposeful study of the sector that one can understand the broad features and the special points of the sector, an attempt to learn the work by trial and error will not do. Purposeful in-service training to bring oneself up-to-date with the new ramifications in the various parts becomes absolutely necessary. The administrator who does not to keep himself abreast has no more claim to a comprehensive knowledge of his field or sector of his field.

The field of administration today is vast and, with the increasing problems of the State, will get much vaster. It is no more reasonable to expect that we can develop Generalists who can have a comprehensive grasp of the entire field. Following the analogy with science and technology, it will only be a Super Generalist who can conquer the entire field. Such persons may be thrown up by chance, but can never be built up by any known method of administrative development. Realizing the complications of the field, the advisory system is more and more diverted to the Committee approach where experts in several sectors can get together to analyze a problem and to evolve a solution.

The Specialist, on the other hand, by the very nature of his specialization, sees only a part of his field. What applies to science and technology applies to administration also. A Technical Specialist in the state and Central Services is nearest to our concept of a Specialist in science and technology. Barring rare exceptions which occur in any field, these Specialists can rarely take a comprehensive view of problems and become good administrators. At the same time, some attempt to identify genius where it exists can be made by trying out suitable candidates from these Services, at low levels of management. Those that show a flair for management may, with sufficient in-service training, prove effective as Generalists in certain restricted sectors. The position is a little better with the non-technical Specialists in State and Central Services. The chances of management opportunities throwing up good Generalists in this group is better than in the technical group. Opportunities should be made available so that the State and the Centre get the best of the various Services under their control. This applies also to the Technical Services in the public sector enterprises. A trial in lower management positions should be given to promising technical personnel so that if they make good progress, higher management positions can be opened out to them. In all these areas, in-service training will be necessary but of a Generalist type to introduce a candidate to

management functions, social and political forces and such matters which do not usually come directly within his purview in his day-to-day work.

Finally, carrying the analogy of the Specialist and the Generalist in science and technology further, whereas the Generalist will generally fit in as an overall adviser or coordinator or planner, it is only on rare occasions that the Specialist will fit in as such adviser, coordinator or planner. It is, therefore, theoretically incorrect to put all Services at the same level in any system of selection for the top management posts. The Generalist who has the right training will always be at an advantage over the Specialist with training because the field is of the Generalist.

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## TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN INDIA

*S. N. Jain*

ADMINISTRATIVE Law is regarded as the law of the 20th century. Eighty per cent of the litigation at the present day is between the individual and the administration and involves one principle or the other of administrative law. Administrative Law has grown out of the necessity to control administrative powers which the administration enjoys vastly these days for the welfare of the people. Whether it is the capitalistic society of the United States or the societies committed to establish democratic socialism, like India, government regulation of human activity is the order of the day. Ungarbled capitalism does not exist anywhere on the globe. It is only in relative quantity and significance that the regulations may differ from country to country. In the common law world, India is perhaps the most administered state. Reasons for this are apparent. Its economy is developing, thus necessitating planning, regulation of private enterprise and marshalling limited resources to the best advantage. Secondly, India is committed to establish an egalitarian order. Thirdly, not too well stable law and order situation in the country has also resulted in conferment of administrative powers on the executive. The law relating to preventive detention is the case in point.

The post-Independent era saw the Statute Book growing up at an accelerated pace. Number of new enactments came to be passed to regulate the different aspects of human activity. For instance, in the field of business were enacted statutes, like the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947; the Companies Act, 1956; The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951; the Essential Commodities Act, 1955; the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947; the Tea Act, 1953; and the Rubber Act, 1947. Then there were enacted laws to improve the economic and social welfare of the labour, like the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Minimum Wages Act, 1948; the Factories Act, 1948; Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948; etc. The statutes mentioned here are merely an iota of the mass of legislation enacted after 1947. Even a brief survey of the legislation would require a full-length article.

The result has been a vast expansion of the powers of the administration. The momentum has, however, not exhausted itself. This is substantiated by a number of new enactments passed by Parliament to regulate various human activities during the last five or six years. A few of these statutes are: The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, which empowers the Central Government to declare an association as unlawful if, in its opinion, it is such; the Cardamom Act, 1965, which empowers the Central Government to establish a Cardamom Board for the development of the cardamom industry; the Produce Cess Act, 1966, which provides for imposition of cess in certain produce for improvement and development of methods of cultivation and marketing of such produce; the Customs (Amendment) Act, 1969, which amended the Customs Act, 1962, has given wide powers to the authorities to check illegal importation and exportation of goods; the Gold (Control) Act, 1968, which provides for the control of production, manufacture, supply, distribution, use and possession of, and business in, gold ornaments and articles of gold and confers wide powers on the administration for these purposes;<sup>1</sup> State Agricultural Credit Corporations Act, 1968, which empowers the appropriate government to establish agricultural credit corporations; the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1967, which amended the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, requires that no employer shall close his industry, engaged in the production of any article or things used in the production of any essential commodity, without previous permission of the specified officer; the Seeds Act, 1966, to regulate the quality of certain seeds for sale; Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, for controlling monopolies and restrictive trade practices; and the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970, to provide for the constitution of a Central Council of Indian medicine and maintenance of a Central Register of Indian Medicine.

With the lapse of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, on 31st December, 1969, the government has recently enacted the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. The Act confers wide powers on the executive to detain a person if, in its opinion, his activities are prejudicial to the defence of India, maintenance of public order, maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, etc. Recently (on 12th August, 1971) the government introduced the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, which provides for measures omnibus in nature to check tax evasion and circulation of black money and discourage *benami* holdings and confers wide powers on the tax authorities for these purposes.

<sup>1</sup> Some of the provisions of the Act were declared unconstitutional under Article 19 (i) (g) of the Constitution by the Supreme Court in *H.R. Banthia v. India*, 1969 (2), S.C.C. 166.

The increase in the functions of the administration has created a vast new complex of relations between the administration and the citizen. There is not a moment of a person's existence when he is not in contact with the administration in one way or the other. This circumstance has posed certain basic questions for administrative law. Does arming the administration with wide powers keep in view the interests of the individual? Are adequate precautions being taken to ensure that the administration does not misuse or abuse its powers? Do the administrative agencies follow, in discharging their functions, such procedures as are reasonable, consistent with the rule of law, democratic values and natural justice? Bestowal of sweeping powers on administrative organs demands adequate control-mechanism to ensure that officials do not use their powers in an undue manner or for an unwarranted purpose, and that the individual has adequate remedies for the wrongs of the administration. There is a variety of control-mechanisms. Some may be provided by the statute conferring powers over the administration, e.g., provisions for administrative appeals, an administrative tribunal, an advisory board, reasonable opportunity of being heard to the individual concerned, etc. But all these checks may not give sufficient assurance to the individual that the power has been exercised properly in his case, as these controls are part of the administrative process itself. Administrative appeals within the department, for instance, have been described as appeals from Caesar to Caesar. The individual needs the guarantee of the institutional safeguards outside the administration for remedying the wrongs done to him. Courts occupy a unique and a distinguished position in this regard. Before the court's role is examined, the two Bills introduced in Parliament, which would strengthen remedies of the individual against the administration, may be considered first. One of these Bills would enable the individual to have recourse to the courts previously denied to him, and the other would provide an independent forum, outside the system of courts, for redressing his grievances. These Bills are: the Government (Liability in Tort) Bill, and the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill.

### *The Government (Liability in Tort) Bill*

India still follows the antiquated and outmoded law that the government cannot be sued for the tort of its servants committed in the discharge of its sovereign functions<sup>2</sup>. This immunity of the government was borrowed in India from England where it arose from the maxim "King can do no wrong" which implies that no wrong could be imputed to the Crown nor could it authorize a wrong. In England, the position

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<sup>2</sup> See *Kasturi Lal v. Uttar Pradesh*, A.I.R. 1965, S.C. 1039.



has been changed by the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, which has made the Crown liable for its torts, like a private person of full age and capacity subject to such exceptions as defence of realm, maintenance of armed forces and postal services. In the United States of America, the Federal Tort Claims Act, 1946, has been enacted to restrict the immunity of the government for its tortious acts. On the recommendations of the Law Commission in its First Report (Liability of State in Tort), 1956, a Bill, entitled "the Government (Liability in Tort) Bill", was first introduced in Parliament in 1965, then reintroduced in 1967, and certain modifications in the Bill were suggested in 1969 by the Joint Committee of Parliament, but the Bill lapsed with the dissolution of the Fourth Lok Sabha, and has not been reintroduced so far. The Bill sought to make the government liable for any tort committed by an employee or an agent of the government subject to certain exceptions.

### *The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill*

With all the inroads that the judiciary may have made into the functioning of the administration in recent years, the courts still play only a marginal role in controlling the administration. Some of the inhibitions from which the judicial process suffers are that the courts normally do not review findings of fact of the administrative authorities, they do not go into the merits of the exercise of the discretionary powers by the officials and do not substitute their own judgment for that of the officials on whom power has been conferred, and they are reluctant to look into the departmental files. The quest for an effective control mechanism over the administration has led people to the institution of Ombudsman which has been in operation in the Scandinavian countries. He is the people's watchdog of the wrongs of the officials. In the common law world, it was adopted in New Zealand in 1962, and in England in 1966. In India, the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill, which seeks to introduce the Ombudsman-type institution, was passed by Lok Sabha in 1969. It lapsed with the dissolution of Fourth Lok Sabha, but it has now been reintroduced. It is not possible to go into the details of the Bill, but, broadly speaking, the features of these offices are as follows.

There is to be one Lokpal and one or more Lokayuktas. The Lokpal is to be appointed after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha. The Lokayuktas are given the security of tenure just like a judge of the Supreme Court. These functionaries are, thus, immune from executive and parliamentary influence so that they could exercise their functions without fear or favour. The Lokpal is to investigate any action which is taken by or

with the approval of a minister (other than the Prime Minister) or a Secretary, or any other public servant belonging to that class which has been notified by the Central Government in consultation with the Lokpal for this purpose. Lokayukta may investigate any action taken by a public servant, other than the one who comes under the jurisdiction of the Lokpal. An investigation can be undertaken if a person makes a complaint involving a grievance or allegation. Though the Ombudsman has wide powers of investigation, yet he only recommends the remedial action and he himself does not take the final decision. If his recommendation is not complied with and he is not satisfied with the reasons for non-compliance, he has to make a special report to the President who is to cause the same, along with an explanatory memorandum, to be laid before the Houses of Parliament. In practice, therefore, it would not be easy for an official to disregard the advice of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman will not substitute the existing judicial remedies but provide them where none were available. This is made clear by the fact that a grievance is not to be investigated if the complainant has a remedy available by way of proceeding before a tribunal or a court. Further, in the decision-making process, the Ombudsman would have certain advantages over the courts in that he could scrutinize the departmental file, go into the merits of the case and suggest remedial action.

#### JUDICIAL CONTROL

Judicial control of administrative action occupies a place of pride in the control-mechanism. The judicial review enables an individual to have his case examined by an authority independent of the executive and legislature—an authority which has no partiality to the issues involved in the case. There is a danger, particularly in a nascent democracy where the roots of democratic traditions and the rule of law are not deep, for the administration to ride roughshod over the rights of the people. Law reports are replete with cases where the administration has acted in a high-handed manner and trampled upon the rights of the people. A recent reported case<sup>3</sup> would be sufficient to illustrate the position. The case involved the cancellation by the administration of a foodgrains dealer's licence of a person under the U.P. Foodgrains Licensing Order, 1964. On June 5, 1967, he was called upon to explain certain irregularities detected on inspection of his shop by the Assistant Commissioner of Food and Supplies on April 24, 1967. On the next day, he was directed to hand over all his

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<sup>3</sup> *Mahabir Prasad v. Uttar Pradesh*, A.I.R. 1970, S.C. 1302.

stock of sugar and flour to a cooperative society without any authority of law. Representations against the aforesaid order to the District Magistrate were not even attended to. On June 28, 1967, he was informed that the District Magistrate had cancelled his licence. He asked for a copy of the order but it was not supplied. Thereupon, he filed an appeal against the order of the District Magistrate to the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Without according any hearing to him, he was informed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh, Food and Rationing Department, that his appeal was rejected. No reasons for rejection of the appeal were ever communicated to him. From the beginning to the end, the authorities, thus, acted in a cavalier and an arbitrary manner. The Supreme Court was constrained to observe that "the appellants have, by a series of official acts which flout the rule of law, been deprived of even the semblance of protection they may claim in an administrative functioning under a democratic Constitution . . . . The case discloses a disturbing state of affairs. The authorities have disclosed by their conduct a reckless disregard of the rights of the appellants."<sup>4</sup>

The cases, like the one mentioned above, should be a warning against any attempt to dilute judicial remedies, but it seems such warnings are apt to be lost in the wilderness in the present surge of establishing a welfare society and achieving socio-economic justice for the people. Recently, a disturbing news item which has appeared in the press is that the Government of India "is considering suggestions that the powers of the courts to issue writs should be limited to foil the attempts of individuals or firms who frustrate investigation into their various economic offences".<sup>5</sup> Efficiency is not the only test of the government. If it were, totalitarian and dictatorial regimes would have received universal acceptance and acclaim. A good government has to be based on proper checks and balances to avoid administrative despotism.

So far, India is fortunate in having a well developed judicial system with certain guaranteed constitutional rights to the individual to have recourse to the courts against the administration. These constitutional remedies cannot be whittled down or restricted by the ordinary process of legislation. The most frequently resorted to remedies are those contained in Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution, namely, the prerogative writs of *mandamus*, *certiorari*, etc. These writs have been borrowed from England by our Constitution. The judicial review around these writs is both technical and restrictive. The review under these writs lies somewhere in between the review on appeal and no

<sup>4</sup> *Mahabir Prasad v. Uttar Pradesh*, op. cit., p. 1303.

<sup>5</sup> *The Hindustan Times*, August 20, 1971, p. 1.

review at all. Happily, the judicial trend in recent years has been to widen the scope of judicial review under these writs and to have greater control over the administration than heretofore.

The courts have achieved the above mentioned objective through various means, like requiring the judicial authority and administrative authorities to give reasons, holding an administrative function as quasi-judicial and insisting on hearing to be given to the individual, examining the exercise of discretion more rigorously without at the same time giving up the established norms of review, etc. These matters could be briefly considered here.

### *Insistence on Reasons*

In England, section 12 of the Tribunals and Enquiries Act, 1958, provides for giving of reasons by quasi-judicial bodies if so requested by the parties, unless grounds of national security require to the contrary. Similarly, section 8(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946, of the United States requires an administrative decision to be accompanied by findings and conclusions, as well as reasons or basis therefor, upon all the material issues of law, facts or discretion. The duty to give reasons is a safeguard against administrative arbitrariness. The best enumeration of this approach is to be found in the concurring judgment of Subba Rao, J., in *M. P. Industries v. Union of India*<sup>6</sup> where he stated:

"In the context of a Welfare State, administrative tribunals have come to stay . . . But arbitrariness in their functioning destroys the concept of a Welfare State itself . . . The least that a tribunal can do is to disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure guarantees consideration. The condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimizes arbitrariness; it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made . . . ."<sup>7</sup>

In India, unfortunately, no such enactment has been passed by the legislature. However, the response came from the judiciary. In a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court after 1965, it has been held that a quasi-judicial authority should give reasons.<sup>8</sup> In a recent Gujarat High Court case,<sup>9</sup> an attempt was made to confine the rulings

<sup>6</sup> A.I.R., 1966, S.C. 671.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 674.

<sup>8</sup> See M.P. Jain and S.N. Jain, *Principles of Administrative Law*, pp. 193-198 (1971).

<sup>9</sup> *Testeels v. N. M. Desai*, A.I.R., 1970, Guj. 1.

of the Supreme Court only to bodies which were tribunals under Article 136 and not to all quasi-judicial bodies. The court refused to import this distinction. A recent Supreme Court decision, *Mahesh Prasad v. State of U.P.*,<sup>10</sup> seems to make the position quite clear that all quasi-judicial bodies, whether they are tribunals or not, should give reasons. In this case, a District Magistrate who was exercising a quasi-judicial function while cancelling a dealer's licence was required to give reasons without the court going into the question whether he was a tribunal or not.

In India, the position is also developing that even an 'administrative authority' (as against an authority discharging quasi-judicial functions) enjoying wide discretionary powers should state the reasons or circumstances for taking an action. Thus, *Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board*<sup>11</sup> involved an investigation into the affairs of a public limited company under Section 237(b) of the Companies Act, 1956, under which the government could order an investigation into the affairs of a company, if, *inter alia*, there were circumstances suggesting fraud on the part of the management. Two judges, namely, Hidayatullah, J., and Shelat, J., in separate but concurring opinions, took the view that it was necessary for the government to state the circumstances, which led it to make the order in question, for being examined by the court. Disclosure of reasons by an administrative authority in support of its action widens the scope of judicial review and enables the courts to exercise better control over the authority as it actually happened in the *Barium* case. The opinion of the two judges was reiterated by majority of the Supreme Court in *Rohtas Industries v. S. D. Agarwal*.<sup>12</sup>

In the judicial insistence that a body exercising 'administrative powers' ought to disclose circumstances, at least in the affidavit filed before the court, there has been a development in administrative law parallel to the quasi-judicial bodies being required to state their reasons for their decisions. The difference, however, is that whereas for a quasi-judicial body it is obligatory to make a speaking order, and that an order in absence of reasons would be quashed on that ground, it is not so when an administrative body is involved. In the latter case, the court would only insist on disclosing the reasons to it, but would not quash the action if the reasons were not initially disclosed to the party.

<sup>10</sup> A.I.R., 1970, S.C. 1302.

<sup>11</sup> A.I.R., 1967, S.C. 295.

<sup>12</sup> A.I.R., 1969, S.C. 707.

*Quasi-judicial and Hearing*

Another trend which is visible is a tendency of the judiciary to regard an administrative function as quasi-judicial. A few years back, the courts would not easily presume that the administrative function was quasi-judicial, but now the general approach is to regard the function as quasi-judicial, unless there is something in the statute justifying holding otherwise. A number of cases can be cited to demonstrate this trend.<sup>13</sup> In case of a quasi-judicial function, there are less chances for an official to act in a waywardly fashion because hearing would enable him to be fully informed about the case before him. It becomes necessary for him to give reasons for his decisions, and the courts can exercise better judicial control over his action.

The trend is even developing that an administrative authority, though not acting in a quasi-judicial manner, should observe certain norms of hearing. Thus, in *State of Assam v. Bharat Kala Bhandar*,<sup>14</sup> the Supreme Court held, without holding the function as quasi-judicial, that, in fixing of minimum wages for workers in certain employments, the authority must consult the interests concerned as the effect of its order was to disturb settled industrial relations based on contracts or industrial awards. In the *Kraipak* case,<sup>15</sup> a decision of the Selection Board to select persons for the Indian Forest Service from amongst the officers serving in the Forest Department of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was quashed on ground of bias as a member of the selection committee himself was a candidate for the post and had participated when other names were being considered, though he did not take part in the deliberations at the time of his own selection.

*Control over Exercise of Discretionary Powers*

The pattern of judicial review of discretionary powers reflects reconciliation of two conflicting values. One, since the legislature has conferred power on an administrative authority, and the courts have not been given power to hear appeals against its decision, it shows that trust has been placed in the judgment of the authority instead of the courts. Two, nevertheless, the authority must act within the bounds

<sup>13</sup> *Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand*, A.I.R., 1965, S.C. 1767; *Associated Cement Companies v. P.N. Sharma*, A.I.R., 1965, S.C. 1595; *State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani*, A.I.R., 1967, S.C. 1269; *Dr. Bookhand v. Chancellor, Kurukshetra University*, A.I.R., 1968, S.C. 292; *Calcutta Dock Labour Board v. Jaffar Immam*, A.I.R., 1966, S.C. 282; *Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer*, A.I.R., 1966, S.C. 81; *P.L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India*, A.I.R. 1967, S.C. 1507; and *Mahabir Prasad v. State of U.P.*, A.I.R., 1970, S.C. 1302.

<sup>14</sup> A.I.R., 1967, S.C. 1768. See also *Chandra Bhawan Boarding v. Mysore*, A.I.R., 1970, S.C. 2042.

<sup>15</sup> *A.K. Kraipak v. India*, A.I.R., 1970, S.C. 150.

of law and power, and since the legislature cannot have intended that the executive be the final judge of the extent of its own powers, the courts have to come into the picture and keep administration within the confines of the law.

The major ground for quashing an administrative order by the courts has been taking into account irrelevant considerations by an authority. The recent trend has been that the courts are probing more deeply into the exercise of the discretionary powers of the executive and acting more vigorously in the matter. They have been able to achieve this not by giving up established norms of review but by examining the facts to find out whether those facts are relevant to the grounds or not, or whether there was natural or causal connection between the facts and grounds, or whether it was possible to draw reasonable inferences as to the grounds mentioned in the order from the facts, or whether a reasonable body of persons properly vested in law could have reached the decision which the administration did, and by reading (by implication) certain considerations into the statute concerned. All this comes under the rubric 'irrelevant considerations.'<sup>16</sup>

It is not possible to cover the whole panorama of the judicial control of discretionary powers in this brief article but the following three cases may be mentioned to depict the trend.

In *Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board*,<sup>17</sup> the board ordered an investigation into the affairs of the company under Section 237 of the Companies Act, 1956. Under the section, the board could order investigation into the affairs of a company, if, in the opinion of the board, there were circumstances suggesting: (1) that the business of the company was being conducted with intent to defraud its creditors, or members, etc., (2) that the persons concerned in the formation of the company or its management had been guilty of fraud, misfeasance or other misconduct towards the company or any of its members; and (3) that the members of the company had not given full information about the affairs of the company. The basis of the governmental order of investigation in the *Barium* case was that there had been delay and faulty expenditure and continuous losses to the company, that the value of its shares had gone down considerably and that some eminent persons had resigned from the board of directors. The court, by a majority, quashed the order of the government as these facts had no relevance to the question of fraud by the company.

<sup>16</sup> See S. N. Jain, "New Trends in Judicial Control of Administrative Discretion", 11 J.I.L.I., 544, 549-550 (1969).

<sup>17</sup> A.I.R., 1967, S.C. 295.



In *Rohtas Industries v. S. D. Agarwal*<sup>18</sup> case was also involved investigation of a company under Section 237 of the Companies Act. The investigation was ordered on grounds that there were several complaints of misconduct against one of the leading directors of the appellant company in relation to other companies under his control for which he was being prosecuted, and that the company had arranged to sell preference shares (of the face value of rupees three lacs) of another company held by it for inadequate consideration. About the former, the court (majority) was of the opinion that it was not a relevant circumstance. About the other ground, the court found no evidence of the shares having been sold for inadequate consideration. The order of the Board was, therefore, quashed.

Similarly, in *Rampur Distillery Co. v. Company Law Board*,<sup>19</sup> the Board acting under Section 326 of the Companies Act, 1956, refused to give its approval for renewing the managing agency of the company concerned which had been the managing agents of the Rampur Distillery since 1943. Sub-section 2(b) of the section confers practically an unlimited discretion on the Board to accord approval as is obvious from the wordings of the section which are: "that the managing agent proposed is, in its opinion, a fit and proper person to be appointed or reappointed as such, and that the conditions of the managing agency agreement proposed are fair and reasonable". The reason given by the Board for not giving its approval was that a commission of enquiry headed by Mr. Justice Vivian Bose had severely criticized the dealings of the managing director of the managing agents in relation to various other companies of which he was the director. In the view of the commission, the said director was guilty of grossly improper conduct in relation to those companies in the year 1946-47. The court did not dispute that the past conduct of the directors was a relevant circumstance in considering the question of fitness of the managing agents for the purpose of giving its approval for renewing the same, but the court insisted that the Board should also take into account the present acts and activities of the directors of the managing agents. Since the board did not take into account the latter, it left out a relevant consideration and the action of the Board was, therefore, bad.

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<sup>18</sup> A.I.R., 1969, S.C. 707.

<sup>19</sup> (1970) II, S.C.J. 89.

## GRIEVANCE-MAN IN THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM—OMBUDSMAN, LOKAYUKTA AND LOKPAL

*P. B. Mukharji*

IT is said that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. This vigilance is a part of the rule of law and the ordinary functions of the courts of the land. They are charged with natural vigilance in a constitutional democracy. They expect that subjects and citizens of a democracy would be vigilant not only to protect their private rights but also to protect public rights and liberties. Laws and courts are the natural custodians to express such vigilance. Rule of law is infringed by secret vigilance which have not the publicity and the openness of public laws and the courts of the land. Secrecy defeats democracy and the public administration of private and public laws. Its next step is prying and secret espionage followed by secret police and underground informers.

### *Complexity and Vastness of Modern Laws*

The modern law, its complexity and its vastness are such that it is said to be no longer possible in the modern age to know where are the breaches of law occurring. Besides, there are many grievances, felt necessity, delay and obstruction in the course of natural relief against increasing governmental and executive actions. There is a vast body of complaints which are never redressed. This volume of complaints has been a matter of serious concern in recent time. Only a small percentage of these complaints see the light of courts. Lawyers, jurists, administrators, and statesmen are, therefore, trying to see whether a mechanism could be evolved to deal with the situation.

### THE INDIAN PROPOSAL

The recent experiments with the institution of the Central Vigilance Commission and the prospective Ombudsman have been very much in the picture. Shri P. B. Gajendragadkar, a former Chief Justice of India, in his book *Law, Liberty and Social Justice*, at page 144, has

expressed the view:

"It is, however, doubtful if the Vigilance Commission as it has been constituted at present, the limitation under which it has to function and the narrow sphere of its jurisdiction would make it half as effective as it is expected to be. I would, therefore, earnestly request political thinkers and public workers to address themselves to the question as to whether it would not be desirable to evolve an institution like the Ombudsman in our country. I realise that India is a very big country and the institution of an Ombudsman cannot be copied blindly from the Scandinavian country where it has worked satisfactorily. Instead of Ombudsman, you may have a Commission and its jurisdiction, functions and powers may have to be carefully determined in the light of the relevant constitutional provisions. But unless we evolve an institution like Ombudsman and give that institution a very high constitutional status by amending the Constitution, the problem will not be effectively tackled."

In India, the problem is not quite so simple. The non-informed character of the general mass of the population, the illiteracy and the apathy of the people make the position extremely difficult and delicate. The vast administration and its officers very often seem to go their own way and they do not seem to be alive to the grievances of the ordinary people.

The International Commission of Jurists set up a Committee (Committee III) to discuss the need for an Ombudsman in the Asian and Pacific regions. Their proposals are that there should be an Ombudsman with powers declared and defined by an Act constituting the office, but his powers of investigation should not extend to Head of State and Judges or to matters of discipline in the armed forces. It is even suggested by this Committee that the Ombudsman should deal not only with the complaints by any aggrieved person but also take up any matter on his own initiative. In other words, this Ombudsman will be both an accusatorial and inquisitorial institution, a combination unprecedented in a democracy with traditions of independent judiciary.

Presumably inspired by these suggestions, the recent proposal of the Administrative Reforms Commission is for the creation of Central and States Ombudsmen, the Indian edition of the names being "Lok Pal" and "Lok Ayukta". Their appointment, status and tenure proposed are to approximate to the conditions of service of the Supreme Court and High Court Judges.

*Criticism*

These Ombudsmen will be new constitutional institutions to be set up by amendment of the Constitution. The names Lok Pal and Lok Ayukta are not only flamboyant but also dangerously pretentious, much too reminiscent of the 'benevolent despots'. Such Ombudsman is not quite a Supreme Court or a High Court Judge. He has only the pretensions of that Office's conditions of service. By reason of this proposed method of appointment, status and tenure, he cannot be responsible to Parliament or State Legislatures, and he is expected to be a watch-dog of erring ministers and officials. Secondly, one Lok Pal for the entire sub-continent of India, will necessarily be a captive of unmanageably numerous files and dossiers, and inescapably dependent on a whole miscellaneous army of subordinates and self-proliferating secretariat. Fourteen States of India with their fourteen States Ombudsmen with their numerous respective subordinates and staff of filing and noting clerks will be a formidable array of administration, expensive, dilatory, and hidebound by red tape. The idea is impractical and is bound to fail to achieve the purpose. Thirdly, it is not only impractical, it is also against the whole tenor and set-up of the present Indian Constitution and will involve undesirable re-adjustment of existing constitutional values in relation to Parliament, State Legislatures and Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court. This Ombudsman will, in time be the Super-Parliament, the Super-Legislature, the Super-Minister, and in the name of Indian democracy, God forbid, the Super-Judge. He will have the road to dictatorship in India, a reign of espionage under the cover of bureaucratic tyranny, and a grievance-oriented State constitutionally encouraging a society of grumblers and critics. It is expected that the authorities will think twice and reflect wisely before taking such a disastrous step of demoralizing the whole administration and plunging the State into administrative chaos and confusion from which it will be difficult to emerge.

*British Adaptation*

The British administrative wisdom in this respect is worth recalling. In Scandinavia, the original Nordic home of the Ombudsman, there appears no comparable responsibility of ministers to Parliament, whereas in India and Great Britain, ministers are constitutionally responsible to Parliament and there is the constitutionally and conventionally recognized right of Members of Parliament to ask questions to ministers and call for redress and remedy of grievances and injustice done to individual citizens or other interests in society. Therefore, Great Britain resisted the introduction of an Ombudsman and had in his

place only a Parliamentary Commissioner who was merely to supplement the task of the member of Parliament. That is why, the British White Paper on this point utters the caution in the following terms:

“In Britain, Parliament is the place for ventilating the grievances of the citizens—by history, tradition, and past and present practice. We do not want to create any new institution which would erode the functions of members of Parliament. We shall give members of Parliament a better instrument which they can use in this respect.”

Therefore, the British Commissioner is only a servant of the House of Commons and able to act only at the instance of the members of Parliament, to whom the individual citizens must first make their complaints. One only hopes that Indian statesmanship will see the wisdom of these words of caution before creating this new institution in pursuit of a Scandinavian model, irrelevant and detrimental to the principles enshrined in the Indian Constitution.

#### *Imitation to be Avoided*

It seems to me, we are bedevilled with imitation. We are taken up too easily with novelties in law. Ombudsman and Commissions are the new fashions of legal thinking. Anything wrong anywhere, create a new office or set up a Commission as though it is universal legal anodyne. It is time to say that they are serious infractions on the rule of law. Commissions are unavoidable sometimes in matters of State-wide or nation-wide public importance. But Commissions are not the ordinary rule of law but exceptions to it. Exceptions in exceptional circumstances should not provide materials for ordinary constitutional norms or permanent constitutional impositions. But where individual rights and wrongs are involved of persons, be they public officers or private citizens, I shall insist on the full and free operation of the rule of law and access to the ordinary courts of the land. By all means remove, by legislation, procedural defects in this respect, but I will not subscribe to the creation of competing institutions to compete with the courts and ordinary laws by which all should be governed. I have no doubt that an institution like an Ombudsman will be an excuse for tyranny and maladministration. An Ombudsman is contrary to the basic spirit of the Indian Constitution and unless one is prepared to throw the whole Indian Constitution, lock, stock and barrel, overboard, an Ombudsman cannot fit into the Indian Constitution. It will denigrate the Constitution. It will denigrate the judiciary. It will denigrate Parliament and the State Legislatures. Soon after the

Ombudsman, we will have to have an Ombudsman for the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman in India will be a new 'star-chamber' with a different Indian instead of a Nordic name.

There are today on the Indian scene, not by the Constitution but by legal and administrative fiat, two special authorities worth noticing. One is the Vigilance Commission with the Vigilance Commissioner and the other the Commissioner of Public Grievances. If the numerous Government and administrative departments with still more numerous officers cannot exercise vigilance and discover public and private grievances, is it being seriously suggested that one Vigilance Commissioner or more, or a Commissioner of Public Grievances will do the miracle? What guarantee is there that they will not go the way that the myriad departments and numerous officers have gone? I see no hope in these legal fancies and proliferations. Vigilance and sensitiveness to grievances have to be spontaneous and self-springing and not imposed. That is the way to improve government and administration. The point here to emphasize is that with the prospective Ombudsman, the Vigilance Commission, and the Commissioner of Public Grievances, India has an unholy trinity to threaten the Rule of Law.

#### CHALLENGE TO THE RULE OF LAW

The Rule of Law is really an antidote to power and its abuse. It has been well said, "All power corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely." The official or the executive who today possesses the power does not realise when he is exceeding his limits. Lord Denning, in his Hamlyn Lectures "Freedom under the Law", described it as insidious and so insidious that the official or the executive often believes that he is acting for the public good when in fact he is only asserting his unjustified and brief authority. Lord Denning said, at page 100 : "The Jack-in-office never realizes that he is being a little tyrant". The most important task of the court and the rule of law is that the powers of the executive are properly used, honestly and reasonably, for the purposes authorized by Parliament and Legislatures and not for any other consideration. Lord Denning posed this problem in the following terms, at page 103 of his Hamlyn Lectures : "The problem before us today is not so clear cut. It is more subtle, as is to be expected in a more complex society, but it is in principle the same, and it must be solved by the courts and not civil war. For today the executive have great powers over the lives and property of every one of us. No one will dispute that the powers exist, for Parliament has granted them, but the question is what remedy the courts provide if they are misused or abused."

This is the greatest challenge to the rule of law in the modern age. In the realm of the rule of law, the exercise of these executive powers is the frequent and recurring source of irritation and protest, specially when these powers relate to search, seizure, and entry. They produce direct conflict between the rights of man and the rights of the State. Many new powers of search and entry are today recognized in modern statutes. Enforcement officers from the Income Tax Department, Customs Department, Excise Department, Food Department and many other Government executive agencies are today clothed with the right to enter shop and residential premises to inspect goods and call upon the shopkeeper and the householder to produce his goods and papers. Factory Inspectors, Sanitary Inspectors, Town Planning or Municipal Officers and a whole host of miscellaneous officers of the Government may enter all kinds of premises for various purposes. It is said that the officials of the Ministry of Supply of England may enter an Englishman's house, no longer a castle, in order to see if he is doing research into atomic energy and the officials of the Agricultural Committee can enter an Englishman's land to see if he is farming it properly. Many Parliamentary and State Statutes in India bear testimony to these powers. Many of these powers conferred on such officers are much greater than those conferred on the ordinary police, with which the rule of law was so long familiar. In some cases, it is not necessary for these officers, as it is for the police, to get a search warrant even from the Magistrate, nor even is it necessary for them to show to anybody else outside themselves, that they have reasonable grounds for thinking that an offence has been committed or the law which they are asked to administer has been violated. All that they need to be armed with is a duly authenticated power from an official of their own department.

While it is possible to make the rule of law effective against the misuse or the abuse of power, it has remained a passive spectator in instances of non-use of legitimate powers. Very often a public authority has power to issue a licence but equally often that authority indefinitely delays consideration of application for such licence. The question arises whether in such a case the aggrieved person has a remedy. What is the legal position where a man's house leaks because he needs a licence to do the repairs, but the legal authority puts off issuing the licence indefinitely while water gets in and damages his goods. Similarly, some one may have urgent work or business abroad and the Treasury may delay consideration of his application for necessary currency with the result that the man loses the business or the work. Lord Denning points out that unlike *Droit Administratif* in France on this point of non-user of power there is no corresponding principle in English Law to deal with such cases of non-use of powers. To some extent, writs,



such as *mandamus*, are of help in this respect as part of the rule of law.

#### THE CASE FOR AN OMBUDSMAN

Therefore, the whole question of Ombudsman is reduced to this. There are many injustices and in many areas of law today where complaints of its abuse, misuse or non-use are frequently made. Not all of them come to Court. There is also public grievance which is accumulating in the country. Something has got to be done. Ombudsman as a person receiving complaints is one thing but as a punishing authority it is quite a different proposition. The shifting of complaints is a procedure which is understandable.

#### *Indian Complaints*

Formerly, these complaints were made to every department which had an organization to deal with them. Without such a self-reliant machinery, these complaints will never be actually disposed of. Disciplinary control of the public officers has weakened in the modern days. This is the basic problem.

Then there is another aspect of the problem in the parliamentary and democratic system of Government. A Member of Parliament is saddled with the primary task of receiving complaints from his constituency and focussing the attention of Parliament and the State Legislature. To assist him effectively, an organization might be set up to deal with these problems.

The things that require to be avoided in a set-up, such as the Government of India, under the Constitution may be summarized. First, in a parliamentary system, where Parliament and the State Legislatures are the sole authority to focus public attention to these matters, nothing should be done to undermine the authority of Parliament. The second is the rule of law which prevails in this country. It will not be safe to undermine the authority of Public Prosecutors who are well accepted today. They should be assisted and responsibilities given to them without unnecessary fetters to proceed against an offending public servant by an appropriate complaint.

#### *Administrative Reforms Commission's Proposal*

In India, the proposal was mooted by the Administrative Reforms Commission, 1966. According to such report, there should be one

authority dealing with complaints against the administrative acts of Ministers or Secretaries to Government at the Centre and in the States. There should be another authority in each State and at the Centre for dealing with complaints against the administrative acts of other officials. All these authorities, it was recommended, should be independent of the executive as well as the legislature and the judiciary, but it was pointed out that setting up of these authorities should not, however, be taken to be a complete answer to the problem of redress of citizens' grievances. It is also suggested by the Administrative Reforms Commission that the present system of Vigilance Commissions, wherever operative, will then become redundant and would have to be abolished on the setting up of the institution. It is there that the Ombudsman of India was designated as 'Lokpal' and the Ombudsman for other officials as 'Lokayukta'.

The following main features of the institutions of Lokpal and Lokayukta are recommended by the Administrative Reforms Commission:

- (1) They should be demonstrably independent and impartial.
- (2) Their investigations and proceedings should be conducted in private and should be informal in character.
- (3) Their appointment should, as far as possible, be non-political.
- (4) Their status should compare with the highest judicial functionaries in the country.
- (5) They should deal with matters in the discretionary field involving acts of injustice, corruption or favouritism.
- (6) Their proceedings should not be subject to judicial interference and they should have the maximum latitude and powers in obtaining information relevant to their duties.
- (7) They should not look forward to any benefit or pecuniary advantage from the executive government.

Such Lokpal should be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister, which would be tendered by him after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of the Opposition. The Lokpal is suggested to have the same status as the Chief Justice of India. His tenure will be 5 years, subject to eligibility for reappointment for another term of five years in accordance with the same procedure. He may, by writing under his hand, addressed to the President, resign

his office. He will not be removable from office except in the manner prescribed in the Constitution for the removal from office of a judge of the Supreme Court. He cannot be a member of any Legislature.

Lokpal will have the power to investigate an administrative act done by or with the approval of a minister or a secretary to government at the Centre or in the State, if a complaint is made against such an act by a person who is affected by it and who claims to have suffered an injustice on account of that act. In this context, an act would include a failure to take action. He may, in his discretion, inquire into a complaint of maladministration involving not only an act of injustice but also an allegation of favouritism to any person. It is suggested that Lokpal may *suo motu* investigate administrative acts of the types described above which may come to his notice otherwise than through a complaint of an adversely affected person.

The Administrative Reforms Commission, however, excluded certain areas from the purview of the Lokpal as follows:

- (1) Action taken in a matter certified by a minister as affecting the relations or dealings between the Government of India and any foreign government or any international organization of states or governments;
- (2) Action taken under the Foreigners Act;
- (3) Action taken for the purpose of investigating crime or protecting the security of the state, including action taken with respect to passports;
- (4) Action taken in the exercise of power in relation to determining whether a matter shall go to the court;
- (5) Action taken in matters which arise out of the terms of contract governing purely commercial relations of the administration with customers or suppliers except complaints of harassment or delays in the performance of contractual obligations;
- (6) Action taken in respect of appointments, removals, pay, discipline, superannuation or other personnel matters;
- (7) Grant of honours and awards;
- (8) A decision made in exercise of his discretion by an administrative authority unless the elements involved in the exercise of discretion are absent to such an extent that no discretion has been exercised at all;

- (9) Any action in respect of which the person aggrieved has or had a right of appeal, reference or review to or before a tribunal;
- (10) Matters in respect of which a person aggrieved has or had a remedy by way of proceedings in any court of law; and
- (11) An administrative decision which was taken more than 12 months before the date of the complaint.

On receipt of a complaint from a person claiming to have suffered, the procedure for dealing with it is as shown in the following paragraph.

Lokpal will scrutinize the complaint and come to a conclusion as to whether he has jurisdiction to deal with it and, if so, whether the case is worth investigation. If his conclusion is in the negative on either of these points, he will reject the complaint and inform the complainant accordingly.

If he decides to take up the investigation, he will, in the first instance, communicate the complaint to the administration and invite the administration's comments thereon. At this stage, it may be possible for the administration to rectify, on its own, any faulty decision made by it, or it may seek to establish the correctness or justice of the action taken. Lokpal, on receipt of the administration's comments, will decide whether the complaint is actionable and inform the complainant in case the faulty decision has been rectified or he has decided not to take any further action. In those cases in which he decides to proceed with the investigation, if, on its completion, the Lokpal is satisfied that there is no cause for grievance, he will inform the complainant accordingly and close the case. If, however, he considers that an injustice has been done to the complainant, he will suggest to the administration remedial action where it is possible for it to provide the remedy. If his recommendation is accepted, the case will then be closed. If, however, the recommendation is not accepted, it will be open to him to make a report on the case to the Prime Minister or Chief Minister of the State, as the case may be. The Prime Minister or the Chief Minister will inform the Lokpal of action taken on the reference within two months. Thereafter he may, if he is dissatisfied with the action taken, bring it to the notice of the Parliament or the Legislature, as the case may be, through an *ad hoc* report or through the annual report. The administration's explanation in its defence will also be brought out in the report. Also, if the Lokpal considers, as a result of his study of any case or cases, that an amendment of the law would be justified, he can make appropriate recommendations to the Prime Minister or Chief Minister, as the case may

bc. The above mentioned procedure will apply *mutatis mutandis* to investigation taken up *suo motu* by the Lokpal.

If, during his investigations, he finds that a case involves criminal misconduct or would justify criminal proceedings, he will report to the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister, as the case may be, who will take further action in the matter within two months of the receipt thereof and inform the Lokpal of the action taken.

At the beginning of each year, the Lokpal will submit a report to the Legislature concerned on his activities during the previous year. Besides giving a summary of the cases disposed of by him, he may indicate the need for amending any law in order to remove occasions for unintended hardship experienced as a result of the administration of the existing law.

So far as the Lokayukta is concerned, the suggestion was that he will be concerned with problems similar to those which will face the Lokpal in respect of Ministers and Secretaries though, in respect of action taken at subordinate levels of official hierarchy, he will in many cases have to refer complainants to competent higher levels. The suggestion was perhaps powers, functions and procedures may be prescribed *mutatis mutandis* with those which are laid down by the Lokpal. His status, position, emoluments, etc., should, however, be analogous to those of a Chief Justice of a High Court and he should be entitled to have free access to Secretary to the Government concerned or to the Head of the Department with whom he will mostly have to deal with to secure justice for a deserving citizen.

### *The Bill for Lokpal and Lokayukta, 1968*

In the Bill circulated as "the Lokpal and Lokayukta Bill, 1968", it has been provided that the Lokpal may investigate any action which is taken by or with the general or specific approval of a Minister or a Secretary or any other public servant being a public servant notified by the Central Government in consultation with the Lokpal in this behalf except as provided in the Bill. The Lokpal or Lokayukta shall not conduct any investigation under this Act in case of a complaint involving a grievance in respect of any action: (1) if such action relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, or (2) if the complainant has or had any remedy by way of proceedings before any tribunal or court of law, or (3) any complaint involving a grievance, if the complaint is made after expiry of 12 months from the date on which action complained against has become known to the complainant, or (4) any

complaint involving an allegation, if the complaint is made after expiry of 5 years from the date on which the action complained against is alleged to have taken place.

The Second Schedule to the Bill enumerates the following matters as beyond purview of the Lokpal: (1) action taken in the matter certified by the Secretary as affecting the relation between the Government of India and any foreign Government or any international organization or state or government; (2) action taken under the Extradition Act, 1943, or Foreigners Act, 1946; (3) action taken for the purpose of investigating crime or protecting the security of the State, including action taken in respect of passports and travel documents; (4) action taken in the exercise of power in relation to determining whether a matter shall go to the court or not; (5) action taken in the matter which arises out of the contract governing purely commercial relation of the administration with customers and suppliers, except where the complainant alleges harassment or gross delay in meeting the contractual obligation; (6) action taken in respect of appointment, removal, superannuation and other matters relating to condition of service of public servant but not including action relating to claim for compensation, gratuity, provident fund or to any claim which arises on retirement or termination of service; and (7) grant of honour and award.

Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Lokpal may investigate any action which is taken by or with the general or specific approval of: (1) a Minister or a Secretary, or (2) any other public servant, being a public servant notified by the Central Government, in consultation with the Lokpal in this behalf, in any case where a complaint involving a grievance or an allegation is made in respect of such action or such action can be or could have been, in the opinion of the Lokpal, subject of a grievance or an allegation.

In the statement of Objects and Reasons in introducing the Bill, it is said that in its scope it differs from the draft Bill proposed by the Administrative Reforms Commission in two major respects. Firstly, it does not extend to public servant in the State. Secondly, it does not confine itself to Ministers and Secretaries alone. In other words, the Bill seeks to provide a statutory machinery to enquire into the complaints based on action of all Union public servants, including Ministers. The scope of the Bill is wide when one considers the definition of a public servant which leaves many gaps to be filled up.

#### A WORLD VIEW OF OMBUDSMAN

In 1955, only three Scandinavian countries—Sweden, Finland and Denmark—had an Ombudsman system. In 1962, two more

countries—Norway and New Zealand—adopted the same. Since then, the scheme has been adopted in five other countries around the world—Guyana, Mauritius, the United Kingdom, the Canadian provinces of Alberta and New Brunswick, and the American State of Hawaii. In addition, West Germany set up an Ombudsman for the armed forces in 1957, and the State Comptroller in Israel has assumed the complaint-handling function of an Ombudsman. By middle of 1967, variations of the Ombudsman system existed in 12 countries. Not only that, but the scheme has been officially proposed or is being actively-discussed in many other places around the world. Why has this Ombudsman idea spread so rapidly in recent years? A short answer is that the growth of the welfare state had made necessary new protection for bureaucratic mistakes and abuses of power. The Ombudsman is a novel and allegedly appropriate institution for dealing with the average citizen's complaints about unfair administrative action. It differs from our traditional methods of dealing with grievances and is supposed to have important advantages over these methods.

The important feature in all systems of Ombudsman so far proposed is that, because of the simple and cheap way in which complaints are handled, many minor complaints can be satisfied. Though important to the complainant, they would not be worth the cost of an elaborate court procedure. Many cases involve no more than explaining to the bewildered citizen the reasons for the decision of which he has complained, and warning the government office in question that in future it should give adequate reasons for its decisions. Other examples of minor grievances are complaints about getting no answer to an application, leisureliness in replying to mail, giving insufficient information on a right of appeal, and delay in making decisions. Nevertheless, some of the Ombudsman's most valuable work has been done on serious cases of illegality involving the liberty of the subject, such as the unjustifiable use of handcuffs or the recording of telephone conversations by the police, or an assault by a nurse on a mental patient.

Of greater relevance to American discussions is the recent proposal for India. India is a huge quasi-federal state, with a heterogeneous population. Some of the problems of adjusting the plan to fit such a country are similar to those in the United States. The Ombudsman idea has been discussed in India for several years and proposals have been made at both the state and federal levels.

In the United States, the Ombudsman idea has recently become so popular that the word 'Ombudsman' is now being used to describe any new complaint-handling or appeal machinery. Thus, the term



Tax Ombudsman has been applied to a federal proposal by Senators Warren Magnuson and Edward V. Long to appoint administrative appeal court judges for small tax claims. The most serious misapplication of the term has been to complaint officers who are appointed by and responsible to the executive side of government.

The controversy over Ombudsman appears to have blown over. At one stage, the interest in Ombudsman was very keen. It even extended to international sphere where Professor Frank called attention to the "three treaty proposals—the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, its accompanying Protocol, and the Convention on Racial Discrimination—in which the United Nations have constructed two committees that could serve powerfully as Ombudsmen for Worldwide human rights".

The Ombudsman has to be considered in the background of the political systems in a country. Ombudsman's opponents are some of his best friends, those who expect too much of him. The Ombudsman can encourage continuing improvement in a basically sound and honest administration. He cannot correct basic injustices, even though he may protest against that. Problems of poverty, prejudice and ignorance will not be solved by shunting them on to the shoulders of a single Don Quixote.

'Ombudsmania' can be identified by one key characteristic. It would give the Ombudsman power to change administrative decisions, power to prosecute brutal policemen, and power to modify faulty regulations. Such an Ombudsman would be a chief executive, legislature and judge rolled into one. The frustration of trial-and-error democracy sometimes gives rise to an understandable longing for an all-powerful father-figure. By virtue of his wisdom, the Ombudsman would seem to fill the role; the same wisdom leads him to decline it. He declines not only because such a role would be authoritarian, but because he cannot in fact fill it. For him, to try to do so would be merely to create a 'para-government' recapitulating all the shortcomings of the primary government.

#### WHAT CAN OMBUDSMAN REALLY ACHIEVE

What, then, does an Ombudsman accomplish that present institutions do not? Any particular grievance could conceivably be rectified through the intervention of a friend, neighbour, relative, lawyer, newspaper or legislator or even directly by the agency who inflicted it.

The lawyer's fee often makes him inaccessible. When others help, they do so as charity. Substitution of an Ombudsman means that evil imposed by government is rectified by government, and rectified as a primary responsibility rather than as a haphazard favour from a busy legislator. Lawmakers have a right to intervene, and so do we all. The Ombudsman has a duty to do so in cases where he believes they merit. Others who volunteer usually lack expertise and impartiality. They are amateurs and advocates.

One possible contribution of the Ombudsman stands out in the zone of secondary impact. Citizens' complaints are symptoms of governmental malaise. To be useful in diagnosis, they must be examined by a specialist. The Ombudsman really does not undertake to root out underlying causes of social sickness.

Finally, the Ombudsman assists in the restoration of balance between the legislative and the executive branches. Size and complexity have overwhelmed, often underpaid, understaffed and over-extended lawmakers. The Ombudsman can free the legislator from the harassment of trivial matters, while turning minute complaints into a mosaic which the legislature should find helpful in supervising bureaucracy.

Each of these services represents a substantial increment to the traditional complaint-handling function of Ombudsman.

There are countries of western Europe that have a highly developed system of administrative courts, such as France, Italy, Germany and Austria. A common initial reaction of persons from these countries to the Ombudsman scheme is to say that it is not needed because administrative courts do the job instead, and any way, it could not be fitted into the administrative court system. Turning now to the countries that have inherited the common law and have no system of administrative courts, there is an important distinction between the many that have copied the British cabinet system of government, with a union of executive and legislative powers, and those like the United States that have adopted a separation of powers. Regarding the latter countries, the deficiencies in their present legal systems seem to be much the same as in other common-law countries and speak in favour of an Ombudsman scheme. However, because of the separation of powers and the traditional struggle between the executive and the legislature, it may be objected that an Ombudsman would be regarded with suspicion by the executive departments as a biased agent of the legislature. In the United States of America, because of the highly politicized nature of

the presidency and of the top administrative posts, an Ombudsman would be likely to be caught up in partisan politics.

Many of the problems raised by the separation of powers might be overcome by creating a plural Ombudsman—a Complaints Commission whose members would be appointed jointly by the executive and the legislature. For its effectiveness would lie not so much in its direct relationship to the legislature as in its easy accessibility to the citizens, its power to investigate, the reasonableness of its opinions on cases, and its ability to bring them to the attention of the public. In the countries with monarchical tradition or with the British system where adopted, the previous strength of the royal power has led the courts to inherit a tradition of no fetters on executive discretion and of reticence about reviewing administrative action. This tradition has been preserved in recent times by the convenient assumption that it is the job of Parliament to control the administration and that, therefore, any complaint about administrative action other than its clear illegality should be left to Parliament to deal with. The courts have only hesitantly entered the arena by marking out a vague area of so-called judicial or quasi-judicial administrative action for review, and the legal procedures for bringing the administrative cases before the courts are archaic and complex in most Commonwealth countries. Because of Parliament's inability to cope with the situation, our simple faith in the doctrine of ministerial responsibility has often resulted in something dangerously close to administrative irresponsibility. An Ombudsman scheme is, therefore, put forward as a healthy step in the direction of a better balance between the rights of the citizen and the powers of the State or of the Crown.

Prof. Abel has pointed to a number of common characteristics of the Commonwealth parliamentary systems with which an Ombudsman would have to make his peace, though these may mean that the Ombudsman scheme would work somewhat differently. Federal systems, such as those in India, Canada and Australia, would, of course, require considerable adjustment before Ombudsman can be introduced at Central and State levels of government. The size and population of some countries might call for a collegial body, a Complaints Commission. Otherwise, as New Zealand's experience to date demonstrates, an Ombudsman can be fitted into the Commonwealth parliamentary system with minor adjustments and even some of these, designed to assuage the sensitivity of ministers, were not necessary.

The general characteristic of all Ombudsman's scheme reveals the following features. Firstly, the Ombudsman is an officer of the

legislature and not of the executive. Secondly, he is an impartial investigator and is politically independent even of the legislature. Thirdly, a significant limitation upon Ombudsman's power is unlike other courts. He has no right to quash or reverse a decision and has no direct control over the administration. He has right to investigate, to get the facts and then report. Fourthly, he has power to investigate on his own initiative. Fifthly, his method of handling appeal against administrative decision is—unlike that of the court—direct, informal, speedy and cheap. All that is required to initiate an appeal is for the complainant to write a letter.

So long, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary were regarded as the three organs of the State. Ombudsman today represents a different organ. It seems to me that, quite apart from the doctrine of separation of powers, this institution is fraught with great danger. Administrative procedures must be improved, parliamentary control must be made more effective and review of the courts made more simplified. If on these three fronts progress is maintained, much of the case for Ombudsman would disappear.

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## THE UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

K. R. Damle

THE Union Public Service Commission is a creature of the Indian Constitution. The Government of India Act, 1919, first provided for the establishment of a Public Service Commission. The later Act of 1935 led to the establishment of Public Service Commissions both in the Centre as well as in the States. The process was carried a step forward in the Indian Constitution, which clothed them with independent status and kept them apart from the government. In this respect, the Union Public Service Commission differs from the Civil Service Commissions in U.K., who gave the original inspiration for its establishment. The latter are a part of the new Department of Personnel with the Chief Civil Service Commissioner holding an *ex-officio* Secretariat rank.

The Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), as established under the Constitution of India, acts as a check on the vagaries of the executive government in the same way as the Supreme Court and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India do. It has been given the necessary independent status for this purpose by the Constitution makers. The Chairman and the Members of the Commission are appointed by the President of India for a term of six years or up to the age of sixtyfive years, whichever is earlier. Once appointed, they cannot be removed unless a charge of misbehaviour is made and on a reference by the President to it is investigated by the Supreme Court and found to be correct. They can also be removed from office by the President if they are adjudged insolvent or engage during their term of office in any paid employment outside the duties of their office or become unfit to continue in office by reason of infirmity of mind or body. On relinquishing office, they become ineligible for further employment either under the Central Government or the State Government. This provision removes them from the ambit of temptation of further office, which may be held out by the executive government. Meticulous care has, thus, been taken to ensure its independence.

A member of the UPSC, on completion of his term as a member, is, however, eligible for appointment as Chairman of the UPSC or as

Chairman of the State Public Service Commission provided he is within the prescribed age limit. On such appointment, he is entitled to a fresh tenure of six years.

The Commission is essentially an advisory body. It has no executive functions. Its recommendations are of an advisory character. The Government at the Centre is the appointing authority for all posts under it and can theoretically ignore the recommendations made by the Commission if it chooses to do so. But a healthy convention has grown over the last 20 years that recommendations made by the Commission are accepted except in rare cases.

The Constitution provides that, at the close of every year, the Commission shall submit a report of its activities to the President, who causes copies of it to be placed before Parliament. This report contains a brief account of cases in which the Commission's recommendations have not been accepted. When the report is placed before Parliament, it is always accompanied by a memorandum giving reasons why Government was unable to accept the Commission's advice. This provision in the Constitution ensures that the Government's right to appoint its servants is exercised after giving due weight to the advice of the Commission and that its discretion is not exercised in an arbitrary, erratic and capricious manner.

The number of members of the UPSC is determined by the President by means of regulations. The present strength of the UPSC sanctioned by the President is eight members and a Chairman. In order to ensure that the Commission possesses necessary expertise in service matters, the Constitution requires that as many as—maybe one-half—possible of the members of every Commission shall be persons who, at the time of their respective appointments, have held office for at least ten years either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State.

The UPSC conducts examinations for appointments to the services of the Union. These include the All India Services and the Central Services together with the services in the Union Territories. The Commission has to be consulted: (1) on all matters relating to the methods of recruitment to civil services and civil posts; (2) on the principles to be followed in making appointments to Civil Services and civil posts and in making promotions and transfers from one service to another and on the suitability of candidates for such appointments, promotions and transfers; (3) on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of India, including memorials or

petitions relating to such matters; (4) on any claim by or in respect of a person, who is serving or has served under the Government of India in a civil capacity that any costs incurred by him in defending legal proceedings instituted against him in respect of acts done in the execution of his duty should be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India; and (5) on any claim for the award of a pension in respect of injuries sustained by a person while serving under the Government of India in a civil capacity and any question as to the amount of any such award.

An Act of Parliament can also provide for exercise of additional functions by the UPSC in respect of the Services of the Union and also in respect of the services of any local authority or other body corporate constituted by law or of any public institution. Under this provision, the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act passed by Parliament requires consultation with the UPSC in respect of all appointments made by it where the minimum salary of the post exceeds Rs. 350 per month.

With the growth in the number of Public Sector Undertakings, financed wholly by funds provided by the Central Government, and the increase in the number of autonomous bodies, a feeling is growing that appointments to posts under them should be made on the basis of recommendations made by the UPSC or a similarly constituted independent organization. It will be difficult for the UPSC as constituted at present to undertake the ever-growing additional work involved in making recommendations to fill these posts. The patronage exercised in making appointments in this field is enormous. It is necessary to inspire confidence in the methods of recruitment to these posts and to provide an effective control on these appointments in order to allay public misgivings that these appointments are likely to be the product of nepotism or favouritism. An independent body like the UPSC should be entrusted with the task of giving advice in respect of these appointments, if public criticism is to be avoided and a feeling of confidence is to be generated among the candidates for these posts.

The Constitution empowers the President to provide for exclusion of consultation with the Commission in respect of All India Services as well as other services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union by means of regulations specifying the matters in which either generally or in any particular class of case or circumstances it shall not be necessary to consult the Commission. Thus, all civil posts in Class III and Class IV categories have been excluded from the Commission's purview. Appointments to certain other posts, like Ambassadors, High Commissioners, etc., and to tenure posts have also been taken out of the Commission's jurisdiction. The inclusion of any post in the



excluded list is always done after consulting the Commission.

While framing recruitment rules for filling up certain posts, the Commission is consulted with regard to the percentage of posts, which should be filled by promotion from lower cadres and the percentage which should be filled by direct recruitment from the open market. In respect of posts to be filled by promotion, a departmental promotion committee is constituted, which is presided over by a member or Chairman of the UPSC.

With the growth of the regional languages and their acceptance as media of instruction in schools and colleges as well as by State Governments as official languages for transaction of government business, a demand is made that the UPSC should conduct its examinations through the medium of regional languages.

The Constitution provides that the official language of the Union shall be Hindi in the Devanagari script. The use of English had been permitted for a period of 15 years from the introduction of the Constitution for official purposes. This period has subsequently been extended. It is, therefore, necessary that the employees of the Union must be proficient in the use of the language prescribed as its official language. The use of English for the purpose of the examinations conducted by the UPSC is at present obligatory except where, by rules, an option is given to the candidates to write their answers in any other language. A beginning has been made in this respect by permitting candidates to write their answers in two compulsory papers for the All India and Central Services examinations, viz., Essay and General Knowledge, in any one of the languages mentioned in VIII Schedule of the Constitution. Further extension of the use of these languages for this purpose will have to be done cautiously after examining the facilities that exist for instruction at college and university level in different subjects in regional languages, and the impact that it may have on the efficiency or otherwise of official work under the Union Government. It will be impossible to permit work under the Union Government to be done through the medium of all regional languages. A minimum standard of proficiency in the official language of the Union Government or English, as long as its use is permitted, will be necessary for the efficient discharge of official business. Whether this proficiency should be acquired after entry into the service or before, is a matter for careful consideration. Any violent departure from the existing system, which seems to have served adequately so far, should be avoided so long as an alternative acceptable to all is not forthcoming, if chaos in administration is to be eschewed.

The civil posts under the Union Government are filled partly by deputing officers from the States, belonging to the All India Services or to the States Services, and partly by direct recruitment. Since different States have different languages for the transaction of official business, this method introduces an element of uncertainty with regard to the degree of proficiency in the use of the official language of the Union, required to be attained by the intending entrants. With more and more States insisting on the use of regional languages for official purposes within their jurisdiction, it may in future be difficult to obtain the necessary number of officers from those States, where the official language is different from that of the Union Government, on account of lack of requisite proficiency in it. Similarly, the direct recruits from different States may not be equally proficient in the use of the official language on account of their having been educated through the medium of their regional languages at the university level. This may lead to bickering and charges that residents of one State have been preferred to those of another. The introduction of the use of different languages for purposes of the examinations conducted by the UPSC is, thus, fraught with several pitfalls and should not be made without giving thought to the resultant problems and without providing a remedy therefor. Otherwise, the whole system of recruitment that obtains today may have to be drastically altered if an equal opportunity has to be given to all the citizens of the country to enter the Civil Services of the Union Government.

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## DIRECT TAXES ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA

*R. D. Shah*

THE role of tax administration in a modern State is a complex one. Taxation is not only an instrument for raising revenues but also has to subserve certain economic and social objectives. It has to mobilize resources for expenditure on economic development and expansion of social services, while maintaining the flow of savings and investment, and also strive to bring about a wider measure of equality in incomes, wealth and opportunities. The attainment of these objectives is largely a function of efficient tax administration. Taxation administration today, thus, comprehends a wide field ranging from the changes in taxation laws for achieving the above mentioned objectives, to appropriate organizational structure for administering these, management cadres for effective implementation of the adopted policies, personnel problems of recruitment, training, placement and promotions and appropriate procedures and practices to expedite assessment and collection of taxes, to eliminate tax evasion and to enlist public cooperation. Taxes are classified from the point of view of their incidence as direct and indirect taxes. This article deals only with direct taxes administration.

Tax administration during the British rule was confined largely to matters connected with the collection of land revenue, until Income-tax was introduced in 1860. With the transfer of land revenue to the provincial administrations, income-tax came to be the sole direct tax levied by the Central Government. With the introduction of Estate Duty in 1953, taxes on wealth and expenditure in 1957 and on gifts in 1958, and the Companies (Profits) Sur-tax Act in 1964, a broad based, integrated direct taxes structure came into existence. The Expenditure Tax Act was repealed in 1966.

Income Tax Administration functioned as a branch of the provincial revenue administration until the Income-tax Act, 1922, created a separate central machinery for administering the Act. In 1924, the Central Board of Revenue was set up to administer the Income-tax Act, as a branch of the Finance Department of the Government of India, with Provincial Commissioners and a hierarchy of officials acting under

its control and supervision. There was, however, no uniformity in pay, methods of recruitment, and conditions of service and prospects and no interchange of officers among the different provincial branches of the administration for another decade, as they were modelled on the respective local revenue administrations.

## PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

### CENTRAL BOARD OF DIRECT TAXES AND DIRECTORATES

The direct taxes administration has now at its apex the Central Board of Direct Taxes, a statutory body set up in 1963, bifurcating the Central Board of Revenue. It consists of a Chairman and four Members. It guides, supervises and controls the administration of the direct tax laws in India. It also functions as a part of the Department of Revenue and Insurance, of the Ministry of Finance, Government of India. In this capacity, it advises the Government on all matters relating to direct taxes and exercises statutory functions vested in the Government. The Board is assisted by three Directorates of Inspection, which are attached offices of the Board performing 'staff' functions. Generally, they direct the implementation of the policies laid down by the Board and furnish it with management information.

### LINE AUTHORITIES

The line management functions are performed by Commissioners of Income-tax and Additional Commissioners of Income-tax, who are heads of departments controlling the field administrations. Generally, the Commissioners are in-charge of administration, assessment and collection while the Additional Commissioners are in-charge of judicial and audit functions of the department. However, very recently, some Commissioners and Additional Commissioners have been placed in-charge of recovery of taxes in arrears. Under them are Inspecting Assistant Commissioners who are the first line supervisors (see Figure 1, p. 432).

#### *Income-Tax Officer*

The determination of the tax liabilities and their collection are the function of Income-tax Officers belonging to Class I and Class II cadres. The Income-tax Investigation Commission has described the Income-tax Officer's role in the following terms:

"Under the present machinery of the Indian Income-tax Act, the Income-tax Officer is the only authority who brings on record

## Chairman and Four Members




Fig. 1 Organizational Chart of Central Board of Direct Taxes

the materials with reference to which assessments are to be framed. It is on these materials, that not only the Income-tax Officer's assessments but also the inspections, the appeals and the references to the High Court are based. In the strength of the Income-tax Officer's materials lies the strength of the assessments and any weakness that the Income-tax Officer might introduce in the framework of his assessments weakens the later proceedings right up to the end. In the course of his duties, the Income-tax Officer has, therefore, to know his charge inside out, know the character and the business activities of his assessee. He must be an expert accountant to get within the short time at his disposal to the essentials of the assessee's income from the account books which are maintained by the assessee with the help of expert knowledge. He has to be not only able to pierce through the subterfuges played by the assessee but also to meet successfully on their own ground the accountants, the lawyers and the other experts that the assessee can and does engage. He must be able to judge the value of evidence and to frame an assessment in a spirit of judicial procedure."

Thus, he is the linchpin of the administrative structure on whose character and capacity the stability and strength of the whole fabric rests.

### *Field Staff*

The Income-tax Officers are assisted in their field work by Inspectors who are to act as their eyes and ears in the field and in their office work by ministerial staff.

### APPELLATE AUTHORITIES

Appeals against the assessments of tax made by the Income-tax Officers are heard, in the first instance, by the Appellate Assistant Commissioners, who are independent in the exercise of their appellate functions while functioning under the administrative control of the Board. Further appeals are provided to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, which is an independent body under the Ministry of Law and is the ultimate fact-finding authority. On questions of law, references may be made to the decision of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to the High Court, from which appeal lies to the Supreme Court. If the assessee so prefer, they can also approach the Commissioner of Income-tax for revision of the orders of the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, provided they waive their right of appeal to the Appellate

Tribunal. In that case, the Commissioner's order will be final (see Figure 2).




Fig. 2 Organisational Chart for Appeals

## LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

The role of the tax administration is determined by the objectives of state policy. According to the Directive Principles of State Policy (contained in the Constitution of India), which are "fundamental in the governance of the country", the State is "to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting, as effectively as it may, a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life" (Article 38). To achieve such an order of society, the state is enjoined to ensure "that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment" (Article 39). In their resolution on industrial policy dated the 6th April, 1948, the Government had outlined, *inter alia*, the following steps as immediate objectives:

- (1) to expand production, both agricultural and industrial, particularly of capital equipment of goods satisfying the basic needs of the people and of commodities the export of which will increase earnings of foreign exchange;



- (2) to give a distinctively cooperative bias to the field of industry;
- (3) to promote cottage and small-scale industries which offer scope for individual, village or cooperative enterprise;
- (4) to regulate in the national interest the participation of foreign capital and enterprise in Indian industry, particularly as regards industrial technique and knowledge; and
- (5) to provide educational and health services on a much wider scale.

These objectives are reflected in the taxation laws.

### *Incentives for Savings and Investment*

Taxation laws, thus, provide for a wide variety of tax benefits by way of exemptions, rebates and incentives in fulfilment of national objectives. Incentives for personal savings and investments are provided by partial deduction from taxable income of contributions to provident funds and superannuation funds, premium paid for life insurance, and deposits in certain cumulative time deposit accounts in post offices; and by exemption from tax of interest on a wide variety of government small savings schemes, and of returns up to Rs. 3,000 from a wide area of investment, like shares in Indian companies, units in Unit Trust of India, deposits in banks and investments in government securities.

### *Encouraging Industrial Development*

In addition to creating a climate for investment, Government has also sought to encourage industrial development by giving various tax benefits. These include development rebate in respect of the actual cost of new ships acquired or new machinery or plant installed after 31st March, 1954, in addition to depreciation allowance; special concessions to industries treated as priority industries including a deduction of 5 per cent (8 per cent till now) of their profits for purposes of tax; exemption of profits up to 6 per cent on the capital employed in the case of newly established industrial undertakings or ships or hotels for a period of 5 years, as well as of dividends attributable to such profits; rehabilitation allowance to businesses discontinued due to natural calamities, civil riots or enemy action, if re-established within three years; concessional taxation of inter-corporate dividends of royalties or fees received by a foreign company from an Indian company, and of royalties, commission or fees received by an Indian company from any

concern in India; exemption of interest payable by industrial undertakings on money borrowed from approved financial institutions or debts incurred in a foreign country for purchase abroad of raw materials or capital plant and machinery on terms approved by Government; exemption from tax of remuneration received from a foreign state of individuals assigned to duties in India in connection with any cooperative technical assistance programme; exemption from tax for four years of remuneration of foreign technicians, and for 90 days of non-citizen employees of foreign enterprises not engaged in any trade or business in India but rendering service in India; amortization, over a period of ten years, of specified preliminary expenditure, up to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the cost of the profit, incurred by Indian companies or resident assesses in connection with the extension of an industrial undertaking or the setting up of a new industrial unit; amortization, over a ten-year period, of expenditure incurred on prospecting for and development of certain specified minerals or natural deposits; and amortization, over a period of 14 years, of expenditure on acquisition of patent rights or copy rights.

### *Promoting Scientific Research*

Liberal provisions have been made to promote industrial and scientific research. Contributions for scientific research to approved institutions are allowed as a deduction from income. Expenditure, whether of a capital or a revenue nature, incurred on scientific research related to the business is also similarly exempted. Exemption is extended to the income of approved Scientific Research Associations. The cost of assets acquired for scientific research has also been made eligible for a development rebate of 25 per cent.

### *Incentives to Exports*

To improve the balance of payments position and to increase our earnings of foreign exchange, tax incentives are granted for export of goods and technical knowhow. Indian companies, who received dividends from shares allotted in a foreign company, or royalty, commission or fees in consideration of any patent, designs or secret formulas made available to it or for technical services rendered, are allowed to deduct the whole of such income in computing the total income. Indian authors, playwrights, artists, musicians and actors are encouraged to project their activities outside India and augment our foreign exchange resources by allowing them to deduct 25 per cent of the income derived in the exercise of their profession abroad and received in India in foreign exchange in computing their total income. Exporters of goods out of India are granted a tax credit certificate up to 15 per cent of the sale

proceeds received in India. Domestic companies or Indian residents are also allowed a deduction of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  times the amount of expenditure incurred, which is not of a capital or personal nature, for promotion of exports as export market development allowance. To encourage foreigners to make purchases in India, no income is deemed to accrue or arise in India to a non-resident through or from operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.

### *Promotion of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry*

Livestock breeding, poultry and dairy farming are sought to be encouraged by exempting any income derived from such business from income-tax. Encouragement to agricultural marketing is given by exempting authorities constituted under law for the marketing of commodities from their income derived from letting of the godowns or warehouses for storage, processing or facilitating the marketing of commodities. Provision has also been made in the Income-tax Act to give companies engaged in agro-based industries a weighted deduction, in the computation of their total income, of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  times the amount of expenditure incurred on the provision of goods, services or facilities to independent cultivators, growers or producers in India of the products of agriculture, animal husbandry or dairy or poultry farming, with a view to encouraging industry to incur expenditure on providing inputs and extension services for improvement of Agricultural productivity. Activities for the extension of knowledge in the spheres of agriculture, animal husbandry and fisheries have been included in the definition of the term 'scientific research' to make them qualify for the deductions allowed for research expenditure. As a measure for encouraging the production of improved high-yielding and disease-resistant strains of seeds through modern methods, of processed concentrates for processed fish and fish products, and of vegetable oils and oil cakes manufactured by the solvent extraction process, these industries have been included in the list of priority industries entitling them to special tax concessions. With a view to encouraging re-plantation of tea estates, expenditure incurred on planting tea bushes, on replacement of bushes that have died or become permanently useless, is allowed as a deduction in computing the income derived from the sale of tea grown and manufactured by the seller in India. The subsidy granted by the Government to cover a part of the expenses on such re-plantation is also exempted from tax.

### *Promotion of Cooperative Movement*

Every incentive is given to the cooperative movement. The entire income of a cooperative society connected with agriculture, banking, rural credit, milk production and cottage industries is exempt from tax

in respect of their business income from these activities, while the business income up to Rs. 20,000 of cooperative societies engaged in other activities is also exempted from tax. Exemption is also extended to interest or dividends derived by a cooperative society from their investments with other cooperative societies or income derived from letting out of godowns or warehouses. In certain cases, where the gross income of a cooperative society does not exceed Rs. 20,000, income by way of interest on securities or income from house property also enjoys complete exemption. Exemption is now extended to business income of labour cooperative societies with a view to promoting self-help among persons of small means and to farm cooperative societies for the collective disposal of their labour. The business income of cooperative societies engaged in fishing and other allied pursuits is also similarly exempted. Dividends received from a cooperative society by a member of the society is also exempted from tax.

### *Fostering Educational and Health Services*

An impetus is provided to investments in educational institutions and hospitals not only by the deduction from total income granted as donations to any fund or institution established for a charitable purpose, which is defined to include education and medical relief, and by the exemption granted to charitable trusts and funds, but also by the exemption specifically granted to incomes of universities, educational institutions, hospitals and other allied institutions existing for philanthropic purposes and not for profit.

### *Promoting Social Justice*

There are several provisions in the Income-tax Act which are intended to benefit the less fortunate sections of the population. Resident individuals who are totally blind or who suffer from a permanent physical disability are allowed a deduction of Rs. 5,000 in computing their taxable income. Resident individuals and Hindu undivided families incurring expenses in the medical treatment of handicapped dependents in a medical institution are allowed a deduction of Rs. 2,400 for 182 days or more and Rs. 600 in other cases. An incentive to employment of displaced persons or repatriates is provided by allowing new industrial undertakings which employ such persons up to 60 per cent or more, a deduction of 50 per cent of their profits, subject to a maximum of Rs. 100,000, in computing their total income. Industries ravaged by natural calamities or social upheavals are provided a rehabilitation allowance. To encourage implementation of the housing programmes of government, the income of statutory housing boards and development or improvement authorities is totally

exempted from tax. Similarly, with a view to encouraging construction of house property to be let out on rent to low and middle income groups, in the case of such property completed after March 31, 1970, the annual value is reduced by Rs. 1,200 in respect of each residential unit for each year for tax purposes for a period of five years.

### *Reducing Disparities in Income and Concentration of Wealth*

An attempt to discourage payment of very high salaries to employees in the private sector is made by putting a ceiling of Rs. 5,000, per month, per person, on expenditure on payment of salary which will be allowed as a deduction from profits in computing the total income. Similarly, the expenditure on perquisites to an employee is also limited to  $\frac{1}{5}$  of the salary or Rs. 1,000 per month. This ceiling is also made applicable to the remuneration or amenities provided to a director of a company or a person who has a substantial interest in the company or a relative of either. With a view to reducing concentration of wealth and disparities in income, income-tax and wealth-tax rates have been made steeply progressive, thereby making them conform more to the canons of equality and productivity. The marginal rate of income-tax on slab of income exceeding Rs. 2 lakhs is 85 per cent and the marginal rate of wealth tax on the slab of net wealth exceeding Rs. 15 lakhs is 8 per cent. In addition, lands and buildings situated in urban areas have to pay from 1971-72 onwards an additional wealth tax of 5 per cent on the slab between Rs. 5,00,000 and Rs. 10,00,000 and 7 per cent on the slab over Rs. 10,00,000. With effect from 1970-71, agricultural property has also been made liable to wealth tax. The exemption from wealth tax granted to personal or household jewellery has been withdrawn. To reduce opportunities for avoidance of liability to estate duty by making gifts, the rate structure of gifts tax has been brought more into line with that of estate duty. The rates vary from 5 per cent on gifts of the value of Rs. 20,000 to 75 per cent on gifts exceeding Rs. 20,00,000. The rates of estate duty range from 4 per cent on the principal value of the estate exceeding Rs. 50,000 but not exceeding Rs. 1,00,000 to the marginal rate of 85 per cent on the slab exceeding Rs. 20,00,000. These measures serve to impose a ceiling on wealth of individuals.

## ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AND THEIR REMEDIES

### PROBLEMS

#### *Tax Evasion*

The post-War world has been one of ferment and change. It had witnessed technological progress, material advancement and moral degradation. This has posed many problems for the tax administrator.

The War had created opportunities for making easy and quick gains and for amassing large fortunes. It also lowered moral standards and civic consciousness, making people more self-centred and less conscious of their obligations to society. In order to establish a just social order and to promote a rapid rise in the standard of living of the people by exploiting the latent resources of the country and increasing the opportunities for employment through a diversified economy, the government resorted to national planning. This involved placing of restrictions to promote integrated and orderly economic development and to conserve foreign exchange resources. Quotas had to be introduced for imports and licences for starting new industries and expanding old ones. The planned efforts for industrial growth and the resulting economic development led to expansion of import and export trade. These conditions created opportunities for payment and receipt of premiums on licences for imports and on transactions in scarce commodities, and for under-invoicing and over-invoicing of imports and exports. Smuggling and racketeering also found a ready climate in the restrictive conditions of a planned economy. Droughts and floods, which affected agricultural production, and labour unrest and raw material shortages, which affected industrial production, created fresh fields for such anti-social and illegal activities. Thus came into being a parallel economy run by unaccounted money distorting material and moral values. Tax avoidance and evasion has become a way of life.

#### *Strain on the Income-tax Department*

The Department has a large number of difficult tasks to tackle. The working of the Department in the past has suffered from handicaps arising from insufficiency and unbalanced growth of personnel, inadequate facilities for training, constant shortages in basic requirements, such as accommodation, forms and stationery. All these have led to various problems relating to arrears of tax assessments and tax recovery. Criticism in and out of Parliament and by the Public Accounts Committee has forced the Department to emerge out of its shell and adopt progressive administrative policies. The recent improvement in men and material resources would no doubt help; even so, it has to clear the debris of the past before it can plan and build for the future. Unimaginative economies in these directions would only complicate matters for the future.

#### REMEDIAL MEASURES—ORGANIZATIONAL

##### *Enquiries*

In a bid to find solutions to the complex problems facing tax administration, various committees and commissions were appointed

from time to time to look into the various issues involved and suggest solutions. The technical problems of plugging the loop-holes in the taxation laws with a view to combating tax avoidance and evasion, simplifying the tax laws, mobilizing resources for the developmental plans of the Government and strengthening tax administration formed the subject of their enquiries. Such enquiries were conducted by the Ayers Committee in 1936, Shri K. R. K. Menon in 1945, the Investigation Commission in 1948, the Taxation Enquiry Commission in 1954, the Direct Taxes Administration Enquiry Committee in 1949, Prof. Nicholas Kaldor in 1954, Shri S. Boothalingam in 1967, the Administrative Reforms Commission in 1968, and a Departmental Committee on Tax Evasion in 1968. Recently, the Government has appointed a Committee of Experts headed by Shri K. N. Wanchoo, the retired Chief Justice of India, to recommend concrete steps to unearth blackmoney, to check avoidance of tax, to reduce tax arrears and to improve the tax administration. The studies made by the various committees and persons mentioned above had been of great assistance to the Department in bringing to light the complexities of the problems facing it and in taking appropriate measures to solve them. In recent years, Government has taken several measures—organizational, managerial, legislative, procedural and others—to tighten the machinery of tax collection and to improve the tax administration.

### *Intelligence Wing*

A momentous step was taken in 1966 when an Intelligence Wing was added to the Directorate of Inspection (Investigation) as a specialized agency for tackling tax evasion by collecting intelligence in respect of cases of substantial tax evasion and by processing suitable cases for prosecution. Through the efforts of the Intelligence Wing, numerous cases of substantial tax evasion have been brought to light. Between 1968-69 and 1970-71, prosecutions were launched in 85 cases and convictions have been obtained in 21 cases. The estimated concealed income detected by the Intelligence Wing was Rs. 13.21 crores in 1969-70 and Rs. 8.42 crores in 1970-71.

### *Functional System*

Another significant step was taken in 1967 when the Department adopted the functional system of work. Even before 1966, some sort of functional allocation of work obtained among the staff attached to an Income-tax Officer. But the Income-tax Officer combined in himself the role of an investigator, judge, tax collector and administrator. Under the system introduced in 1967, the distinctive functions,



like assessment, collection and administration, in respect of each assessee were assigned to different Income-tax Officers chosen for such function having regard to their experience and aptitude. Similarly, the ministerial functions were also segregated in separate functional cells which attended to distinctive functions. Such a functional distribution of work ensures higher productivity and better efficiency by optimum utilization of manpower, specialization of functions and timely attention to important aspects of work, if properly supervised. Steps are being taken to remedy the shortcomings noticed in its working and to extend it to other multiple-officer stations. The functional distribution of work has now been extended also to the managerial cadre by allocating distinct spheres of work to the Commissioners and Additional Commissioners as stated earlier.

### *Organization and Planning Cell*

A step in the direction of introducing organizational and procedural planning was taken in 1967 when an organization and Planning Division was set up in the Central Board of Direct Taxes, simultaneously with the introduction of the functional scheme. It is a small beginning. Its role can be expanded with profit to watch implementation of the policy decisions of the Board, to look into problems arising in the field in implementing them, to propose new techniques and procedures and organizational changes to ensure better implementation of the Board's decisions, to experiment with new schemes on a pilot basis, and to lay down standards of performance at all levels.

### *Career Management Unit*

The Department has also begun to realize the importance of the modern concepts of personnel planning and management in improving the efficiency of the administration. An adequate personnel policy should provide for:

- (1) forecasting requirements of personnel, their recruitment, accommodation and equipment;
- (2) optimizing the utilization of available manpower resources;
- (3) evolving objective criteria for evaluating performances;
- (4) initiating career management and executive selection programmes; and
- (5) comprehensive training programmes at all levels.

In recent years, the Department has tried to assess its manpower requirements of officers and staff and meet them to the extent possible. A beginning has also been made by constituting a Career Management Unit in the Board's office to collect material for an executive selection programme by determining the key characteristics of significant jobs in the Department and obtaining personal data to locate qualified personnel to fill those job requirements.

### *Internal Work Study Unit*

An Internal Work Study Unit of modest size has also been set up in one of the Directorates to determine scientifically the manpower requirements of the Department from time to time by employing modern methods of work study and activity analysis.

### *New Cadres*

One of the major steps taken in strengthening the income-tax administration was the creation of a Class I cadre of Income-tax Officers in the Income-tax Department in 1944 and later declaring it to be an established Central Service. In 1970, a further step was taken to increase the administrative efficiency of the Department by creating a new cadre of Additional Commissioners of Income-tax to relieve the Commissioners of their judicial responsibilities and supervisory functions over internal audit work. This was in effect a functional distribution of work at the managerial level. Shortages in manpower have, however, led to switching off functions according to priorities.

## REMEDIAL MEASURES—PROCEDURAL

### *Selective Scrutiny of Assessments*

The Department has been trying to meet the problem of progressive increase in the number of assessments carried forward from year to year by slowly increasing the strength of the assessing officers and by organizing a drive for disposals. Disposal per Income-tax Officer has been stepped up from 845 in 1957-58 to 1561 in 1970-71. Since 1960, it also introduced various summary assessment schemes for expeditious disposal of 'small income' cases and for staggering the scrutiny of 'higher income' cases. These measures succeeded in stemming the tide but were found inadequate to bring the work more or less to current levels. The administration, therefore, took a radical

decision to make a change in the procedure of Income-tax assessment. The law, as it stood, did not authorize the Income-tax Officer to make any adjustment to the income or loss declared in the return of income even to correct obvious errors without calling for the assessee to produce the evidence on which his return was based. The law has, therefore, been amended to enable the Income-tax Officer to complete assessments in the bulk of cases which do not involve substantial points of dispute, on the basis of the returns and the documents accompanying them and the records, without requiring the presence of the assessee or the production of any evidence in support of the return. He is also authorized to make any adjustments to the income declared in the return found necessary to rectify any arithmetical errors or allowing any deduction or relief which is *prima facie* admissible or disallowing any deduction or relief which is *prima facie* inadmissible. It is proposed to dispose of over 80 per cent of the assessments under this new procedure. The other cases which are marked for assessment after scrutiny will be disposed of in the normal manner after examining the evidence produced by the assessee and proper investigation, where necessary. As a safeguard, even cases where a 'summary' assessment has been made may be taken up by the Income-tax Officer for scrutiny if he considers it necessary or expedient to do so and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner agrees. This new procedure is based on two basic concepts. The first is that the tax-payer should be encouraged to make a correct declaration of his income and a fair deal should be assured to the honest citizen by accepting his return without troubling him to attend the Income-tax Office or submit further evidence to prove his return, thus promoting voluntary compliance of the tax laws by the citizens. It is also based on the concept that more productive use of the available manpower resources could be made by deploying them to scrutinize returns with a high tax potential. The new procedure is expected to accelerate the rate of disposal of assessments, improve public relations and increase tax realizations. The interests of revenue have been safeguarded by subjecting all returns of high tax potential to scrutiny and by selecting a percentage of the returns accepted on summary basis for detailed scrutiny. It is the administration's hope that by meting out deterrent punishment to those who conceal income or submit inaccurate particulars of income and by dealing with honest tax-payers in a spirit of trust, it will be possible to ensure due compliance with tax laws.

#### *Permanent Account Numbers*

One of the basic instruments of control in the Income-tax Office is the General Index Register Number to identify assesseees subject to

the jurisdiction of an Income-tax Officer. According to the existing system, there is generally a separate General Index Register (GIR) for each Income-tax Officer (ITO) in which the names and addresses of the tax-payers within his jurisdiction are recorded. Under this system, different assesseees in different jurisdictions can have the same GIR Number even in the same station. This creates difficulties in identifying assesseees with similar names and leads to mis-carriage of correspondence and documents, in the absence of any reference to the ITO concerned. Consequent on the increase in the number of assesseees, there are frequent changes in the jurisdiction of Income-tax Officers which lead to changes in the General Index Register. All these lead to enormous confusion in the Income-tax Offices and inconvenience to assesseees. What is more serious is that if the challans of payment of tax are mis-directed to the wrong office, tax payments are not duly credited to the account of tax-payers and penal actions are initiated for defaults which really do not exist or are overstated. Similarly, requests for rectification of assessment and other reliefs are also not attended to in time. In order to remove the difficulties from this system of fluctuating GIR Numbers, the Department has decided to allot 'Permanent Account Numbers' to tax-payers. Under this system, every tax-payer is given a permanent number which his records will bear irrespective of changes in jurisdiction. If the number is quoted in his correspondence or any of the documents, it can be directed to the correct office and easily linked with his records, as this number will identify the particular tax-payer all over India. Alphabetical and numerical card indexes will also be set up for this purpose. This system of permanent account numbers will facilitate adoption of automatic data processing methods, if and when considered necessary. It can help in making effective use of the reporting system in the Department by requiring the permanent account number of the tax-payer to be quoted while reporting the information relating to him. It can make the survey work of the Department more purposeful and effective, as inquiry will be based on the basis of reported transactions. It will also be possible to make the permanent account number a powerful instrument in the hands of the Department to counter tax evasion, if necessary legislation is introduced to require the tax account numbers to be quoted in specified types of transactions, like transfer of property, making of investments, opening of bank accounts, etc.

### *Tackling Tax Evasion*

Evasion is a perennial problem of tax administration. It is necessary to combat tax evasion not only to collect whatever is legally

due to government and, thus, augment its resources, but also to prevent the affluent sections of society from transferring their burden to those less well-placed and less able to bear it. It has assumed an urgency with the adoption of the system of selective scrutiny of returns of income. The success of the system depends on two factors—the facilities provided for voluntary compliance with tax laws and the deterrent punishment meted out for violations. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the enforcement machinery against tax evasion should be strengthened in all directions.

### *Legislative Measures*

Several legislative measures have been taken to arm the Department with sufficient powers for this purpose. The principle of deduction of tax at source has been extended to payments of interest (other than interest on securities) exceeding Rs. 400 made to residents by any person other than an individual or a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) with certain exceptions like interest paid on deposits with a banking company or a cooperative society or interest paid to a banking company or financial corporation, Life Insurance Corporation, etc. To provide the Government with information about the earning of income, the system of reporting has been extended to contracts by making it obligatory for a contractor for the construction of a building or supply of goods or services in connection therewith to furnish to the Income-tax Officer within one month the prescribed particulars relating to contracts exceeding Rs. 50,000 in value. Extraordinary powers have been given to the Officers of the Department to enter and search any premises to seize books of accounts or other documents useful or relevant for assessment proceedings and to seize articles, including money, disproportionate to known sources of income. Powers also are given to enter any place where business or profession is carried on to inspect books of accounts or other documents. Provisions have also been made in the Income-tax Act to bring to tax unaccounted money, bullion, jewellery and other articles by deeming it to be the income of the assessee for the financial year in which he was found to be the owner of such unrecorded assets and to tax investments, not fully disclosed in the books of accounts and for which no satisfactory explanation is offered, in the year of investment. To exercise a check on expenditure claimed as deductions, provision has been made to disallow any expenditure exceeding Rs. 2,500, if it is not paid by a crossed cheque drawn on a bank or by a crossed bank draft, subject to certain relaxations. To prevent discretionary Trusts, religious Trusts and charitable Trusts from diverting taxable income, such Trusts are required to file a return of income, if their

income exceeds the taxable limit, without taking into consideration any exemption under the Act. The exemption from tax granted to such Trusts is limited to the extent the income of the Trust is actually applied for purposes of the Trust within the period in which the income arises or within 3 months of the end of that period. The Trusts are deprived of the benefit of exemption, if the income or corpus of the Trust is applied in any manner for the benefit of the persons controlling the Trust. Tax payable by a private discretionary Trust is calculated by applying a fixed rate of 65 per cent, if the income of the discretionary Trust is not specifically received or receivable on behalf of the Trust. Capital Gains Tax has been made applicable to transfers of agricultural land within the vicinity of a town or municipal area; making investments in such lands is one of the modes of tax evasion. As tax is evaded by claiming deduction of expenses for entertainment and on guest houses from the taxable income, the exemption granted to such expenses has been withdrawn. Another usual method of tax avoidance is to impress self-acquired property of a Hindu with the character of HUF income. Therefore, the income attributable to the individual, spouse and minor children arising from such transfers of assets has been made taxable in the hands of the individual in respect of transfers made after December 31, 1969. The law has also been amended to deny the benefit of registration to a firm, if any partner of the firm is a *benamidar* of any other partner to whom he is not related as a spouse or a minor child.

### *Penalties*

With a view to making penalties for violation of tax laws deterrent, the provisions relating to imposition of penalties have been tightened. It is, therefore, provided that if the income returned is less than 80 per cent of the income assessed, the assessee will be deemed to have concealed his income unless he proves that the failure to return the correct income was not on account of any fraud or gross or wilful neglect on his part. While the earlier Income-tax Act, 1922, provided only for either imposition of penalty or prosecution for tax evasion, the Income-tax Act, 1961, has provided for both for the same offence. Abetment of evasion has been made an offence. Penalty has been made exigible for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, even if it is not deliberate. Reward rules have been liberalized to encourage informants to furnish information about tax evasion, and secrecy provisions have been relaxed to permit disclosure of the tax paid by an assessee to any person, if it is in the public interest. The punishments for concealment have also been enhanced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of 2 years with a minimum of 6 months for false

verification in the return of income or abatement thereof. Failure to furnish return of income or to produce accounts books has been made punishable with rigorous imprisonment up to one year or fine. Legislation has also been introduced to confer power on government to acquire property which has been grossly undervalued for purposes of transfer, for the consideration shown in transfer deeds and a solatium of 15 per cent. It is also proposed to deny a beneficial owner the right to assert his ownership against the *benami* holder in a court of law unless he has given notice of his beneficial interest in such property to the taxing authorities.

#### REMEDIAL MEASURES—OTHERS

Several administrative and organizational measures have also been adopted to tackle tax evasion. The creation of an Intelligence Wing to deal with cases of substantial tax evasion has already been mentioned. A Valuation Cell has been set up at Delhi to help the departmental officers in ascertaining the correct value of properties for investigating the sources of investment and for purposes of wealth and gift taxes. This organization is being strengthened. As cases of suspected evasion are being investigated in central circles, the number of such central circles has been increased and the strength of existing circles augmented. As a matter of policy, the Department is resorting to prosecution in all cases of deliberate concealment if there is sufficient evidence. Eightyfive prosecutions have been launched in the last three years. Penalties awarded are publicized and incomes and wealth assessed in the cases of persons with substantial incomes or wealth are given wide publicity. Between 1966-67 and 1969-70, penalties amounting to about Rs. 15.91 crores were levied in 1,17,633 cases for concealing incomes aggregating to Rs. 61.62 crores. Tax-payers who had evaded tax in the past were given an opportunity to disclose concealed incomes in 1965 under two schemes of voluntary disclosures. This brought to light concealed income of about Rs. 200 crores and yielded evaded taxes to the extent of Rs. 59 crores. The earlier disclosure scheme of 1951 has brought to light only Rs. 70 crores of concealed income and yielded tax of only Rs. 11 crores. This is, however, a measure which cannot be repeated without impairing the confidence of the honest tax-payer. However, there is a provision in the law which gives an opportunity to an assessee to disclose his true income voluntarily prior to the detection by the Income-tax Officer and, if he cooperates in the assessment and payment of taxes, he can seek a reduction or waiver of penalty and avoid prosecution.

As observed by Prof. Kaldor in his *Survey of Indian Tax Reform* in 1956-57, "Finally, the prevention of evasion is very greatly dependent



on the standard of administration in the revenue department—on the zeal, ability, efficiency and adequacy of numbers of tax officers. An efficient administration requires the ability of the Department to attract the best talent and to attract them in adequate numbers. This in turn is very greatly a matter of conditions of pay and prospects in the service. The revision of pay scales and improving the prospects of promotion of the officers so as to fulfil their legitimate aspirations in regard to career advancement, are matters which call for the attention of the Pay Commission and the Wanchoo Committee for their solution.

### *Expediting Disposal of Appeals*

The problem of increasing pendency in appeals at various levels is receiving earnest attention of the government. The number of posts of Assistant Commissioners is being increased gradually and a strict control is exercised to step up their disposals. To expedite the disposal of appeals before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, government have increased the number of benches of the Tribunal and have set up new benches at several centres. As mentioned earlier, a new cadre of Additional Commissioners of Income-tax has also been created to deal with revision petitions filed before the Commissioners.

### *Reduction of Tax Arrears*

The Department has been taking vigorous steps to step up the recovery of taxes. In the ranges where the functional system is in operation, the collection of taxes is the responsibility of separate officers earmarked for that work. The responsibility for watching recovery of arrears has been specifically fixed. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner has been made specifically responsible for watching over the collection of arrears below Rs. 1 lakh, while the Commissioner of Income-tax has been made responsible for arrears between Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 5 lakhs. The arrears between Rs. 5 lakhs and Rs. 25 lakhs have been made the responsibility of the Director of Inspection (RS&P) and the Board itself is supervising cases of arrear demands exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs. A programme for a concerted drive for the reduction of arrears of taxes known by the OPERATION RAT has been in force since last year. Arrear clearance fortnights are also being observed by the Department, when special emphasis is laid on carrying out pending adjustments and rectifications and collecting the net demands due.

To increase the momentum of recovery of arrears, the recovery work, which was hitherto being done by the State revenue authorities,

is being taken over by the Departmental Tax Recovery Officers in a phased programme. For better administrative supervision over their work and to take over the appellate work connected therewith, five new posts of Tax Recovery Commissioners have been created. Steps also have been taken to expedite the work relating to write-off of irrecoverable arrears by decentralizing the work. To consider the case of write-off below Rs. 1 lakh, Committees consisting of the Commissioner of Income-tax, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Officers concerned have been formed, and irrecoverable demands of Rs. 1 lakh and above are to be considered by Zonal Committees consisting of three Commissioners of Income-tax. All these steps have succeeded in increasing the tempo of collections and the process of writing off of irrecoverable demands.

### *Good Public Relations*

The main activity of tax administrator is to take a slice (big or small) out of the earnings of a citizen, although it be to promote the common good. It is, therefore, a sensitive function which calls for the utmost tact and patience on his part. He has to pluck the golden feathers with as little squealing as possible. This is sought to be achieved by inculcating in the tax officials the proper attitude to the tax-payer, by ensuring that the assessment and appellate procedures are simple and speedy and by educating the tax-payer in voluntary compliance with tax laws.

Public Relations Officers have been posted in metropolitan cities to give assistance to the tax-payers. Officers have been enjoined to be courteous, fair and helpful to the assessee. Steps have been taken to speed up assessments and appeals. Separate refund circles have been created where there are at least 3,500 cases a year to deal promptly with claims for pure refunds. Interest is payable to the assessee if refunds are delayed beyond six months. Special emphasis is laid on giving prompt effect to appellate, revisionary and rectification orders. Refund weeks have become an annual feature, when wide publicity is given to bring to the notice of the Department pending refund claims, and exclusive attention is paid to disposing of refund claims. Recently, the law has been amended to make it obligatory on the Income-tax Officer to make a provisional assessment to grant refund of the tax paid in excess, if the regular assessment is not made within six months of the receipt of the return. Steps have been taken to make available Income Tax Return Forms through post offices in selected towns, and challan forms at bank counters. Facilities have also been provided to the tax-payers to pay their taxes through crossed cheques at pay-in counters in selected Income-tax Offices.

*Direct Taxes Advisory Committees*

Another important step taken in fostering understanding between the tax paying public and the Department has been the constitution of a Central Direct Taxes Advisory Committee, consisting of representatives of Chambers of Commerce, trade and industry and the accountancy and legal professions to meet twice a year under the Chairmanship of the Minister of Finance to consider suggestions from the public. Similar Regional Advisory Committees met under the presidentship of the Commissioner of Income-tax to discuss local problems and resolve difficulties. These advisory committees bring together the senior officers of the Department and representatives of the public for a free and frank exchange of views regarding the administration of Direct Taxes and help to create a feeling of association of the public with the tax administration.

*Tax-Payers' Education*

It has been the Department's endeavour to maintain a steady flow of tax literature to keep the public well informed about tax matters and offer them necessary guidance in fulfilling their tax obligations. Such publications range from manuals containing the bare Acts relating to the various direct taxes, and quarterly Direct Taxes Bulletins containing notifications and circulars, to explanatory notes and instructions on the Finance Acts, booklets in layman series explaining tax laws in simple and non-technical language, and guidance notes and pamphlets on filling up of Income-tax Returns and calculating tax. The Department is also resorting increasingly to publicity through the press for releasing comprehensive advertisements reminding the tax-payers of their obligations and press notes explaining important amendments made in the tax laws and through the radio for making announcements relating to tax matters.

*Facilities*

The Department is at pains to improve the working conditions and facilities available to Income-tax Officer to enable him to give of his best, within the limitation of finance. With the adoption of selective scrutiny of returns, it is hoped that the pressure of assessment load on Income-tax Officer will ease and he will be able to devote more time to revenue-yielding cases. More attention is being given to equipping him and the senior officers by arranging refresher courses and specialized in-service training. Stock is also being taken of the accommodation requirements to draw up a programme for providing

the Department with suitable office and residential accommodation. Efforts are also under way to remove the erratic availability of tax forms, which is disrupting the efficient functioning of the Department, by setting up a Forms Organization which will devise proper forms, make a realistic assessment of their requirements, arrange for their economic and expeditious printing and enforce proper inventory control at all levels. The staff requirements of the Income-tax Officer have also been under study and suitable action is being taken to remove the shortcomings. When all these measures have been accomplished, the functioning of the Department will be smoother, swifter and better.

#### PROSPECTS

In 1970-71, Direct Taxes contributed Rs. 834 crores to the public revenues. This, however, is barely 3 per cent of the national income and the number of income-tax payers constitute barely 0.6 per cent of the population. These figures project the potential for the Department's future growth. An effective tax administration is one of the prime requisites for the maximum mobilization of the national resources. It is a function of both the Government and the public. The Government has to guarantee an honest, impartial, speedy and effective administration, while the public has to regard the tax administration as a beneficent agent of the Government to collect the legal dues from its citizens for their employment in schemes of national development. The Department has to project an image of service to the tax-payer. It has to streamline its administration to accelerate disposals and augment collections and tighten its enforcement machinery. When the citizen is assured of fair and equal treatment and of the administration's capacity and willingness to enforce tax obligations impartially, public cooperation is bound to increase. Not long ago, it was considered a patriotic duty not to pay the taxes to an alien government. But with the attainment of political freedom, it has become the patriotic duty of every citizen to pay the taxes due to their national government and to witness the taxes at work in safeguarding the country's Independence, developing its economy and removing the social and economic disparities. The tax administration is geared to this task by relying, on the one hand, on voluntary compliance with the taxation laws by the tax-payers and, on the other, on its enforcement machinery to deal deterrently with tax delinquents. Given the dedicated efforts of the departmental officials and the conscious cooperation of the public, there is no reason why this policy of the administration should not succeed.

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## CUSTOMS AND CENTRAL EXCISE ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA—SOME TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

*D. P. Anand*

INDIA inherited a system of public finance and tax administration, the main principles of which were evolved on the lines of the British economic thought and fiscal practices of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Budget was an instrument of financial control in an essentially *laissez-faire* economy. Taxation was necessary for maintaining law and order and minimum welfare services to be provided by Government and for servicing the external obligations of the country. Fiscal management meant maximum economy in expenditure and adjusting the level of taxation every year in the light of the anticipated surplus or deficit.

After Independence, the functions of the State have greatly expanded. The pent-up aspirations of the people over years of slavery are seeking fulfilment. The State is expected today to be the accelerator of economic and social change and no longer the preserver of the *status quo*. In its new role, the State has not only to assume the principal responsibility for the control and direction of the growth of economy but has also to increase its direct participation in the developmental process and to regulate the distribution of the gains of progress.

These growing responsibilities of the State required matching administrative capabilities to make plans and programmes and to carry them out. With the new demands, the purposes and methodology of the public administration, of which the tax administration is a small, albeit significant, part, had, of necessity, to be reoriented.

Taxation is viewed as one of mankind's leading vexations. And yet it is the chief source of government revenues and has to bear main burden of providing the funds for not only the financing of the non-revenue yielding services but also a large part of the savings for capital formation. And of the tax revenues, the duties of customs and central excise constitute the largest source. Apart from bridging

the gap between savings and investment, taxation is also one of the instruments for resource allocation, income redistribution and economic stabilization. These multiple functions of taxation require that it be harmonized with the overall strategy for development and the changing economic structure and not be treated simply as a function of annual budgetary expediency or of immediate revenue requirements. And these objectives have to be achieved within the framework of the consent of the people with due regard to the rule of law. These tenets, *inter alia*, have set the goal and direction of the recent trends and developments in the customs and central excise administration in India.

In the last 20 years, there has been over tenfold increase in the customs and central excise revenues from Rs. 224 crores in 1950-51 to about Rs. 2,300 crores in 1970-71. The rise in customs and central excise revenue has entailed a considerable expansion of the coverage. The import and export traffic from which the customs revenue is derived, has gone up from about Rs. 1,250.8 crores in 1950-51 to about Rs. 2,980.7 crores in 1969-70. On the central excise side, the number of excisable commodities has gone up from 15 in 1950-51 to 115 in 1970-71. Significantly, this massive expansion has been accompanied by a marked reduction in the cost of collection, which has come down from about 3 per cent in 1950-51 to about 1 per cent in 1970-71.

In the course of this expansion, the Customs and Central Excise Department had continually to face and overcome various problems of administration that are common to any large organization which aims at accomplishing its tasks with efficiency and despatch, such as: (1) planning and policy making and harnessing the tax structure to the overall economic policy and developmental strategy, (2) coordination—in the spheres of planning as well as enforcement, and (3) communication—vertical and horizontal—between policy making levels and executive levels, between different formations in the field, between the public and the Department, with other disciplines for whom the Customs and Central Excise Department performs agency functions, such as Trade Control and Foreign Exchange Regulation authorities. Then there were the problems of personnel and staffing and of economical management of the Department.

Besides these common problems, we have had others which are peculiar to a tax administration. A good tax administration, from the point of view of the tax-payer, has to aim at: (1) uniformity and impartiality, (2) certainty, (3) simplicity, (4) speed, and (5) system for

quick redress. The requirements of these tenets of good tax administration have to be balanced with the need to guard against loss or leakage of revenue; and the system of checks and balances has to keep in view the proclivities of the foolish and the morally weak from whom any large organization can never expect to be totally free.

It is not as though we always found new solutions to the old problems. We have been experimenting with the solutions which have been tried in other areas of public administration, adapting them to our needs and improvising remedies as the situations developed under the stresses and strains of the growing economy and the expanding administration. During the last two decades, we had our share of reviews by committees. After the Taxation Enquiry Commission in 1953, we have had the Tobacco Expert Committee in 1956, the Customs Reorganization Committee in 1957, the Central Excise Reorganization Committee in 1960, the Tariff Revision Committee in 1964 followed by the Customs Study Team in 1966. The Customs and Central Excise administration has undoubtedly benefited by the studies and recommendations of these bodies. More recently, we had a Committee on Disposal of Confiscated Goods and a Study Team to examine the problem of Leakage of Foreign Exchange Through Invoice Manipulation. Their reports are under consideration. A committee is being set up to review the working of the Self Removal Procedure for the clearance of the excisable goods and it is likely that before long a committee or Study Team may be asked to overhaul the Tobacco Tariff and Procedures. Committees and study teams apart, administrative reform is a continuous process and goes on as the Department grows. Some of the trends and developments in this direction are discussed below.

#### TAX PLANNING AND POLICY-MAKING

The tax revenues of our country have remained around 13 to 14 per cent of the national income over the last several years. The tax receipts have no doubt gone up during this period, but so has the national income. In the developed countries, taxation is about 25 to 30 per cent of the gross national product. If a higher growth rate is to be achieved, the tax effort has to be stepped up. Since Independence, there has been an increasing shift from tax on foreign trade to tax on domestic manufacture. With the growing prosperity and increasing urbanization and the possible tapping of the agricultural sector, there may be a gradual shift in times to come towards direct taxation. But in the foreseeable future, substantial reliance will have to continue to be placed on the Customs and Central Excise



for the additional tax effort which has, therefore, to be planned on a long-range basis.

The annual budgetary exercise is understandably cloaked with great secrecy which precludes any open enquiries and handicaps satisfactory collection and verification of the data on which tax proposals are formulated. What is needed is a continuous study and a long-range planning of the tax effort in the context of the overall requirements during a plan period. We have made a modest beginning in this direction by setting up a Tax Research Unit headed by a Director under the Central Board of Excise and Customs. When the estimate of the tax revenues required for a plan becomes available, it should be possible to broadly project the tax effort for the duration of the plan period, subject, of course, to such adjustments as may become necessary for unforeseen reasons, at the time of the annual budgetary exercise. I visualize the Tax Research Unit engaging itself in such a task keeping in view the other objectives of the economic and fiscal policies.

This will have another advantage in the sphere of personnel administration. At present, the proposals for additional staff required to cope with the new levies, if any, are included in the Financial Memorandum of the Finance Bill. It is only after the Bill is passed by Parliament that further action ensues to sanction new posts, recruit the personnel, train them and attend to their placements. While human effort is elastic and can be stretched temporarily to cope with the additional work, this recurring hiatus between creation of work and deploying of staff results in arrears and generally tends to impair efficiency. With the long-range planning of the tax effort for a Plan period, it should be possible to synchronize, to a great extent, recruitment and training programmes and plan in advance the timely placement of the personnel to cope with the additional tax levies. We are actively considering setting up of a Unit for Personnel Planning and hope to make a beginning soon.

Since perspective planning cannot be in vacuum, a tax research or planning unit has to be aided by an efficient statistical organization. We inherited a modest nucleus of a statistical organization which was designed more to facilitate control over the working of the Central Excise formations and not so much to aid in perspective tax planning. We are now gradually building up this organization and expanding its functions and have already commenced making use of computers in the compilation of some statistics. Another proposal at present under consideration is for setting up a computerized Central Exchange

which would collect and compile, from the basic Customs and Central Excise documents, data regarding value, classification, etc., of the goods, check on the duty calculation, classification and valuation, and point out the aberrations, if any, to the concerned field formations and, *inter alia*, help to secure uniformity of classification and valuation.

#### TAX STRUCTURE—ITS SIMPLICITY AND CERTAINTY

A really simple tax structure would contemplate levy of duties of Customs or Central Excise at specific rates on the basis of such easily determinable factors as weight, measurement or number. Such a system, which exists in a few developing countries even now, is regressive in its incidence. The modern trend is in favour of *ad valorem* levies. In India, on the Customs side, with a few exceptions, nearly all dutiable items carry *ad valorem* duties. On the Central Excise side, there is a mixture of specific and *ad valorem* duties but there is an increasing shift towards the latter. Levy of *ad valorem* duties involves three processes, viz. (1) determination of the assessable value of the dutiable goods, (2) classification of the goods according to the tariff item for the purpose of levying the duty, and (3) calculation of the duty leviable on the basis of such valuation and classification. The duty so determined is to be checked by reference to physical examination of the goods. This system, by the nature of things, detracts from the 'simplicity' of the levy and reduces its 'certainty'. A tax-payer, particularly with respect to the indirect taxes, since the incidence is passed on to others, would like to be reasonably certain of the tax liability so that he could do the pricing of his goods accordingly.

#### Valuation

We have tried to tackle the problem, balancing the interest of the tax-payer in keeping the structure simple and certain with the merits of an *ad valorem* tax structure.

On the Customs side, the concept of linking the assessable value with the wholesale market price in India, which was embodied in Section 30(a) of the old Sea Customs Act of 1878 and which had the defect of imbibing the uncertainties of a fluctuating home market, has been given up. Instead, in the Customs Act of 1962, the definition of assessable value has reference to the price at which similar goods are ordinarily sold in the course of international trade. It is still a 'deeming' value, and it must remain if a modicum of uniformity and impartiality is to be achieved in the tax levy. In practice, however, shorn of the

legal jargon, the definition amounts to assessment at the actual transaction value, Government retaining the right to discard the transaction value if they find that it represents a doctored price or that the transaction is exceptional or not bonafide. Where such normal price is not ascertainable, the assessable value is to be determined according to set rules which have been notified and are known to the tax-payer. All this introduces the requisite certainty in some measure. This is not to suggest that disputes as to assessable value cannot or do not arise. That the number of cases of such valuation disputes is not very large, is also not an indication that all is well with the system, the Government or the tax-payer, for there is a widely shared feeling that there is a substantial manipulation of invoice values and that Customs valuation processes need to be sharpened to detect more effectively the cases of under-invoicing and over-invoicing. Various measures in this regard have been taken from time to time and others are under consideration. But the effort is that such measures should not destroy the element of reasonable certainty as to the tax liability so far as the bonafide tax-payer is concerned.

On the Central Excise side, the definition of assessable value is derived from the concept embodied in the old Sea Customs Act of 1878. A new Central Excise Bill is on the anvil in which the concept of assessable value may undergo a change. In practice, the licensee files with the authorities a list of his prices which are then scrutinized and approved for purposes of assessment. Once the value is approved, there is no uncertainty so far as valuation is concerned unless there is a change in the manufacturer's price.

### *Tariff Classification*

So far as classification is concerned, the uncertainty is aggravated by the unavoidable complexity of the tariff. Of the Central Excise tariff, it is said that it is like a floating ice-berg—more below the surface than above it. While the main tariff is small and the broad classification of the goods under the tariff items is not very difficult, except in marginal areas, to find the effective rate of duty leviable on the particular commodity manufactured by a particular class of manufacturers, one has to wade through a labyrinth of exemption notifications. These myriad exemption notifications (it is worthwhile considering the incorporation of some of them, which are of a permanent nature, into the Tariff Schedule itself) are a valuable instrument for giving effect to State's economic and fiscal policies. Right from the time that new levies are conceived or tax proposals are formulated, the considerations that weigh in selecting a commodity for such levy are : whether the

commodity is an item of necessity or luxury, on which section of the society the burden of the levy will eventually fall, whether the levy can be economically collected, whether any segment of the industry, on whose product the levy is imposed, is deserving of fiscal support. Even after the legislative sanction is obtained for the levy, adjustments are continually made through the medium of exemptions having regard to those considerations. For instance, coarse cotton fabric carries much less duty than superfine; petty industrial units manufacturing excisable goods without the aid of power are often exempted; exemptions from duty are also related to the volume of the annual production or the number of workers employed with a view to giving support to the upcoming units in the small-scale sector. In practice, the uncertainty caused by the complexity of the tariff and the exemption notifications is considerably mitigated by the fact that a particular manufacture would ordinarily be manufacturing a specified class of goods of specified composition and quality. Once the tariff classification of the product is initially settled, the uncertainty practically ceases till he brings out a new product or changes the composition or quality of his old product. But in the matter of initial settling of the classification, disputes do arise and are sometimes long drawn.

On the Customs side, difficulties and uncertainties of classification arise because, owing to the technological advancement the world over, new products keep entering the trade. While the classification of the traditional items of import or export is fairly settled, the new products present new problems. By the nature of things, in the matter of Customs and Central Excise levies, there cannot be a certainty of that degree or nature as one would have in buying a ticket to travel on a bus or to see a cinema or what one would get in a fixed-price, retail departmental store. What we aim to do is to reduce the area of classification disputes. This we have tried to do by two methods. Firstly, there is a system of tariff advices which represent the view taken at the Board's level as to the classification of particular goods. Though these advices are not legally binding in the same sense as the judgments of the Supreme Court or the High Courts are upon the lower courts in their jurisdiction, these tariff advices are an administrative device to bring about uniformity in assessments. These tariff advices are published and are made available to the tax-payer. Secondly, we have a system which envisages that when there is a considered judgment as to the tariff classification of a commodity made at a responsible level in the Custom House or there have been a chain of assessments of a commodity under a particular tariff item over a long period, these would constitute an established practice of the Custom House and no departure would be made from it without prior approval of the Board. This is intended to

bring about stability and to ensure uniformity in assessments at the same port. Further, the Indian Customs Tariff is being revised on the lines of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN). This will bring in its wake the advantage of information about the classifications rulings settled by the Customs Cooperation Council or in other countries who follow the BTN. This will be as much for the benefit of the tax-payer as the Customs administration in India. A product which is imported into India for the first time may not be new for some other countries and its classification might have been settled elsewhere. The foreign supplier would be in a position to advise the Indian importer about such classification.

### *Duty Calculation*

Coming to the third process, viz., calculation of duty, we have made some attempts at simplification and rounding off the rates of duty. Owing to the levy of surcharges which were expressed in terms of a percentage of the basic duty, we came to a point where effective rates of duty came to be in fractions like  $19\frac{1}{2}$  per cent *ad valorem*. In August 1965, an exercise was undertaken to round off the rates of duty to the nearest rupee. Again, in June 1966, when, consequent on the revision of the par value of the rupee, the cost of imported goods in terms of Indian currency got escalated by 57.5 per cent, similar rounding off was done in the course of adjusting the rates of duty to retain the incidence at the pre-devaluation levels. In the last budget, once more a simplification of the tariff rates has been attempted and the current rates of duties are of four levels, viz., 30 per cent, 40 per cent, 60 per cent, and 100 per cent. Despite this simplification, some difficulties of calculation will remain in respect of commodities which attract countervailing duty.

### *Baggage and Import by Post*

This is so far as the persons in the trade and industry are concerned. They make it their business to know about the tax structure and have access to expert legal and other advice. For them, simplicity or certainty of the tax structure does not connote so much the freedom from complexities as long as they are not dilatory, but a protection from the vagaries of the whims and subjective opinions of individual officers. As for the common citizen, the problem of simplicity has a different hue. He does not come into contact with the central excise administration because this duty is levied at the point of production or manufacture. His acquaintance with Customs administration is likely to be in two areas, either in relation to clearance of baggage when he passes through Customs as a passenger or in relation to imports by post.

So far baggage is concerned, the law now provides a uniform rate of duty at 100 per cent, irrespective of the nature of the articles imported as baggage. This eliminates the problem of classification and simplifies calculation of duty. Under the Baggage Rules, articles for personal use or for genuine gifts up to a certain monetary limit are passed duty-free. Many a passenger feels unhappy with this monetary limit, draws comparisons with other countries and would like to have the freedom of importing much more as baggage duty-free. This just cannot be done. As for the valuation, instructions exist to go by the retail price of such goods in the country from which the goods are brought as baggage; and the Customs ports and airports are equipped with such price lists for the goods which are commonly imported as baggage. This does away with the elaborate calculation of the 'landed cost' on which the trade goods are assessed. Difficulties in relation to baggage which provoke complaints, arise for two reasons. A passenger, who has actually purchased some article of his baggage at an unusual and concessional price, expects that the article would be assessed to duty on the basis of the concessional price actually paid by him and feels hurt when the value is stepped up for assessment purposes to conform to the normal price of such goods in the country of export. His indignation is based on misconception of the law and principles of taxation. If a person acquires a dutiable article without any cost, it would not warrant that the article has no value or that it should be passed duty-free.

The irritant in respect of baggage, very often, is neither valuation nor classification, nor even the monetary limit, but the physical examination of the baggage. A passenger is inclined to feel that if his baggage is opened for examination, he is being treated as a smuggler and discriminated against. This, of course, is not at all true. Our system is based on a presumption of trust of the passenger. Ordinarily, the declaration of the passenger is accepted and his baggage passed without examination unless there are some grounds for suspicion. But, in addition, we have a system of routine random examination also as a moral check. There are separate channels for clearance of tourists, passengers carrying dutiable goods, and passengers having no dutiable goods. Undoubtedly, there is scope for improvement in both policy and procedures regarding baggage and we are having a fresh look at the whole matter. In regard to the clearance of goods imported by post, several simplifications have been made. For example, gifts up to specified value imported by post have been exempted from duty; a substantial proportion of the post parcels are cleared without opening the parcels on the basis of the particulars entered in the sheets which are prepared by the postal authorities from the declaration made by the senders on the parcels. Thus, in the areas of Customs activity which

affect the common citizen, legal technicalities and procedural complexities have been greatly reduced.

### *Assessment and Clearance of Excisable Goods*

Another significant development in the annals of Customs and Central Excise administration in India is the system that we have devised which enables the tax-payer to himself determine the duty and clear the excisable goods from his factory without having to repair to the Central Excise officer for such clearance. This step is a culmination of the various administrative trends and developments over the last one decade. When the factory excise first came in, the system of control envisaged posting of Central Excise officers to the factory for purposes of check on manufacture and clearance of excisable goods. As it became increasingly clear that in years to come greater reliance will have to be placed on the Central Excise Duty for the revenue earnings entailing wide extension of its coverage, we had to look for alternatives to replace the policing system of control which was uneconomical and wasteful. Any sophisticated system of control would require more of the managerial level and high calibre personnel. As a first step, therefore, it was necessary to improve the administrative machinery. Accordingly, the recruitment to the Indian Customs Service was increased to cater to the needs of the Central Excise Department; and, in 1956, a Class I Central Excise Service was created. The basic problem of valuation and classification and assessment being common, the two Class I services were merged in 1959 with a view to developing a synthesized expertise. The cadre composition was also progressively altered. In 1950, there were 299 gazetted posts in the Central Excise Department as against 9,704 non-gazetted posts, excluding Class IV posts. In 1971, there are 1,735 gazetted posts as against 17,769 non-gazetted posts, excluding Class IV. If we exclude the supporting ministerial services, in the executive field the proportion of the higher level gazetted posts is even more. These changes in the administrative infrastructure of the Department paved the way for the experiment on which we embarked three years ago.

A procedural beginning in this direction was made a few years back by setting up multiple officer ranges, and in some cases, composite circles and divisional offices. This was a significant departure from the initial scheme of posting officers to the factory. Under this scheme, a number of officers posted to a range were responsible for the excise work in relation to the factories within the jurisdiction of that range. The officers would attend the factory when any clearance was sought or paid visits to the factory for surprise checks. The composite circles and divisional offices (which in the Central Excise



hierarchy are the higher formations than the range) enabled distribution of work according to commodities which was conducive to developing of better expertise. Doubts were expressed about the efficacy of the system from the point of safety of revenue. After persevering with the system for some time, which dispelled the initial doubts, the logical development was what we did in 1968. In between, for some organized sectors of excisable industry, the system of audit type of control was tried which was optional for the licensee. This implied the licensee making his books of account, etc. available for periodical checks by the Central Excise officers to gain freedom from physical control.

The present system, which, not very aesthetically, is called "Self Removal Procedure", is, in essence, an extension of the 'audit type of control'. The salient features of the scheme are that a licensee deposits in the treasury an *ad hoc* amount and himself maintains a ledger in his factory. He files a price list of his products with the Central Excise Circle Officer and the prices are approved for assessment and classification is settled. Every time he needs clearance of his goods, he prepares the necessary documents, *viz.*, the application for removal and the gate pass, and himself debits the ledger account with the amount of duty leviable on the goods cleared. The gate pass accompanies the goods. Other documents are periodically filed in convenient batches with the Central Excise authorities who then scrutinize the documents, check the assessment and satisfy themselves that the duty has been correctly paid. The scheme provides for a periodical, systematic and intelligent scrutiny of the raw material, manufacturing, stock and other such accounts of the licensees by inspection groups of the Central Excise Department. This is supplemented by occasional surprise checks by the preventive parties of the Department both at the factory and in the course of transportation of the excisable goods. Human nature being what it is, a scheme of control based on trust, such as this, has a better chance of success if it simultaneously instils fear for those who deviate from the honest course. We have accordingly provided for very heavy punishment of the licensee covered by the Self Removal Procedure (SRP) Scheme who is found to have removed the goods without payment of duty. The contravention of the law by him may entail not only confiscation of the offending goods and imposition of penalty upon him, but also the forfeiture of his entire factory, including its building, plant, machinery, material, etc., and other goods stored in such building or manufactured from such plant or machinery. There have been no cases yet where these severe penal provisions had to be invoked; but that by itself is not a conclusive indication of any distinct trend.

Initially the SRP Scheme was made applicable to a few of the excisable commodities. Two years ago, it was extended to all excisable commodities barring tobacco. If we had not gradually prepared for and embarked on improved methods of control, we would have needed very much larger staff to cope with the expanding coverage of the central excise levies and with not much less of the risk of leakage of revenue. This development was inevitable, sooner or later, and in the right direction and the calculated risk that it involves seems worthwhile. Now, that the scheme has been in operation for some time, a Committee is being appointed to re-assess the scheme in the light of its actual working and suggest such modifications as may be necessary.

#### PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT

Times have not reduced the validity of the old adage that 'whatever is best administered is best'. What counts for the success of the tax policies is how well they are implemented and how efficiently the tax laws are administered. Customs and Central Excise Laws are administered through 20 Collectorates of Central Excise spread all over the country, through 4 major Custom Houses and at 180 minor ports, 95 land custom stations and 14 Customs airports. The implementation of tax policies through such scattered and large field organization throws up problems of : (1) Coordination, and (2) Communication.

##### *Coordination*

The problems of coordination that we face in the Customs and Central Excise administration are common to any large organization. The methods that we have tried to solve them are also not all new. A blend of the tried methods of inspection, manuals, instructions, committees and conferences is our recipe for ensuring coordination and uniformity of approach in the matter of enforcement of tax laws and implementation of the tax policies. Coordination has to begin at the policy-making level. For this, we have tried to reorganize the work in the Board's office to ensure a unity of command at appropriate levels in respect of allied matters. There are limitations to this remedy, owing to the workload, but the trend is clear.

Coordination is even more important between the different intelligence, investigation and executive agencies in the field, particularly in the matter of dealing with fiscal and exchange offences. Lack of it operates to the advantage of the law-breaker. A person

who violates one fiscal law, would, more often than not, be simultaneously contravening other allied laws. A smuggler, for instance, also contravenes the Foreign Exchange Law and obviously does not pay income-tax on his earnings from smuggling. The documents seized by one agency may contain clues and information about contraventions of other laws which may be of concern to another agency. A smuggling gang may operate at more places than one at the same time. To tackle the problem of coordination in this sphere, some years back we set up a Directorate of Revenue Intelligence. Later on, committees of the Heads of Revenue Departments at important centres were set up. These committees meet once a month to exchange information and intelligence and to specifically discuss important cases under investigation which have wide ramifications concerning different agencies. Subsequently, a post of Director-General of Revenue Intelligence and Investigation was created in 1969 to improve the coordination between the activities of the Customs, Central Excise, Income-tax and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Enforcement Directorate. A recent experiment is to give powers to a few selected officers under various enactments to facilitate simultaneous, coordinated and expeditious investigation in complicated cases.

### *Communication*

Gap between policy and performance arises more often due to failure of communication than to any deliberate flouting of the policy or instructions. Communication may be in the sphere of technical work or personnel management; it may be vertical, up or down the line of command; or it may be horizontal; or with others outside the Department. Choking of the communication channels precludes timely corrective action and spells disaster for the organization. If the message gets distorted in communication, it is likely to create a chasm between intention and execution. We are making use of various known and tried methods to improve our communication processes. But words are an imperfect vehicle of thought. The problem of communication is a trifle more difficult in the sphere of governmental activity because the governmental communications, of a general or continuing significance, whether these be laws, rules or standing orders, have to be written not with an eye to a particular audience or a specific situation of known dimensions but to cope with situations seen and unforeseen. As against this, the operational fiats can be terse and direct. But even there, a knowledge of the background of the policy helps in interpreting the instructions and improvising when new situations develop while carrying out the directives.

The important thing, therefore, is to get the policy-making levels and the executive levels on the same wave-length and to bring about a comity of ideas and understanding between them. For this, it is necessary to imbue the field officers with proper attitudes and background. Accordingly, we have developed our training organization and set up a regular academy under a Director. The probationers, either before or after their foundation course at Mussoorie, are put through an intensive course of training in our departmental academy and also given an on-the-job orientation. Training programmes are correspondingly arranged for the lower level executive staff. For the ministerial staff, there is still no centralized arrangement and their training depends on the initiative and the resources of the local heads of departments.

This is still a beginning. To cater to the staffing needs of our growingly sophisticated administration, we have to suitably adjust and align our recruitment and training programmes and our career management and promotion policies. We need men at the executive level where the main emphasis is on technical expertise and executive ability; then we require men for the managerial levels where the main emphasis has to shift to qualities of man-management and leadership; and lastly, we need men for the top jobs where the emphasis has to be more on wider perspective, conceptual capacity and policy-level thinking. Our recruiting programmes have to be so geared as to ensure a continuous stream of qualified personnel with required experience to meet our requirements for jobs at various level. Our training programmes have to be forward-looking and so arranged as to equip the officers not only to handle their immediate assignments competently but also to gradually prepare them for the higher responsibilities which they would be called upon to shoulder when the time comes. Simultaneously, our selective processes have to be sharpened and the weeding out has to be more thorough. An excellent executive officer may not have the qualities necessary for a managerial job and sometimes even *vice versa*. A competent tactician may be a poor strategist. For optimum results, the promotion to a higher job should not be entirely a reward for the performance in the lower position, but should also involve an assessment of the officer with reference to the qualities required for the higher job. There could be several ways of achieving this. One possible method could be that officers who are within the consideration zone for the next promotion or other assignments like posting to the Secretariat, should be put through a short training-cum-seminar which aims at the job requirements of the new level or assignment. This would have two advantages. Firstly, it will provide for a systematic training of the officers

in accordance with the job requirements; secondly, it would offer a better opportunity for assessing the officer's responses and suitability to meet the demands of the new job. This is only a trend in thinking and much more thought has to go into it before a well-defined policy is evolved in this regard.

Last major problem is communication with the public. There are several types of public. On one end of the spectrum are the organized social, economic trading or industrial groups, and on the other are the law-breakers, smugglers and tax evaders; in between the two are the indifferentiated anonymous mass of common citizens who have either occasional dealings with the Department or none. Each segment calls for a different type of treatment and response. A tax administration can never aspire to be popular. The behaviour of a service administration, like Post Office or Railways, is subject to different criteria than the administration which collects taxes or enforces law and order. But what a tax administration can aim at is to be better understood by the public, strive to win its confidence and hope to mobilize its support and cooperation.

So far as the organized sectors of public engaged in trade or industry, with whom the Customs and Central Excise administration continuously deals, are concerned, the system has to provide for a two-way flow of information—informing the administration of their needs and views and informing them about the administration's decisions. We have a system of advisory committees in different Collectorates and at the Centre. We have our posse of PROs in all major formations. We have a system of Trade Notices and similar Hand-outs through which the decisions of the administration of general significance get communicated to them. In addition, we have also made some progress in associating the public in the administration's tasks and decisions. On the various Committees which reviewed the organization, procedures and working of the Department, we had representatives from the public. Contact with the trading public is also maintained through their Chambers and Associations. Even in the day-to-day working of the Department, we have a system of associating the public. For example, market enquiries are usually made with regard to valuation and classification disputes. More formally, there are panels of experts to advise the administration in specified areas, e.g., panel of authors and artists to advise about books and works of art.

Another aspect of the dealings with this public is to inspire their confidence in the judicious impartiality of the tax administration, not

merely between one tax-payer and other, but also between the Department and the tax-payer. We have made a beginning by creating posts of Appellate Collectors in the field and by assigning the work of revisions, which lie to Central Government against orders of the Appellate Collectors, to separate officers who are not Members of the Board.

As to the future trends in this direction, there are three schools of thought. One school is in favour of having independent appellate tribunals to deal with the appeals which now lie to the Board of Excise and Customs. Its likely corollary would be to have separate officers to deal with the determination of disputes in the original jurisdiction as well. The second school favours independent tribunals only at the stage of revision which lie to the Central Government, keeping the rest of the existing system intact. The third school is in favour of continuing the present system and improving it, but against any independent tribunals on the ground that determination of disputes in the sphere of Customs and Central Excise does not involve so much the interpretation of the law as the finding of facts, and that the independent tribunals, with their trappings of the judicial system, will make the processes of redress costly and time-consuming for the tax-payer. A clearer trend is likely to emerge in this regard by the time we go up before Parliament with the new Central Excise Bill.

As for the second segment of public, *viz.*, the smugglers and tax-evaders, they and the administration understand the language of each other. There is no failure of communication except to convince them that the Department means business and cannot be trifled with.

Coming to the common citizen, to him the administration still appears inscrutable and a strong-hold of coercive authority. Our policies still largely remain an enigma to the common citizen. Democracy being governance by explanation and consent, the bureaucracy can no longer be content to operate in anonymity. It has continuously to strive to project the image of the administration and make the policies better understood as lack of public confidence, support and cooperation places serious constraints on the tax administration and handicaps its fight against tax evasion and smuggling. We may refine our techniques of tax policy and planning. We may continue to hone the tools of our administration. But administration is only the means to an end; and it is by the end-results that the administration is truly judged. There has to be sustained effort to inculcate in the people a better understanding of the Government's policies, a greater realization of how the policies are being implemented, and a larger consciousness

of their own duty in making these policies a success. This is a sphere where a lot remains to be done. This is a sphere where publicity by the administration alone will not suffice. This is a sphere where the leaders of public have a big role to play.

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## CHANGING PATTERN OF INDUSTRIAL ADMINISTRATION

*Ram K. Vepa\**

IT is now well recognized that industrial development plays an important role in the economic growth of any nation; barring the Scandinavian countries and a few others—such as Kuwait, which have grown rich through internal resources like oil—the bulk of the developed countries have, since the Industrial Revolution of the 18th century, used the establishment of new industrial enterprises as an effective tool for growth. In fact, there is a real danger that the mere establishment of a prestigious industry, such as a steel mill, has come to be regarded as a status symbol, irrespective of its real impact on the economy of the country. Most Asian and African countries look upon industrial growth as the magic wand which will bring them up on an economic level with the affluent West and Japan. There are fortunately signs of a more balanced appraisal of the role of industrial development which, in turn, has given rise to new techniques and agencies for such development; this article seeks to describe this new pattern of industrial administration which may assume, for most developing countries, increasing significance in the coming decade.

### *Pre-Independence Role*

India's industrial development may be said to have begun with the textile industry of Bombay and the jute mills of Calcutta—the former predominantly Indian-owned, while the latter was largely in the hands of British and Scottish business interests. In the early years of the 20th century, sugar mills, cement plants and, more significantly, a steel plant added new dimensions to the industrial scene with increasing participation by Indian businessmen. The first World War provided some impetus to industrial growth but hardly on the scale which enabled Japan to forge ahead, although its industrial development began at the same time as that of India.

The inter-war years which were tumultuous for India with mass movements and political instability were hardly conducive to economic

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\*The views expressed in the article are those of the author and are not necessarily of the Ministry to which he belongs.

growth. Encouragement to Small and Village Industries was provided through the States Aid to Industries Acts that were passed in many States but the amounts provided were meagre and the funds available for the purpose limited. Even so, the textile industry rapidly marched ahead, aided by strong nationalist sentiment that looked with disfavour on imported goods. The Indian National Congress under the inspiration of Jawaharlal Nehru had set up in 1938 a National Planning Committee which formed a number of Working Groups to study the problems of economic growth.

Mention must, however, be made of a 'backlash' that had also appeared in the 'twenties and 'thirties against indiscriminate industrialization. Mahatma Gandhi, as early as by 1906, outlined in his booklet *Hind Swaraj* a new type of economic order (later to be called Sarvodaya—or the Welfare of all) in which the revival of the village industries, notably Khadi, occupied an important place. Although most intellectuals were not prepared to go all the way with Gandhiji, his powerful plea against the evils of industrialization made a strong impression on many minds; it was, in fact, the inspiration of many of the policies since Independence.

The Second World War provided India a new opportunity to widen its industrial base; although reluctantly, India's capacity in strategic products was expanded by its alien rulers to enable it to produce the goods needed in the Asian theatre of war. India's three steel mills were producing nearly  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million tonnes annually, while production of cement, sugar, paper, textiles, jute, etc., registered impressive increases. A ship-building yard was set up on the eastern sea board at Visakhapatnam while Bangalore was the location for an aircraft repair industry. By the time the war had ended, Planning was in the air, the country's top industrialists had come out with the Bombay Plan, while the Government of India themselves had set up a Planning Department which initiated new industrial projects.

### *Era of Planned Development*

With Independence, the country had the opportunity to undertake a planned development of the industry, and it was quick to seize the opportunity. The Constitution (adopted in 1950) adopted Justice (social, economic and political) and Equality of opportunity as one of its cardinal principles; it laid down in its section on Fundamental Rights, specific prohibition on employment of children in factories or mines. It further added, as a Directive Principle of State Policy, that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community

are to subserve the common good, that is the operation of the economic system should not result in concentration of wealth. It recognized the right to work and the right to a living wage through promotion of cottage industries in rural areas, either on individual or cooperative basis.

The First Plan, initiated in 1951, was largely a collection of various schemes which had already been initiated after the conclusion of the World War. It was, nonetheless, heavily oriented to agricultural development and its industrial content was limited to consolidation rather than expansion. More significant from our point of view was the enactment of Industrial Development and Regulation Act (1951) which specified a number of key industries which were to be regulated through a system of licensing so as not to waste the limited national resources. The act also laid down procedures to keep watch on the growth of these industries and although the Act dealt only with units which employed more than 50 persons (with power) or 100 (without power) it provided for the first time wide powers to government agencies to control the growth of industry.

The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 provided the first indication of the new Government's attitude to industrial growth which was later re-emphasized in the Policy Resolution of 1956. Both the Policy Resolutions clearly laid down the role of the State in promoting the industrial growth and outlined the framework in which this was to be done. While strategic industries were to be the sole responsibility of the State, a large number of areas were left to private enterprise, and many areas kept in the 'mixed' sector where both the public sector and private enterprises would operate in healthy competition. The 1956 Resolution allayed, once and for all, the apprehension in the minds of many about imminent nationalization and enabled the large industrial groups to plan the establishment of many new enterprises.

The Second Plan, which began in 1956, may be said to have laid down the pattern of future industrial growth. Inspired by the now celebrated 'Mahalanobis Frame', the Second Plan was unmistakably oriented towards heavy industry which was recognized as the basis for all industrial growth; many giant enterprises, notably the three steel mills, the Heavy Electricals Plant, and the Heavy Engineering Corporation were set up in the public sector while the private enterprises were provided liberal financial assistance through new financing institutions (IFCI, IDBI, ICICI) and adequate supply of raw materials. India's industrial stature grew rapidly and though in some cases unrealistically high capacities were built up, there is little doubt that its

present self-sufficiency in many strategic sectors is largely due to the vision of those who formulated the Second Plan—a process that was continued during the Third Plan period.

Another notable feature of this decade (1956-1966) was the establishment of new institutions approved by Government and in most cases solely financed by them, exclusively meant for industrial development. Apart from the three financing institutions, Government also set up the National Industrial Development Corporation for assistance to textile and jute industry—its Technical Consultancy work has tended to assume greater importance—and the National Small Industries Corporation for assistance to small-scale units through supply of machinery on soft terms. At the State level, the phenomena was even more marked where Industrial Development Corporations, separately for large and small industries, were set up in almost all States and these became the primary agencies for extending assistance—both financial and technical—to new industries within the State. State financial corporations were also set up jointly by the concerned State Government, the Reserve Bank of India and the Commercial Banks to provide working capital and term-loans to small and medium industries while the nationalization of the Imperial Bank of India in 1956 and subsequently of the Life Insurance activity enabled a more aggressive policy to be adopted towards financing industrial enterprises.

New agencies at the government level were also set up to implement the government policies towards industrial development. The Directorate General of Technical Development (DGTD) was expanded to regulate the large and medium industries while a separate agency known as the 'Central Small Industries Organization' (CSIO) was constituted to assist small industries. For cottage and village industries, a statutory body known as the 'Khadi and Village Industries Commission', was constituted to implement special schemes to assist the decentralized sector. Similarly, at the State level, the State Directorates of Industries were expanded to act as agents of growth and vied with each other in providing a 'package of incentives'. New enterprises became status symbols leading even to mass agitations, such as a second refinery in Assam and a steel plant in Andhra. Each State also set up a Khadi and Village Industries Board to provide grants and loans to village artisans and those engaged in the spinning and weaving of Khadi.

### *End of Euphoria*

This state of euphoria ended in 1966: a number of factors contributed to the shock the country then received. The passing away of

two respected Prime Ministers in quick succession, the confrontation with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965), the poor harvests due to repeated failures of monsoon lead to a recession which was sought to be avoided through a massive devaluation of the rupee. But the next three years were periods of gloom for all industries: the order books of most of the industries were near empty, both private consumers and government departments restraining expenditure which, in turn, worsened the situation. The Capital market was sluggish or more correctly dead; new investments were not flowing into industry while over the entire country was a pall of famine, drought and starvation. India's image abroad slumped badly and there were gloomy forecasts whether it would survive at all the linguistic jealousies, the political squabbles and the armed revolts by extremists groups.

It was in these years (1966-1969) that an 'agonising reappraisal' of the whole pattern of economic growth was undertaken at all levels. Certain facts become readily obvious: the Second and Third Plans had depended far too heavily on industrialization, neglecting agricultural development. For this, the country had to pay heavily in importing massive quantities of foodgrains to starve off starvation deaths. Even in industrialization, there was too much reliance on heavy industries; the role of light industries was minimized, and village and cottage industries were altogether neglected. It was recognized that the common people could not be denied, for too long, consumer goods that symbolized a better way of life and that too strict an austerity in this regard was likely to be self-defeating; nothing symbolized the good life in the 'sixties so much as the transistor radio that blared latest film songs from a pan-shop even in remote villages. India's industrial economy had to provide for both heavy and light industry; there was need also for encouragement to small and village industries both for dispersing industrial growth and diffusing prosperity. A blend of agriculture or industry—an agro-industrial continuum—was looked upon as the right framework for an agrarian country, which was likely to remain so in the foreseeable future.

Another important lesson of these years was the fact that industrial growth cannot be over controlled; too rigid control on capacities lead to shortages in many items since the licences issued did not always fructify. In fact, as the Hazari Report indicated, in many cases, large industrial houses applied for licenses not to implement them but merely to prevent others from doing so. The over-regimented system also lead to irregularities at the top level and corruption at lower levels—the big houses maintained elaborate liaison establishments to 'persuade' persons in authority to make decisions in their

favour. Donations to political parties were also resorted to for acquiring undue influence in the inner counsels of Government.

The third important factor that emerged from these years is the fact of growing regional imbalances within the country. Whereas some states, such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, and Punjab, were going ahead rapidly taking advantage of the many facilities offered by Government agencies, many others, such as Bihar, U.P., Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Rajasthan, remained stagnant, and, therefore, fell relatively backward. Even within a State, there were pockets of affluence, side by side with those of poverty; but the inter-State differences became serious, threatening the integrity of the country. Social tensions aggravated with the emergence of the 'new rich' who flaunted their wealth (ill-gotten in many cases) in the shape of lavish parties and ostentatious living. It seemed somewhat ironic that after 15 years of planning, the rich, as was often said, seemed to have become richer, and the poor, relatively speaking, poorer.

A fourth factor was the growth of unemployment at the end of every Plan; in spite of the massive investments made during such Plan periods, their employment generation was not commensurate with the growth in population which was estimated to be ten million annually. But what was particularly disconcerting was the fact that the rate of unemployment amongst the highly qualified rapidly increased; by 1968, it was estimated that almost 70,000 persons with a degree or diploma in Engineering were without suitable employment, which constituted a tragic wastage of the nation's manpower, apart from its sociological implications, such as the sense of frustration and disillusionment it produced amongst the educated youth of the country.

#### GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES

Government recognized that unless corrective steps were taken—and taken immediately—the situation might well become explosive. Therefore, an Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee was set up in 1968 to go into the whole question of licensing and to suggest the way it should be modified to subserve the larger national objectives; their report, submitted in 1969, suggested a more liberal policy of licensing but a stricter control over implementation of the licences issued. The Committee also suggested a heavy investment sector in which the large industrial houses may be allowed to operate while restricting their activities in other fields. Accordingly, in 1970, all enterprises which

required an investment of less than Rs. 1 crore was delicensed while those below Rs. 5 crores were to be thrown open to new entrepreneurs. The small sector was protected through increasing reservation of products, which now number as many as 128.

The big business houses were to be controlled more strictly through a Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practice Act (1970) which was enacted to prevent any monopoly practices of such firms. The managing agency system which had outlived its usefulness and had merely served to provide a framework for interlocking controls was finally abolished. The nationalization of 14 major commercial banks, in June 1969, further enabled Government to control the flow of deposits from these banks to more worthwhile channels of activity. In regard to licensing procedures, efforts have been made to simplify them so as to eliminate avoidable delays. A Foreign Investment Board was set up which would speedily decide on application for foreign collaboration; guidelines for such collaboration were widely publicized so that entrepreneurs may be come well aware of the official policy in this regard. The Indian Investment Centre—operating with branches at Dusseldorf, New York, and London—played an important role in securing such collaborations from suitable companies. Thus, the previous rigidity in official attitudes gave way to pragmatism but within a clearly defined policy framework.

The problem of backward areas was studied in depth by two committees constituted by the National Development Council—one headed by Shri N. N. Wanchoo, the then Secretary of Industrial Development, and the other by Shri B. D. Pande, the then Secretary of the Planning Commission. The Wanchoo Committee recognized the need for providing incentives to enterprises in backward areas and suggested a variety of these. It was, therefore, decided that, for administrative simplicity, a 10 per cent subsidy (not exceeding Rs. 5 lakhs in each case) might be provided for all new industries in selected districts. Thirtyseven such districts have been so designated all over India (two in each of the backward States and one in each of the relatively forward States) while more than 200 districts have been selected for providing concessional finance by the financing institutions.

The Pande Committee laid down specific criteria for determining industrial backwardness, such as per capita income, number of industrial workers, per capita consumption of electricity, length of roads and railways. On this basis, they selected six States—Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan—as backward while the special position of Nagaland, Jammu & Kashmir,



and Assam were also recognized. In addition, Goa, Manipur and Tripura from amongst the Union territories were designated as backward. More recently, the entire State of West Bengal (excluding metropolitan Calcutta and Howrah areas) have been declared as backward to provide incentives for industrial growth in that highly disturbed State. Thus, for the first time, a specific official categorization was made the basis for future policies. Recently, special transport subsidy, both for new materials and finished goods, has been announced for Assam, Nagaland, NEFA, Manipur, Tripura, and Jammu & Kashmir.

The importance accorded to the development of backward areas has had an impact on the pattern of industrial administration both at the Central and State levels. Special relaxations are being considered in respect of issue of licences for enterprises in such areas; it is being conceded that, for speedy development, some of the restrictions on the larger houses may have to be relaxed since they alone are in a position to undertake ventures in such regions. New Corporations are being set up in many States to implement schemes of development; thus, in Maharashtra, three new corporations have been set up to assist in the development of Konkan, Marathwada and Western Maharashtra. In recognition of the close linkage between agriculture and industry, agro-industries corporations have also been set up in most States to operate special programmes to provide inputs to the farmers, such as fertilizers, improved seeds, insecticides and pesticides as also service facilities for motors, diesel engines, and tractors that are being increasingly used in agriculture.

The creation of new employment opportunities is a major problem that is being tackled in a variety of ways. The stimulation to industrial growth and the success of the 'green revolution' in many areas will, it is hoped, generate sizable employment as a natural consequence. Special incentives are being provided for educated persons, particularly those qualified technically to set up new enterprises in rural and semi-urban areas. Liberal credit is being made available to them at 'soft' rates and machinery supplied on easy payment terms to enable such persons to set up new units. Training programmes are being operated to provide such persons with the know-how to run industrial enterprises, and consultancy arrangements are being set up to provide technical assistance to them. A study is being made of labour-intensive techniques in industrial development so that indiscriminate 'automation' is not introduced at too early a stage. Special rural industries projects are being undertaken to set up newer type of agro-industries in them which would provide new employment opportunities

in such areas, cater to local demand and utilize local raw materials. One must confess, however, that the full impact of all these programmes on the employment position is yet to be seen; but an indication of the earnestness of the Government in meeting this situation is provided by the fact that in the current year (1971-72) a special provision of Rs. 25 crores has been made to assist the educated-unemployed who are recognized as an important responsibility of the community.

### *Dilemma of Objectives*

As one looks back over two decades of Planning for Industrial Development, one is aware of a perceptible shift in the objectives of governmental policies. Whereas in the 'fifties and early 'sixties the main emphasis in Planning was on greater production, there was increased recognition in the late 'sixties that a mere increase in production was necessary but not enough and that it needed to be tempered with a sense of social justice. That such justice is not likely to be automatically achieved unless one consciously builds it into the policies of the Government, was a fact that emerged from the medley of tensions that has racked Indian Society. In fact, at times, the very measures of the Government designed to accelerate production may have encouraged concentration of economic power in a few people and it was agreed that one must take corrective measures to remedy the situation. In the 'seventies, undoubtedly, the emphasis will, therefore, be not merely on growth but, as the budget notes picturesquely described it, on *Growth with Justice*. Admittedly, this is a more difficult condition to achieve; an increase in growth can perhaps be obtained through assistance to key sectors of the society which can move forward, but to couple this objective with a sense of justice would undoubtedly put a brake on the process. That such a step is, however, correct is evidenced by the grave conflicts that have arisen in a neighbouring country due to acute imbalances between the different regions of the country. Even within India, acute tensions have developed in some States due to disparities in the stages of economic development of different areas.

To achieve Growth with Justice requires, however, a greater refinement of Government policies, a close watch on key sectors and a constant awareness of the dynamics of a situation. We are today moving into a stage of policy making when growth rates may not always tell the whole story nor even per capita incomes; since they are macro-averages, they mask the fact that a great number of people live below that level. The problems of development of backward

areas and creation of new employment opportunities require an imaginative policy framework as well as sensitive agencies at the implementation level.

Japan is often held as a model nation for developing countries and its growth rates for almost 15 years have been above the 10 per cent level, reaching in some years as much as 17 per cent. But what is often missed, however, is the fact that Japan achieved this success through, what are euphemistically called 'pragmatic policies' but which, in reality, are measures that assisted small-interest groups (in some cases the pre-War *Zaibatsu*) to help increase production. That the resulting affluence percolated, to some extent, to the lower levels of the society is undeniable, but it must be admitted that it was largely the sense of austerity, discipline and devotion to work of the Japanese people that made progress possible. It is doubtful whether other countries in Africa and Asia can command such qualities at a time when equality has been accepted as a fundamental right of every individual, whether rich or poor, literate or illiterate.

The Soviet Union in the 'twenties and 'thirties (and Red China today) has demonstrated that a high growth rate is possible when backed by a revolutionary fervour. Although tremendous successes have been registered in all sectors of the economy, one must admit that the price, in terms of human suffering, was perhaps unduly high. In any case, it requires a political system, that is directly contrary to many of the principles enshrined in our democratic Constitution. This is not to deny the right of each nation to choose a particular political framework that it considers best; but one must also realize that a mere adoption of one set of policies that had succeeded in a different milieu may not be equally productive.

#### CONCLUSION

India's distinctive contribution to economic thought was the pattern advocated by Gandhiji which is today called *Sarvodaya* or the 'Welfare of All'. In essence, this consisted in making the village the central focus of all planning and to develop an industrial pattern which would revolve round the rural economy—rather than the other way around, where the villages function as mere satellites of the adjacent urban areas. India's Planning effort did not quite conform to this concept in the 'fifties and 'sixties; although rural development was taken up as a separate programme, it was not built into the industrial economy of the country. Today, however, there are signs of a welcome recognition that the ideas of *Sarvodaya* are not perhaps

so impractical as was at one time imagined; that the village economy needs to be revitalized and given greater priority, that prosperity needs to be diffused and production decentralized, and that different sectors of the society have complementary not competitive roles. Admittedly, it is still a far cry from Gandhiji's concept of the ideal state but the signs are unmistakable that the trends in industrial development are in that direction, rather than copying more glamorous foreign models—Russian or American, Chinese or Japanese. India's industrial growth will, in the ultimate analysis, depend on the ability of its planners to evolve a system that is rooted in the country's own ethos which alone can evoke the dormant sense of patriotism in the nation that will enable it cheerfully bear the inevitable burdens of growth. This indeed is the Challenge of the 'seventies in the field of industrial administration which will call for both wisdom and vision at all levels of decision-making.

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## RAILWAY ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA

*B. C. Ganguli & P. Lal*

THE year 1825 saw the World's first Railway train to run in England between Stockton and Darlington. Within 20 years of this, proposals were submitted to the East India Company in 1844 for the construction of Railways in India.

Initially, these proposals were viewed in the context of the great military advantages which Railways would provide, in addition to their commercial and social benefits. The proposals could, however, be finalized only in 1854 when, on the recommendations of Lord Dalhousie, a decision was taken to undertake construction of Railways in India through the agency of companies, under the supervision and control of the Government of India.

In accordance with the policy enunciated by Lord Dalhousie, the companies undertook to construct and manage specified Railway lines. On their part, the Government agreed to provide land and guaranteed an interest on the capital at the rate of about 5 per cent. The companies were free to choose their own employees. However, the overall control of the Railways vested with the Government, which had the power to decide on the standard and details of construction, the rolling stock to be provided, the number, time and speed of the trains, the rates and fares to be charged, expenditure to be incurred, the standard of maintenance and the form of accounts. Provision was also made in the contracts for an option enabling the Government to purchase the Railway lines after a period of 25 or 50 years and the companies to surrender their line to the Government and receive, in return, their capital at par.

It was soon realized that, with the backing of Government guarantee of 5 per cent on the capital outlay, construction and operation of the Railways were often extravagant. This called for a re-orientation of the Government's policies in respect of Railway development in the country. Accordingly, from 1869 onwards, the Government of India initiated construction<sup>o</sup> of Railways through Government agency and the guarantee system was abolished.

At this stage, when the Government of India took over the responsibility of arranging for the capital expenditure on the Railways from their own funds, a decision was also taken to undertake construction of the Railway lines of Metre gauge also, in addition to the Broad gauge. This was an unhappy departure from the Uni-gauge policy laid down by Lord Dalhousie and introduction of the handicap of break of gauge at trans-shipment points. But it was then considered that it was far more important to extend the benefit of Railway communications at lower capital outlay involved in the construction of Metre gauge than standardize the Broad gauge throughout India.

The whole policy about the construction of Railways in India was, once again, reviewed in 1880 in the wake of the Afghan War which emphasized the need for construction of lines for strategic purposes and on the recommendations made by the Famine Commission of 1878. It was then decided that the construction of profitable new lines should be left entirely to private commercial enterprises and that the Government should only undertake the construction of Railways which, through their unprofitable character in a commercial sense, could not be undertaken by private agencies.

From 1880 onwards, a new period started of Company Railway lines along with State Railways under a new guarantee system. However, the rate of guarantee interest allowed was lower than that fixed in the past and the other terms were also much more favourable to the Government.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE AT THE TOP—PRE-INDEPENDENCE ERA

At this stage, it would be appropriate to mention that, initially, the Government exercised control over the railways through the appointment of consulting engineers. The State Railway Directorate was established in 1874, under the charge of a Director in the Public Works Department of the Government of India.

In 1877, another experiment was tried of having three Directors of territorial systems, in place of one Director of State Railways. This was, however, found to be unsatisfactory, as it resulted in the issue of conflicting orders concerning the management of open lines. The earlier arrangement was, therefore, revived but the status of the Director at the Centre was now raised to that of Director General.

Further changes were made in 1897. In that year, the post of Director General was abolished and the post of a Secretary to the Government of India in the Public Works Department was created in its place.

*Setting up of a Board*

At the turn of the century, the Government appointed Sir Thomas Robertson, in October 1901, as Special Commissioner for Indian Railways, to enquire into and report upon the administration and working of Indian Railways. Sir Thomas Robertson recommended that the administration of the Railways in India should be entrusted to a small Board, consisting of a President or Chief Commissioner, who should possess a thorough practical knowledge of Railway working and two other Commissioners, who should be men of high railway standing.

As a result of these recommendations, the Government decided to transfer the control of the Railway system in India to a Railway Board consisting of three persons—a Chairman and two Members. The Board was made subordinate and directly responsible to the Government of India.

In 1914, it was felt that the importance of financial and commercial considerations in the control of Indian Railway policy justified a modification of the policy that the Chairman and Members of the Railway Board should be men of experience in the actual working of Railways. It was decided that, in future, one Member, who could, equally with the other Members, be appointed as President, should be selected from amongst persons having commercial and financial experience.

This arrangement was, however, altered in 1920 when it was decided that all the three Members of the Railway Board should possess railway experience.

By then, the Government of India had come to own 73 per cent of the total mileage of the Railways in India, while private companies owned only 15 per cent of the total mileage of a little over 37,000 miles, the rest being the property of the then Indian States. In spite of this, however, the Government operated only 21 per cent, while private companies operated 70 per cent of the Railway lines. There was considerable dissatisfaction in the public about the large scale management of the Railways by private companies.

*Acworth Committee*

In November 1920, the Government set up a Committee called the Indian Railway Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir William



Acworth to enquire into questions relating to the management, finance and future control and organization of the Indian Railways. The Acworth Committee expressed a clear opinion that, in India, the State should manage directly the Railways which it already owns. With a view to making adequate provision for depreciation and limiting the demand of the State on Railway surpluses, the Committee also recommended that the Railways should have a separate budget of their own and that they should be responsible for expanding their own income and for providing such net revenue as is required to meet the interest on the debt incurred or to be incurred by the Government for Railway purposes; the Railway Budget being presented by the Member incharge of Railways. The Government accepted the recommendations of the Committee. In terms of these recommendations, a Financial Commissioner was appointed in the Board. Later, one more post of Member was also added.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION SINCE INDEPENDENCE

At the dawn of Independence in 1947, the entire Railway system, except for few Light Railways had already been taken over for direct management by the Government.

As a result of the Federal Financial Integration in 1950, the ex-Indian State Railways were also merged into the Government Railway system. At this stage, the Railways, including the ex-State Railways, were grouped into a few viable units on a zonal basis, each zonal system being under the charge of a senior officer of the rank of General Manager, directly responsible to the Railway Board.

In 1951-52, the Government decided to surrender the top post in the railway hierarchy, which was then designated as Chief Commissioner of Railways. - One of the functional Members was appointed to act as the Chairman of the Board and *ex-officio* Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Railways. This arrangement, however, was found unsatisfactory in practice.

In 1954, it was decided to vest the Chairman, Railway Board, once again with all the functions and powers of the Chief Commissioner of Railways. It was also clearly stipulated that the Chairman would be solely responsible to the Minister of Railways for arriving at decisions on technical questions and advising the Government on matters of Railway policy. All policy and other important matters would have to be put up to the Minister through him. He would also have the powers to over-rule other Members of the Board, except that, if, in any

matter of Finance, the Financial Commissioner did not agree with the Chairman, he had the right to ask for it to be referred to the Railway Minister and the Finance Minister. Later, the Chairman was also designated the Principal Secretary to the Government of India and the Financial Commissioner and other Members of the Railway Board as *ex-officio* Secretaries to the Government of India, in their respective spheres. This position has continued to subsist and represents the structural formation of the top decision-making authority for the Indian Railway system.

### *Zonal Railway Administration*

While the Railway Board formulates the policy, the actual implementation is entrusted to the Zonal Railways. The Zonal Railways, as mentioned above, is headed by a General Manager. General Managers have been delegated with adequate authority to enable them to exercise full control over the day-to-day operation of the Railways, within the broad policies approved by the Railway Board. Each General Manager is assisted, among other staff, by Heads of Departments and also Divisional Superintendents, the latter are incharge of specified areas with proper delegation of powers and adequate administrative authority.

We have narrated in some detail, the evolution of the pattern of Railway management in India, so that there is a clear appreciation of the various aspects which should be kept in view in considering the administrative set-up of the Indian Railways.

### BROAD GUIDELINES

The first and foremost objective which needs to be emphasized is that the Railways should continue to be run as a Government undertaking. This is the position obtaining at present. We have, repeatedly in the past, tried to work the Railways under company management but this has not been found sound and practicable course. Direct Government management is essential for coordinated service and systematic growth of the Railways which is the most dependable means of transport.

### *Multi Gauge System for the Time Being Only*

Secondly, as a result of what could be termed as the short-sighted policy followed in the past; on narrow financial consideration, we are

now faced with the continuing Break of Gauge problem, from Metre gauge to Broad gauge. We have over 26,000 kms of track on the Metre gauge. A rough estimate shows that the expenditure involved in conversion of this length of Metre Gauge to Broad Gauge would amount to about Rs. 2,000 crores. Due to limited resources, we shall have to live with this break of Gauge problem for some years to come. So, while planning for the future development of the Railways, we should ensure that the long-term interests of the country are invariably kept in view.

### *Control by Specialist Technocrats*

The third aspect which needs very careful evaluation is that under the overall supervision of the Minister, it would be prudent to leave the control of the Railway system to be exercised by specialist technocrats who have had long and intimate knowledge and experience of Railway working. Modern management techniques must necessarily have to be introduced on an increasing scale on the Railways but it may not be prudent to relegate the specialist to a subordinate position and power. This has been tried in the past but without success.

### *Overall Control by Railway Board*

Fourthly, while the Railway Board Members should be left free to formulate policies in their respective spheres and General Managers should have wide discretion and delegation of authority in the day-to-day functioning of the Railways, the overall control in technical direction and management should be allowed to continue to vest in the Chairman, Railway Board. This should ensure avoidance of undue conflicts in the formulation and execution of policies.

Fifthly, the Railway revenues must be allowed to remain separate from the general revenues. Adequate provision should be made for depreciation to cover cost of renewals and modernization of assets. As far as possible, this might not be linked with the general ways and means position of the Government.

### *Railway Policy on Commercial Principles*

Sixthly, Railway policies should basically be formulated on sound commercial considerations. However, policies should take into account not only the short-term and long-term economic interests but also the political and strategic requirements of the country.

From these broad principles, for conclusions, based on the past study of Railway development in India, let us now turn to the problems, at present faced by the Railways in the administrative field, how these are being tackled and the planning which is under way to ensure the continued viability of the system.

### *Convenient and Economic Mode of Transport*

Basically, the purpose of Railways is to provide convenient and economic transport service to the Rail users. The key role of the Railways in the transport sphere of the country can be gauged by the fact that about 75 per cent of the freight and 60 per cent of passengers in India are carried by the Railways.

The Indian Railways extend over a length of nearly 60,000 kms, covering practically all the States in the Union of India. They have on their rolls, some 13.6 lakhs of employees apart from casual workers engaged on seasonal works, construction of new Railway lines and other projects.

#### THE NEW TASKS—FIVE YEAR PLANS

During World War II, Indian Railways were denuded of quite a lot of equipment, railway track, rolling stock, etc., to provide rail facilities for the Middle-East sector. Normal repairs, replacements and renewals were allowed to fall badly into arrears. The Railway system was, thus, in a very bad shape when India achieved its Independence. The first task that the Indian Railways took up at that time was to rehabilitate their assets and put the whole system once again back to a sound undertaking. In addition, the Railways were soon called upon to measure up to the increasing transport demands arising from the planned development which was taken up through the Five Year Plans from 1951-52. During the preceding year (1950-51), the Indian Railways carried some 1,284 million passengers and 93 million tonnes of goods.

Time has shown that the Railway organization has justified the trust reposed in its ability to meet the challenge. The Railways embarked on their own extensive expansion programme, within the framework of the existing management and administrative set-up. The performance figures for the year 1969-70 show that the Railways carried 2,338 million passengers and 207 million tonnes of freight during that year. Taking 100 as the index of performance for the year 1950-51, the index figures for the year 1969-70 come to 182.1 for the passengers and 223.5 for goods traffic. In fact, if we take into account the present-day longer distances for the carriage of goods traffic, the

index figure for such traffic would come to 290.7, correctly representing the work-load on this account.

#### SOME PERFORMANCE FIGURES

Arising from the increased work-load, capital investment on Railways has gone up from Rs. 827 crores in 1950-51 to Rs. 3,195.5 crores in 1969-70. There has been an increase in staff strength from 9.14 lakhs to 13.57 lakhs during the above mentioned period. This increase is not literally proportionate to the work-load as a fair share thereof has been taken care of through improved efficiency and better utilization of assets. Apart from Railway track, these assets may broadly be classified as follows:

<i>Assets</i>	<i>Numbers</i>
Locomotives	
Steam	9,436
Diesel	1,202
Electric	604
	<hr/>
	11,242
	<hr/>
Goods wagons	3,87,000
Passenger coaches	24,500
Electric Multiple Unit coaches	1,830

With all this stock, the Railways operate on their track, every day, some 10,800 trains, carrying 6.6 million passengers and 0.6 million tonnes of goods; the number of railway stations served being 7,060, located all over the country. These figures are reproduced here to give a bird's eye view to the readers of the extent of coverage of the Indian Railways and a glimpse into the magnitude of their problems.

#### PROBLEMS OF RAILWAY ADMINISTRATION

##### *Problem of Staff Management—Emoluments*

The first and foremost of these problems is necessarily associated with the staff organization. Considering the vast expanse of the country covered by the Railways, close supervision of each and every employee is well-nigh impossible. It is, therefore, imperative to set up a line of command and channel of communication on a sound principle. The Indian Railways are fortunate that the bulk of the

Railwaymen are fully alive to their sense of responsibility and full involvement in the success of the undertaking.

The problem of staff management should be viewed in the context of the prevailing industrial relations in other public sector undertakings and not according to the pattern set for white-collared workers. This is particularly relevant in the sphere of pay structures and other emoluments. Here, the Railways are, more often than not, equated with the pattern obtaining in the civil departments, although with some measure of discretion in other spheres. The public sector undertakings are attracting available talents by offering superior pay scales and perquisites. Should the Railways not be granted the discretion and authority in this sphere to avoid the flight of talents already taking place to a large extent?

#### *Import Substitution—Railways' Own Production Units and Sophisticated Components*

The second objective which is required to receive a high priority is sustained drive for import substitution and self-sufficiency. Out of the total purchases of stores of Rs. 331.6 crores for the Indian Railways during 1969-70, the imported stores amounted to only 18.1 crores, i.e. 5.48 per cent of the total purchases. This is comprised of mainly the critical steel items, specialized and sophisticated components, etc., the manufacture of which too are being developed indigenously. So that we are self-sufficient in the real sense of the term, Indian Railways today do have their own production units for steam, diesel and electric locomotives, as also for the bulk of their requirement of passenger coaches. Wagon manufacturing capacity has been developed adequately, mostly in the private sector.

The Railway Board, among its other functions, ensures that the production units are geared up for the designed output and managed on the most economic and efficient lines. There is continuous accent on high quality of production. The State Trading Corporation has already secured some export orders for the rolling stock and components manufactured by these units.

#### *Lowest Freight and Fare Rates*

The third problem, which in priority overrides all others is the necessary attention and precautions to maintain the financial viability of the Railways as a commercial undertaking. During 1969-70, the gross revenue receipts of the Indian Railways amounted to Rs. 951.6 crores and total revenue expenditure to Rs. 805 crores. The operating ratio, i.e. the percentage of expenses to receipts was, thus, of the order

of 83 per cent. This is a satisfactory position compared to the Railways in most of the countries of the world. Our freight rates and fares are still one of the lowest among the Railways of the world. This picture is apt to get blurred when we provide for the interest or dividend, as it is more generally known, on the capital invested, payable to the general revenues. It may be mentioned here that almost entirely the whole of the capital invested in the Indian Railways is treated as 'loan' capital borrowed from the general revenues. During 1969-70, the amount payable on account of the dividend, including the amount payable to the various States in lieu of the tax on passenger fares, amounted to Rs. 156.3 crores. After making this payment, the Railways were left with a shortfall of Rs. 9.8 crores. During 1970-71, the shortfall further increased to Rs. 19.84 crores. We are required to arrest this tendency of progressive shortfalls eating into the very fabric of the undertaking.

### *Social Burdens*

The Indian Railways, more than any other form of transport, are distinguished by the public utility characteristics, as is amply borne out by the history of development of Indian Railways. Investment in railways is to a great extent influenced by socio-economic factors. For instance, construction of new lines has been undertaken in backward areas to facilitate development. Apart from catering to the suburban services which are generally non-paying, the rates of certain commodities, like coal, important raw materials and foodgrains, have been deliberately kept low in order not to impose too great a burden on the economy. The various social burdens borne by the Indian Railways as a public utility organization are detailed below:

<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>Items</i>	<i>Rs. (in crores)</i>
1.	Loss on unremunerative branch lines	8
2.	Loss on coaching services (suburban and non-suburban passenger traffic, parcels, luggage, etc.)	59
3.	Losses on low-rated freight traffic (e.g., foodgrains—17.55 crores; coal—11.95 crores; fodder, including oil cake—5.75 crores; ores—3.91 crores; gypsum, limestone, dolomite and other stones—2.5 crores; firewood and charcoal—2.31 crores; salt—2.13 crores; sugarcane—2.04 crores; fruits and vegetables—1.28 crores, etc.)	52
4.	Loss due to freight concessions on export trade, relief measures, etc.	1
Total		<u>120</u>

Besides, the Railways are also spending Rs. 16 crores on Railway



Protection Force, Order Police, etc.; Rs. 19.50 crores on Health, Medical & Welfare Services; Rs. 3 crores on educational assistance to railway employees' children; and Rs. 10 crores by way of subsidized housing of employees.

#### BLUE PRINT FOR FUTURE

##### *Railways' Fourth Plan*

It would be of interest to our readers now to have some idea of the various measures taken by us to increase our revenues to obtain the maximum possible return on our investment. The Fourth Plan of the Railways was based on the expectation of the goods traffic attaining the level of 265 million tonnes in 1973-74. Originally, a plan outlay of Rs. 1,700 crores was envisaged for meeting this traffic demand. This was, however, reduced to Rs. 1,525 crores in view of the difficult resources position. The target of goods traffic has since been scaled downward to 240 million tonnes in 1973-74. In consequence, the Plan allocation has been proposed to be reduced to Rs. 1,275 crores.

The shortfall in the original target of goods traffic is largely in the steel and coal sectors where the Railway capacity is fully developed to meet the target demands of the original Fourth Plan. At the same time, there is still a sizable bottleneck on the free movement on certain trunk routes and terminal and marshalling yards. There is also the necessity for modernizing our motive power and rolling stock and also the communication and signalling systems. Investment on safety items is also inescapable irrespective of the quantum of financial returns. It may be mentioned also that capacity developed in one area cannot be transferred to another. A sizable investment, thus, would remain in one sector and yet additional outlay would have to be made during this Plan, notwithstanding the reduced level of traffic in the steel and coal sectors.

Meanwhile, we are required to take into account the other adverse factors affecting Railway finances. The extremely difficult law and order situation in certain regions of the country has badly disrupted the free flow of traffic over the entire Railway system. Floods and other natural calamities also have taken their toll. But man-made difficulties created by the break down of law and order must necessarily have to be fought against.

Also the staff costs, which already account for about 60 per cent of the Working Expenses of the Railways, are showing a further upward

trend. The position would be aggravated when the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission are received and implemented. In addition, the fuel bill, accounting for 20 per cent of the working expenses, is continuously on its upward hike. There have also been substantial increases in the prices of steel, track fittings, components of locomotives and coaches, electric fittings, etc. All these add up to a rather sizable sum to create anxious problems for the management. However, as Railwaymen, we do not feel subdued by the challenge of the time. Railwaymen have faced difficult days many a time in the past. We have always been found equal to the demands made on us in every national emergency.

### *Salient Features*

Let us now spell out in brief, the broad outlines of the salient features of the blue-print which the Railways propose to adopt to meet the situation. The busy arterial routes of the Indian Railways carry some 70 per cent of the traffic, although they form only 22 per cent of the total route kilometrage. Although we shall continue to open new areas within available resources by building new lines, we must first concentrate our attention on removing the bottlenecks in the 'busy' arterial routes. On all these routes, the steam locomotives, with their limited throughput, must give way, more and more, to the more powerful and sophisticated diesel and electric locomotives. The speeds on the main trunk routes must be increased from the present level of 100 kms to 130-160 kms per hour. Japan is running trains at 220 kms per hour on the New Tokaido line. France has already completed experiments with turbo trains at 300 kms per hour. I know that there is the usual opposition from the minority section of vested interests to the marginal extra expenditure that might be involved in raising the speeds. The minimal expenses on the infrastructure would be more than compensated by the increased capacity, particularly of the freight movement, which would become available on the trunk routes. We have to steamroll the obstacles to the wheels of progress. High speed passenger services from point to point coupled with point to point fast freight trains, supplemented by 'container services' from door to door would usher in a new and profitable era of rail transport.

We should not, at the same time, be accused of perpetuating the short-sighted policy of the four-Gauge systems for the Indian Railways on narrower financial appraisals. What we should adopt is a policy of perspective planning for a sufficiently long future, with a financial test for the total investment. Goods should invariably be moved

safely and on a time schedule. We should be aggressive in sales promotion and better customer service. More and more express goods trains should roar along between important commercial centres. We have introduced only limited container services up to now. What we need is a push, on a much bigger scale to establish a guaranteed door to door service.

Telecommunication and signalling installations should receive greater attention. In a vast country like ours, communications get disrupted from time to time, owing to thefts and damage of telephone transmission lines in one or the other area. A network of microwave communication system has already been introduced on the Railways. It should be our constant aim and endeavour to cover all the zonal and divisional headquarters and the important goods yards and terminals, supplemented by a network of Teleprinter Services, so that the flow in the traffic artery is in no way obstructed due to lack of communications. We must earn the trust and goodwill of our customers. Thefts and pilferages of goods in transit must be prevented at all costs. Passenger services should be comfortable and punctual. Reservation facilities should be improved and, in fact, put on computer in busy streams. And, above all, courtesy should become the second nature of all the Railwaymen of India, all big and small.

As mentioned above, the freight rates and fares on the Indian Railways are the lowest in the world. The suburban passenger services are non-paying, the freight rates of bulk commodities, like coal, important raw materials and foodgrains, have deliberately been kept at a low level on social and economic compulsions. Unremunerative branch lines continue to be operated. The social burden on Railways on this account is estimated to be of the order of Rs. 120 crores. We should be afforded some relief from the size of this burden by readjustment of rates and fares, as considered appropriate, on overall economic requirements of the country and by a relief on the dividend liability which is justifiably due.

Finally, we must continually endeavour to improve the efficiency and output of the Railway staff who are the very backbone of this undertaking. There should be no hesitation in the necessary inputs of welfare measures, including medical care, recreation, educational facilities, etc., to bring about a greater involvement of all the individual Railway employees of all levels in the Railway undertaking with better health and satisfaction. We should also improve their wage structure, linking it more with the concept of productivity rather than the structure laid down for other civil employees. There should be

a due share in the profits for the employees, an ethical distribution of the production between the employees and the management, a more equalitarian distribution of the Gross National Product of rail transport. There should as a prerequisite to efficiency, be greater accent on training facilities and, where necessary, we should overhaul and update our existing training institutions to match with the needs of the time.

I have an undying faith in the capability and potential of the Indian Railwaymen. Within the last few months, the new look in the management have shown results. We have re-established punctual running of passenger carrying trains. The loading of freight has been stepped up, the transport of coal and raw materials and distribution of the finished agricultural and industrial products have been stepped up appreciably, exceeding our proportional Plan targets; for the year 1971-72 and in the month of July, 1971, we have earned a handsome additional revenue over our budget proportion. This is in spite of the extensive and intensive natural and man-made calamities in large parts of the country. If the demands on the rail transport do not fall from the rate prevailing in the months of July and August, 1971, and if no untoward incidents erode into the present level of the efficiency of Railway operation, I have every hope that the Indian Railways would come out of its Nadir of financial performance, on its onward march to a financially sound Railway system, perhaps the only one in the world.

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## RECENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICE ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA

G. C. Singhvi

OUR society is passing through what could be termed a revolution of rising expectations directed to achieve political, economic and social modernization.

And since police touch upon the lives of the individuals at so many points and spend a greater proportion of their time and effort in working with the people, society's expectations from the police have also been steadily rising.

As a result, the entire gamut of the role of police and its place in society must assume a new complexion.

In the backdrop of a total and comprehensive sociological, technological, economic, political and psychological change, police value judgments must also change so that they do not become out-paced, out-flanked or out-manoeuvred by the velocity of this societal change.

Police administrators have accordingly to play the role of change-initiators and change-agents. Whether they have been able effectively to play this role could be assessed by peeping into the recent trends and developments in the realm of police administration in our country.

I have endeavoured to recall to my mind recent trends and developments in police administration in India, and by recent I mean those which relate to the post-Independence era.

Space does not permit me either to deal with all the trends and developments or to deal with them elaborately. I, therefore, propose to make a brief, realistic and pragmatic assessment of a mere dozen facets of police administration which in my view are of operational significance indeed.

### *Constitution of States' Police Commissions*

According to the Constitution of India, police, including village and railway police, is a State List subject. Nevertheless, the Police

Act of 1861, while vesting all powers in the State Governments for superintendence over the State police, has made a specific provision to the effect that no State Government will empower any person, officer or court to supersede or control any police functionary except as provided in that Act.

Similarly, the Police Act of 1961, *mutatis mutandis* provides that pay and all other conditions of service of officers of the rank of Deputy Superintendents of Police and above shall be such as may be determined by the Government of India and by implication not by the Governments of States.

These two explicit, almost unequivocal, provisions make it abundantly clear that the Police Act expects the Union Government to keep its finger in the pie of and play a significant role in the police administration of the States.

Anyway, the Constitution of India, which lists police as a State subject, had understandably aroused a political consciousness in the country over the fact that police being a State List subject, the Union Government of India had nothing directly to do with it.

The consequence was that instead of appointing an all-India Police Commission on the lines of the Police Commission of 1902-3, State Government started appointing their own Police Commissions.

By now, almost all the States have had their Police Commissions and their reports too. As is quite natural, the recommendations made by these different Police Commissions could not have been uniform.

What inevitably followed was that whatever uniformity that has been achieved in the police administration of the country, because of the implementation of the recommendations of the Indian Police Commission of 1902-3, started slowly and gradually to wane.

If this trend goes on and is not checkmated well in time, the day, when comparative police administration of States in India will have to be prescribed as a subject of study at the police training institutions, does not appear to be far away.

Because of the non-appointment of an all-India Police Commission, or even a Central Police Commission, the working of all the Central Police organizations has also not been subjected to that penetrating study as it ought to have been.

*Police as Servants of the People*

The policemen have repeatedly been told that they should change their old methods and ways, and behave like servants of the people. They are also told that public service is their primary duty and proud privilege.

This advice is indeed laudable insofar as it goes but unfortunately it does not go far. If, by simply rendering advice, by speech making, or otherwise, we could achieve things, we would have by now made Heaven on Earth.

Some serious thought will, therefore, have to be given to see as to how could the spirit of public service be inculcated in the policemen.

Incidentally, the Police Act of 1861 clearly lays down that the police is an instrument for detection and prevention of crime. This instrument is obviously in the hands of the Government of the day.

The duties of the police have been laid down in Section 23 of the Police Act of 1861. They too, do not even as much as make a mention of public service. The emphasis is, thus, on the idea that police is an instrument in the hands of government and not on the ideal that the policeman is a servant of the public.

Since what is aimed at is the inculcation of a spirit of public service in the policemen, it would perhaps be desirable to change the police laws with a view to rendering them public-service oriented rather than as an instrument in the hands of government-oriented.

It is conceded that mere change of law would not help much in making police service dedicated, motivated, and committed. At the same time, it shall have to be appreciated that the change of law is likely to prepare a ground for and accelerate the pace of so many welcome changes, including the change of hearts.

The trend in this behalf has been for administering doses of sermons to policemen preaching that they should develop better relations with the public. But how this is to be achieved, not many seem to be bothered.

In the true sense of the term, the best public relations that the police can maintain could be through keeping the clients satisfied with the service rendered by them.



If the service rendered by the policemen to the public is of a high order, good and cordial public-police relations will follow as a matter of course.

If the service rendered is of a poor or inferior quality or, in the alternative, if instead of being service with a smile, it is a service with a frown, no amount of public relation would be of any avail.

In a word, what we require is an action-motivated and goal-oriented police administration.

While focussing our viewing lenses on police-public relations, we do get reminded about the role of the feature films in projecting an image of the police. If the role of the police is indiscreetly projected in the films, as has been done in various films, the image of the police gets tarnished causing irreparable damage to police administration.

On the other hand, if the image projected is a sensible and public-service oriented one, it will serve as a morale booster for the police and help them fight their battle with the criminals and other anti-social elements on a more favourable ground.

A lot could predictably be achieved on this front if a criminologist is appointed as one of the members of the Film Censor Board so that he may look at the film from the angle of bettering police-public relations. If the film tends to have a deleterious effect on this relationship, the scissors of the censors should come into operation.

For, after all, the police are law enforcement officers and if their image is projected in a shabby manner, respect for law would diminish and it will directly effect adversely the society as a whole.

For improving upon police-public relations by projecting a servants of the people image of the police, use of core documentary films has been advocated time and again but very little has been done to translate this precept into a reality.

### *Population Explosion and Policing of Big Cities*

We have been witnessing a population explosion. Urbanization has been on the increase. There has been congestion and over-crowding in big cities. The number of crimes has considerably gone up and is still going up. Peace and tranquility have also been endangered. The

number of agitations and riots that take place have also registered a lamentable increase.

All in all, because of these problems which are creations of urbanization and population explosion, policing of cities has attracted that special attention in the recent past which is almost unprecedented.

On the administrative front, to meet these serious challenges posed by urbanization, the raising of a self-contained unit of city police in bigger cities under the stewardship of a Commissioner of Police has been pleaded.

A few years ago, only the cities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras had Commissioners of Police. Poona, Ahmedabad, Nagpur, Hyderabad and Bangalore were then added to the list and there is a likelihood that other big cities will also in a not too distant future follow suit.

The Administrative Reforms Commission have also recommended that in cities having a population of 4 lakhs or more, the Commissioner of Police system should be introduced.

The Commissioner of Police enjoys all the magisterial powers which are necessary for maintenance of law and order in the cities and understandably, therefore, cities having Commissioners of Police do not have District Magistrates.

The Commissioner of Police system has been found to be highly successful in the cities where it has been inducted. It was after taking into consideration all the pros and cons of the Commissioner of Police system that the Delhi Police Commission headed by Justice Khosla had recommended its adoption for the metropolitan city of Delhi also.

Another trend that has been begotten by population explosion and urbanization comprises a plea for separation of law police from order police, particularly in cities. It has been argued repeatedly that it is too much to expect the generalist and multipurpose city police force simultaneously and efficaciously to attend to both law and order duties.

Law duties, in this context, have in their ambit investigation of crimes and prosecution of criminals. Order duties mean and include prevention of offences and maintenance of peace and tranquility.

According to the trend of thought, the law police should deal with only investigation of crimes and prosecution of criminals and should have nothing to do with the maintenance of order, including quelling of riots.

Opinion, however, is yet divided on this subject and there has not as yet emerged any clear picture as to what shape should the things take. The trend is, thus, very much there but there has been no corresponding development in any tangible and perceptible form.

### *Policing of the Villages*

In Independent India, considerable attention has been paid by the Union and State Governments to the development of rural areas. The community development programmes and the panchayati raj institutions came into being simply with a view to bringing about a bloodless revolution in the rural areas.

As a sequel, the face of the Indian village has appreciably undergone a lift. Facilities in the form of improved transport, communication, electrification and mechanization have liberally been extended to the villages.

Unfortunately, this trend was not followed up properly insofar as the policing of the rural areas was concerned. The old '*chaukidara* (watch men) system' has virtually come to an end but the panchayati raj institutions and their village volunteer forces, or *gram rakshadals* as these are called in some States, could not take the place of the *chaukidars*.

The end result today is that villages are virtually without police. A police station having a Sub-Inspector as its officer incharge, a couple of ASIs and Head Constables and a dozen or more Constables to assist him has to look after 50, 100 or even more villages. Obviously, it is not feasible for this meagre posse to do justice to the policing of villages.

If we look at things in a correct perspective, it will appear that the need for paying legitimate attention to the policing of the rural areas was never so great as it is now and that we can ignore it only at our own peril. Let us remind ourselves that by avoiding or evading issues we do not solve problems. Instead, we complicate them. For hard realities would obstinately go on raising their inexorable heads.

### *Mass Preparedness and Police*

The two armed conflicts forced upon us—one by China and the other by Pakistan—highlighted the need for having and strengthening our Home Guards and Civil Defence organizations as also other security organizations so that in times of need these organizations may come to the rescue of the police and thereby enable the civil administration more effectively to face the multifarious civil challenges posed by a war.

The Home Guards and the Civil Defence organizations are by their very nature virtually police organizations. Invariably, they have been organized as independent departments but more often than not are headed by police officers. Their duties are more akin to police duties and they have to maintain good liaison with the local police forces.

It is a moot point whether these organizations, which were brought into existence for enthusing the people and injecting into them a sense of mass preparedness, have come into their own. Nevertheless, as extension of the local police, they have irreversibly come to stay.

### *Intelligence : Collection, Collation and Communication*

In the post-Independence era, on more occasions than one, we have read it in the papers that the intelligence machinery of the police had let the government down. This has particularly been so on occasions of widespread riots on one issue or the other.

If one scans through these news reports, one would probably gain an impression that the people expect too much of the intelligence agencies. Perhaps they think that the intelligence agencies possess the rare attributes of omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience.

Anyway, following every such failure—real or assumed—the government machinery starts rattling to find out what should be done to make intelligence more foolproof, and invariably they have arrived at a comforting conclusion that they need an additional cell or maybe an additional agency or even an organization.

As a consequence, intelligence organization in the country today consists of various cells, agencies and organizations—general as well as specialized.

With various agencies working in the field, the problem of collection, collation and communication of intelligence gets rather more complicated than simplified. At the moment, we have intelligence

agencies working at police stations, sub-divisions, districts, State zones, States and Union levels. At the State and the Union levels, there are various specialized agencies also.

While the trend towards the establishment of agencies and organizations is good as far as it goes, there is an under-current of feeling among people who are concerned with collection, collation and communication of intelligence that in this behalf what is the top most need of the day is that intelligence orientation should percolate down to the lowest level of the police formations, namely, the Constable posted at the police station and the police outpost.

Once these levels are saturated with adequate intelligence orientation, by means of intelligence training imparted to them at the initial stages and in refresher courses, the task of the superior intelligence formations and specialized intelligence organizations would greatly be facilitated. After all, there has got to be a limit beyond which intelligence organizations cannot be expanded any further.

What has been advocated is that, in addition to whatever intelligence agencies and organizations that exist at the moment, we should make the police station and police outpost level intelligence-oriented so that on the front of intelligence the police may be able to deliver more and better goods.

### *Pervasive Influence of Science*

We talk of science. We think of science. We take pride in using scientific nomenclature. Public administration has assumed a scientific character. The terminology used in the exact physical sciences is being transplanted for use in public administration also.

Naturally, police administration, being a branch of public administration, could not have lagged behind. Police science accordingly came to be recognized on its own. Police Science Congress took birth and almost every year it has one session where invigorating academic discussions on subjects relating to police science and police administration take place.

An extension of this line of thinking is that professional police officers should be given the same deal as accorded to the scientists.

A number of new forensic science laboratories have come into being and the existing ones expanded. It cannot, however, be claimed that they are up to the mark. A lot more needs to be done on this front.

A forensic science laboratory is a comparatively small unit in the State Police organization and, therefore, it will not be possible for the States to raise their own cadres of forensic scientists in different branches of forensic science.

Moreover, as police and public order are subjects in the State list, it would perhaps be more in keeping with the established principles of rule of law that forensic science laboratories, whose experts examine objects and then tender expert evidence in courts of law in cases put up by the police, are placed under the Union Government and the subject of forensic science laboratories included in the Union List.

If the Union takes over the States' forensic science laboratories, they can build their own cadres for each branch of forensic science and can ensure better facilities for research and development as well.

It is a pity that our talk in terms of police science has not been carried to its logical conclusion. A doctor is a scientist and nobody can become a doctor unless he is M.B.B.S. An engineer is a scientist and nobody can become an engineer unless he has a degree or diploma in one of the branches of engineering. The same is the case with physicists, chemists, biologists, botanists, anthropologists, economists, etc. Unfortunately, there is nothing like that in the police.

No pre-entry degree or diploma courses and examinations, the passing of which may be prerequisite for entry to the police have been instituted. Unless such courses with a bias towards police science and attuned and harnessed to the goals of scientific development of police administration are organized, the claim of police administrators that police also is a science would be empty and almost meaningless.

This underscores the need for professionalism in police service and acquisition of appropriate skills—technical as well as conceptual.

In investigation of crime also, a lot of talk has been there on scientific aids to investigation. Development has also certainly been there on this front and that is quite appreciable. But scope for application of science to investigation of crime is immense and the field shall have to be explored further to make investigations really scientific.

Finally, all the ballyhoo about science in police and police in science would be redundant if we do not change our standards of recruitment, particularly insofar as the rank of Constable is concerned.

A Constable is an officer of the law and it is a sad commentary on the state of police administration of the country that this officer of law is, by and large, hardly educated. He is ill paid, frustrated and disgruntled. What superstructure of police administration and police science can be built and can stand on such layers of sand can well be imagined.

### *Impact of Separation of Judiciary*

Article 50 of the Constitution of India lays down a Directive Principle of the State Policy saying that the State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services. In pursuance of this directive, in one form or the other, judiciary has been separated from the executive in almost all the States.

In the emerging pattern, by and large, cases under the Indian Penal Code are tried by judicial magistrates but cases under local and special Acts as also cases under the preventive sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure are tried, as heretofore, by the executive magistrates.

The principle on which separation of judiciary is advocated is that if judicial function is to be discharged by the executive, people will have little faith in the administration of justice. Justice, they say, should not only be done but should seem to have been done also.

Therefore, it has been argued that if trial of Indian Penal Code cases could be entrusted to judicial magistrates, why can't they be trusted with the cases relating to preventive sections under the Code of Criminal Procedure as also cases under the local and special laws.

If this trend gains momentum, which it seems quite likely to, it will have a perceptible impact on police administration. For once the executive magistrates are completely divested of judicial powers, they will have hardly any relationship with the police except in a superfluous manner and that too in the field of maintenance of order only.

This will most likely have far-reaching consequences on the issue of District Magistrate's general control and direction over the administration of the police in the district. Actually, once judiciary is wholly separated from the executive, the institution of the executive magistracy, including the District Magistrate, may become almost anachronistic.



Another trend that has followed the separation of judiciary from the executive comprises a plea for the separation of prosecution from the police.

Members of the bar and bench alike have been advocating in seminars and conferences and otherwise also that police being the agency charged with investigation of crime should not be trusted with the prosecution of criminals.

Instead, a department of public prosecutions, having a director of its own, working directly under the Law Ministry of the State should be constituted. It is argued that separation of prosecution from police would improve upon the standard of prosecution of criminals. At the moment, police prosecutors in States are under the Inspector-General of Police of the State and the Home Department of the State.

The other school of thought contends that the standard of prosecution cannot be improved upon simply by putting the prosecutors under the Law Minister of the State instead of the Home Minister of the State.

Improvements could be brought about only by recruiting competent prosecutors and improving upon the conditions of service and working of the prosecutors. If their lot could be improved upon even while they are in the police department, the standard of prosecution would register a purposeful improvement.

On the other hand, if the conditions of service of the prosecutors continue to remain as poor as they are, even if they are transferred from the Home to the Law department, prosecution of criminals shall inescapably continue to suffer adversely as at the moment.

Still another school of thought has been contending that not only prosecution but investigation also should be taken away from the police and both investigation of crimes and prosecution of criminals should be made the sole responsibility of a Supreme Prosecutor General to be appointed for the whole of the country.

The powers and responsibilities of the Supreme Prosecutor General could in a way be analogous to the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. That officer shall submit his report to Parliament but shall not be under the executive government.

If this envisioned trend gains currency and is heeded to by the powers that be, the development that is likely to take place will almost revolutionize not only the police administration but the administration of justice also in the country.

### *Staffing Pattern : Quantitative Increase*

The population of the country has of late increased considerably; political consciousness has increased; and political and economic activity has also increased. Violence has increasingly become very much a part of political life. And as a result of all these increases, crime has increased and problems for the police have also registered a considerable increase.

These increases have obviously necessitated an increase in numbers in the police forces to cope with the increased responsibilities. Unfortunately, this 'piling up of men' has not been sustained by a corresponding qualitative improvement. Mere accumulation of men is rarely satisfactory. The crying need of the day is creation of a balanced force.

Then, while, on the one hand, even increase in numbers has not been quite commensurate with the increase in responsibilities and workload, on the other hand, for fear of not getting requisite additional police within a reasonable time to cope with increase in the number of crimes to be investigated and for other reasons, a dubious tendency to keep the increase in crime itself in check by evading registration of offences has come to the fore.

The evasion of registration of crime is undeniably detrimental to police administration as it cuts both ways. A bold and sustained effort at the highest level in the State Governments shall have to be made for inducing the police station officers to register all the cases that are reported to them. Without that, the very object of having police is inexcusably frustrated.

### *Corruption and Vigilance*

Ever since the advent of our acceptance of the process of planning at the national level as a way of life, we have been witnessing a rapid growth in the number of economic and social projects undertaken for execution by the government as also in the number of government departments. And all this legitimately caused an unimaginable increase in governmental expenditure. With this increase cropped up

all sorts of allegations of corruption—real and imaginary, wild and mild—against all categories of public servants.

This trend was followed by the establishment of Anti-Corruption Departments in all the States for dealing with cases of corruption against State Government employees.

For dealing with cases of corruption against Union Government employees, the Special Police Establishment was begotten by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, and it has gained from strength to strength. Today, under the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), it has become a mighty force in our national life.

Consequent on the acceptance of the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee, Vigilance Commissioners for the States and a Central Vigilance Commissioner for the Union of India was appointed.

The trend of thinking now is in the direction of appointment of a Lok Pal and Lok Ayuktas, in place of the Central Vigilance Commissioner and the State Vigilance Commissioners. This is in conformity with the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission, a study team of which has recommended that the proposed Lok Pal and Lok Ayuktas should have a free hand in utilizing the CBI and State Anti-Corruption Departments.

These vigilance bodies have been vested with a sort of operational control in the nature of backseat driving over the Special Police Establishment and the Anti-Corruption Departments. Inescapably, therefore, the Special Police Establishment and the Anti-Corruption Departments have been reduced to the unenviable position of being mere instruments in the hands of these vigilance bodies for conducting investigations and holding enquiries.

However, as proximity disturbs perspective, it would perhaps be too early to hazard any appraisal or assessment of the merits or otherwise of this apparently meaningful and significant development.

### *Central Police Organizations*

Police and public order, it may be reiterated, are State List subjects. The Union Government, on the one hand, in deference to this principle, tacitly allowed State Governments to have their own Police Commissions, on the other hand, they have slowly and gradually, albeit subtly, been making in-roads into the realm of these State List subjects.

The institution and expansion of Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB), Border Security Force (BSF), Railway Protection Force (RPF), Central Reserve Police (CRP), National Police Academy, Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Police Research and Development Bureau, Industrial Security Force and other security forces are standing testimonies of this fact.

The result of this trend has been that the Central police organizations have become forces to be reckoned with.

As a natural corollary to this tendency, the Central police organizations have started building up their own cadres. Senior police positions in the Union Government of India are to be manned by officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS) or even State Police Services on deputation from the States to the Union. This, however, is not feasible now to the fullest extent because of the unprecedented expansion of the Central police organizations and their ever-increasing demand for deputation of police officers from States.

Naturally, to overcome the difficulty, the Central police organizations have started recruiting their own officers in the rank of Deputy Superintendents of Police. These, in course of time, will eventually aspire for, claim and get promotion to the rank of Superintendents of Police and Deputy Inspectors General of Police (and they cannot be promoted and absorbed in the IPS because the Central police organizations have no cadre of IPS of their own) and that will go contrary to the all-India Service character of the Indian Police Service.

To obviate such an eventuality, the thinking on the subject is that just as States have their own cadres of IPS, these Central police organizations, jointly or severally depending on the magnitude of their strength, should also have their own cadres of IPS. And the CIB, BSF, CRP and RPF will have bigger cadres of IPS than the biggest State of India.

The Constitution of India could be amended to make a provision for the constitution of such cadres.

Once the Central police organizations have their own cadres of Indian Police Service officers a two-way flow in the form of deputation of officers from the Central police organizations to the State police and *vice versa* could be ensured. This will be in the interest of the well balanced and synchronized growth and development of the States

police as well as the Central police organizations and do a lot of good to the health of the Indian police as a whole.

In the emerging pattern, the Central police organizations will be blessed with that continuity in their administration and the personnel manning these organizations will be imbued with that sense of belonging to the organization which at the moment are conspicuous by their very absence.

This also will do away with the difficulty experienced by the Central police organizations at the moment in having suitable police officers from the States on deputation.

### *Policing the Railways*

The old time Watch and Ward organization of the Railways developed into a full fledged Railway Protection Force (RPF) organization in the 'fifties.

The main duty of the RPF, as defined in the RPF Act of 1957, is to protect and safeguard railway property and do any other act conducive to such protection and security. They have, therefore, been vested with limited powers of investigation also.

The RPF is under an Inspector-General of Police. There is a Chief Security Officer (a Deputy Inspector General of Police) for each one of the nine zones of the Indian Railways. They have Security Officers under them and they are of the rank of Superintendents of Police. Then there are all other ranks.

The Union's Railway Protection Force is co-existing with the States' Railway Police. The latter are responsible for policing the Indian Railways but the Union Government have to make payments to the State Governments for the 'order' element of the States' Railway Police.

Several proposals for bringing about organizational improvement in the Railway Police of the States get bogged simply because they need the concurrence of the Railway administration as they have to bear the cost of the order element of the State's Railway Police.

Of late, law and order on the Railways has gone from bad to worse and, as a sequel, a line of thinking is taking shape according to which the continuance of duality in the policing of the Indian Railway

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calls for a review. The thinking is that the entire policing of the Railways should be with one agency, maybe the States' Railway Police or the Union's Railway Protection Force.

Both have their advantages and drawbacks also. But, all in all, the net advantages, that could be visualized, weigh in favour of the merger of the States' Railway Police Forces with the existing Union's Railway Protection Force. The amalgamated forces could be refurbished as a full fledged Railway Police Force under the Union Government, and given a comprehensive activity charter.

Constitution of India, of course, shall have to be amended to provide for such a unified Railway Police Force under the Union Government. And this could be done by taking out Railway Police from the State List and putting it under the Union List.

#### CONCLUSION

A brief survey of a few recent trends and developments in police administration in India, thus, reveals that trends certainly have made appearance but the steps taken in pursuance of the same have been more in the shape of marginal adjustments and peripheral adaptations rather than fundamental changes directed to achieve a break-through into the police developmental goals.

The police administrators, like other public administrators, have yet to free themselves from the existing conceptual orthodoxies, age-old affiliations and narrow mental grooves.

In our research and development programmes, we have been prone to pursuing the spectacular and ignoring the more essential but commonplace tasks. The anxiety to be modern has prevailed over the needs to be practical. The resultant half-hearted measures, it is well known, lead nobody anywhere.

True, financial and legal obstacles are there, but for a spirited and determined people the removal of these obstacles should not be difficult.

The irony of fate from the police point of view (and public point of view also, as police and public are one) is that, for reasons more historical than real, police is by and large not liked by the people and, therefore, even men in positions avoid evincing any interest in the betterment of the police administration.

Whatever little attention that has of late been paid to the improvement of the lot of the police all over India could be ascribed not to the enthusiasm of the powers that be but to the deteriorating law and order situation in the country.

Even now, admittedly, there is time to act, and act we must. For the policy of wait and see in the hope of something turning up does no good to anybody. As to the lines on which we are to act, a lot of constructive thinking has to go into it and such a job could justifiably and fruitfully be undertaken only by an all-India Police Commission, the terms of reference of which should cover the bringing about of improvements in the working of the Indian Police (States police and Central police organizations included).

The working of the State police and the Central police organizations is so inextricably inter-related that it is not possible to do justice to anyone of them by dealing with it in isolation.

That all-India Police Commission should be asked to submit its report in six months time. The report should not cover more than 1,00,000 words. It should identify the malaise and recommend broad remedial policy guidelines only. If they meet with governmental approval, the comparatively easier but more time-consuming task of elaboration of the recommendations in meticulous details within the framework of the recommendations could again be entrusted to the Commission which could be revived for the purpose and given a further lease of life.

The appointment of an all-India Police Commission on the circumspect lines envisaged to go into the recent trends and developments in police administration in India, submission by them of their concrete and tangible recommendations and the acceptance and implementation of those recommendations would tend not only to pull the Indian Police out of the quagmire in which it has willy nilly got stuck up, but also move the police machine towards the determined goal by achieving the desired level of development and thereby usher in a new innovative era in the annals of police administration in India.

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## HOUSING AND TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING IN INDIA—RECENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENT

*Jagmohan*

IT is no exaggeration to say that housing and town and country planning have been placed in the backyard of Indian economic scene. Obsessed by the concept of input-output ratios, our planners have considered housing as a 'dead weight', given lower priority to it, and not effectively linked it with allied subjects, such as town and country planning, and urban land policy. They have, by and large, failed to realize that absence of effective town and country planning and lack of housing, and consequent growth of slums and shacks, particularly in the metropolitan towns, create social stresses and strains which lower the productivity of the nation and even threaten its political stability. With the notable exception of Delhi, where new experiments have been tried and where new trends have emerged and new developments taken place, a grave and tragic error of viewing housing in isolation and giving it only superficial attention is still being committed. What social, political and economic price the nation is paying for this error should be evident from the recent happenings in Calcutta.

It is significant to note that public investment in housing in the successive Five Year Plans has been in descending order. "In the first Plan, public investment in housing was 16 per cent of the total public sector investment, in the second, it was 8 per cent, and in the third only 7 per cent."<sup>1</sup> The fourth Plan brings this figure down to 1.6 per cent. We are constructing houses only at the rate of 2 dwelling units per thousand population against 10 recommended by the United Nations Study Group to cope with the increasing demand.

It is because of the continued neglect of housing that today we find ourselves in deplorable conditions. We have the dubious distinction of having the highest congested dwelling rates in the world. Sixteen to nineteen per cent of our families live in less than 10 sq. mtr. of space, and 51 to 54 per cent of the families in less than 20 sq. mtr. of space. Most of our cities present a spectacle of chaotic land uses. Migration from rural areas to the cities is largely unregulated and unplanned.

<sup>1</sup> U.N.I. Report in *National Herald*, August 19, 1968.

Development potential of our middle-size towns is not being exploited, and the metropolitan centres are getting over-urbanized, with the squatters and shanty colonies all around. The studies made by the Calcutta Metropolitan Organization reveal that in Calcutta metropolis, about  $\frac{2}{3}$  of its 8 million population lives in shacks, hovels and sub-standard houses. A recent Bombay survey indicated that 6 out of every 100 families live on pavements, and another 6 in slushy slums. In Madras, 'cherry-dwellers' constitute  $\frac{1}{10}$  of the population. The position is no better in other big towns.

The total current housing shortage in urban areas is estimated to be 1.19 crores.<sup>2</sup> Even the houses that are available are unsuitable for human habitation. According to a recent National Sample Survey, only 45 per cent houses in urban areas are pucca, and about 77 per cent of the houses comprise one or two rooms. Between 60 to 70 per cent of the population in Bombay and Calcutta have no bath-room facilities of any kind, and 8 to 12 per cent live in houses which have no latrines at all.

What is worse is that, with the passage of time, the situation is worsening. In 1961, for instance, the shortage of houses in the urban areas was 28 lakhs. This shortage increased to 50 lakhs by 1956, 93 lakhs by 1961, and 118 lakhs by 1966. At the end of the fourth Five Year Plan, the housing shortage is expected to be 137 lakhs.

The position in villages is no better. The current shortage here is of the order of 7.18 crores,<sup>3</sup> and the type of dwellings that are available is no better than what was half a century ago. In this connection, it will be relevant to quote from the survey of housing conditions in rural Saurashtra. This survey revealed that, "While in rural areas, the percentage of houses owned was greater than in the urban areas, the floor space per capita was only 58 sq. ft. The number of rooms per tenement was less; sanitation and ventilation were worse, and farm produce, fodder and cattle competed with men for space in residential houses."

The work of town and country planning, too, has so far been handled indifferently. It has been mostly left to imbecile Improvement Trusts which have concerned themselves, wherever funds permitted, only with the tasks of developing vacant areas on the fringes of cities. Comprehensive regional and local planning was not undertaken even in the States, where town and country planning laws were

<sup>2</sup> *Report of the working group on Housing for the Fourth Five Year Plan*, New Delhi, Ministry of Works, Housing & Supply (Department of Works & Housing), Government of India, 1968.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

enacted on the model of English town and country planning Acts. The only exceptions, where comprehensive planning of modern character was practised, were the cities of Chandigarh, Delhi, and, to some extent, Bombay.

From the above mentioned facts, it should be fairly clear that, unless the current programme and policies in the field of housing and town and country planning are radically altered, the surge on the cities will go on, the competition for the space will become keener, the housing shortage will increase, the squatting will be difficult to check, and slums will continue to crop up like cancerous growth, notwithstanding the surgery that is performed on one or two units.

#### SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICIES SO FAR FOLLOWED

The earliest attempt to tackle the problem of housing in India was made in the second decade of the twentieth century, when the then Secretary of State, Edward Montagu, advised the then Governor of Bombay, Lord Lyde, to take some measures to solve the housing problem of Bombay city. The latter studied the problem and, baffled by its magnitude and complexity, wrote back to the Secretary in 1919, "Housing in India is really a nightmare", implying that nothing worthwhile could be done. And nothing was actually done till the end of the British regime.

After the dawn of Independence, the importance of housing was realized, and a modest beginning was made during the first Five Year Plan, when two social housing schemes—Subsidized Industrial Housing and Low Income Group Housing—were introduced. In the second Plan, the scope of the social housing schemes was widened, and six more schemes—Plantation Labour Housing, Slum Clearance, Village Housing, Land Acquisition and Development, Middle Income Group Housing and Rental Housing for Government Employees—were enforced. In the third Plan, two more housing schemes—Dock Labour Housing and Experimental Housing—were added. Under these schemes, facilities of loans or subsidies, or both, are given. Up to December 1970, Rs. 271.4 crores had been spent, and about 5.3 lakhs houses sanctioned.

An analysis of the working of these schemes would indicate some revealing facts. Most of the housing schemes were implemented in a desolate, half-hearted, manner. For instance, under the Subsidized Industrial Housing Scheme, till December 1970, only 1.72 lakhs houses had been constructed, although funds had been made available for

2.25 lakhs houses. Performance in the sphere of the Middle Income Group Housing Scheme and the Rental Housing Scheme has been equally disappointing. Against 22,300 houses sanctioned under the Middle Income Group Housing Scheme and 24,800 houses under the Rental Housing Scheme, 21,600 and 19,300 housing units respectively had been built. Under the Village Housing Schemes, up to the end of 1969, only 43,500 houses had been constructed against the sanction of 72,500 houses. Such shortfalls are a sad reflection on our administrative and institutional arrangements and our earnestness to solve one of the most complex and explosive problems of our times.

It has been estimated that during the third Five Year Plan Rs. 1,400 crores were spent in housing by the private sector, and about Rs. 22,000 crores are likely to be spent by this sector in the fourth Five Year Plan period. Although no precise calculations have been made, yet it is quite apparent from the type of construction that has been going on in our cities that a sizable portion of the funds from the private sectors have been spent by luxury houses which are out of tune with our economic and social realities, which have consumed considerable scarce building material, and which have kept our young architects, engineers and town planners busy with the problems of affluent class. I am not aware of any other sector of economy in which our limited resources have been so badly misdirected and misapplied.

It has been calculated that about Rs. 33,000 crores—one and a half times the total outlay of the fourth Five Year Plan—are required to wipe out the existing housing shortage. Against this, only Rs. 240 crores have been provided for the public sector housing. It should be clear that if at all the housing problem has to be solved, we must create additional resources from within the city. One such source is urban land. Unfortunately, this source has been frittered away, only to be exploited by the colonizers and speculators, creating black money in the economy and setting in motion inflationary tendencies which, in turn, have raised the price of urban lands and cost of construction of houses for the poorer section.

Another unhappy development that took place during the third Five Year Plan was the inclusion of housing allocation in the block-grants to be made available to the States by the Centre. The States do not seem to realize the importance of housing, and this resulted in diversion of funds from the housing sector to other fields, thereby further slowing the pace of house construction.

Our problems are formidable. We have not only urban but also village slums. The level of our income is very low, and our capacity to

raise funds for housing is extremely limited. The developed urban land is scarce, and the building material and technical personnel are in short supply. But these basic, underlying facts have not been fully appreciated by the planners and executors of our public policies. Delhi, in my opinion, has proved an exception. This opinion, was confirmed by the Union Minister of State, Shri I. K. Gujral, while inaugurating the recent national seminar on housing and slum clearance when he observed that Delhi has led the way and State Governments might follow Delhi's example. It is, therefore, necessary to dwell upon Delhi's experience at some length.

#### DELHI'S EXPERIENCE

Much might not have been achieved in Delhi in concrete terms, but what is important for the country is that here new trends have been set up in planning the city and its hinterland, in evolving new urban land policy, in initiating massive public housing schemes for the middle and low income groups, and in improving the general environments of the city by eliminating mixed land uses, shifting of non-conforming industries and trades, resettlement of squatters, and establishment of new woodlands and parks.

A new urban institution—the Delhi Development Authority—was set up in 1957 under the Act of Parliament, known as Delhi Development Act. The basic objective of the Authority was to formulate a comprehensive Master Plan, and to ensure the development of Delhi in accordance with that Plan. After various studies undertaken by the Town & Country Planning Organization, the Delhi Development Authority formulated a comprehensive Master Plan and gave it a statutory shape in the year 1962. The Master Plan assessed the existing deficiencies in various directions—housing, community facilities, water, power, sewerage disposal, transport, etc.—and estimated the requirement of future. The backlogs and future needs were put together, so as to provide a realistic framework of development in an integrated and coordinated manner, keeping in view the present resources as well as those that could be created. In brief, a planned and rational basis was imparted to the city's development and all the operating agencies brought within the overall framework of the Master Plan.

An essential prerequisite to the implementation of the Delhi Master Plan was acquisition of the entire land proposed to be urbanized up to 1981. The basic objective of the acquisition scheme, which was financed through a Revolving Fund of Rs. 5 crores, was to evolve rational urban land policy, and to lease out plots in developed or semi-developed form to various sections of the community, keeping in view



the dictates of social and economic justice. Prior to acquisition, more than  $\frac{1}{3}$  of urban land had been seized by the rich upper class, solely with the purpose of speculation and profiteering. The State ownership of the entire urbanizable land, through acquisition, was one of the biggest socialist measures and proved a great boon to the community. It eliminated the speculators and colonizers, created huge assets in the shape of urban land, and facilitated the smooth and speedy implementation of housing and other urban development projects.

So far, acquisition of about 35,000 acres has been completed, and the initial fund of Rs. 5 crores has been revolved to the extent of Rs. 75 crores. The break-up of the plots developed is: 20,000 residential plots for general public, 48,000 for the resettlement of squatters, 4,000 for shifting of industries, and another 2,000 for commercial purposes. Construction of 20,000 houses for the low and middle income groups has been undertaken, and schemes for construction of another 24,000 in the next two years formulated.

Taking into account the magnitude of the problem, poverty of the masses, and extremely limited resources available with the Government and public authorities, the Delhi Development Authority has fully recognized that we, in India, have problem not of housing in the conventional sense, but of 'shelter'; not of comfortable or luxurious living, but of 'roof over the head'; not of having spacious colonies but of avoiding extreme congestion, and creating an atmosphere in which personality is not stifled. The Delhi Development Authority has, therefore, been stressing the need for simplicity and utility, and has been concentrating on construction of maximum number of 'shelter-units' with minimum cost.

In raising additional resources for housing, the Delhi Development Authority has experimented with new ideas and has successfully exploited man's instinct of 'saving for a house'. Besides raising loans from the Life Insurance Corporation, it has collected about 3.5 crores under the scheme of advance registration. Under this scheme, the intending purchaser is required to deposit, with the application, Rs. 5,000 if he belongs to the middle income group; Rs. 3,000 if he belongs to the low income group; and Rs. 500 if he belongs to the lowest income group. The deposit carries an interest of 7 per cent per annum and is adjusted towards the cost of the house after allotment. So far, about 6,000 houses have been constructed and allotted under this scheme, and another 7,000 are likely to be allotted by the end of the current year. The success of the scheme has prompted the Delhi Development Authority to go in for fresh registration in September this year. It

has now formulated a scheme of building 24,000 houses for the low and middle income group category during the next two-three years.

To come to the broad outline of different schemes, it may be indicated that for the individuals in the 'middle income group', *i.e.* those whose annual income is not less than Rs. 7,200 and not more than Rs. 18,000, the Delhi Development Authority is building flats on plots of 125 sq. yds. and 150 sq. yds. providing a plinth area of 700-800 sq. ft. The cost of the flats built on the former category of plots ranges between Rs. 22,500 and Rs. 24,500 and for the flats built on the latter category of plots between Rs. 25,500 and Rs. 28,500. The flats so built are generally allotted on hire-purchase basis.

For the 'low income group', *i.e.* those whose annual income is less than Rs. 7,200, flats are being constructed on plots of 80 sq. yds. and 40 sq. yds. The cost of a flat constructed on a 40 sq. yds. plot is about Rs. 12,000, while the cost of a flat constructed on an 80 sq. yds. plot is about Rs. 15,000. The plinth area provided ranges between 350-500 sq. ft. These flats, too, are allotted on a hire-purchase basis. Normally 30 per cent of the total cost is charged at the time of handing over possession and the remaining 70 per cent in 180 equal monthly instalments. The monthly instalment comes to less than Rs. 100.

The 'service personnel', *viz.* sweepers, dhobies, domestic servants, cobblers, gardeners, and the like, are not generally able to take advantage of the low income group housing schemes. For them, the Delhi Development Authority has formulated a special scheme. Under this scheme, benefit is extended to all the service personnel whose annual income is less than Rs. 2,400. Initially, under this scheme, 1,000 tenements have been constructed in the East of Kailash, Jhilmila Tahirpur, Pankha Road and Safdarjang area. They have been built on plots of 30 sq. yds. and the cost per tenement is about Rs. 3,300. The allottee is, however, charged only Rs. 2,200 in easy instalments. The balance of Rs. 1,100 as well as the cost of land is subsidized. It is for the first time that this class of people are able to have individual houses in posh colonies. Now, 1,500 additional houses are being built for this class of people in similar localities. In this context, it has to be remembered that those days when the service personnel were able to secure accommodation in the servants quarters are fast disappearing.

Another section of the Delhi population, whose needs the Delhi Development Authority is looking after, are 'squatters'. For these squatters, who are caught in the whirlwind of over-population and unemployment, the urge to earn, even while living in most squalid and

miserable conditions, is paramount. In their case, squatting is involuntary, and it is necessary to give relief to them. Accordingly, a scheme known as 'Jhuggi Jhonpuri Removal Scheme' was drawn up envisaging allotment of one-roomed tenements on a rental basis or allotment of developed plots of 80 sq. yds. on payment of 50 per cent of the cost of the plot. However, after the commencement of the scheme, it was noticed that the number of the squatters to be resettled was very large and most of the plots of 80 sq. yds. were sold through 'benami' transactions. The scheme was, therefore, revised. Under the scheme, now in force, developed plots of 25 sq. yds., with basic civic amenities, such as roads and street lighting, public latrines and hydrants, community baths and storm water drains, are allotted. So far, 48,000 families have been resettled, and up to March 1971, expenditure of about Rs. 10 crores had been incurred on the implementation of this scheme.

Apart from catering to the housing needs of the poorer sections of the society, the Delhi Development Authority has been trying to improve the environments of the common citizen. It is not only by providing a house, which has necessarily to be small, but also by providing, on a liberal scale, public gardens and lawns and community facilities that tranquility and repose can be injected in the environments of the city. Under the intensive plantation drive, about 8 lakhs trees of different varieties have been planted over an area of about 3,000 acres and new gardens and parks laid on about 500 acres. To eliminate traffic hazards and decongest the central portion of the city, non-conforming industries have been shifted and a new wholesale Subzimandi, and a new cycle market have been constructed. A new Inter-State Bus Terminus is also under construction.

The above mentioned facts amply illustrate that, even with the meagre resources, something substantial can be done, provided we are willing to abandon beaten paths and explore new avenues, consistent with the realities of Indian situation. I have no doubt that the new trends set up by Delhi would soon be picked up by other major cities of India. The Central Government, during the President's rule in West Bengal, has set up, through special legislation, Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority, which would function on lines similar to the Delhi Development Authority.

#### CENTRAL HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

An encouraging development in the field of housing has been the recent constitution of the Central Housing and Urban Development Corporation. This Corporation came into existence on April 25,

1970. The present authorized share capital of the Corporation is Rs. 10 crores, but it is likely to build up a corpus of Rs. 200 crores during the next few years by raising long-term loans from institutions and open market. This amount of Rs. 200 crores will constitute a Revolving Fund, and it will be operated, more or less, in the same manner as the Revolving Fund of Rs. 5 crores has been operated by the Delhi Development Authority.

The Articles of the Corporation are comprehensive and provide for financing of schemes of the State Governments and State Housing Boards, and also for undertaking, wherever feasible, schemes of its own. The Corporation will also finance and set up building material industries, and may also develop new satellite towns. So far, the Corporation has approved five major housing schemes—one each in Maharashtra, Mysore, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. These schemes involve a total financial commitment of about Rs. 15 crores.

If the Central Housing and Urban Development Corporation fulfils the hope that has been placed on it by the Central Government, it will appreciably accelerate the pace of housing and urban development programmes in the country.

#### REGIONAL PLANNING

In the sphere of town and country planning, there is a growing realization of the importance of regional planning. It is being increasingly appreciated that no modern town can be planned and developed in isolation. In this respect, again, Delhi has shown the way. The Master Plan of Delhi covered the areas of the neighbouring States and envisaged development of six ring towns—Narela, Ghaziabad, Faridabad, Gurgaon, Bahadurgarh and Loni. Unfortunately, due to full cooperation not being extended by the neighbouring States, no real headway could be made in the development of these towns.

Now, a far more comprehensive regional development plan for the National Capital Region has been prepared. The National Capital Region will cover the entire Union Territory of Delhi; two districts—Bulandshahr and Meerut—of U.P.; two districts—Gurgaon and Rohtak—and Panipat Tehsil of District Karnal of Haryana; and a good portion of Alwar District of Rajasthan. The Plan is intended to be enforced through a statutory Board to be called the National Capital Regional Planning Board. This Board will comprise the Union Minister of Home Affairs as Chairman, Chief

Ministers of Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh and Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi as Members. There will be 11 other members who would be nominated by the Central Government in consultation with the State Governments of Haryana, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh.

The National Capital Regional Planning Board will prepare regional, functional and sub-regional plans and coordinate their implementation in an effective manner. The Board will have separate funds of its own. A draft Bill on the subject has already been prepared and it is likely to be introduced in the Parliament next year after obtaining the concurrence of the Legislators of the State Governments concerned.

Other State Governments are also realizing the importance of regional planning. Maharashtra, Mysore, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal have made considerable progress in enacting laws and formulating regional development plans. This is a very happy trend, indeed. It will go a long way in avoiding *ad hoc* and wasteful development.

#### CONCLUSION

Our record in the field of housing and town planning has, on the whole, been dismal. In certain spheres, such as in the case of social housing schemes, we have not even achieved what was achievable. Nevertheless, some of the recent trends and developments, referred in this article, are encouraging. If we show foresight, vision and earnestness, and explore new frontiers, there is no reason why we should not be able to successfully meet the twin challenge of massive urbanization and abysmal poverty and make our cities worth living.

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## DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION IN THE PAST AND IN FUTURE

*B. Mehta*

**D**ISTRICT has been defined in the Chambers' Dictionary as a sub-division of a division. In India, States are, according to this definition, divisions. Each state or division contains districts or sub-divisions. Throughout Indian history, such a sub-division has been considered to be the most convenient geographical unit where the total apparatus of public administration could be concentrated, though the concentration varied and may vary to suit the requirements of administration of the day.

The basic form of the district, as a unit of administration, has a remarkable continuity. It has not changed substantially from the times of Manu. In Manu's times, about a thousand villages formed a district; it was in the charge of a separate official. This figure of 1,000 is significant because even today it closely approximates the all-India average of about 1,000 villages to a district. The present form of district administration, however, is more akin to the Moryan era. The Mughals also based their system of administration almost on the Moryan lines. After the dissolution of the Mughal Empire, the East India Company created the office of the Collector, in 1772, and gave more powers than what his counterpart had in Mughal times. Duties of many district level officers were combined in him, the intention being to make him the sole representative of the government at that level, responsible for executing the government policy in all its details. The institution of the Collector underwent certain changes in the succeeding years though he did remain a strong connecting link between the people and the government and continued to be the head of the district administration, performing the dual role of head of the revenue organization and supervisor of the lower courts and the police work. He served as a general representative of the government and influenced the policy of district officers of different departments in varying degrees. He also lent support to the technical services and mediated between them and the people.

Towards 1937, the position of the collector weakened considerably because of the growing tendency of independent and uncoordinated action by the various heads of development departments at the district level. The district administration during these years was concerned mainly with public order, swift and impartial administration of justice, prompt collection of revenue and correct maintenance of land records. A couple of years later, these came to include rural development, Cooperative Movement and the village panchayats. New dimensions were added to these functions with the start of the Second World War by including activities, like recruitment for armed forces, arranging provisions for troops, looking after the families of soldiers and sailors, collecting war funds and certain measures of civil defence. With Independence, these functions have grown and included almost all activities which touch upon the welfare of the people. The Collector today is captain of district organization—far more complex and comprehensive than in the past—besides the fact that he is expected to show all deference to popular opinion and to justify actions for which he is directly or indirectly responsible, when criticized by the members of the legislature.

The management of the tasks of government, so far as these lie within an area declared by law as a district, are mainly revenue, magisterial, judicial, executive, and developmental. The following description of duties of the District Collector throws light upon this subject:

“It is very well known that the Collector of a district occupies a cardinal position in the administration; he is the local representative of the government; he is the head of the revenue department and the district; he is the executive District Magistrate; he keeps in general touch with the working of all departments in the district; and with the increased shift in emphasis on developmental activities, he is personally responsible for coordination and guidance in this respect.”

In the last decade, two patterns of district administration have emerged in India. One is the Maharashtra and Gujarat pattern where regulatory functions have completely been separated from development functions by an arrangement whereby:

- (1) all district level officers of development departments have been placed under the administrative control of Zila Parishad;



- (2) an IAS Officer has been appointed as Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad; and
- (3) administrative control of all officials of the Zila Parishad is exercised through him.

The second pattern is the one that obtains in Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan and other States. In these States, the Collector continues to look after both the regulatory functions and the developmental functions. Both the patterns have worked fairly satisfactorily, though the pattern adopted by the States of Maharashtra and Gujarat has given greater opportunities to the elected representative and has also helped in better coordination in developmental activities.

In the context of present socio-economic ferment in the country, it is time to examine as to what should be the set-up of a district. If experience is any guide, a stage has now been reached when there should not only be complete separation of development aspect of district administration from the regulatory side but also of the law and order from the tax collection side.

In the past, functions of tax collection and control of law and order were combined, partly because the peasantry agitated against the undue burden of tax mostly realized by the assignees of land revenue. Collection of tax by an alien government also provoked agitation, sometimes quite serious. It was, therefore, natural that the authority of tax collection was vested in that person who was also responsible for keeping law and order. In the days of representative government in a democratic set-up, perhaps it is not necessary to combine these functions to the same extent. Moreover, the various levies that have now come to stay were not then in vogue. The number and nature of taxes to be collected was not as large. The laws regulating the levy on these taxes were also not so complicated.

It has to be recognized that problems of law and order are getting more and more complex and difficult. They are no longer the problems only of preventing thefts, land disputes, murders, dacoities, etc., but are problems that are likely to have a far-reaching effect on our social and political structure. Therefore, the authority incharge of law and order, should not only be responsible for maintenance of law and order as we understand, but should have an organization to study and understand the cause of discontent which results in lawlessness. My suggestion, therefore, is that at the district level, the

administration should be divided under three heads: (1) tax collection, (2) law and order, and (3) developmental.

One officer should be incharge of tax collection of all departments. He should have full and detailed knowledge of different laws to enable him to stand the test of civil courts. The officer incharge of law and order should be assisted by a sociologist for study and research in socio-economic problems and actions and reactions of the people on the policies of the government to enable the government to take remedial measures in time. It is only then that the complex problems of law and order, such as students unrest, labour trouble, agrarian trouble, etc., could be dealt within an imaginative way. This authority should also deal with public relations work to keep the people informed of the plans and activities of the government, and the government of the reactions of the people.

In order that the officer incharge of maintaining law and order is effective, it is desirable that he should be the senior-most person amongst three officers in the hierarchy, because ultimately he would work as the eyes and the ears of the State Government to convey to the appropriate levels the reactions of the people on the various programmes implemented in the field as also to convey the urgent problems which agitate the public opinion so that remedial measures can be taken well in time. He should have authority to suggest to the district level officers, responsible for both tax collection as well as implementing programmes of development, the remedial measures that can be taken at their own level to avoid serious law and order problems.

As far as developmental administration is concerned, I would suggest that this work should be transferred to Zila Parishad. The Parishad should be provided with a chief executive officer to control and coordinate development departments at the district level.

The idea to have a separate officer for development activities to work as the chief executive of the popular body at the district level can be justified mainly because the span of control and supervision has increased considerably to be effectively exercised by one person. An effective supervisor must himself have an intimate knowledge of the various processes of development and its technical aspects before he is able to guide and supervise the activities of officers at the district level. The old concept of a superior officer's mere authority, without having proper understanding of problems of the people and

their solution based on the technological development and scientific advance, is no longer valid.

I would like academicians, students of public administration, administrators and politicians to study my suggestions to meet the complex situation in which we find ourselves. A public debate may be useful. It may be that some other alternative could be evolved.



## ON REMODELLING PANCHAYATI RAJ

R. N. Haldipur

THOUGH panchayats have been in existence ever since the Vedic period in one form or another, the present form of people's local government is essentially a recent creation. During the time of the British, a system of local bodies with limited powers was devised for housekeeping in response to the sentiments of a liberal group of Indians, like Dadabhai Naoroji, Pherozeshah Mehta, and Gopal Krishna Gokhale, demanding self-government. During the period of the nationalist movement, including the Gandhian era, our political behaviour and administrative performance were influenced by two major factors. On the one hand, ethical and spiritual overtones were given to political conduct by Tilak, Tagore and Gandhi while, on the other hand, the concept of permanent, neutral and generalist civil service was introduced by the British in India, thus attempting to achieve impartiality and equality before law. In order to administer law without fear or favour, the civil service conditions kept the officials beyond temptations of corruption and also insulated them from the people. The introduction of an impartial civil service, howsoever laudable in that context, became inadequate to meet the prevailing situation. The national leaders who opposed the colonial rule, however, wanted to fight deprivation of independence on moral grounds.

With the advent of freedom and the acceptance of the concept of welfare state, new challenges were posed with apparently conflicting aims. Economic growth and social justice within the framework of parliamentary democracy and secularism raised new issues, apart from giving new dimensions to the old problems. The erstwhile governmental machinery was required to effect adjustments far beyond its inherent capacity. According to Taylor and Ensminger, "the inadequacies of Indian bureaucracy are not due to the fact that it is a bureaucracy, but due to a considerable extent, to the fact that it carries too much baggage from the past".<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Carl C. Taylor, Douglas Ensminger and associates, *India's Roots of Democracy: A Sociological Analysis of Rural India's Experience in Planned Development Since Independence*, Calcutta, Orient Longmans, 1965, p. 579.

To face the needs of development, it was felt necessary that people's participation should be secured in carrying out various programmes. In response to the emergent situation, which necessitated finding of new answers to various challenges, different suggestions were made. When the Constitution was being framed, there was a debate as to whether it should give primacy of place to Panchayati Raj or village republics from which various tiers of people's representative institutions could be established to ensure grassroot democracy. However, the debate temporarily ended by providing for the establishment of village panchayats only, as contemplated in Article 40 of the chapter on Directive Principles in the Constitution. Panchayati Raj, in the form and content as seen today, owes its origin to the report of the Balvantray Mehta Committee appointed by the Central Government and to a large number of other committees appointed by the State Governments to evolve and evaluate the functioning of Community Development programme and the structure that would be appropriate for its effective working.

A decade or more has elapsed since the submission of the Balvantray Mehta report and its implementation in various States of India. In some States, these institutions have taken root and have gathered momentum, while in others, they are still in the embryonic stage. Considerable thinking on various facets and the working of the scheme has been stimulated. On one side, certain trends in Indian society are now visible—indicating a growing political consciousness and a demand for an egalitarian society in which the 'elite', not only traditional but the newly emergent too, wish to participate. There is a feeling that the developments that have taken place so far—both on the socio-economic front as well as the political—have not kept pace with time. In this context, democratic decentralization or Panchayati Raj is regarded by some as an important milestone in the progress of democracy in our country. There is another group which feels that Panchayati Raj has introduced a new dimension in the body politic which has only helped the traditional leaders and vested interests in creating and promoting factionalism. The reactions that have been evoked have, therefore, been varied—from stark pessimism and disillusionment on one side to conviction in its efficacy and qualified optimism in its ultimate future.

The main criticism of Panchayati Raj has been that it has created vested interests in the rural scene, introducing a spoils system and creating factions. While, partly, this is endemic to any developing society, it is more so in a country of our size and complexity where caste, class and history are the warp and woof of its social fabric.

In determining the jurisdiction, power and resources of the new bodies to be established for rural development, the Balvantray Mehta team recommended democratic decentralization, at three levels. The concept of people's active participation—"power to the people"—has been elaborated as the pivot of the whole scheme. The term "power" has been used equivocally and needs clarification for a better understanding of the processes involved. If one looks at Panchayati Raj as it is in operation today, one would be tempted to ask whether there has been a real transfer of power to these bodies in most of the States. Another natural query would be whether such a transfer is at all possible. After all, when one talks of power to the people, one cannot help asking as to who the people are, what one often finds is a traditional leader, a wealthy person or a leader of a socially powerful group wielding authority in the name of people.

The concept of people's participation is also clouded with ambiguities. In order that the people participate effectively, they should be able to plan for the improvement of their own lot. But are the people able to do so, on their own at this juncture of development? How many of the so-called 'felt-needs', barring the very obvious physical needs, are consciously felt and articulated? The vast majority of our people are busy, eking out a living. Neither the evidence of the aspirations of the people, without any reference to the socio-economic status and work orientation, is to be found, nor would the country benefit by captaining discontent of the people without kindling their hope.

The usual cliché is that the 'have-nots' trigger off revolutions. But this is not very true. Mere discontent is not enough to fan a desire for change. There should be some sense of power also. For perpetuation of the social order, according to Eric Hoffer, "a conservatism of the destitute is as profound as the conservatism of the privileged".<sup>2</sup> "Fear of the future causes us to lean against and cling to the present, while faith in the future renders us receptive to change."<sup>3</sup> It is often said that, in our country, the rich are becoming richer and the poor are becoming poorer. It is true in a relative sense, though, during the last two decades, all classes of people have improved their lot; but this improvement had been highly conspicuous in the case of a particular section of our people who are a small minority. We have been witnessing the phenomena of sprawling cities and gaping countrysides. The position has been exacerbated by social mobility of the skilled and the educated moving to the cities and also by the

<sup>2</sup> Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer*, New York, Time Incorporated, 1963, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

mass media which are causing a feeling of deprivation amongst the rural masses, since there is a revolution of rising expectations amongst them. Hence, in some areas, we are sitting on a volcano which can erupt any time with the pressure of seething discontent of the times. A sense of deprivation of better facilities, dissatisfaction with local leadership and consciousness of the gulf between the quality of life of different sections and different areas, do cause disturbance. If an effort is made to put a lid over people's emotions, they get choked. Amongst the alternatives, one could be holding the lid down with force, and the other, having an outlet through dialogue and deliberations within various pressure groups.

Nowhere in the history of civilization does one come across a perfectly integrated society. A certain amount of discontent is symptomatic of progress and growth. But, at the same time, if we have, on one side, a revolution of rising expectations and, on the other, uneven growth which is inadequate to fulfil the immediate needs of the people, disequilibrium creeps into and disrupts the social structure causing unrest. In the course of time, there will be a growing urge on the part of the common man to get more and more out of his involvement, in the affairs of the community of which he is a part. From this angle, the U.N. report on "Measures for Economic Development for Underdeveloped Countries" has pertinently pointed out that men learn administration by participating in it. They, therefore, learn fastest in countries where self-governing institutions are most widespread. Considered from this point of view, Panchayati Raj bodies have a vital role to play because they provide forum for a dialogue and make possible government by consent at various levels.

In a country where there is a party system of government and where people are approached, with party manifestoes, for their votes during the Assembly and Lok Sabha elections, politicization of rural life is inevitable. The moot point, however, is whether we should be satisfied with a system of informal pressure groups, which impinge on local administration without accountability to the local population, or whether we should legitimize the political process by establishing Panchayati Raj bodies which have to seek people's mandate, from time to time, and are to some extent accountable to them. Moreover, the interaction of the traditional administrative system with the locally elected representatives is full of ambiguity, leading to general dissatisfaction amongst all. This is largely because in many areas where panchayats operate, there is no rationalization of power, responsibility and resources of these bodies, based upon their capability to perform certain tasks at the level of their operation. The



main hurdle, however, is to create, amongst the rural population, national impulses through perception of national goals and reconcile them with local aspirations. This could only be done through the Panchayati Raj bodies.

Some amount of misunderstanding may partly be due to a lack of conceptual clarity about democratic decentralization in the context of economic and political compulsions of today and the need for preservation of national unity. In this context, on one side, we have the thesis propounded by Jayaprakash Narayan,<sup>4</sup> basing his views on Gandhian and Sarvodaya philosophy which envisage complete transfer of power to Panchayati Raj institutions in matters pertaining to local development and local administration. This conjures up the image of Panchayati Raj as a charter of rural local government whose leaders are elected by a consensus. There is, however, a school which feels that this is not possible in a country functioning within the framework of parliamentary democracy. With the politicization of rural areas, consensus is not possible. They feel that the ends of social justice are achieved better at the national and the state levels than at the local level, particularly in the matter of taxation. "It will not do to think poorly of the politicians and talk with bated breath about the voters. No more than the kings before them should the people be hedged with divinity."<sup>5</sup> Roscoe Martin has also opposed complete transfer of power to local bodies on the ground that they would not be in a position to discharge a number of functions they may be required to do. According to him: (1) Little government is amateur, casual, often highly personal and even proprietary. If any one thinks that small rural unit governs itself democratically in practice, he has only to live in one or observe it closely over a period. (2) Little government arouses little interest in people; they may be living, geographically, in small area of 'self government'. (3) It is not free of 'politics' either. Actually, it is often ruthlessly political as a minor official often discovers to his cost. Also, little government cannot possibly perform the many services required of any government today. They are too many, and too important for the purpose; the national interest forbids them to be left to its choice and mercy.<sup>6</sup>

While there is some truth in what he says, to make little government bereft of all privileges and powers of handling local problems

<sup>4</sup> Jayaprakash Narayan, "Fundamental Problems of Panchayati Raj", *Action for Rural Change—Readings on Community Development*, New Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970, pp. 148-156.

<sup>5</sup> Paul H. Appleby, *Citizens as Sovereigns*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1962.

<sup>6</sup> Roscoe C. Martin, *Grass-Roots*, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1957 [reviewed in *The IJPA*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, (July-September, 1962), pp. 426-427 by Prof. V.K.N. Menon].

would be a greater mistake indeed. Today, we want not merely leaders and pressure groups but we want them to be accountable, responsible and also responsive to the needs of the people. This probably can come only through various tiers of local institutions made responsible to the people who select them. From that angle, Panchayati Raj is a most momentous venture in rural administration just as, after the first decade of British rule, introduction of land revenue system was one. It is not merely a new system of administration. It is creation of new levels of government. A good part of the time of State Legislatures has till now been consumed in discussion of local needs, ventilation of local grievances and criticism of the functioning of the local officials. Taking local problems and individual grievances to civil servants and not infrequently to Ministers has been a conspicuous form of political activity. With the transfer of responsibilities over a wide field, from officials directly accountable to Ministers, to autonomous, elected Panchayati Raj bodies, this situation will undergo some change. The members of the Parliament who have to think of national issues would have much more time to specialize in these areas and advise the Government regarding choices and options that could be conceived. Similarly, members of the Legislatures could consider the type of legislation required for the smooth functioning of the State for its progress and prosperity. No doubt, with the establishment of Panchayati Raj, new centres of political power and influence will come into existence. This will affect to some extent the established pattern of political leverage. But these are all checks and balances which are essential for any democratic form of government, apart from the scope it gives to people, at various levels, for effective participation in the realization of their local goals. This also leads to a certain amount of social responsibility. A full-fledged democracy at the Centre and at the State level and a bureaucratic conveyor-belt all along the line below, would be incongruous and undesirable in the long run. "The politics of adult franchise and participation, and diffusion with decentralization of political power that it entails, would lead to both more responsive and more integrated polity."<sup>7</sup>

The basic concept behind establishing Panchayati Raj was to create rural, local-government agencies responsible for discharging certain select functions pertaining to development. It is not merely a state agency but a self-propelling institution which could mobilize its own resources, both human and material, so that development could be energized. But one must remember that this decentralization at lower level is possible only if democracy is secured at the

<sup>7</sup> Rajni Kothari, *Politics in India*, Boston, Little Brown, 1970.

national level. According to Appleby, " 'Democratic decentralization' appears to suggest that decentralization axiomatically enhances democracy", on the other hand, 'decentralized democracy' correctly assumes "that democracy has first been achieved through the establishment of a centralized governing institution designed to operate under popular control . . . it may, when it is strong enough, carry on some or all of its functions through structures, which in various ways and in various degrees are more than ordinarily decentralized when this is found to be effective, desirable and not nationally debilitating."<sup>8</sup>

Broadly speaking, the views on democratic decentralization could be classified into two extreme positions with a number of intermediate ones trying to synthesize them. At one extreme, it is maintained that Panchayati Raj institutions should be the limbs and agencies of State Government and no more. Preferably, it would be better not to have such institutions as they create factions; the Legislative Assembly at the State level and the Parliament at the national level should be adequate to preserve democracy. At the other end, it is argued that these institutions should be regarded as self-government institutions at various levels. According to Jayaprakash Narayan, "To have gone all the trouble and expense of establishing Panchayati Raj merely in order to create new agencies of the State governments, would appear to me to have been a foolish and wasteful enterprise."<sup>9</sup>

In a country of India's gigantic size and bewildering complexity, where modernity co-exists with age-old traditionalism, it is necessary to work out a strategy of development, through local-level institutions in keeping with the genius of the people and their native wisdom.

The working of the Panchayati Raj, today, seems to be nowhere near the promised utopia. With poverty, destitution and illiteracy holding the rural masses in bondage, their ability to select their representatives to various bodies, with responsibility and knowledge of the consequences, still remains suspect. If the people are not made conscious of what they want and how to get it, there is no real dispersal of power. It is partially true that the voter at the grassroots remains a puppet in the hands of warring factions of the village. Panchayati Raj is also accused of being responsible for violence. In this context, one may, however, note that serious unrest is prevalent, even in States where Panchayati Raj has not struck roots. The vigour and growth of mass-movements depend on their capacity to

<sup>8</sup> Paul H. Appleby, "Some Thoughts on Decentralised Democracy", *The IJPA* (Special Number), Vol. VIII, No. 4 (October-December, 1962), p. 443.

<sup>9</sup> Jayaprakash Narayan, *op.cit.*, p. 151.

evoke and satisfy the passion for self-renunciation by instilling a strong sense of deprivation. "When a mass-movement begins to attract people who are interested in their individual careers, it is a sign that it has passed its vigorous stage; that it is no longer engaged in moulding a new world but in possessing and preserving the present. It ceases then to be a movement and becomes an enterprise."<sup>10</sup>

It is important to remember that in spite of the weaknesses of this body, it is necessary to give people a stake, particularly since the social system in which we are living is not homogeneous. There are various centres of power. If power is diffused, it would serve as checks and balances, provided there is direction from the national level. Also, the structural and cultural contradictions, which exist in our society today, need to be removed by appropriate legislation. The local bodies would then be effective instruments to probe into the aspirations of the people, find out their own resources and build a strategy of development suited to them.

In this century, we are super-imposing the modern concepts of democracy, socialism and secularism on a traditional society which is based on caste, creed and religion. Therefore, we have to look at problems from the point of view of historicity. A certain amount of disturbance is bound to take place with the modernizing process and there will be a growing need for statutory bodies at the local level. These could be related to various groups, such as cooperatives, farmers' organizations, youth clubs, mahila mandals, etc., which, in turn, could be committees of Panchayats for implementation of their respective programmes. The concept of village self-sufficiency has no room today. It is a question of interdependence which means increasing areas of contact and these have to be coordinated by a body, like the Panchayats.

Modernizing forces have to enter the very heart of rural community. People should be sensitized to social responsibility and awakened to broader national requirements. As things exist, the rural masses do not have their larger perspective but restrict their vision to local needs and factional problems. To bring about this change, the States and the Central Government are hopelessly inadequate, especially in a country so vast as ours. Then, what effective alternative, can we suggest to Panchayati Raj to bring about this process of socialization? In the words of Aneurin Bevan, "The whole art of local Government is to estimate catchment areas for dealing with particular services before deciding where boundaries of these services should be

<sup>10</sup> Eric Hoffer, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

drawn". Can reorganization or remodelling the structure of our Panchayati Raj bodies offer a solution? We have to find out correctives and strengthen organizations at various levels. The delimitation of scope of authority of different tiers and proper coordination of local initiative and governmental assistance is necessary.

The constitution of Gram Sabhas is based on the assumption that the village is and could be a self-sufficient unit consisting of a homogeneous community. This is more true in a fairy tale, considering the modern conditions where so much of interdependence, interaction and mobility are in evidence. On the other hand, we should also recognize the fact that the diversity of needs of various groups conflicts in the village society. To have the village as a Panchayat unit would only heighten, to some extent, tensions and the fact of interdependence is likely to be overlooked. Sociologists, however, have pointed out that though caste, religion and politics have taken people outside the limits of a village, there is still the village-pride which often manifests itself. The problem, therefore, is how to reconcile the feeling of village-pride with the concept of interdependence, which is vital for growth. It is essential to activate the Gram Sabha, and, with this end in view, to recognize the factors, which can move the people and bring them together. These could be a concrete programme based on their real needs, the acceptance and image of the local leader or a crisis facing them. People do not like to come merely for the sake of attending a meeting and listening to a few talks by the local leaders which they are bound, in any case, to hear in the course of their day-to-day interactions.

Just as it is important to activate the Gram Sabha, it is also necessary to broaden the base of the Gram Panchayat, so that the forces of interaction could bring villages together in a wider community, where viability will be improved. The Panchayat should be located at existing or potential growth-centres, covering a group of villages which could serve as wards and act as its hinterland. It could cover a population of about six to ten thousand or so, in a cluster of about eight-to-ten villages. In the course of delimitation, one cannot ignore the inhibiting social factors and political compulsions. The Gram Panchayat would then be able to determine norms for viable village communities in terms of economic investments and social amenities. This will make it effective as it will be able to cater, with its greater resources, to the various sections of population, such as small or big farmers, agricultural labour, rural artisans and trademen. This would act as a point of radiation to transmit impulses to its hinterland. It should be helped with matching grants for projects contributory to

the creation of community assets. The election of members to the Panchayat should be done in such a way that each village is represented. Here, population need not be a criterion. (Incidentally, by making population a criterion, there is a chance of the family planning programme receiving a set-back.) This kind of an arrangement is likely to cut at the root of factionalism in an individual village. Though the village factions are not corollary to Panchayati Raj, they vitiate the functions of the local bodies and the result is often a stalemate and inertia. The functions of the Gram Panchayat should essentially be the maintenance of institutions established by higher tiers and to serve as a feed-back to the levels above, in the process of planning. It is a known fact that, the 'common man' is not usually interested in plans, proformas and abstract schemes. He would like to have something tangible to handle. Most people cannot be moved by abstract ideas. They need a concrete situation to activate them. They will, however, have to be helped with planning, by the enlightened elite who even in their own interest will have to change the vast countryside and give people a new quality of life.

The next tier—the Panchayat Union Council or what is known as the Panchayat Samiti—could consist of representatives of various Gram Panchayats by indirect elections so that they could be responsible and accountable to the Panchayats and indirectly to the village people. The Samiti whose sphere of operation could be co-extensive with that of a Taluk, should be entrusted with the responsibility of mobilization of local resources and implementation of various schemes, depending upon the capability in terms of staff and resources that are available. It is no use giving them functions where they do not have the adequate expertise. At this stage, it may be pointed out that, at the levels of the Taluks, there is a functional dichotomy between the town and the villages around. The towns are looked after by the municipalities and, in the same headquarters, the Samiti functions looking after the villages within its jurisdiction. While care will have to be taken to demarcate the municipal area, which has its specific needs to be met, it is advisable to have a built-in interaction between the two areas, at the level of the Samiti by having one of its Standing Committees, mainly elected from the town, being entrusted with municipal functions. This will avoid a tug-of-war between the two interests and make both grow, instead of working at cross-purposes. However, necessary financial allocations will have to be made on the basis of tax collections.

The unit of planning, however, should be the District, with the Zila Parishad consisting of a majority of members elected by direct

elections and the rest from the Panchayat Samitis. The MLAs and Members of the Parliament should be associated with their respective Samitis as well as the Zila Parishads. The district body should be empowered to levy taxes and also collect land revenue which it should share with the lower tiers of Panchayati Raj bodies. While it would be desirable to continue to make the Collector of the District responsible for maintenance of revenue records, the Zila Parishad should have an Executive Officer of the rank of a Collector to undertake planning and coordinate developmental work. He should be assisted by a District Planning Officer and specialists in various fields, in order to strengthen the planning and developmental machinery. It is important to ensure that the powers of the Zila Parishad are fairly well balanced with those of the Panchayat Samiti so that the Samiti is not turned into a feeble institution, starved of initiative and purposeful development. The Zila Parishads should have some regulatory and advisory functions enjoined on them by statute and they should be in a position to match schemes with resources and be responsible for their enforcement. It should divest itself of some of its specific functions and transfer them to Panchayat Samitis, cooperatives and other voluntary organizations. We find that the existing administrative apparatus presents two problems—one is that some of the institutions have not imbibed a development concept and the other is that many organizations have overlapping powers and functions. The type of leadership available at the district level, the organizing ability of the generalists and the technical know-how of the specialists are of a fairly high order to enable them to coordinate the work of these organizations and take up planning and implementation functions at the district level. The Zila Parishad will have a crucial role to play in galvanizing the lower tiers into activity and in sustaining the tempo of development. It is also desirable to constitute a statutory body, as in existence in Gujarat, consisting of the Minister incharge, Chairmen of Zila Parishads and heads of departments concerned, to coordinate problems arising out of inter-district projects and to resolve conflicts.

The role of the State Assembly should be to provide State-level legislation to bring about structural changes required for the functioning of various tiers of lower bodies and to serve as a catalytic agent for building up momentum, by regional and State planning, on the basis of the total resources available. It should also concern itself essentially with the provision of large-scale infrastructure and of financial assistance to Panchayati Raj bodies in the form of matching grants. The Panchayati Raj bodies could also take up some programme on behalf of the State. After all, Panchayati Raj institutions



are the creations of the State Governments and hence it is important for the State Governments to over-view and guide, so that they could function much more effectively, by providing planning and technical inputs required by these bodies. The Members of the Legislatures would then have enough time to give thought to the State plans and problems, so that adequate legislative support could be given for bringing about change.

Similarly, the Centre has the vital task of framing economic and foreign policy, of looking after the defence of the country and the maintenance of law and order on a national level. Besides, it will have to provide and maintain inter-State services and inter-State collaboration. In evolving these policies, Members of the Parliament have a crucial role to play by building up expertise in various fields.

The kingpin of the movement and the main actor in the whole drama is the 'common man' on whom depends the success or otherwise of any plan or scheme, however perfectly it is conceived. Much also depends on the involvement of workers and their commitment to programme and policies. In the ultimate analysis, people's participation has to be evoked for implementation of the programmes.

"A great society needs not consensus but creative leadership and creative opposition. It needs the sting of challenge in a society rich in diversity and in a politics rich in dissent."<sup>11</sup> Here, one is reminded of what John Steinbeck has said, "I believe that all men are honest when they are disinterested. I believe that most people are vulnerable where they are interested. I believe that some men are honest in spite of interest. It seems to one reprehensible to search out areas of weakness and to exploit them."<sup>12</sup> Some of us have ignored the value of Panchayati Raj institutions because of some shortcomings. Should we, therefore, throw the baby with the bath-water?

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<sup>11</sup> James MacGregor Burns, *Presidential Government : The Crucible of Leadership*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1966.

<sup>12</sup> John Steinbeck, *The Short Reign of Pippin IV*,

## RESEARCH IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION —A TREND ANALYSIS

*V. A. Pai Panandiker*

LIKE the various social sciences in their early infancy, public administration as a discipline in the first phase of its development, especially between 1950-60, was largely descriptive and legalistic. Traditionally, public administration was shrouded in considerable mystery. Mystery because public administration, though so domineering a force in the life of the people of India through the ages, was left outside the scrutiny of scholars and researchers. Barring Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, in the fourth century B.C., there is no evidence of any original study or treatise on public administration in India. Indeed, even the original Kautilyan text does not appear to have been available to scholars and practitioners of public administration in India until its discovery during the 20th century.

During the more recent history of the country, from the Moghul rule to the British Era, public administration was at the centre of the mighty imperial power—its prestige exceedingly high but its doors barred to the students and researchers in the discipline.

Public administration as a system of governance was subjected to some attention during the Independence struggle by some of the national leaders often from a political angle. A few academic writings during the period were also published. But there were more studies in government than in public administration.

The establishment of the discipline came in the 'fifties as a part of a bigger movement of which the creation of the Indian Institute of Public Administration and the various University Departments of Public Administration were concrete manifestations.

Most of the academic research during the 'fifties indicates considerable timidity to enter the portals of the complex world of public administration. Barring exceptional pieces of research, therefore, most of the academic work appears confined to a narrow description of institutions and only once in a while of the various administrative processes,

This is, however, not to belittle the contribution of such work in the early stages of a new discipline, especially one which dealt with sensitive as well as complex real life problems. Besides, the descriptive base was necessary and desirable for the development of the discipline. Significant changes in this respect came through during the 'sixties. Above all, the pressing administrative problems facing the country necessitated fresh look at what were called the "administrative assumptions of planning".

A large number of studies by the various administrative ministries, the Planning Commission, and its agencies, such as the Committee on Plan Projects, and the Programme Evaluation Organization, are indicative of the real life problems and difficulties faced in programmes and projects of planning and development.

While the doors of governmental documents and files still remained the close preserve of the public agencies, several academic and official studies, including those of the various committees of Parliament, began to press for administrative reform or, in the other words, for administrative policy change.

Considerable literature emerging during the period highlighted specific policy issues in public administration and a generic need for change in administrative policy. For the first time, some of the closed doors were opened to researchers and scholars in public administration.

The appointment of the Administrative Reforms Commission at the Centre and such similar type of bodies in the States provided a fresh stimulus to research in public administration even though the objectives here were much more specific. In other words, if the trends in research in public administration in the 'fifties were towards descriptive research and studies, the trends in the 'sixties were decidedly towards administrative reforms and policy.

For the discipline of public administration and research in it, there were several problems. One of the problems of the discipline has been its definition. There is, even today, no clear-cut and agreed definition of public administration. Any definition would depend upon how public administration is viewed at. It could be viewed as technical activity of implementing public policy. Or, it could be viewed in terms of a broader integrated political and administrative process involving the stages from the conception of public policy, its formulation, through its implementation and management.

In the Indian context, where the interplay between the various organs of the Government is so intense, any restrictive definition of public administration is likely to distort both our understanding of the field as well as the development of the discipline. Thus, the manner, in which the parliamentary democracy functions at the Union or the State levels, impinges directly on the functions and the character of the administrative process and activities. Similarly, the decisions of the courts at various levels on matters relating to administrative issues have had major implications for the public administration of the country.

It is for these reasons that it is necessary to put the broadest construction upon the discipline of public administration in India. For the purpose of this article, public administration is viewed both as a broader policy and as an implementative process. Its scope covers the manner in which policy issues in the country arise; the formulation of public policy, including the interaction between the legislatures, the bureaucracy, the legal systems, the institutional and technological systems designed for both policy formulation and implementation; and finally, the day-to-day management of public policy which determines its actual content.

### *Politics and Administration*

As a substantive area of research in public administration, politics and administration occupies a central place. The inextricable link between politics and administration has attracted intense interest of both the academician and the practitioner in public administration. All the more so, since most of the public policy emerges out of a continuous interaction between the two key processes, *viz.*, politics and administration. There has also been a general recognition that the entire character of administrations is deeply influenced by the political process, especially under the parliamentary form of democracy in India.

The important questions for the discipline of public administration are:

- (1) How precisely does this interaction take place?
- (2) How does public policy get initiated, formulated and accepted?
- (3) What are the processes through which public policy develops?
- (4) How are policy alternatives developed?
- (5) What kind of political sanctions cover public policy?
- (6) How does policy get converted into plans of action?

- (7) Who implements public policy and what implications do the implementation processes have for the substantive policy?
- (8) Is there any administrative policy which can achieve the policy objectives?

Research studies of public policy in India are, however, conspicuously absent. Social scientists in other disciplines, especially students of economics, have from time to time made studies of public policy in their respective areas of interest. However, their focus has always been on the substantive areas without a study of public policy as a generic process. Nor has there been any known attempt to view public policy as an administrative instrument of translating broad national policies and objectives into specific programmes of action.

Of particular interest to public administration in this area are some of the following sub-topics. First of all, the Centre-State relationships in policy formulation in matters economic, social and administrative; the manner in which the interaction influences public policy at the various stages and the operation of the process including the patterns of this relationship.

Secondly, what exactly is the policy relationship between the legislatures and the administration. Is the relationship identical in all matters? What factors influence this relationship? How much is the influence of these two key institutions on public policy and in which areas? Are there any tensions in these policy relationships? What are the points of contact between the legislatures and the administration and what influence do they exert upon each other? What is the officials' role in a parliamentary democracy and to what extent does the administration and the legislatures influence each other through their normal functions and operations?

Thirdly, important questions relate to administrative politics, especially public policy experience of the administration which not only influences the character of public policy but also gives rise to new public policy measures. In recent years, an emerging area of interest in the policy process has been the bureaucratic politics. This has been of special importance since, in the planning era, a shift in public policy has been towards more centralized decisions. Some useful literature has grown recently, broadly on the theme of bureaucratic politics through the work of the Parliamentary Committees, the work of the Administrative Reforms Commission and its study teams as well as of a few academic scholars. Some polemical work by the partisans in the bureaucratic politics is also available. However, systematic study of

bureaucratic politics has been absent. In particular, policy commitments of bureaucracy, the inter-relationships within its various classes and services, the view-point of bureaucracy on administrative policy, and finally, implications of these for the generic field of public policy have not been studied.

The researchers as well as practitioners have naturally been more attracted by the problems of the minister-civil servant relationship. The relationship came in sharp focus in 1957 due to the so-called Mundhra Scandal. B. S. Narula (1969)<sup>1</sup> undertook a more useful academic study on this topic for the use of the Administrative Reforms Commission. Amongst the prominent public figures, N. V. Gadgil,<sup>2</sup> H. V. R. Iyengar<sup>3</sup>, S. G. Barve<sup>4</sup>, and B. Shiva Rao<sup>5</sup> contributed valuable information and insights often through biographical writings. While no systematic effort has yet been made to relate the various published material to develop any broader framework of policy relationship, considerable literature, both academic and other, is now available as a basis for such research.

In the post-Independence era, the relationship between the citizen and the administration has been widely discussed in several forums. It is, however, only more recently that the field has been the subject of academic research. A. P. Barnabas (1966)<sup>6</sup> made one of the early research studies of citizens' grievances, including the citizens' attitudes and perceptions in relation to the public utility services. Such studies were given a wider frame by Samuel Eldersveld, V. Jagannadham and A. P. Barnabas (1968)<sup>7</sup>, who went further into this area and explored the wider implications of this relationship. Several papers and articles, including the view points of several prominent public figures, as well as seminar publications are now available.

There are a few other areas of politics and administration, which have been examined in some detail. One good example is the

<sup>1</sup> B. S. Narula, "Ministers and Civil Servants in a Developing Democracy", *Management in Government*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1969).

<sup>2</sup> N. V. Gadgil, *Government from In side*, Meerut, Meenakshi Prakashan, 1968.

<sup>3</sup> H.V.R. Iyengar, *Business and Planned Economy*, Bombay, Vora, 1968.

<sup>4</sup> S. G. Barve, *Good Government : The Administrative Malaise and Connected Issues*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1964; and *With Malice Towards None*, Bombay, Asia, 1962.

<sup>5</sup> B. Shiva Rao, *The Framing of India's Constitution*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1969.

<sup>6</sup> A. P. Barnabas, *The Experience of Citizens in Getting Water Connections*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1965; and *Citizens Grievances in Development Administration*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1969.

<sup>7</sup> Samuel Eldersveld, V. Jagannadham and A. P. Barnabas, *The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1968.

Panchayati Raj. The study of these institutions, particularly in States where the Zila Parishads are key political instruments, has drawn considerable academic interest. The intermeshing of administration with the political institution at this level has naturally evoked the interest and curiosity of many a researcher and policy practitioner. Most of the existing studies are largely descriptive. However, V. R. Gaikwad<sup>8</sup>, T. N. Chaturvedi<sup>9</sup>, Anil Bhat<sup>10</sup>, and Shanti Kothari and Ramashray Roy<sup>11</sup> have made very useful beginnings in the study of political and bureaucratic relationships and their implications at the level of districts and the Panchayats. Less academic attention was, however, focussed until recently on municipal and urban administration which in recent years has grown in importance.

### *Administrative Organization and Structure in India*

By far, the most researched area in public administration in Indian administration is its organization and structure. From the pre-Independence era through the present days, studies abound in the constitutional structure of government, the federal system, the organization of the Government of India and the State Governments. B. Shiva Rao<sup>12</sup> (1969), M. V. Pylee<sup>13</sup> (1965), and A. K. Chanda<sup>14</sup> (1958) are some of the important contributors to this literature. The Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC)<sup>15</sup> brought out in the late 'sixties a series of comprehensive studies on the structure and organization of administration at all levels—Union, State and District. The ARC also published several reports on key functional areas, such as economic administration,

<sup>8</sup> V. R. Gaikwad, *Administration of Development Programmes in Agriculture and Community Development*, New Delhi, Indian Council of Social Science Research, 1970 (Mimeo).

<sup>9</sup> T. N. Chaturvedi, "Tensions in Panchayat Raj—Relations Between Officials and Non-Officials", *Economic Weekly*, Vol 16, No. 22 (May, 1964).

<sup>10</sup> Anil Bhat, "Tensions in Panchayat Raj—A Comment", *Economic Weekly*, Vol. 16, No. 32 & 33 (Aug., 1964).

<sup>11</sup> Shanti Kothari and Ramashray Roy, *Relations Between Politicians and Administrators at the District Level*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1969.

<sup>12</sup> B. Shiva Rao, *The Framing of India's Constitution*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1969.

<sup>13</sup> M. V. Pylee, *Constitutional Government of India*, Bombay, Asia, 1965.

<sup>14</sup> A. K. Chanda, *Indian Administration*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1958.

<sup>15</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission (Government of India), *Report of the Study Team on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1963 (2 Vols.); *Report on Personnel Administration*, Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1969; *Report of the Study Team on Personnel Administration (Personnel Staffing of Public Sector Undertakings and Personnel Management)*, Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1969; *Report of the Study Team on Promotion Policies, Conduct Rules, Discipline and Morale*, New Delhi, ARC, 1967, Part I (Mimeo); *Report of the Study Team on Public Sector Undertakings*, Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1967; *Report of the Study Team on Recruitment, Selection, U.P.S.C./P.C.Ss. and Training*, New Delhi, ARC, 1967 (Mimeo); and *Report on Finance, Accounts and Audit*, Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1967.



financial administration, personnel administration, and also on the departmental organization. There are, in addition, several useful studies by academic scholars and by researchers on the various structural and organizational aspects of the Indian administration.

Many of these studies are descriptive-analytical as well as prescriptive. A major theme in more recent literature in this field revolves around administrative reforms, especially changes in the structure, rules, regulations and problems of the various facts of administration to suit the needs of the country. While, on one hand, these studies reflect policy issues, they also constitute useful literature to students of organizational theory to find out what concepts have been relevant to the Indian administrative needs and with what modifications.

Studies of the organization of the Legislative Branch and the Judiciary are, however, conspicuously few. Somewhat more is published about how the Parliament functions than how the State Assemblies operate. W. H. Morris Jones<sup>16</sup> (1957) made a pioneering study of the Indian Parliament. Several studies, especially by P. R. Mukerji *et al*<sup>17</sup> have gone into parliamentary procedures and parliamentary committees. None, however, have attempted the study from an administrative and organizational view point, especially how the various functions of the Central and the State Legislatures are organized for, how they operate *vis-a-vis* the administrative system and with what effectiveness.

A similar academic neglect is apparent in relation to the administration of justice. The only comprehensive study available in this area is the report of the Law Commission, especially what is called its XIV Report<sup>18</sup>. However, many former judges have, in their autobiographical literature, made detailed references to these problems and made several suggestions for reforms and improvements. Useful studies have been conducted in the Indian Law Institute in areas like delegated legislation in India, disciplinary proceedings against government servants, judicial review of administration through writ petitions, etc. Many of these have important consequences on the administrative system and operation. However, few researchers in public administration have so far devoted any attention to these issues and related these to the generic discipline, especially from the broader policy angle.

Another area on the organizational side which has not been sufficiently researched into is the intra-governmental relationships.

<sup>16</sup> W. H. Morris Jones, *Parliament in India*, London, Orient Longmans, 1957.

<sup>17</sup> P. R. Mukerjee, *Parliamentary Procedures in India*, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1967 (2nd Ed.).

<sup>18</sup> Law Commission of India, *Fourteenth Report (Reform of Judicial Administration)*, New Delhi, Ministry of Law (Government of India), 1958.

Many public reports and some of the biographical writings of civil servants have brought to the fore several problems of intra-governmental relationships. While some of these problems are ascribed to bureaucratic politics, several problems appear inherent in the prevailing structure of government, especially the insufficient differentiation of administrative roles, e.g. between the ministries and the executive departments.

On the organizational side, again, whatever studies that are available on the ministries and the executive departments are more on the structural side than the managerial. Considerable academic as well as official literature is available on the hierarchical system in the ministries and the departments, their rules of business and procedures of operation. Much less work is available on issues, such as the degree to which the structure is 'functionally' related to the objectives of these agencies, the organizational problems of their design, the entire range of management technology required for achieving their objectives, etc. The Study Team on the Machinery of Government of the Administrative Reforms Commission was one of the first to examine this issue in considerable detail. The development of the broader organizational theory relevant to Indian administration will, however, necessitate considerable work in each of these areas both to attend to the practical problems and for developing new concepts.

One of the most extensively studied and researched area is public personnel administration. From almost negligible literature in the early 'fifties in the field, a large number of studies have emerged on the structure and processes of public personnel administration. Considerable research material as well as official studies on recruitment, selection, placements, training and career development as well as the key institutions in the field have also been published. M. A. Muttalib<sup>19</sup> (1967), Bishwanath Das<sup>20</sup> (1968), C. N. Bhalerao<sup>21</sup> (1967), V. A. Pai Panandiker<sup>22</sup> (1966) are some of the basic academic works now available in the field. Many studies conducted at the Indian Institute of Public Administration in the late 'sixties for the use of the Administrative Reforms Commission have added to this literature. Much of these writings, with the exception of studies of bureaucracy, have a natural bias towards policy frameworks. Nonetheless, they touch upon

<sup>19</sup> M. A. Muttalib, *The Union Public Service Commission*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1967.

<sup>20</sup> Bishwanath Das, *The Indian Administrative Service*, New Delhi, S. Chand, 1968.

<sup>21</sup> C. N. Bhalerao, *Public Service Commissions of India: A Study*, Delhi, Sterling, 1966.

<sup>22</sup> V. A. Pai Panandiker, *Personnel System for Development Administration*, Bombay, Popular, 1966.

important academic issues also, especially in matters like personnel policies suitable or appropriate to Indian conditions.

Researchers both in public administration and in economics as well as official agencies have created considerable literature in economic studies which abound in the area of credit and financial institutions, import-export agencies, etc. Here, again, both the academic and official literature offer a wealth of data on the structural aspects, including a series of prescriptions for improving the present systems. Researchers either in Public Administration or in economics have not yet made sufficient efforts to develop conceptual models to tie in economic administration with the broader administrative system in the country. A review of literature also suggests that even on the practical side of the field not enough thought has been given to policy alternatives and to new researchable areas, suggesting thereby that a fresh academic look into this field would be useful.

What is true of economic administration is also true of budgetary and financial administration, especially accounting systems, expenditure controls, etc. Bulk of the earlier work has been descriptive even though sometimes critical. Due to the nature of this field, scholars from diverse disciplines, like accountancy, economics, management, and public administration, have contributed to the literature in the area. Here, again, the administrative policy angle has been recognized only recently which is beginning to get reflected in the new literature.

Fiscal and monetary administration have always received the attention both of academic researchers and the official agencies. Large-scale literature and public documents are, therefore, available. However, the relationship between the budgets and the Five Year Plans have not yet been brought out. Similarly, not much attention has been paid to the question of an integrated tax structure and its administrative implications. Again, the tax system of the Centre has been the primary focus of attention of scholars leading to a neglect of the State taxation systems and problems. The field of monetary administration was until recently relatively neglected by academic scholars. It is only in the wake of significant shifts in the banking policies, especially after the social control of banks followed by their nationalization, that monetary and credit administration has received some attention. The development of any broader framework either for academic research or for policy needs in monetary administration has yet to begin. In the very nature of the field, this area deserves collaborative efforts between researchers in public administration and other social sciences, especially those in economics.

*Administrative Processes*

The generic administrative processes have often been cited to be important factors not only in practical administrative matters but also building organizational theory. Herbert Simon<sup>23</sup> (1960) and many other theorists in this field abroad have made administrative processes key to their theoretical formulations. In particular, decision-making has been regarded as the central theme of all administrative activity and hence of the system itself.

Though the relevance of administrative processes to the discipline has been widely recognized in India, there is little published work in this field. The only available literature are a series of cases studies, specially those prepared by the Case Unit of the Indian Institute of Public Administration and some individual scholars. Many of these cases, taken together, provide a basis for developing a broader framework on decision-making as a key process in the practical administrative circumstance in India. So far, such an integrative exercise has not been made.

Another side of decision-making, viz., rule application, though a common administrative process, also remains academically unscrutinized. How an actual administrative rule gets applied by different people in different circumstances and in different places which gives substance to the rule is admittedly crucial to public administration. What makes the rule effective in one case or one area and not in the other deserves careful study for building broader theoretical frameworks. As an administrative process, rule application has many useful academic possibilities which remain unexplored.

Relatively speaking, two processes, viz., administrative control and accountability, have received much more research attention. Several committees of the legislatures, both at the Centre and in the States, as well as academic experts, have focussed attention on this area. Academic studies have been more prominent on the financial side. P. K. Wattal<sup>24</sup> (1953), in the earlier years, and A. Premchand<sup>25</sup> (1963), more recently, have made illustrative efforts to examine the structural issues of relationship, especially in matters like expenditure control, etc. The functional relationship of administrative accountability in financial matters with the purpose of the process, however,

<sup>23</sup> Herbert Simon, *The New Science of Management Decision*, New York, Harper and Row, 1960.

<sup>24</sup> P. K. Wattal, *Parliamentary Financial Control in India*, Bombay, Minerva, 1953.

<sup>25</sup> A. Premchand, *Control of Public Expenditure in India*, New Delhi, Allied, 1963.

remains unexplored. The present literature, both official and academic, seems preoccupied with procedural and formal requirements rather than with their managerial effectiveness or with broader policy implications.

In the same vein, the process of audit has been viewed more in terms of legal accountability of expenditure than in terms of a policy instrument, including for establishing parliamentary and administrative relationships. Most of the writings in this field have been by the practitioners indicating partly its technical character and partly lack of access to audit data to the academicians. The Administrative Reforms Commission's studies breathe somewhat of a fresh air in this area. Academically speaking, the linkage between the various administrative processes, including audit, for building an integrated system has not yet been clearly established. As a result, individual processes tend to be looked at in isolation, often times dysfunctionally leading to both practical as well as other difficulties in the development of a unified body of knowledge.

#### *Development Planning and Administration of Development*

The importance of development planning being formally recognized, the literature in this area has been prolific. Its contributors range from academicians in varied fields, like economics, statistics, and sociology, apart from students of public administration, to policy practitioners and political leaders and executives.

Most of the academic writings on planning itself and on the Planning Commission are of recent origin. Tarlok Singh (1963) and H. K. Paranjape<sup>26</sup> (1964) were two of the early persons to study planning from a public administration angle. These attempt a definition of objectives and organization of planning and offer valuable information on the planning processes and the institutional base of the planning machinery.

Most of the available works are essentially aggregate studies of the central planning agency and the national planning process. The Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) and some of its Study Teams made more concerted efforts to examine the planning process and machinery at the State level and even at the level of the individual ministries and districts. Academic work on the planning machinery and process at the State or the Ministry level is scanty.

<sup>26</sup> H. K. Paranjape, *Planning Commission : A Descriptive Study*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1964.

As an administrative process, planning merely at the national level tends to hang without firm roots and, therefore, shows wide discrepancies in actual performance on the field. In this connection some of the specialized work in State level planning need a mention, especially P. N. Masaldan's<sup>27</sup> (1962) study of the planning organization and procedures in U. P. An interesting analysis of the role of bureaucracy in the formulation and implementation of planning with reference to Andhra and Kerala States from the view point of a sociologist was made by P. K. B. Nair<sup>28</sup> (1969).

District level planning as a focus of action has been more discussed than researched into. The Planning Commission itself appears to have prepared considerable literature on this field including special studies developed on the Wardha District in Maharashtra. The ARC's Study Team on the Machinery for Planning as well as A. H. Hanson<sup>29</sup> (1966) made several useful contributions in this area. R. B. Das and D. P. Singh's<sup>30</sup> case study (1968) and M. A. Muttalib's<sup>31</sup> (in progress) study of administration of development programmes at the district, block, and village levels are some of the more recent academic efforts in this direction.

At the level of project planning, more is available by way of prescription than by way of research work. The erstwhile Committee on Plan Projects (COPP) of the Planning Commission published a large number of policy studies in this area. Some of the COPP's studies on individual public sector corporation, however, cover extensive research data. The ARC and its Study Team on Public Enterprises have added considerably to this official literature. Amongst a somewhat more academic work, S. S. Khera's<sup>32</sup> (1963) case study of the Heavy Electrical Plant at Bhopal is useful in describing the processes of decision-making in relation to an important public sector project.

Agricultural Administration, like many other functional areas, abounds in public documents, especially since the report of the Royal

<sup>27</sup> P. N. Masaldan, *Planning in Uttar Pradesh: A Study of Machinery for Coordination at the State Level*, Bombay, Vora, 1962.

<sup>28</sup> P. K. B. Nair, *Leadership, Bureaucracy and Planning in India—A Sociological Survey*, New Delhi, Associated, 1969.

<sup>29</sup> A. H. Hanson, *The Process of Planning*, London, Oxford, 1966.

<sup>30</sup> R. B. Das & D. P. Singh, *Formulation and Execution of Block Plan: A Case Study*, Lucknow, University of Lucknow (Department of Public Administration), 1968.

<sup>31</sup> M. A. Muttalib, *Administration of Development Programme at the District, Block and Village Levels* (in progress); and *The Union Public Service Commission*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1967.

<sup>32</sup> S. S. Khera, *The Establishment of the Heavy Electrical Plant at Bhopal*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1963.

Commission on Agriculture 1926-28. Most of the earlier academic writings in the field deal more with agricultural economics than administration, although such studies did make reference to the problems of implementation. Many of the research studies in agricultural administration were often related to the community development as well. Albert Mayer<sup>33</sup> (1956), Iqbal Narain<sup>34</sup> (1959), S. C. Dube<sup>35</sup> (1958) and others largely emphasized this point of view. At the governmental level, the report of the Agricultural Administration Committee (1958) constitutes an important policy document. A large number of studies of the COPP and the Programme Evaluation Organization provide useful insights into the nature of problems emerging in agricultural administration. One common theme of failure relates to lack of programme planning, of administrative policy which is often times not congruent with the objectives.

As a generalized impression of the existing literature, it could be said to be highly oriented towards the practical needs of administration. Both the policy issues and the management problems seem to have been examined in considerable detail. From a more academic point of view, few of the present studies relate agricultural administration to the general analytical or conceptual frameworks in public administration. Nor is there an effort to theorize out of the vast literature on agricultural administration to develop general organizational constructs which could be used in other fields of administration.

Literature in other areas of development administration, such as health, education, transport, industrial administration, though not as voluminous as in the agricultural sector, is considerable. Here too, the official studies predominate though some research studies are available.

### *Administration of the Public Enterprise*

The two issues dominant in the entire literature relate to the public policy and the management of the public enterprise. The literature in the field is generally extensive which in many ways reflects the importance given to the public enterprise in the Indian economy as well as its polity.

<sup>33</sup> Albert Mayer, *et al*, *Pilot Project in India: The Study of Rural Development at Etawah*, Berkeley (California), University of California Press, 1956.

<sup>34</sup> Iqbal Narain, "A Fundamental Approach to the Administration of the Rural Community Programmes", *IJPA*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jan.-Mar., 1957).

<sup>35</sup> S. C. Dube, *India's Changing Villages*, New Delhi, Allied, 1967 (Indian edition); and *Village Level Workers: Their Work and Result Demonstration*, Hyderabad, National Institute of Community Development, 1959.



One major source of new literature on public enterprises in the post-Independence era in India has been the various Parliamentary Committees, especially the Estimates Committee, the Committee on Public Undertakings and also the Public Accounts Committee. Considerable literature has been added by the Committee on Plan Projects in the Planning Commission and later by the Bureau of Public Enterprises in the Ministry of Finance. These public documents, though of limited direct academic utility, provide useful information and clues to the problems in the field, which could be systematically used for developing generalized conclusions.

Academic work in public enterprises was initiated by H. K. Paranjape<sup>36</sup> and V. V. Ramanadham<sup>37</sup> (1964) who wrote on their major features and problems. Several other studies now embellish the field. These range from the structural and organizational aspects of public enterprises to their managerial problems, accountability and control. The general impression created by the existing literature in the field is its concern with policy issues, the management problems, the problems of performance and the problems of public accountability.

There is no attempt yet in the present studies to look at the Indian experience with respect to public enterprise, both successful and unsuccessful, from a general stand point of organizational theory or from the point of establishing an organic linkage between the administrative system as a whole and the public enterprise organization, including what implications the Indian experience has for more generalized theoretical formulations.

### *General Administration*

In the post-Independence era, general administration somehow receded into the background and the focus shifted largely towards the developmental activity. Looking at the growth of the new governmental activity in the developmental sector, perhaps this was inevitable. Two undesirable consequences have, however, followed. First of all, the traditional functions, though they remain critical to the general policy including to the success of developmental effort, have been relatively neglected and remain unstudied. In point of fact, the complexity of issues that have arisen in these fields raise important questions

<sup>36</sup> H. K. Paranjape, *The Industrial Management Pool: An Administrative Experiment*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1962.

<sup>37</sup> V. V. Ramanadham, *The Structure of Public Enterprise in India*, Bombay, Asia, 1961; and *Control of Public Enterprise in India*, Bombay, Asia, 1964.

about the traditional organizational and managerial systems. Secondly, the organizational system of the traditional functions have been transferred to the newer activities without a careful scrutiny of the relevance of such a system to these functions and activities. Many areas in general administration which were traditionally kept out of academic scrutiny, are slowly being opened to research and study.

### *Bureaucracy and Administrative Behaviour*

Studies of bureaucracy have been a recent entrant in the academic world of public administration in India. As a field of research, considerable work has been done by the Western scholars both in the development of bureaucratic theory and its applications in cross-cultural setting. Max Weber, Robert Merton, Peter Blau and Ferrel Heady are familiar names in the classical and the present-day literature on bureaucracy.

Bureaucracy as a focal point of research in public administration in India is of recent origin although the bureaucratic phenomenon has been pronounced in the Indian setting and has been recognized as one of the most crucial elements of the Indian political system, both for policy formulation and the management of public affairs.

Academic studies of the nature and character of the Indian bureaucracy, its structure and characteristics, its behaviour and its operations, are few. Traditionally, information was available in the autobiographical sketches of civil servants as well as of many important political figures, including former ministers. Amongst the academic studies, D. N. Rao and R. K. Trivedi<sup>38</sup> (1961), A. P. Barnabas<sup>39</sup> (1966), Samuel Eldersveld, V. Jagannadham and A. P. Barnabas (1969)<sup>40</sup>, V. Subramaniam<sup>41</sup> (1967), V. A. Pai Panandiker and S. S. Kshirsagar<sup>42</sup> (1971), and C. P. Bhambhri<sup>43</sup> (1970), are some of the major works in the field.

<sup>38</sup> D. N. Rao & R. K. Trivedi, *Regular Recruits to the I.A.S.*, Allahabad, Law Printing Press, 1961.

<sup>39</sup> A. P. Barnabas, *op. cit.*

<sup>40</sup> Samuel Eldersveld, *et al*, *op. cit.*

<sup>41</sup> V. Subramaniam, "Representative Bureaucracy—A Reassessment", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (1967).

<sup>42</sup> V. A. Pai Panandiker & S. S. Kshirsagar, "Bureaucracy in India: An Empirical Study", *IIPA*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Apr.-June, 1971); and *Civil Service and Development Administration in India*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1968 (Mimeo).

<sup>43</sup> C. P. Bhambhri, "The Indian Administrative Service—Milieu, Challenges and Response", *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1970).

Many of the present studies are somewhat sociologically oriented. Partly, this reflects the international trend where the earliest scholars to place an academic focus on the bureaucracy were sociologists. While many of such works and their findings are of considerable relevance to the studies of public administration, they do not entirely meet the needs of the discipline of public administration.

D. N. Rao and R. K. Trivedi (1961) began the series with a broad analysis of the backgrounds of the IAS probationers. This is now available as a bench-mark for further substantive work in the development of bureaucratic profiles in India. V. Subramaniam<sup>44</sup> (1967) went considerably further into the bureaucracy and its representative character. Samuel Eldersveld, V. Jagannadham and A. P. Barnabas<sup>45</sup> (1969) examined the citizen-administration relationships. A broad profile of the developmental bureaucracy was available in the study by V. A. Pai Panandiker and S. S. Kshirsagar.<sup>46</sup>

This brings up the basic question of bureaucratic theory and its relevance to India, both in academic and in practical or policy matters. V. A. Pai Panandiker and S. S. Kshirsagar studies (1968 and 1971)<sup>47</sup> suggest that the basic theoretical framework, as developed by Max Weber and subsequently modified by others is both relevant and useful. The studies, however, indicate that some interesting adaptations of the behavioural characteristics tend to take place in the developmental bureaucracy. In particular, different organizational settings appear to influence the bureaucratic orientations as well as the degree of bureaucratization. More important, the studies suggest that behavioural adaptations of bureaucracy to meet the needs of development administration of certain nature tend to influence the structure of bureaucracy itself.

#### RESEARCH IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION—AN OVERVIEW

For a discipline, which has developed in India essentially in the last two decades, research in public administration has made a reasonable beginning. New institutions meant to operate in the discipline, especially the University Departments of Public Administration, the Indian Institute of Public Administration are important developments.

<sup>44</sup> V. Subramaniam, *op. cit.*

<sup>45</sup> Samuel Eldersveld, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

<sup>46</sup> V. A. Pai Panandiker and S. S. Kshirsagar, *op. cit.*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

The establishment of Staff Colleges and similar institutions by State Governments for training civil servants are also indicative of significant supportive changes in the institutional framework.

There is also, today, a considerable body of literature available on many an aspect of public administration. Descriptive literature on the key institutions in public administration is also available in reasonable number. A beginning has been made in studying administrative behaviour and the dynamics of public administration.

Yet the discipline as a whole does not show a sense of buoyancy, of achievements either in the academic or practical worlds, of being of continuing relevance to the needs of the country. A lurking doubt, in the academic and even in the practitioner, exists whether public administration, as a field of study and enquiry, could develop as a useful and relevant independent discipline as well as a practical and applied science. Several issues, therefore, need to be faced and resolved.

#### *Issues before the Academia*

By far, the most important issue before the academia in the discipline is the development of concepts and ideas which enable an understanding of real life problems, as well as evolving new and live ways of resolving them. In other words, the basic questions before the academia relate to the quality of its theoretical frameworks. Bulk of the present theoretical frameworks and constructs available in public administration are based on Western administrative systems. Even if many of these are apparently relevant and useful, they need to be carefully tested and, wherever required, properly validated.

In most cases, however, the utility and relevance of Western administrative frameworks and constructs have not been tested. It is only in recent years that some efforts are being made in the direction of relating studies of the Indian administration to the bigger theoretical frameworks and assessing the relevance of such frameworks to the Indian circumstance.

This apart, few researchers in public administration have made use of the considerable amount of academic and applied studies which have been completed for the development of analytical tools and theoretical constructs out of such literature.

One of the most important issue facing the discipline of public administration in India is, therefore, the development of a set of properly tested and validated theoretical constructs. With the vast amount of the literature which is published and available, it should now be possible to move in this direction. If the process of such testing and validation of theoretical constructs reaches a certain level of sophistication, it would then be possible to examine the validity of broader theoretical frameworks and over time move towards an administrative theory built out of the Indian experience. Each step in this direction now needs to be carefully measured and taken. In turn, each such step should be deliberately related and linked to the long-term interests and objectives of the discipline.

In this context, a special mention may be made of the need for cross-cultural comparative research in public administration. This would benefit the discipline from the approaches and experiences of the other systems in the world. The comparative approach, however, need not be confined to international or cross-cultural studies. Given the political and administration diversity and experience within India, comparative studies in different parts of the country or in different functional areas would be both beneficial and useful. In particular, such studies would help the process of validation as well as refinement of the concepts and framework of public administration.

#### CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The primary objective of this survey was to examine the trends in research in public administration and to assess broadly the state of the discipline including the nature of work done in its various sub-fields. In conducting this broad survey, no attempt has been made to evaluate the scholarly works of individual researchers and authors nor to provide for exhaustive references. Instead, the focus has been placed on the major trends in research. Even the reference to the sub-fields is more to illustrate the nature of work done in public administration than to provide a comprehensive assessment of the literature or the work done.

By way of conclusion, it could be stated that research in public administration has just begun to move from the traditional focus on structural dimensions to the substantive and even the dynamic dimensions. In that sense, the trends in recent research efforts suggest a greater degree of relevance of the discipline, especially to the practical side of the field.

What is perhaps not adequately reflected in the research effort up till now is a degree of conceptualization to gear research effort to proper theory building or testing. In this regard, the problem of research methodology, which looms large over the field, deserves a special mention. If both these problems can be tackled, then the future research effort could prove far more fruitful, worthwhile, and productive.



## ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM—A PERSPECTIVE-ANALYSIS

Bata K. Dey

THE expression 'administrative reform', which today has almost become a homely word in bureaucratic parlance, is itself a late arrival in the public administration-scene in India. One of the less known things in this regard is that the term made its entry into the Central arena *via* the States<sup>1</sup>. This is not to say that the reform of administration in the sense of change in directions considered desirable had not been in existence in the Centre, either as a concept or in practice. Indeed, attempts at administrative vitaminization, though mostly as responses to *ad hoc* needs, and not usually as a comprehensive package programme, have been in vogue both before and immediately after Independence in 1947. Ignoring, for the purpose of this article, the pre-Independence phase, one sees a plethora of such sectoral improvement efforts<sup>2</sup> during the decade after Independence, though it was not fashionable then to attach to them the now-respectable epithet of 'administrative reform'. Some of the institutions specially contrived to conduct prospecting probe into procedures and methods of work, organizations, delegations, staff requirements, project execution, etc., also came into existence in the 'fifties'.<sup>3</sup> In addition to these,

<sup>1</sup> The early landmarks in the field of administrative reforms as such are the reports of Kerala Administrative Reforms Committee (1958), the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Reforms Enquiry Committee (1960), and the Rajasthan Administrative Reforms Committee (1963). It is perhaps in 1963 that 'administrative reforms' came to be first used as an administrative jargon, a valuable operational tool to make good a gap in goal-realization.

<sup>2</sup> To cite a few: Report of the Secretariat Reorganization Committee (Bajpai) New Delhi, 1947; Report on Reorganization of the Machinery of Government (Gopalswamy Ayyangar), New Delhi, 1949; Report on Public Administration (A.D. Gorwala). Planning Commission, 1951; Public Administration in India—Report of a Survey (Paul H. Appleby), New Delhi, 1953; Reorganization of India's Administrative Systems with Special Reference to Administration of Government's Industrial and Commercial Enterprises, New Delhi, 1956.

There had also been evidence of special interest in administrative reshaping at the Centre by the Estimates Committee of the First Lok Sabha during 1950-54, *e.g.*, Reorganization of the Secretariat and Departments of the Government of India, Second Report 1950-51; Administrative, Financial and Other Reforms, Ninth Report, 1953-54. In a sense, though not in any integrative fashion, this last named report mentions 'administrative reforms' for the first time in New Delhi in 1953 before Kerala's use of the expression in 1958.

<sup>3</sup> Reference may be made to the setting up of O & M Division under the Cabinet Secretariat, in March 1954; Special Reorganization Unit under the Ministry of Finance,



the five-year-plan documents contain invaluable exhortations, without themselves being studies in depth of administrative ineffectiveness and prescription of remedies, for meeting up developmental shortfalls insofar as they could be accounted for, among other things, by administration's failure to deliver the goods. All this might lead one to assume that there had perhaps been more than necessary, administrative reforms activities in this country.

True enough. But can one discern any well-concerted, organized, scientific, reforms-movement behind all these disjointed, 'diffuse' and disparate change-attempts? Perhaps not. And why not is also not difficult to decipher. There had been no conscious, well-coordinated, centrally planned and deliberative process of thinking, comprehensive in its sweep and deep in its diagnostic analysis, which could have ignited a really consuming reform-fire. Possibly one could even find justification for this lack of fore-thought or far-sight. On Independence, the authorities were genuinely grappling with problems all-around—partition, refugees, integration of States, and a host of other politico-social compulsions. In the warrant of prioritization, administrative revitalization tended to occupy a lower position. In any developing<sup>4</sup> country, administrative modernization necessarily gets a back-stage role in national development drama, for the centre of the stage is, by the very nature of things, occupied by more ambitious, showy economic and social renewal programmes, and, not unoften, though to a lesser degree, by political reform. It is only when socio-politico-economic programmes do not gain a good pick-up and show some decelerating trends that a search for scapegoat is initiated. And what could fill this bill better than putting the finger firm on administrative incapacilities? That the building up of administrative capability should itself form an integral part of the all-round national development efforts—if not as an end in itself, at least as a necessary and sufficient condition for the fulfilment of the latter—escapes everybody's notice, and, hence,

(Contd. from p. 558)

in 1956; the Committee on Plans Projects in the Planning Commission in 1956. It is noteworthy that the Indian Institute of Public Administration, came to be set up in 1954 to study problems of administration, though from outside the Government.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Buron, President of the OECD Development Centre, Paris, prefers the term 'emerging' to 'developing'. He says: "The problem which faces so many countries in the Third world is that of 'emergence', a new translation of Rostow's 'take off', that is to say the desire to reach a certain level, starting from which a country is almost bound to find itself in the process of development." *Social Change and Economic Growth*, Paris, Development Centre for OECD, 1967.

While the term 'developing' avoids the unsavoury connotation of 'underdeveloped' (though both refer to the same set of countries), the differentia should really be in terms of industrialization; that is to say, distinction should ideally be drawn between 'pre-industrial' societies (some of which are already industrializing) and 'industrial' societies (some of which are moving into the first stages of 'post-industrialization'. Please see *The Administration of Economic Development Planning: Principles and Fallacies* (U. N. Publication No. ST/TAO/M/32), New York, The United Nations, 1966

reckoning. Is it because administrative reform lacks 'sex appeal' as compared with more demonstrative and gigantic programmes in the economic, social and political fields? Or, is it because everybody just takes it for granted that administration after all is meant to perform whatever is assigned to it—and there must be no mistaking (or questioning) this fact—so that even an old, traditional and 'maintenance'-administration (which, in one word, I would prefer to describe as a 'folk lore administration') is unthinkingly assumed to be more than a match—at any rate equal—to the new, unfamiliar, and unconventional tasks that follow from the assumptions of faster developmental goals in the wake of people's revolution of rising expectations. In other words, the necessity of sharpening the blunt edge of administration even when it is required to cut the Gordian knot of country's manifold modernization problems is the least recognized of governmental responsibilities. It is only when a function or a service is faced with a break-down or threatened with collapse that attention is diverted to administrative ill-health. And not before that.

#### NATURE AND FRAME OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

This leads us to the question of the real import of the nature of administrative reform itself. It has been defined as the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance.<sup>5</sup> This definition postulates three distinct elements:

- (1) Administrative reform is, first, artificially stimulated;
- (2) It is, then, a transformatory process; and
- (3) There is, lastly, the existence of resistance to the change process.

Obviously, reforms do not just happen; they surely are not Acts of God. They are premeditated, well-studied and planned programmes with definite objectives in view. It is an induced and manipulated change, for it involves persuasion, collaboration and generation of conviction in the 'betterness' of the new from the old. Unless the change-agent can show that the 'tomorrow' to be better than 'today', he will be dubbed as a 'muddler' and degraded as 'interferer'—not a welcome 'reformer'. Because change generates some amount of uncertainty, insecurity and a whole complex of anxiety in individuals, groups or even community, most people are by nature votary of 'status-quoism' and resist attempts at transformation. The known

<sup>5</sup> Gerald Caiden, "Administrative Reform", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4, 1968.

present may be bad but unknown future often appears to be worse, psychologically, and that is why people proverbially are happier with one bird in hand than two in the bush.<sup>6</sup>

Even so, the time does not stop; no one can really dip into the same river twice; nothing is static; nothing stays the same for long; and along with 'universal' movement, however imperceptible it may be, society, groups, men and all move. Even if conservatism gains ground, the social arteries harden, and further innovation is resisted, reform will continue as a progressive force urging action.<sup>7</sup> After all, the distinguishing characteristic of modernized social system is its ability to deal with continuous systematic transformation. Administrative reform is but a part of the universality of this cosmic change, for administration is nothing but a sub-culture, a social sub-system reflecting the values of the wider society. If, therefore, society cannot help changing for the mere compulsions of

- freeing itself from the shackles of traditionalism,
- changing relationships with environment,
- fresh innovative culture,
- adoption of new knowledge and technology, and
- craving for a new order through elimination of old ills and evaluation of comparative system-values,

administration must also correspondingly change to be in step with the 'outer' modernization process. Or else, a serious disequilibrium would set in, resulting in an agonising imbalance, dysfunctional maladjustments and eventual goal-displacement. The tension this state of affairs generates constitutes the quintessence of reform-movement. Administrative reform, from this angle, is a dependent variable. Indeed, successful reforms need to be preceded or at least accompanied

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<sup>6</sup> "People essentially, have to be made optimistic, or, otherwise reform becomes 'a cynical game of manipulation, personal aggrandizement, and parasitic security'." Please see Roscoe C. Martin, *Public Administration and Democracy*, Syracuse (N.Y.), Syracuse University Press, 1965.

Also significant are Machiavelli's following remarks in *The Prince*: "... the reformer has enemies in all who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order. This lukewarmness arises partly from fear of their adversaries who have law in their favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it."

<sup>7</sup> Gerald Caiden, *op. cit.*: "Administrative reform is a relatively minor factor in the totality of social change compared with acculturation, technological innovation, modernization, and migration. Social change is only a part of the ceaseless flow that characterises the universe."

by necessary variations in societal values that would make reform-assimilation possible, in any case less painful.<sup>8</sup>

#### REFORM CONTEXT

The preceding paragraphs would at least show that the administrative reform cannot and does not exist in vacuum, immunized or quarantined from other socio-political influences. Administrative reform is, in Fred W. Riggs' expressive phrase, a "problem of dynamic balancing".<sup>9</sup> Since public administration functions within a political context, its basic character, content and style of functioning must be greatly influenced by the political environment, its institutional dynamics and processes in not merely setting national goals, priorities, or deciding between competing values, allocating resources but also in devising the most effective instrument for translating these policies into successful programme realities. The experience of any country which has experimented with administrative reforms would tend to demonstrate that such reforms most frequently occur and take concrete shape in response to major political changes, such as

- a new party coming into power,
- installation of a new constitution, or
- enactment of laws bringing about structural changes in the economic and social system, etc.<sup>10</sup>

Today's India significantly testifies this interactive inter-dependence of the political and reformatory processes. And to this, the spectacular advances in science and technology, State's pervasive role in managing national assets and resources, controlling the entire economy through 'regulation and development' and ensuring a just, equitable economic order, and also government's new 'stellar assignment' as social diagnostician, correcting age-old social imbalances through newer forms of institution-making, and ushering in an egalitarian social system; all these throw up not merely a massive explosion of new tasks of unprecedented magnitude and dimension, they equally invariably require, just to be equal to their complexity and scale,

<sup>8</sup> G. S. Birkhead (ed.), *Administrative Problems in Pakistan*, Syracuse (N. Y.), Syracuse University Press, 1966. He says: "... administrative reform is successful only when associated with major social, political or economic reform. It is doomed to failure when undertaken for its own sake for the traditional rationale of efficiency or economy" (p. 186).

<sup>9</sup> Fred W. Riggs, "Administrative Reforms As a Problem of Dynamic Balancing,"—a paper presented to *Round Table on Administrative Reform and Development*. Beirut, 1970.

<sup>10</sup> *Public Administration in the Second United National Development Decade—Report of the Second Meeting of Experts*, New York, The United Nations, 1971.

fundamental and foundational improvement in administrative capabilities<sup>11</sup>. The latter, in turn, presupposes a long-range perspective planning, educational rearrangement, skill-generation, attitude-formation and a host of other structural-functional administrative reorganizations, quite apart from adoption of new technologies of effective decision-making and implementative gadgets. This being the ecology of administrative reform, the success of administrative reform programmes postulates an inter-disciplinary and multi-dimensional approach.

#### TECHNOLOGY OF REFORM

It will be profitable at this stage to make the observation that while administrative reform usually signifies a formal, mechanistic and planned process of structured change, there could be the other view of reform which comes not so much as a result of deliberately contrived artificial stimuli but in the normal process of unfolding of political, economic and administrative functioning. Here, the motivation comes wholly or primarily from other sectors and administrative sub-system merely catches up with changes in those fields. To take the Indian example, the development process has had tremendous impact on public administration itself. The volume of new tasks has led to significant growth in the number of governmental agencies as also in the number and variety of government employees. Then, new forms of organizations have come into existence, through compulsions of fulfilling the manifold programmes, particularly for the management of public sector enterprises and for extension work in the districts. It is also evident that as planned development postulates channelling of scarce resources into priority sectors of the economy, numerous control laws, mechanisms, and organizations go on mushrooming.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, the system of parliamentary democracy, as it operates in this country, with the concept of public accountability reigning supreme for acts of omissions and commissions of the bureaucratic sector has led to better responsiveness to the felt needs of the people. The proceedings of Parliament and its major committees, e.g., the Public Accounts Committee, the Estimates Committee, and the Committee on Public Undertakings, have made significant reform possible on the administrative fronts. The reports emanating from the Parliament constitute very valuable and vital reforms-documents,

<sup>11</sup> B. K. Dey, "Professionalism in Civil Service", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XV, No. 4 (October-December), 1969.

<sup>12</sup> N. K. Mukharji, "Methods of Administrative Reform"—paper presented to the *Round Table on Administrative Reforms and Development*, National Institute of Administration and Development, Lebanon, 1970.

The author is grateful to Shri N. K. Mukharji for the 'methodology' analysis of administrative reform.

having at least two main virtues: respectability and acceptability. These administrative changes obviously have been the by-product of the primary act of social, economic and political development and had come almost as a matter of course rather than through the pioneering acts of, say, 'reform engineers'.

### *Organizational Head/Action Group*

Though not so indirect, but not very direct either, is the method of bringing about administrative change through the head of an organization or the policy-making group in the enterprise, who, in the course of normal operations, might feel that certain inadequacies need to be remedied and loopholes leading to efficiency-leakage plugged. There need not necessarily be any outside or superior directives for undertaking such reform-measures except the management's own decision to experiment with, say, different organizational form, procedural rationalization or even new personnel engineering for rendering better service or clientele satisfaction. These are the acts of really forward-looking, innovative management-men, with progressive ideas and creative thinking. The impact of such reforms from 'within' may or may not appear very impressive to outsiders but, in terms of organizational performance and clientele satisfaction, they may be profound and, through the multiplier-effect of management creativity, reforms effected by top management may really add up to a very useful and desirable stockpile. Though ordinarily the ambit of such changes has been confined to organizational machinery and methods of work and marginally to personnel development, it should be noted that these are the very areas which remain neglected in the maze of more spectacular and ambitious modernization programmes.<sup>13</sup> Because of the authority attached to the top layers of management, the suggested reforms are easily accepted without much resistance which more often than not torpedo outside attempts at rationalization.

### *Nodal Agencies*

In this context, another aspect of the administrative process of

<sup>13</sup> There is a school which believes that more significant reforms are achievable through these organizational methods from within—incremental, slow often not strikingly radical, yet impactually profound. Sushital Banerji wrote: "If administrative reforms are to catch the imagination of the people of this country, our thinking and action will have to descend to the crucial level of the counter clerk in the millions of public offices at the ground level. . . It is at this level that the cutting-edge of administration has perhaps become a little blunt. . . The task of administrative reforms at this 'low' level is by no means stupendous. No high powered commission is required for this task. It is one for which each department is in the best position to find right answers. . . The answers lie in the much neglected 'obvious steps'. Then he goes on to cite instances where the organization itself through investment of simple thinking input and adoption of a little innovative creative approach, can work wonders. For details, please see Sushital Banerji "Random Reflections", *Management in Government*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1969.

initiating reforms should not also be missed. Quite apart from an individual or a group of innovating managers planting significant changes in the organizations under them, the nodal agencies in charge of particular functions also initiate and sustain reforms movement. The agencies, like department of Personnel, Ministry of Finance or the Planning Commission, having controlling responsibility for specific functions—personnel management, financial administration and planning in these instances—bring about, through constant study, analysis and research, significant changes which have lasting impact on the policies and performance. The charter of responsibilities earmarked by the Fulton Committee of Britain for the new Civil Service Department in the U.K. shows what tremendous innovations in the field of personnel management and agency-interrelationships were expected of that nodal agency. Even the functional catalogue, given by India's Administrative Reforms Commission,<sup>14</sup> for the Department of Personnel is impressive enough from the point of view of potentiality for initiating and guiding personnel reforms. This process of imparting a push in desirable direction, and in sectors where gaps surface up, cracks develop and inadequacies seek to cripple or paralyse administrative performance scores over other processes in that:

- it emanates from within;
- it flows from positions of authority;
- it is a product of research and development, based on functional specialization backed by the expertise of experience;
- the recommendations, being more practical and application-based, command ready acceptance; and
- they have better chances of internalization and implementation.

Even these reforms are the product of normal operation of administrative apparatus.

### *Ad hoc Committees*

When, however, there is any complex problem, a long-standing vexed question or an urgent explosive issue which cannot be considered in the normal administrative process and which is found to be beyond the capability of the day's administration because of either lack of time or paucity of expertise, it may be remitted to a specially constituted committee/commission. Additional grounds for such a committee process may be achievement of objectivity and impartiality, winning political objective at the same time. The reports and

<sup>14</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission Report on Personnel Administration, New Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1969.



recommendations of these *ad hoc* committees/commissions, have induced quite many major reforms by way of injecting radical thinking-inputs in the formulation of policies, their contents, the styles of organizational functioning and the whole complex of programme implementation. In India, there is a really rich harvest<sup>15</sup> of administrative reforms through such *ad hoc*, sectoral committees. It would be truism to say that there had remained perhaps not a single substantive sector in administration which, after Independence, had escaped 'committization'. The wide spectrum of subject remitted to such committees, the motivations for the constitution of such committees, the recommendations made in the reports and their implementation makes fascinating subject for independent research. By and large, these committees have been of the 'open' variety, that is to say the membership had included public men and outside representative, and not merely 'officials', except where the subject of investigation has been purely or primarily administrative in which case committees have, expectedly, acquired a, closed character, *i.e.*, only civil servants have been chosen as members. In many or most cases, such committees have originated in Parliament's pressures or concern, even anticipatory Parliamentary interest in some issues/aspects. Whatever may be the originating impulse, these *ad hoc* committees often provide splendid service in 'mopping up operations' perform unique 'path-finding role'<sup>16</sup> and offer vital guidelines for critical re-appraisal of policies and realigning of programmes. But of crucial importance for any significant impact of such a process should be the careful framing of reference, selection of members on a cold objective basis, and the quality and practicability of recommendations.

### *Agency or Institutional System*

A more direct and quicker method of achieving reforms in administration is the adoption of 'agency technique' under which the whole gamut of administration is exposed for a critical fresh look and the responsibility for a wide-ranging investigation is handed over to a temporary yet comprehensive Reforms Commission or a permanent Reforms Department. The methodology of investigation would, of course, vary depending on the nature of the agency or institution, its reference-frames, membership, staffing and time allowed. Whatever

<sup>15</sup> For fairly good catalogue of such reports up to 1963, both in the Centre and the States, please see *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. IX, No. 3, 1963. After 1963 also, there had been quite a few significant reports in diverse areas at the Centre and in the States. The Central committees/commissions covered fields, like Education, Agricultural Prices, Licencing, Monopoly, Scientific Research Institution, Corruption, even Railway Accidents, etc.

<sup>16</sup> N. K. Mukharji, *op. cit.*

the approach they adopt—macro or micro or combination of both—on the strength of specific policy-decision, the fact remains that the objective in having such an institutional medium is to achieve administrative modernization and system-revitalization in an organized, direct and frontal fashion. This technique obviously views administrative reforms not as a by-product of some other developmental programmes effort but as the main product.

The adoption of this reforms strategy is necessitated by the radicalization of political philosophy and consequent programme commitments on the socio-economic horizons. Administration for development must need an apparatus as much sophisticated as highly potent in competence and capacity factor; the change-agents must necessarily be highly professionalized, well-motivated and deeply committed men, equipped with new skill-drills and attitudinal responsiveness. To be sure, the entire operational arena has undergone a complete change in content and style. The tremendous explosion of information and the need for expert manipulation have brought about a revolution in the technology of decision making, making conventional bureaucrats almost 'obsolete items in administrative cupboards' and simultaneously giving birth to a new species of administrative technologists who could, for the sake of convenience, be called 'data-crats'. The agonizing awareness of the new needs of development administration and the inescapable corollary of making public administration a fit instrument for transforming the sleeping society and an inert economy into a self-reliant, vibrant modernized entity leaves no option but to develop a highly efficient and effective long range administrative delivery system. More particularly, in countries which have stagnated for centuries and where centuries of delayed progress are sought to be compressed into decades, the "administrative capability at all levels which itself is one of the scarest of all resources,"<sup>17</sup> must be generated and this 'delivery capacity' needs to be maintained at the top gear. Since the urgency is actue, the demand insistent and the time short, it is no longer possible to leave the responsibility for administrative modernization to 'chance-changers', for the theory of incremental improvement has lost much of its old validity in this quick-changing scenerio of socio-economic development. It is, therefore, imperative that reform-agents have to be appointed, whose sole business would be the business of administrative reform. There cannot certainly be any cut-and-dried, prefabricated technique<sup>18</sup> for running this business, but any reform activity,

<sup>17</sup> The United Nations, *Appraising Administrative Capability for Development*, New York, 1969.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

to be really meaningful, must stimulate creative approaches toward problem-solving, whether the problems posed are study of policy formulation, programme feasibility, organizational revitalization, personnel and procedural imperfections, or even system replacement. Because of the multi-dimensional ramifications involved in initiating changes in substantive or sub-substantive sectors, the modernizing elites or the 'reform-technicians' must include specialists, leaders of interdisciplinary teams, top executives, political leaders (where possible), and interest group leaders,<sup>19</sup> so that all sections are represented, all aspects taken into consideration and no worthwhile element is overlooked.

### *'Commissionization' of Reforms*

Before we take up the question of staffing pattern of agencies created for administrative reform, it would be profitable to see what structural forms the reform-organizations could take. One obvious form is the comprehensive high-powered commission with a wide ranging charter of reference. This method has the advantage of investigation, both *in extenso* and in depth, of the entire problem-area—and evaluation of an old order to see if it must need yield place to new or if patchwork repair would be in a position to support the otherwise sound foundation. Since such commissions are usually set up on 'felt needs' or parliamentary compulsions and command normally a high degree of authority and respect, the opportunity such committees/commissions offer—they do not come into being just for asking any time—for a thorough-going, insightful probe into the system-inadequacies and deficiencies, and for a viable alternative, should not be lightly missed by somewhat sceptic approach to and cynical disregard for even their worthwhile recommendations. For the success of the commission process of reform, a few prerequisites are inescapable:

- (1) The terms of reference should be pragmatically devised;
- (2) Targets should be achievable;
- (3) The composition of the commission should not be based on 'extraneous' considerations, that is to say, the membership should be open only to real experts in the field which could be wide enough to include insiders, *i.e.* civil servants (serving or retired) and outsiders, *i.e.* private sector 'toppers', political and public men, educationists, management specialists, and 'interest group' representatives;

<sup>19</sup> INTER PLAN Executive Committee, "Developing National Planning Personnel", United Nations, 1965. (INTER PLAN stands for International Group for Studies in National Planning.)

- (4) The same principle and pattern of staffing should be followed even for lower formations of the commissions, e.g., study teams, working groups, research analysts, etc. The commission secretariat (except the purely administrative or house-keeping posts) which includes middle and top level thinkers and draftsmen also, must not follow the usual secretariat representation lines so that the inter-service or bureaucratic 'scores' cannot be sought to be settled through the commission-medium;
- (5) Only the broad prescriptions need be spelt out, details being left for executive 'cooking', ensuring, of course, that evolution of details must not jettison the substance of broad recommendations; and
- (6) The implementation being one of the most important part of commission's work, either the recommendations should be considered at the highest level in the government or commission should stay on till the major implementing process is complete.

This article, frankly, is no exercise in evaluation of India's recent experiment with Administrative Reforms Commission(ARC). Suffice it to say that it was a grand opportunity—a unique experience to institute, for the first time, a total enquiry into the Indian system of public administration in its entirety, shorn, of course, of its theoretical sophistry. The Commission has submitted 20 reports on 20 different sectors of administration, supported by 20 corresponding study teams, 13 working groups for specific subjects of investigation, four expert groups and one taskforce. The subjects handled by the Commission were of crucial significance for the administration of change but to what extent the Commission's recommendations, even if implemented, would bring about accelerated change along radical lines is open to debate. One view, of course, is that nothing dramatic could be expected of a Commission whose membership element consisted purely of politician (except one) and which was serviced by a secretariat which carried the internalized 'conflicts' and 'contradictions' of public bureaucracy. But having regard to the fact that members of the various study teams totalled 230\*, who constituted mostly eminent men belonging to all walks of public life, it was but natural that the recommendations of the Commission would be balanced,

\*The break-up of membership of the Study Teams is as follows: 132 serving or retired officials; 50 non-officials belonging to categories, like eminent educationists, lawyers, businessmen/executives, journalists, professionals, etc.; and 48 politicians, including 21 MPs, 3 Members of State Legislatures, 24 former Members of Parliament or State Legislatures.

taking into account all shades of opinion and interest. In point of fact, however, this strength acted, paradoxically, as its weak point—Commission's whole approach and work appeared halting and over-cautions, and never radical enough to transplant a wholesale new system. It is merely expressing many people's doubts if a moth-eaten structure can do without total replacement and whether the inherited colonial administrative system with its authoritarian temper and base, apart from being anachronistic in itself, is not inconsistent with the popularly adopted progressive parliamentary system, particularly in relation to the achievement of socialistic goals. If this diagnosis is correct, the prescription should be on the lines of 'drastic drug' (did not Machiavelli once say that sometimes a disease might require even poison to be prescribed!) rather than continuing with conventional therapy. That is to say, the Commission process is designed primarily to organize a comprehensive pervasive investigation, into expected administrative performance targets and actual lag for spotting inadequacies with the object of achieving quick 'reforms' and not merely effecting incremental 'changes'.<sup>20</sup> Indian Commission has surely succeeded in highlighting many emerging issues of public administration which would otherwise have remained neglected or at any rate unattended to. The information collected by the study teams and the discussions of issues in the various reports are going to be the 'golden treasury' for future researchers and scholars and are most likely to influence the decision-making in public administration for many years to come and that is a net gain, irrespective of whether ARC's particular reports/recommendations are accepted/implemented or rejected.

### *Departmentalization of Reform*

In addition to the *ad hoc* commission, the other form which the agency method of administrative modernization can take is that of a permanent nodal department for suggesting continuous, though micro, reforms. It may be stated without fear of contradiction that as a method of reform technique, this departmental typology has justified itself, as will be apparent from the experiments of many countries in the post-War period.<sup>21</sup> It would be profitable here to advert, briefly, to India's experiment in regard to this departmental

<sup>20</sup> "Briefly, administrative reform is needed where administrative change is insufficient to keep administration abreast of developments and performance gaps appear." Gerald Caiden, *Administrative Reforms*, Chicago, Aldine Publishing House, 1969.

<sup>21</sup> Since World War II, special organizations have been established to suggest administrative reforms both in private and public organizations, for example, in Italy (Office of Reform), Israel (State Comptroller), Lebanon (Ministry of Administrative Reforms), India (Department of Administrative Reforms), U.K. (Civil Service Department), Canada (Bureau of Management Consulting and Planning Branch of Treasury Board), etc. In France, there is a Minister of State for Administrative Reforms.

form of 'informing' reforms. The Department of Administrative Reforms came into being in March, 1964, as Government of India's standing machinery for investigation and review, on a continuous basis, of the machinery of government, its methods of work and personnel system. Since 1950s, with the advent of development administration through the five year plans, attention has repeatedly been drawn to the administration's capacity, or lack of it, to meet the requirements of planned development, culminating in the setting up of an Organization and Methods Division<sup>22</sup> in March, 1954, under the Cabinet Secretariat of the Government of India, which, just a decade later, blossomed into the present Department of Administrative Reforms. The O & M division's excessive, perhaps obsessive, concern for 'minor gadgets' (such as job description sheets, flow charts, etc.) and other procedural routines without attending to more fundamental problems (such as allround educational efforts, generating professional competence, structural reorganization, etc.) led to the replacement of the limited 'O & M' idea by a more comprehensive concept of 'administrative reforms' and O & M division's ultimate transformation into a more broad-based Department of Administrative Reforms with a more ambitious charter of responsibilities.

The Department (lodged in the Ministry of Home Affairs) now functions under an Additional Secretary (it started with a Joint Secretary) with two Directors, two Deputy Secretaries and one Deputy Director at the divisional levels. The research-complement of the Department at the operative levels of investigation and study consists of Under Secretaries, Senior (Management) Analysts, Junior Analysts, Research Assistants, and Investigators. The two functional divisions of the department are: (1) Management advice, *i.e.* the Consultancy Division, and (2) Management Education-cum-O & M Division. The first undertakes consultancy assignments (mainly on invitation from various ministries, other government offices and even public sector enterprises) on structural, procedural and other efficiency aspects of the entire organization, functioning through fairly well-trained study teams of researchers who conduct painstaking investigations into the problem-areas, both in depth and *in extenso*, with the aid of modern quantitative techniques of management, 'case study' being

<sup>22</sup> As early as 1947, A. D. Gorwala recommended the setting up of a Directorate of Methods & Training Organization as an agency for improving the competence of young administrators. A year later, the Economy Committee recommended the "creation of a separate organization to exercise strict control over the procedures and personnel of all ministries and to suggest improvements in the organization and method of work." Then came the First Five Year Plan (1962) which specifically recommended the setting up of an Organization & Methods Division. A. D. Gorwala's later Report on *Public Administration*, 1951 and Paul H. Appleby's *Public Administration in India—Report of a Survey*, 1953, created the right climate for establishing an O & M Division in the Government of India in 1954.

its principal tool. The study involves steps like reconnaissance and concretization of problems; determination of study design and methodology; collection, collation and analysis of significant data; preparing preliminary report and tentative recommendations; negotiation and discussions with client organizations; and, finally, submission of reports. The second division deals with training in work study techniques and normal O & M work; liaises with internal work study units of the ministries; undertakes horizontal studies of foundational and fundamental type; has a research and administrative intelligence unit under it which functions as a kind of 'data-bank' for 'intelligence' (*i. e.* information) storage and retrieval; and publishes the Department's quarterly journal, *Management in Government*. The journal has been conceived as the instructional medium to transmit to the officers of the Central and State Governments the latest management concepts and progressive practices and to flash the quantitative tools and techniques of management in vogue in India and abroad—which, in sum, constitute the core of modern decision-making technology. There is also an 'Implementation Cell' in this division, which oversees and coordinates the implementation efforts of Administrative Reforms Commission's recommendations contained in its various reports.

This article is no place for performance evaluation of the Department of Administrative Reforms but it would be pertinent to record here that the Department, as the nodal agency for initiating reforms in the government, has done some real pioneering work in the field of applied administrative research as also in piloting quite a few 'break-through' reforms.\* It has, in short, done quite well in the role of what Paul H. Appleby would call "trouble shooter, bottleneck-breaker, procedural reformer and structural adviser".

Some general observations on the 'agency form' of reform may not be out of place. First, there is the inescapable need to have professionally trained, well-motivated and highly committed personnel for a reforms body, engaged as it is in a critical 'staff' function involving system-destruction and reconstruction. There is already an acute anaemia of qualified and skilled researchers of right orientation and innovative temperament and, therefore, whatever number is available, should not be allowed to rust or waste out, just to pay homage to conventional personnel policy. This calls for at least two things:

- (1) a flexible, elastic staffing pattern, and

\*For a structural-functional model of the Department and its prospective pattern of growth, please see C. James Gardner (U. N. Inter Regional Adviser in Public Administration), *Report on the Department of Administrative Reforms*, 1967.



- (2) a bold and dynamic training programme, executive obsolescence being a crucial element in efficiency erosion.

The top manager incharge of reform-movement must have an absolutely free hand to experiment with prolonged tenure with 'home' benefits, where personnel are obtained on deputation or formation of a permanent cadre of management analysts, if tenure system does not work. The personnel in the reforms organization (as elsewhere) must periodically undergo 'horizon exposure' programmes and 'skill renewal' drills related to the 'trend' tasks flowing from the nature and level of functional competence required and the course of reforms-movement in future.

Thus, the reform-organization itself should be a 'reformed' one, organizationally speaking. It should be, as far as possible, hierarchy-free; and super-ordination and sub-ordination relationships, authority and command, etc., should not be the dominant tone of such an organization. It should not accumulate traditional secretariat and bureaucratic 'vices', that is to say, their dysfunctional behavioural traits. It should be enabled to make structural experiments—'matrix' pattern or the Japanese 'Pair System' being some of the forms for encouraging administrative research. The department may, for higher effectivity, be divided, at divisional level, on the basis of strict functional specializations, and training should be geared to such specialized tasks.

The work environment and organizations 'culture' should be creativity-oriented and innovative; freedom of thinking should be encouraged at every level, with individuality in research recognized and rewarded.

Even in the methods of work, there should be a break from traditional noting-based secretariat system—it should, on the contrary, be research-oriented. Then, the consultancy work, through which such departments functions, must not be purely invitation-based. The department itself should identify the foundational and perspective problems and study them or arrange to get them studied by competent outside or inside agencies or institutes, for which purpose close liaison has necessarily to be maintained with professional bodies, like Institutes of Management and Public Administration, training academies, universities, etc. This kind of an 'open door' policy is contingent on the healthy growth of cooperative reforms movement not only in the limited governmental sector but in the country in general. The Fulton Committee Report (U.K.) on *Civil Service* as also the Administrative Reforms Commission's Report on the *Machinery of Government of*

*India and Its Procedures of Work* both emphasise 'hiving off' and farming out reorganization studies to outside agencies for more effective reforms, depending on the particular situations of competence, time, cost, etc. There seems to exist, however, a little scepticism in this country about this concept of liberal exchange of reform-research.

Another defect from which departmentalized form of initiating reforms suffers is that it lacks the professional high status associated with outside agencies; but what it might, if at all, lack in professionalism is often met by 'authority' invested in an inside governmental organization. One other noticeable drawback is that the reforms being essentially a staff function and advisory, not mandatory in nature, the department of reforms usually avoids being involved in the implementation process. This, in many cases, makes reform-suggestions somewhat 'ivory-towerish', as the department making them will not have to work the recommendations in actual practice. To eliminate this, either there should invariably be a kind of 'laboratory' or pilot experimentation of gauging feasibility of particular recommendations or the department must be associated directly at every stage of implementative process, not to speak of any review exercise to be undertaken later.

The Department of Administrative Reforms in India reflects the imperative urgency for continually looking into what could be called 'minor vices' or aberrations in organizational form or procedural norms, so as to ensure that there is no sapping of administrative vitality, and performance level is maintained at as high a point as necessary for all-round development. Perhaps with a more rational staffing arrangement and a more vigorous area-training programmes, with permanency in incumbency or much longer contractual agreements than what normal deputation (or tenure) rules permit, with more authority invested in the department in initiating and installing reform, the department can, in liaison with internal work study units in various ministries and Staff Inspection Unit (of the Ministry of Finance) surely be the most significant 'live wire' agency to tone up the entire administration. One great care that needs to be taken is that the reform-staff must continually undergo 'renewal' programmes—imbibing new orientation, acquiring new skills and going through higher and higher education.

#### CONCLUDING OBSERVATION

It is thus seen that if administrative reform is viewed as stimulated change-activity, with properly planned priority, *i.e.*, with 'why', 'what', and 'when' dimensions, there is no escape from adopting the agency process. But it could also mean un-induced change, which comes

through operation of other politico-economic and social processes and in which case change, though desirable, takes its own course and time. There can, of course, be no prefabricated, universally applicable one single strategy of reforms. The positive reform-process, whether operating at the macro level through comprehensive commissions or at the micro level through a permanent departmental—agency, often leads one to disenchantment about administrative reforms in general, because first, macro measures, having long gestation-period, seem counter-productive in the short run, and, second, micro reforms do not have demonstrative impact and are rather 'slow-motion pictures' reflecting the graduality of change and also the evolutionary character of reforms, though of induced variety. But it is also true that no major break-through in administrative capability and through that in the sphere of all-round developmental efforts is possible unless the 'administrative reform' itself is made a substantive area of governmental activity; the purpose cannot be achieved by relegating it to the insignificant side-lines. To re-state, the fundamental objective of administrative reforms is the improvement of administration; looked at from the other side of the prism, it is the cure of maladministration, attainment of efficient performance at minimum cost or resources, and the development of whatever changes are required to enable administrative organs to execute public policies in an effective and responsible manner.<sup>23</sup> If administrative reforms aim (in short) at

- changing of operating policies, programmes and procedures,
- increasing the administrative effectiveness,
- raising the level of staff performance, and
- anticipating outside criticism and threat,

it is obvious that such an important activity itself cannot be put, to reluctantly use a jargon, 'on welfare'. It is no use having reforms agency as a trendy fashion-piece or to silence merely the noise raised either in Parliament or in press or on party platforms. It is true unfortunately that the rectangle of modernization opportunity is extremely limited compared to the reformer's perception of the magnitude of change needed;<sup>24</sup> also, there are other serious constraints—time, resources, administrative capabilities, lack of counterpart change on socio-political fronts, as also the institutional inertia. But given conviction and commitment, an inspiring reform-leader can, slowly but steadily,

<sup>23</sup> W. F. Finan and A. L. Dean, "Procedures for the Preparation and Implementation of Administrative Reforms", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1957.

<sup>24</sup> N. K. Mukharji, an unpublished paper on "Formulation on Administrative Reforms Strategy", 1971.

re-shape the administration to make it the most effective conveyor-belt of development.

I may now conclude by quoting the following eloquent sentences from Caiden by way of presenting a perceptive analysis of the perspective of administrative reforms:




"Reform is a calculated contravention of the principle of the dangerous precedent. It is more than a series of incremental changes or marginal adjustments, though it may result from the cumulation of small changes which periodically creates the requirement for comprehensive and systematic efforts. Merely incremental changes fail to respond adequately to shifting problems and needs, changes in the role and character of government and administrative structures, development of new knowledge, changing qualifications of personnel, and increased tensions generated by jarring elements. In time, however, incremental changes must lead to episodic-changes or to more comprehensive reorganizations (reforms) resulting from internal maladjustments. Reform is a form of creative destruction in that an old order is broken down to pave the way for a new order."<sup>25</sup>

If this is the perspective of administrative reforms, let us not fear to destroy, to build again.

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<sup>25</sup> Gerald E. Caiden, *op. cit.*

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## ADDRESS BY SHRIMATI INDIRA GANDHI, PRESIDENT OF THE INSTITUTE\*

I am glad to have this opportunity to be with you because, as Asokajit rightly said, the administration is the instrument through which all programmes of work for the country can be achieved. Even though this is perhaps one of the busiest times of the year, I took this opportunity to be with you. You all know that in the last four or five years there has been a general quickening of political consciousness. It has been obvious in India. But this consciousness of the people is a phenomenon which is visible, I think, in every country of the world. At some places, it takes the form of protests, movements and in other places different forms, but they are really different manifestations of the same thing, that is, through education, through growth, etc., people want to have greater participation in what is happening.

In India, because of our own problems and our own economic backwardness, naturally the people are not satisfied with the existing state of affairs. They want a much faster rate of growth. They want more equitable distribution of the fruits of our national endeavour. They want greater social justice and greater equality. They expect a great deal from political parties. They want service from them. They want changes in the legal system. And, I think, it is this general ferment which is at the root of the demand for administrative reform. To achieve these objectives, the administration must be imbued with a sense of need for change and development, the technical competence, the necessary knowledge and also the necessary attitude of mind.

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\*Delivered on October 22, 1971, at the Annual Meeting of the Institute at New Delhi.

†Shri Asoka Mehta, Chairman, Executive Council of IIPA.

Nothing in the world is ever static and we are at a time when things are moving much faster than ever before. So, whatever plan or programme we take up, including imparting of training, we have always to look into the future. The training is for a particular situation which exists today but it should simultaneously look into the future to see how that particular situation can be improved as we go along step by step, year after year. I find this is what is lacking, which is so obvious in the educational system not only of this country but of other countries also. Everybody is being prepared for *status quo* in a society, for conditions as they are, rather than the sort of society we want to have, a better society. I think, any training institute must deal with both these points of views simultaneously.

Here in India, and perhaps everywhere, Government's activities have increased in range, volume and complexity in the course of our planned economic development. The number of public employees has also increased and amongst those, who invoke the so-called Parkinson's Law, are many whose aim is not efficiency but reluctance to accept the need for the Government to undertake new responsibilities. Government's functions have increased as people's requirements and assertiveness have increased. Our country has rightly refused to adopt a negative attitude towards the functions of the Government and the role of civil servants. If Government has to do more for the people, its employees must play a more dynamic and more creative role as the instrument for implementing Government policies and programmes.

To be able to discharge its new responsibilities, the civil service must change itself. Some transformation has already occurred but much more is required in the years to come.

Development, even more than maintenance of continuity and order, has become the business of the administrative apparatus. The implementation of plan programmes requires a greater say for the expert and the technician and re-examination of old axioms so that the desire to enforce obedience to rules does not hold up work. At the same time, the general administrator himself has to acquire a greater understanding of economic and technological forces.

In all countries, today, there is a kind of battle between the expert and the generalist. Our aim should be to ensure that the country gets the best from both. Sometimes, I find that our experts are not expert enough. Nor are they immune from the common human frailty of in-fighting or a sense of hierarchy. Expert and generalist are both products of the same social *milieu*, and both must strive to equip

themselves for future tasks in a world where inter-disciplinary approach is becoming the key to advance.

It is against this perspective that we should keep under constant review our policies regarding recruitment and training of civil servants of different categories and the procedures for appraisal of their performance. No Government can possibly be run without rules and regulations. But these rules and regulations cannot be static. They must fit into the dynamics of a changing situation. We cannot consider satisfactory a state of affairs in which it is easier to amend a constitutional provision than some so-called fundamental rules or civil service regulations.

I am not here to spell out the required changes in rules and regulations; it is for experts in administration like you to think about these things and to find a way out. I would only like to stress that the procedures and practices should encourage initiative, foster innovation, match responsibilities and powers, and create a sense of participation at all levels. We call ourselves a participatory democracy; our administrative system should reflect the spirit of involvement. The question of rank should give place to sense of partnership and working together.

The vast majority of Government servants—whether they are clerks or engineers or tax officers or general administrators—have a career extending over nearly three decades. During this long period, every civil servant will necessarily witness striking changes in the society around him. When the young civil servant of today—whether he is on a technical or a non-technical post—rises to the top, he will see a world vastly different from the one in which he had joined service. Obviously, he should strive for a continuous upgradation of his skills.

I, therefore, attach great importance to the programmes of training—initial training as well as in-service training—to all categories of civil servants. Apart from formal training, I would consider it even more important for a civil servant to develop an enquiring mind receptive to new ideas, and a restless spirit which keeps urging him constantly to find ways of doing assigned tasks better and more efficiently. These are the positive qualities which the country expects from the civil servants of tomorrow. Negatively, they should try and keep away from cynicism and the attitude of taking the line of least resistance. We should place on a rational basis our procedures for the identification of talent, nurturing of talent, and of rewarding such talent. Nothing can be more frustrating than talent unrewarded. A society cannot progress if only seniority of rank counts. Public administration must get out of the shadows of feudalism.

One important administrative problem of today—and the subject of many of your studies—is delegation. But we can interpret this narrowly to mean that an agency or executive should be in a position to make day-to-day decisions without the Secretariat in Delhi (or in the State capital) breathing down his neck. Often the heads of institutions to whom power is delegated do not share it with their colleagues, and do not develop the spirit and mechanism of team work. The aggrieved go back to the same old central authority for redress. This is an area in which there is great need of new practices and conventions.

Another problem is that of attitudes. Our civil service is largely drawn from the urban areas and is urban-oriented, while the majority of our people live in rural areas. With the broadening of the base of our educational system and the wider dispersal of facilities for higher education, we should expect the class composition of our services to change. But this will take time. In the meantime, the problem of knowing as to how to impart to the civil servant—whether he is an administrator, like a collector or a doctor or an irrigation engineer—a sense of identification with the problems of the poor of the rural areas remains. How are we to ensure that they have intuitive sympathy with the people and have a livelier appreciation of their problems and difficulties? The inculcation of proper attitudes should perhaps begin in our educational institutions. But the process must be carried through and completed in the course of the civil servant's career under the Government.

Our civil servants had to undergo a major process of adjustment at the time of transfer of power in 1947. Because of the need for continuity, we did not then make structural changes in the system which were necessary. By and large, the process of adjustment was smoothly completed. As Government's policies are becoming increasingly egalitarian, a similar process of adjustment is now called for. There is urgent need for radical attitudinal changes, particularly at the points at which the administration comes in contact with the people, for example, the block development office, the taluka office, the police station, the post office, the railway ticket booth and so on. Greater courtesy, speed and consideration in dealing with the people is called for.

The cooperation of civil servants and their associations should be enlisted in bringing about a visible improvement in the manner in which these public offices at the grassroot level function. Higher ranks of civil servants have a special responsibility in providing effective leadership to bring about such improvement.

In the process of expansion of our social welfare and social security schemes, we are setting up new agencies and institutions. It is particularly necessary that these agencies and institutions, for example, the Employees' State Insurance hospitals and dispensaries, and offices which give scholarships and aid to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, should have men imbued with genuine compassion and concern. But the complaint at present is that the smallest government functionary acts with condescension and callousness towards the villager, while he himself resents the same attitude on the part of higher officers.

Much of what I have said applies even more to our public sector undertakings. There we need a greater sense of commitment to social objectives, greater scope for the technical element, greater delegation of authority down the line, greater involvement and the development of a corporate spirit. In short, a new culture. The public enterprises must primarily fulfil their economic role. By efficient functioning they should add to the nation's economic strength and also to budgetary resources. They should help to foster a new ethic in administration.

Democracy has struck roots in our country. Whatever theories of administration we may evolve, or whatever system we may fashion, these should be acceptable to the people and promote their interests. Our democratic system has enabled an increasingly large number of people to acquire direct experience of administration through elective offices as members of panchayats or panchayat samitis, zila parishads, state legislative assemblies or Parliament. We, thus, have people in different walks of life who have had occasion to observe our administrative system from positions of vantage, and have some ideas on how the machinery functions and how it could be reshaped. I hope the Institute has devised or will devise arrangements by which there could be mutually beneficial inter-action between experts and holders of elective offices.

I am very glad to hear from Shri Asoka Mehta about your proposed work in the regional languages because it is obvious that we can deal with the people only through their languages and we can understand them much better if we know their languages. So, we have to develop the regional languages and we have also to promote the knowledge of Hindi which, as you know, I always call the national link language. It is not because we want to force the language on anybody, but merely from the very practical point of view of getting to know each other, of communicating with each other, it is absolutely essential to have one language which all the persons in this country can understand and speak. Of course, for those who are in administration, it is even more necessary than the ordinary person.

We have very many problems in this country. We think, it is because we are backward, because we are big, because we became independent recently. But actually, even the smallest country thinks that it has an equal number of problems. So, problems are not merely because of bigness. I think, there are problems wherever there is man, and if we can learn not just to deal with the problems but to deal with the man behind the problem or concerned with the problem, I think, we can find a more durable solution. In the modern world, I find that more and more we think of people not as individuals with problems or difficulties or joys and sorrows but as statistics, whether one is a Harijan or one is of some caste, or one is educated unemployed. Everybody is in some category or the other very neatly labelled and so we forget that behind these labels each person is an entirely different person. Of course, no administrator can deal with each individual but at least, if he thinks of these groups as composed of individuals, it would bring about a difference in his attitude; if he looks at each person not as a person who has come with a problem but as a person with whose help we can solve the problem, I think we would have already moved one step towards finding a proper solution.

Shri Asoka Mehta has said very kind words about me as leader and so on. But perhaps you know that I have quite strong views in the matter. The whole point of democracy is that we should not work with a concept of leader-and-led but we should evolve a concept of partnership. We are here all involved in trying to create a better standard of living without damaging or diminishing the spirit of the people, because we find in many places where the standard of living has gone up, it has not really always made them better people or happier people. So, we have this tremendous task and we can only do it in a spirit of cooperation and partnership, and I think perhaps the most important thing that all of us, whether we are in the administration or not, have to learn is how to work together for the common good of all. I sincerely hope that this Institute will work towards this end and I am sure all those who come out of here will help us to take our country forward and to take it to such heights about which our leaders have taught and dreamt.

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## COALITIONAL POLITICS, NATION-BUILDING AND ADMINISTRATION: FROM MYTHS TO REALITIES

*Iqbal Narain and Mohan Lal Sharma*

THERE appears to be an *a priori* assumption in India that coalitional politics is anti-thesis both of nation-building and effective administration.<sup>1</sup> The built-in preference for the British model of parliamentary government in the psyche of the elite in India, the long span of one-party dominance from 1947 to 1967 and the prospects of its revival in the wake of Fifth Lok Sabha elections,<sup>2</sup> the phenomena of defections and the consequent governmental instability<sup>3</sup> and the persistent and living association of constitutional, political and administrative controversies with the panorama of coalitional politics—these, among others, have contributed to the weakening of the sense of efficacy in the coalitional model of politics in India. It is being argued in this article that both the pride about majority governments and the prejudice against coalitional politics<sup>4</sup> need be subjected to rigorous empirical enquiry before normative myths about their efficacy are given the status of empirically formulated conclusions. The objective of the article is to build a rationale and simultaneously offer a few descriptive hypotheses for this enquiry.

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<sup>1</sup> For theoretical and empirical perspectives on nation-building and the role of administration in this process, see: (1) Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order*, New Delhi, Wiley (Eastern University edition), 1964; (2) Ralph Braibanti (ed.), *Political and Administrative Development*, Durham, Duke University, 1969; (3) Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, *Nation-building*, New York, Atherton, 1966; and (4) Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton, Princeton University, 1963. For a theoretical treatment of coalition politics, see William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, New Haven, Yale University, 1968.

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of the theme, see Iqbal Narain, "Democratic Interlude for Nation-building: Fifth Lok Sabha Elections", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VI, No. 38 (September 18, 1971), pp. 2023-2028.

<sup>3</sup> For details, see Subhas C. Kashyap, "The Politics of Defection: An Enquiry into the Changing Contours of the Political Power Structure in State Politics in India", *Asian Survey*, Vol. X, No. 3, (March 1970), pp. 195-208.

<sup>4</sup> In a sense, India had a coalitional model of politics under the one-party dominance system. (For details, see Rajni Kothari, *Politics in India*, New Delhi, Orient Longmans, 1970, Chapter V, pp. 152-224). Here, however, the focus of enquiry is inter-party coalitional politics resulting in coalitional governments in the post-1967 general elections period and not the intra-Congress party coalition making to which Rajni Kothari refers.

## II

It may be worthwhile to reflect here for a while on the nature of coalitional politics in India.

(1) Coalitional politics in India in the post-1967 period represents a dynamic and not a static situation. It appears to be undergoing a process of transformation through distinct, though not always exclusive, phases of growth which can be identified as:

- (a) the phase of anti-Congress, non-ideological coalitional politics (1967-69);
- (b) the phase of anti-Congress, programmatic coalitional politics (1969: from mid-term poll to Congress split); and
- (c) the phase of politico-programmatic coalitional politics (1969: Congress split and after).

It can, thus, be argued that it is premature to give a final negative verdict about coalitional politics in India which has yet not attained a stage of equilibrium in its life. It may also be hypothesized that coalitional governments in one phase may be more functional to nation-building and effective administration than in others and as such a blanket observation about their efficacy which treats the three phases of change and growth as clubbed together may not be in keeping with the postulates and demands of a scientific enquiry.

(2) It may also be contended that it is not coalitional politics *per se* but the nature and type of coalitional politics which would determine the functionality or otherwise of coalitional politics with nation-building and effective administration. It may be remembered in this context that India has had not one but several patterns<sup>5</sup> of coalitional politics, like electoral-alliance-turned-governmental coalition<sup>6</sup> with its counterpart in post election governmental coalition<sup>7</sup>, ideologically homogeneous governmental coalition<sup>8</sup> with its alternative in ideologically heterogeneous

<sup>5</sup> A scientific multi-variable based typology of coalitions in India is yet to be attempted. For a tentative attempt in this regard, see Iqbal Narain, "Coalitional Politics in India and Political System: The Crisis of Compatibility", *Twilight or Dawn: the Political Change in India (1967-71)*, Agra, Shiv Lal Agarwala and Sons (1971), pp. 138-140.

<sup>6</sup> The coalitional governments in Kerala both after 1967 general election and 1970 mid-term poll, in Orissa after general election of 1967, in Punjab after the mid-term poll and up to June 1970, and in West Bengal after the mid-term, poll illustrate the type.

<sup>7</sup> The coalitional governments in U.P., Bihar and Madhya Pradesh after fourth general election offer instances in point.

<sup>8</sup> Swatantra-Jan Congress coalition in Orissa would bear out the type.

governmental coalition,<sup>9</sup> leftist,<sup>10</sup> rightist<sup>11</sup> and centrist governmental coalitions<sup>12</sup> and the like. It can, thus, be safely hypothesized that one type of coalitional model may be more compatible with nation-building and effective administration than others. This may be so because there may be certain built-in elements in the nature, approach and style of one model of coalitional politics that may serve as greater incentive in some specific fields for nation-building and effective administration than in other models.

(3) The logic of centralized pattern of national planning,<sup>13</sup> the dynamics of the varied patterns of civic culture<sup>14</sup> with accent on economic enterprise or otherwise of the people of different States and use and interplay of technological inputs and pulls and pressures of support structure of parties may also be helpful in narrowing down the distinction between performance profiles of majority party and coalitional governments.

(4) The continuance of Congress government at the Centre, its political needs and links and, more importantly, the ideological congruence or otherwise of the ruling coalitional party combinations at the State level with the party at the Centre add to the complexity of coalitional models and variety in their performance potential.

We now turn to illustrate the descriptive hypotheses identified above with the help of such indices as stability, attitude to and handling of law and order situation, strides in the field of development administration with special reference to land reforms, perception of the role of civil service both by the political and administrative elites and the pattern of relationship between the two and, finally, tension areas between Union and the States.

<sup>9</sup> SVD governments in U.P., M.P. and Bihar can be cited as examples.

<sup>10</sup> UF government in West Bengal would illustrate the point.

<sup>11</sup> Swatantra-Jan Congress coalition in Orissa and Akali-Jana Sangh coalition in Punjab can be cited as examples.

<sup>12</sup> The type is conceptually possible, when the two essentially centrist parties like Congress (O) and Congress (R) decide to join hands and form a government. Congress (R) and BKD coalition in U.P. can also be cited as an example.

<sup>13</sup> For impact of centralized pattern of national planning, see (i) Asok Chanda, *Federalism in India: A Study of Union-State Relations*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1965; (ii) Administrative Reforms Commission, *Interim Report on the Machinery of Government of India*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1967; (iii) H.K. Paranjape, *Centre-State Relations in Planning*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1970; (iv) Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team: Centre State Relationships*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), Vol. I, 1967, pp. 91-156; and (v) Government of Tamil Nadu, *Report of the Centre-State Relations Inquiry Committee*, Madras, Government of Tamil Nadu, 1971, pp. 104-109.

<sup>14</sup> For a theoretical enunciation of the concept, see Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, Boston, Little Brown, 1965. The authors underscore, if not neglect altogether, the economic aspects of civic culture.

## III

Let us begin with the phenomenon of political instability. As Table I opposite would show, it is difficult to offer a generalized conclusion that all coalitional governments are equally unstable. Some are more stable than others. More importantly, some are quite stable. And this applies particularly to ideologically homogeneous coalitions as in Orissa and electoral-alliance-turned-governmental coalition as in Kerala. It may also be worthwhile to point out in this regard that political stability is not an *end-value* but an *instrumental-value* and as such a conscious effort is necessary to ensure that means do not get enshrined as an end and the quest for political stability does not become an earnest for stagnating *status quo*.<sup>15</sup>

## IV

This digression apart, the handling of the law and order situation by the coalitional governments also has neither been uniform nor disappointing in all cases. In fact, we come across a differentiated model of action with three distinct approaches emerging, though all may not agree with its built-in ideological overtones. Firstly, there is an *exclusive law and order situation with anti-social and anti-secular overtones*. The leftist coalitional government of West Bengal and the left parties dominated coalitional government of Bihar had been seriously up and doing in handling the situation.<sup>16</sup> There, in fact, appeared a new style of handling of law and order situation emerging. The minister-in-charge of Home portfolio and sometimes even the Chief Minister would be on the spot and issue instructions then and there. The efforts of the police would be supplemented by party cadres to yield results both with speed and effectiveness. Thus, the manner in which the communal riots were dealt with at Ranchi and Bagmari and Cossipur and other places in Calcutta under coalitional governments of Bihar and West Bengal respectively would offer a happy contrast to the handling of the situation at Ahmedabad and Indore under majority party government.<sup>17</sup> Secondly, there had been *law and order situations with socio-economic contextual moorings*. The Naxalite problem can be cited as an example.

<sup>15</sup> It may be argued that political stability has tended to become an end in itself almost synonymous with immobilism on the eve of fourth general election under one party dominance and hence the people registered a protest vote against this situation. In contrast, the call of *stability with and for change* by Indira Gandhi on the eve of fifth Lok Sabha election paid dividends because she restored the balance and treated political stability as an instrumental value and not as an end in itself.

<sup>16</sup> For details, see *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. II, No. 14 (April 8, 1967), pp. 669-70.

<sup>17</sup> For details in regard to Ranchi riots, see *The Statesman*, August 21, 1967; for Ahmedabad riots, see *ibid*, October 13, 1969; and for Indore riots, see *The Times of India*, June 19, 1969 and July 4, 1969.

Table I  
Stability Pattern of Coalitional Governments

State	Number of Governmental Changes since 1967	Average Period of Government's Life (in months)	Number of Spells of President's Rule	Average Period of President's Rule (in months)	Leader of Present State Government together with Date of Appointment
Bihar	8	5.6	2	8.5	Bhola Paswan Shashtri June 2, 1971.
Haryana	2	3.2	1	6.8	Bansi Lal May 21, 1968.
Kerala	2	20.5	1	3.0	Achuta Menon October 4, 1970.
Madhya Pradesh	3	8.3	—	—	S. C. Shukla March 26, 1969.
Punjab	4	11.1	1	6.8	President's Rule June 15, 1971.
Uttar Pradesh	5	7.3	2	6.2	Kamalapati Tripathi April 4, 1971.
West Bengal	4	7.4	2	12.5	President's Rule June 29, 1971.
Orissa	1	45.9	1	3.7	B. N. Das April 3, 1971.

SOURCE: Compiled from newspapers.

The United Front government in West Bengal would, therefore, combine police approach with emphasis on speedy and effective land reforms, while the majority party government in Andhra would deal with it only as an exclusive law and order situation with the help of police force.<sup>18</sup> Thirdly, there had been law and order situations with political overtones relating to *bundhs*, strike by civil servants against the Centre, *gherao* and the like. Here, ideological commitment of coalitional partners would handicap the governmental effort to deal with law and order situation, as they would, for example, treat *gherao* as a legitimate instrument of protest and to protect and pursue the interests of the labour force. The crisis in the end precipitated to a point that the Chief Minister in West Bengal had to go on hunger strike and undertake a mass *satyagraha* against his own Home Minister.

## V

Let us now turn for a while to the field of development administration and reflect on the performance of coalitional governments in the fields of land reform, foodgrain supply, agriculture development including investment/expenditure on minor irrigation, industrial growth pattern, control of price line, enrolment statistics in schools and the like.

(1) As far as land reforms are concerned, it may be recalled here that the Congress governments had not succeeded in registering substantial progress in the implementation of land reform measures either in terms of enforcement of land ceiling Acts or allotment of lands to the landless agricultural workers. At the most, the feudal agro-economy characterised by absentee landlordism was transferred into a *Kulak* economy.<sup>19</sup> As far as performance of coalitional governments in the field of land reforms is concerned, the pattern is again varied. We come across at least three categories of performance profiles. In the first category, we would place the Achuta Menon's ministry in Kerala that addressed itself to the task with ideological purposiveness, sincerity

<sup>18</sup> For details, see *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. II, No. 23 (June 10, 1967), pp. 1036-37; and *The Times of India*, January 4 and 11, 1970. For failures of economic measures of the State Government, see despatch entitled, "Background to Srikakulam: Neglect of Tribal People in Andhra" from a Special Correspondent to *Mainstream*, Vol. VI, No. 53 (June 22, 1968), pp. 25-28.

<sup>19</sup> About the growth of *Kulak* economy, especially in the wake of new agricultural strategy, telling conclusions have been arrived at by Francine Frankel who studied agricultural modernization and social change in five IADP districts. For a serialized version of the main trends of the study, see issues of *Mainstream*, November 29, 1969 (pp. 9-12); December 13, 1969 (pp. 17-23); December 20, 1969 (pp. 17-25); December 27, 1969 (pp. 27-33); and January 3, 1970 (pp. 17-25). Also see H.D. Malaviya, "Proposals for Land Reforms in India: A Review of Implementation", *Mainstream*, December 27, 1969, pp. 17-26; and gist of "World Bank Report on Indian Economy" for 1969-70 in *The Times of India*, June 28, 1971.

and effectiveness. It may be recalled here that the land reform measures had been initiated in Kerala by the Namboodiripad's ministry, but the ministry was out of office before the differences among the coalitional partners on the nature and extent of land reform measures could be resolved.<sup>20</sup> The Achuta Menon's ministry under the Land Revenue Act, 1970, could abolish landlordism and could provide for conferment of occupancy rights on the tenant cultivator on payment of fixed compensation. Reclamation of land under the ceiling Act and its re-distribution with regularization of *Benami* holdings with the landless was also brought about.<sup>21</sup> The second category refers to coalitional government of Daroga Rai and the subsequent Bhola Paswan's ministry in Bihar, two Ajoy Mukherjee ministries in West Bengal and the EMS Namboodiripad's ministry in Kerala. These ministries did initiate moves in the direction of lowering of land ceilings, regularization of *benami* land in favour of the landless and the like. But they could not achieve a substantial break-through on account of intra-coalitional differences,<sup>22</sup> short span of the life of ministries and their involvement in politics of survival. There is, however, little doubt about their

<sup>20</sup> Cf. K.C. John's despatch on land reforms in Kerala entitled "U.F. Partners Fall out" states the following:

"Within the ruling United Front itself, differences have cropped up about many provisions of the Bill and the general political approach of the Government to land reform.

"The Muslim League, for instance, agrees that the right of resumption of land should be given to the small holder. But it says that compensation should be given to all small holders for loss of land and not only to those who pay sales tax. The CPI says that the Bill is seriously defective insofar as it will not enable hutment dwellers to purchase all the land on which their hutments are situated.

"The Indian Socialist Party opposes the provision which confers on planters the right to extend their plantations to the adjoining uncultivated area.

"The Marxists recently declared that they would not wait for the enactment of the Bill to secure land for the landless. They would seize land in excess of the ceiling and settle the landless on it." (*The Times of India*, September 11, 1969)

<sup>21</sup> For details, see serialized article by K.V.K. Warriar, "Kerala Shows the Way", *Mainstream*, June, 27, 1970, pp. 9-10; July 4, 1970, pp. 23-27; and July 11, 1970, pp. 23-25. Also see N. Gopinathan Nair, "Kerala Land Reforms—Valuable Model to Emulate", *ibid.*, June 13, 1970, pp. 33-35. It may also be added here that the Kerala High Court also appreciated some provisions of State Land Reforms Act, though it declared its certain sections as invalid. (*The Statesman*, August 19, 1970)

<sup>22</sup> Jagannath Sarkar commented on skirmishes among coalitional partners on the issue of land reforms in Bihar in these words:

"Thus, by evaluating and assessing the performance of the Daroga Rai government, it can be said that even in Bihar the Indira Congress has to undergo differentiation and split before it can become fit to be considered as a fullfledged partner in an alliance of Left-democratic parties." (Jagannath Sarkar, "Bihar: Prospects Before New Ministry", *Mainstream*, May 30, 1970, p. 20.) Also see *Link*, September 19, 1971.

Similarly, in West Bengal also the situation was as follows:

"In West Bengal, the landlords and *Kulaks* are reported to have entered in parties like the Bangla Congress, SSP and even to some extent in the two communist parties and, therefore, it was difficult to arrive at any consensus on the issue of land reforms. Still, parties tried in their individual capacity to deal with tenancy and redistribution problems, though it created violent tensions." (For details, see a serialized article on the subject entitled "Rural Unrest in West Bengal" by Sankar Ghosh in *The Times of India*, January 22 and 23, 1970.) See also a survey of 'Promise & Performance of the Second UF' under the title "West Bengal U.F.'s Promises Submerged by Bloody Struggle" in *The Statesman*, January 1, 1971.



concern for quickening the tempo of land reforms and marginal gains that they achieved in the process.<sup>23</sup> Finally, there is the third category of coalitional governments which, in spite of their pronouncement of concern for land reforms, failed to do anything in practice and this often resulted in unrest and mounting tensions. Thus, Mahamaya Prasad Sinha's ministry would give up office leaving only unresolved tensions behind between Jana Sangh, on the one hand, and the CPI and the CPI(M), on the other,<sup>24</sup> over land reform measures to be taken. Again, in Punjab, no coalitional government deemed it fit to give a fair consideration to the problem of land reforms. In U.P., Charan Singh, the then Chief Minister who led Congress (R)-BKD coalition, had to go back over the promises that he had made in regard to the lowering of land ceilings.<sup>25</sup> Thus, the experience of handling of land reforms by coalitional governments only confirms the conclusion arrived at elsewhere in connection with the role of a majority government in this regard:

"In sum, the issue of land reforms has so far tended to be more political than ideological. It should, therefore, not be surprising if considerations about the political cost of land reforms and not so much its ideological dividends turn out to be the ultimate determinant of the thought and action of the political elite on this issue. The crux of the problem of land reforms in India appears to be that their ideological rationale should also become politically paying in terms of the support structure of the ruling party. Unless that happens, the logic of democratic politics will continue to militate against the ideological rationale of land reforms and thereby inhibit any real progress in their regard."<sup>26</sup>

(2) As far as agricultural development is concerned, the data in Tables II and III about sanctioned agricultural schemes and the expenditure incurred on minor irrigation works respectively are revealing. They show that, given determination, the coalitional governments may do as well (if not better) as the majority party governments. Punjab,

<sup>23</sup> Thus, the drive that the second UF government launched in West Bengal to recover the *benami* land was of great help to tenant cultivators and landless workers. (For details, see a correspondent's report on the subject in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. IV, No. 38 (September 20, 1971), p. 1505 and Sankar Ghosh, *op. cit.* About the situation in Bihar, see Jitendra Singh, "Land Reforms Tempo Quickens in Bihar", *The Times of India*, August 16, 1970, and Link, June 13, 1971.

<sup>24</sup> For details, see (i) a serialized article from a staff reporter in *Patriot* published under the head "Bihar Peasant on the Edge of Revolt", in issues of December 29 and 30, 1967; and (ii) Dilip Mukerjee, "Beyond the Defeat of the U. F. Ministry in Bihar", *The Statesman*, January 26, 1968.

<sup>25</sup> For details, see a special reporter entitled "Uttar Pradesh : Government's Hasty Retreat", *Mainstream*, March 30, 1970, pp. 10-11.

<sup>26</sup> This is the conclusion of Iqbal Narain and Arvind K. Sharma in "Union-State Relations in India: A Case Study in the Context of Land Reforms in Rajasthan" (*mimeo graphed*), pp. 44-45.

for example, approximates the performance of Andhra Pradesh and Mysore in regard to formulation and working of agricultural schemes in terms of financial outlay. In contrast, Assam, Rajasthan and Jammu & Kashmir did poorly in spite of their having majority party governments.<sup>27</sup> A similar trend is borne out by Table III, where it would be seen that U.P. and Bihar incurred largest expenditures on minor irrigation works during 1967-68 under coalitional governments. In fact, the investment in Bihar improved by 72.1 per cent and in U.P. by 31.5 per cent over the respective performance of Congress majority party governments in these States during 1966-67. This happened in spite of the fact that 1966-67 was the election year when there should be

Table II

**State-wise Distribution of Agriculture Development Schemes as  
Financed or Sanctioned by Agriculture Refinance Commission  
over a Period from April 1963 to March 1971**

<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>States</i>	<i>Number of Schemes</i>	<i>Financial Outlay (Rs. crores)</i>
1	Andhra Pradesh	63	36.50
2	Tamil Nadu	56	25.00
3	Mysore	33	32.00
4	Punjab	29	33.00
5	Gujarat	40	24.00
6	Maharashtra	37	19.50
7	Kerala	23	6.50
8	Haryana	17	18.00
9	Uttar Pradesh	10	25.00
10	West Bengal	6	4.00
Rest*		108	56.50
Total :		422	280.00

\*State-wise break up of rest of the schemes and outlays were not available. Hence, given however, this includes all the remaining States and the Union Territories.

SOURCE: Compiled from *The Times of India*, September 15, 1971.

<sup>27</sup> These governments have been clubbed with the rest in the table as separate data about them were not available.

Table III

**State-wise Comparative Statement of Investment Expenditure on Minor Irrigation over a Period of Two Years (1966-67 and 1967-68)**

<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>States</i>	<i>1966-67 (Rs. crores)</i>	<i>1967-68 (Rs. crores)</i>	<i>Total Increase or Decrease (Rs. crores)</i>	<i>Per cent Increase or Decrease</i>
1	Andhra Pradesh	6.41	5.56	—0.85	—13.3
2	Assam	1.35	1.28	—0.07	— 5.2
3	Bihar	7.17	12.34	+5.17	+72.1
4	Gujarat	0.60	4.80	+4.20	+70.0
5	Jammu & Kashmir	2.30	0.60	—1.70	—73.9
6	Kerala	6.50	5.93	—0.57	— 8.8
7	Madhya Pradesh	6.50	2.20	—4.30	—66.2
8	Madras	7.64	7.30	—0.34	— 4.5
9	Maharashtra	9.54	11.00	+0.46	+ 4.8
10	Mysore	6.20	7.30	+1.10	+17.7
11	Orissa	2.80	2.67	—0.13	— 4.6
12	Punjab & Haryana	3.25	4.99	+1.74	+53.5
13	Rajasthan	3.25	2.87	—0.38	—11.7
14	Uttar Pradesh	21.30	28.00	+6.70	+31.5
15	West Bengal	4.00	6.16	+2.16	+54.0
All States		84.82	103.00	+18.18	+21.3

SOURCE: B.V. Krishna Murti, "Investment Pattern for Fourth Plan", *Economic and Political Weekly*, March 1, 1969, p. 437.

a natural tendency to invest more in these activities for the sake of political dividends. Further, out of the seven governments showing increase in expenditure, four have been coalitional governments. Still further, the performance of coalitional governments have also been encouraging in terms of utilization of sanctioned amount of money. Take the case

of Bihar. In its nine-month rule, the first United Front government could get installed 7,000 pumping sets, while preceding majority party government had 10,000 pumping sets to their credit over a period of 15 years.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, the number of tube-wells sunk during the nine-month regime was 950, while 1,143 tube-wells were sunk in 15 years earlier.<sup>29</sup> The phenomenon of in-fighting within the preceding Congress governments largely accounts for their poor performance.<sup>30</sup>

(3) Again, the two year data about registration of industries in Table IV (*see* p. 594) would show that there is no reason to assume that the coalitional governments should necessarily lag behind in their efforts in regard to industrial growth. West Bengal, for example, compares well with Maharashtra in spite of the shadows of political instability and industrial unrest haunting the State. It may also be noted that the performance of the coalition government in this respect has been better than that of the government under the President's rule. Other States in both the categories of coalitional and majority governments are quite low on the ladder.

(4) Further, the coalitional governments need not necessarily do badly in controlling the price line also. The case of Kerala as seen in Table V (*see* p. 595) speaks for itself. While the prices were showing a rising curve till July 1967, there followed a short period of stabilization on a comparatively low key between August and December 1967. Since then, there has been a distinct and persistent trend towards decline in price index. Similarly, the first Gurnam Singh ministry in Punjab did well on this score.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>28</sup> *Dinman*, May 19, 1968, p. 17.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* Also *see* Dilip Mukerjee, *op. cit.*

<sup>30</sup> *cf.* a comment in *The Economic Times*, May 1, 1967: "Nature may have had a lot to do with the current sufferings in Bihar. But men can't be completely absolved. The malady of Bihar has long been a by-word and the two rival factions that have been fighting each other for years have been functioning more on caste, communal, and tribal lines than with any regard to welfare and interests of the people. Both politicians and the civil servants were equally tainted with this curse and the administration was a farce. There were no proper attempts made to procure, store or distribute foodgrains effectively. No tube-wells were promptly sunk and even the drilling gear obtained from the Centre for this purpose lay largely unused."

<sup>31</sup> *See* Satyapal Dang, "Behind Punjab Operation Topple: Vested Interests Crusade Against UF Ministry", *Mainstream*, Vol. VI, No. 16 (December 16, 1967), pp. 9-10. *See also* M. L. Ristogi, "Congress Returns to Power in Punjab", *The Times of India* (Republic Day Supplement), January 26, 1968.

Similarly, in case of West Bengal, it was reported that the first Ajoy Mukerjee Ministry could check the prices more effectively than the P. C. Ghosh Ministry and the President's Rule that followed it. It has been stated that though officially foodgrains prices were only 25 per cent higher than those used to be under the first UF Ministry, unofficial reports speak out of much greater difference in this regard. A Calcutta Correspondent's despatch to *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. III, No. 20 (May 18, 1968), p. 773.

Table IV

## State-wise Registrations of Industries

States/Union Territories	1967-68		1968-69	
	Public	Private	Public	Private
Andhra Pradesh	41	3	59	5
Assam, Manipur & Tripura	13	1	7	—
Bihar	20	3	15	2
Gujarat	54	3	59	4
Maharashtra	232	17	251	11
Kerala	24	2	40	6
Madhya Pradesh	13	—	17	2
Mysore	45	7	61	4
Orissa	12	1	9	—
Punjab, Haryana & Himachal Pradesh	51	2	67	2
Rajasthan	24	—	14	5
Tamil Nadu & Pondicherry	86	9	94	4
Uttar Pradesh	35	2	34	3
West Bengal	202	11	185	15
Delhi	113	9	123	3
Goa	7	2	7	—
Total:	972	72	1048	67

NOTE : Figures relate only to applications disposed of during the period and not to applications actually received

SOURCE: *The Times of India: Directory & Year Book*, 1970, p. 113.

Table V

**Index of Open Market Price in Kerala State**  
*(Base 1964-65 is equal to 100)*

<i>Month</i>	1965-66	1966-67	1967-68	1968-69
October	97.6	136.0	185.6	152.0
November	93.6	136.0	189.6	144.0
December	92.8	140.0	197.6	136.8
January	104.0	128.0	164.0	121.6
February	96.0	132.0	160.0	117.6
March	108.0	128.0	161.6	—
April	112.0	136.0	162.4	—
May	124.0	164.0	160.0	—
June	152.0	168.0	148.8	—
July	160.0	216.0	156.0	—
August	152.0	192.0	152.0	—
September	128.0	184.0	145.6	—
Annual Average	118.3	155.1	165.25	—

SOURCE: *The Economic Times*, March 21, 1969.

(5) Finally, the performance of coalition governments in terms of provision of schooling facilities and the consequent increase in enrolment bears out earlier trends. As it can be seen in Table VI, (see p. 596) Bihar and Kerala are on a par with Maharashtra and Gujarat in this respect as far as primary level of education is concerned.

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Madhya Pradesh	13	—	17	2
Mysore	45	7	61	4
Orissa	12	1	9	—
Punjab, Haryana & Himachal Pradesh	51	2	67	2
Rajasthan	24	—	14	5
Tamil Nadu & Pondicherry	86	9	94	4
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March	108.0	128.0	161.6	—
April	112.0	136.0	162.4	—
May	124.0	164.0	160.0	—
June	152.0	168.0	148.8	—
July	160.0	216.0	156.0	—
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**Table VI**  
**State-wise Distribution of Students Enrolled at Various Levels up to Higher Secondary**  
*(Numbers in thousands)*

Sl. No.	States	Primary			Middle			Higher Secondary		
		65-66	68-69	Percentage of increase in Col. 4 over Col. 3	65-66	68-69	Percentage of increase in Col. 7 over Col. 6	65-66	68-69	Percentage of increase in Col. 11 over Col. 10
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1	Andhra Pradesh	3769	3839	1.8	651	526	-19.2	342	542	58.5
2	Assam	1443	1566	8.5	327	360	10.1	207	225	8.7
3	Bihar	3961	4444	12.2	716	821	14.7	450	502	11.5
4	Gujarat	2665	2988	12.1	597	727	21.8	311	416	33.8
5	Haryana	804	855	6.3	206	308	49.5	85	111	30.6
6	Jammu & Kashmir	297	331	11.4	87	117	34.5	42	59	40.5
7	Kerala	2869	3219	12.2	865	984	13.8	369	412	11.6
8	Madhya Pradesh	2849	3142	10.3	564	712	28.0	270	331	22.6
9	Maharashtra	5194	5876	13.1	1223	1527	24.8	617	803	30.1
10	Mysore	3136	3279	4.6	578	647	11.9	288	263	-8.7
11	Naga Land	58	67	15.5	12.2	17.2	41.0	5.2	7.7	48.1
12	Orissa	1749	1899	8.6	251	305	21.4	101	147	45.5
13	Punjab	1334	1362	2.1	326	427	31.0	151	175	15.9
14	Rajasthan	1618	2013	24.4	330	425	28.8	139	183	31.7
15	Tamilnadu	4511	4921	9.2	1066	1273	19.5	551	690	25.2
16	Uttar Pradesh	9018	9935	10.2	1514	1659	9.6	795	930	17.0
17	West Bengal	3950	4367	10.6	854	990	4.6	377	535	44.6

SOURCE: *The Times of India : Directory & Year Book, 1970, pp. 372-73.*

## VI

We now turn to the problems of relationship between the political and the administrative elite under the aegis of coalitional governments in the country. We could preface this discussion with the period that the short-term trends relating to a period when bureaucracy may be adjusting itself to the transition from long extending era of the politics of one-party dominance to the new situation of multi-party competitive politics may not necessarily hold good in the future. The administrative culture<sup>32</sup> everywhere has great potential to adjust to and absorb change and India is no exception. Even, say in the present phase of transition, it is difficult to say that there is one uniform pattern of politico-administrative relationships and behaviour, let alone the question of their being entirely different from the situation obtaining in this regard in the phase of one-party dominance.<sup>33</sup>

To begin with, it is well to recognize that there had been psychological reservations both on the part of political and administrative elites. The coalitional partners would issue statements suspecting the loyalty of the civil servants<sup>34</sup> and fearing that the programmes would either be sabotaged or diluted in contents at the instance of the bureaucracy. The fear got strength from the long standing alleged links of the outgoing Congress ministers with the civil servants. The all-India services became all the more suspect because of their supervening loyalty to the Central Government, where the Congress Party still continued to rule. On the other hand, the civil servants feared victimization at the hands of new masters, many of whom they had put behind bars in one agitation or the other.<sup>35</sup> The psychic situation was reminiscent of the

<sup>32</sup> For theoretical perspectives on the subject in the specific context of France, see Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1971.

<sup>33</sup> For a perceptive analysis of problems at the national level during this period, see C. P. Bhambhri, *Bureaucracy and Politics in India*, Delhi, Vikas, 1971.

<sup>34</sup> This can be illustrated with the help of an extreme case from Bihar. Ramanand Tiwari, the Police Minister in Mahamaya Prasad Sinha ministry, filed a petition on April 3, 1967, in the Court of the District Magistrate, Patna, against the then S. D. O. and other police officers on charges of causing grievous hurt and attempt to murder. (*The Search Light*, April 5, 1967.) Similarly, a despatch from Calcutta in the wake of the Assembly assault case would report as late as August 1969, as follows: "Some of the Communist ministers are reported to have confessed their resuscitated faith in Lenin's 'State and Revolution' which warns against depending on the bourgeois state machine for implementation of a radical social programme." [*Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. IV, No. 38 (Aug. 9, 1969), p. 1297.]

<sup>35</sup> Haridwar Rai, in his competent analytic critique entitled "Politics of Coalition Government: The Experience of the First United Front Government in Bihar" also underlines the psychic contours of tensions between the administrative and the political elites. Quoting from *The Indian Nation*, May 22, 1967, he refers to a resolution of Bihar Civil Service Association which read, "The Association views with deep concern and resentment the recent trend on the part of the public leaders to intimidate, insult and humiliate members of services which impairs the efficiency and morale of the services so essential for the proper growth of a democratic and welfare State." (The article is being published in the forthcoming issue of the *Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies*, July-Sept. 1971, and we are thankful to the author for an advanced mimeographed copy.)

period of transfer of power from British to Indian hands in more than one way.

It will also be worthwhile to point out here that the political parties joining the coalitions would have different perceptions about the role of the civil service. For example, Jana Sangh, Swatantra and also the Congress would, by and large, prefer to operate through the civil service only in getting their programmes implemented. In contrast, the two Communist parties would underline the need of supplementing the efforts of the bureaucracy with the help of the party cadre and popular movements.<sup>36</sup> We may recall here the attempt of Achuta Menon ministry in Kerala to supplement the efforts of the civil servants in regard to the implementation of the land reform programmes. While Tehsildars were appointed in each *Taluqa* as tribunals to expedite the litigation cases in regard to the land occupancy matters and issues relating to fair rent and compensation to the landlords, people's representatives were also associated to serve as a check on the officials. Panchayat committees were also provided to extend a helping hand in conciliation and arbitration<sup>37</sup>. In West Bengal also, while on the one hand the administrative machinery was tightened so as to ensure that civil servants do not dilute the land reform measures, the party cadres were also unofficially entrusted with the role of the watchdogs on administration. In Bihar also, the Daroga Rai ministry, under pressure from the CPI, constituted arbitration boards to settle disputes over *bataidari* rights,<sup>38</sup> though the district officials had also been entrusted with wide powers to intervene in order to prevent foreseeable ejection of tenants. It has also been argued that the attitudes and the value commitments of the civil servants are more pro-*status quo* than pro-change,<sup>39</sup> and for this reason also there is need to supplement their effort and watch their performance.<sup>40</sup> Tamil Nadu offers a case in contrast where the DMK led government did not come to the rescue of the landless workers until 41 landless labourers and their huts were

<sup>36</sup> We may note here a difference of degree between CPI (M) and CPI. While the former would prefer to operate through bureaucratic machine, whether of the government or of the party, the latter would rely more on the popular movements.

<sup>37</sup> K. V. K. Warriar, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>38</sup> Jitendra Singh, *op. cit.*

<sup>39</sup> For interesting side-light on the subject, see C. P. Bhambhri, "The Administrative Elite and Political Modernization in India: A Study of the Value Attitudes of IAS Probationers 1970-71", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (January-March, 1971), pp. 47-64. The author underlines the fact that "ambivalence towards values is a characteristic feature of the modern educated elite in developing societies . . . . The modern man in a developing society lives at two levels of cognition."

<sup>40</sup> It may also be recalled in this context that the Revenue Minister in the B. C. Roy ministry in West Bengal also complained against the unhelpful attitude of the officials in regard to the land reform measures. (*Link*, November 26, 1961.) Thus, perhaps the distinction between majority party governments and the coalition governments may not always be relevant in this context.

burnt down by landlords, though the tensions had been brewing for quite a good deal of time.<sup>41</sup>

What has tended to complicate the situation further is the phenomenon of multiple control over the civil service, the four points in regard to which have been Coordination Committee, Chief Minister on behalf of cabinet or on his own behalf, minister concerned, party officials especially at district and tehsil levels, and to this at times Central Government is also added.<sup>42</sup> These agencies can work at cross purposes and this adds to the dismay and harassment of the civil servants on the one hand and gives them lee-way on the other to ignore their immediate political boss with impunity. This, at times, would result in serious crises. We may recall here the case of Inspector General of Police who is reported to have refused to see or attend a phone call from Ajoy Mukerjee, the Chief Minister in the early days of the first United Front ministry in West Bengal.<sup>43</sup> He wanted to contact the IGP to emphasize upon him the need of immediate and strict disciplinary action against the rowdy policeman of Howrah who had gone to assault, among others, an ex-M.P., an M.L.A., the district magistrate of the area, and finally a minister. Another case in point is the violent raid of a mob of 3,000 policemen on the Legislative Assembly in West Bengal. The following comment from a leading weekly on this incident will not be out of place here:

"Even tiny demonstrations in Calcutta are invariably accompanied by wireless vans, but in this case a procession of over 3,000 disorderly policemen, many of whom were shouting filthy slogans, had none in tow. Coming to know of Alipore incidents through non-official sources, Jyoti Basu had rung up the Inspector-General of Police who murmured something about looking into the matter. But judging by the results, he did precious little . . . These and similar other circumstantial evidence apart, the vandals were actually seen to be led in their depredation by some high-ranking police officers."<sup>44</sup>

<sup>41</sup> See also M. B. Lal, "October Revolution Brewing in Tanjore", *The Statesman*, August 28, 1967. And even then the Government took as many as 8 months since the tragedy occurred on Christmas day of 1968, to issue ordinance just to fix the wages of male agricultural worker at Rs. 3 per day and that of female worker at Rs. 1. 75 per day (*Ibid.* August 3, 1969). See also Andre Beteille "Agrarian Unrest in Tanjore", *The Times of India*, September 19, 1969.

<sup>42</sup> All the coalition governments have not attached equal importance to all these points of control. For example, Gurnam Singh ministry in Punjab would attach little importance to the role of the Co-ordination Committee, while Charan Singh, as a leader of the Congress-BKD coalition, would avoid the constitution of this agency till the end, which will be assigned critical importance by the Ajoy Mukerjee government in West Bengal.

<sup>43</sup> For details, see *Economic and Political Weekly*, June 10, 1967, p. 1036.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, No. 32 (August 9, 1969), p. 1297.

In spite of these abnormal aberrations, it cannot be denied that with the passage of time the prospect of adjustment between the administrative and the political elites have continued to improve. It will also be equally wrong to conclude that the civil servants in all cases and at all levels refused to cooperate with the coalitional government. In fact, there have been not one but several patterns of behaviour. The adjustment between political and the administrative elites in Punjab and Kerala has been much more than in West Bengal. The truth of the matter appears to be that where coalition governments have been in a position to come forward with unambiguous and unified policy stand with clear-cut programmes and directives break-up, they have succeeded in taking the civil service with them. If they themselves have been divided in their mind and the various ministers have tended to work at cross purposes, the civil service could not always be at their beck and call for obvious reasons. It should, thus, not be assumed that blame for maladjustment should always lie at the door of the civil servants. It is also not too certain whether a distinction between majority party governments and coalitional governments is always tenable from a long term point of view in this regard because problems of adjustment between political and administrative elites are common to all governments.

## VII

In sum, the logic of the argument developed in this article is that it should not be taken for granted that coalitional governments, whatever their type and stage of growth, are *per se* dysfunctional to nation-building and effective administration, all the more because we are still travelling on the road to coalition making and there are several patterns of coalitional politics in the country. We are not arguing that coalitional governments are superior to majority party governments or *vice-versa*. The effort here is only to underline the need of empirical enquiry into the dynamics of coalitional politics to replace normative myths with realistic formulations in regard to the efficacy of coalitional experiment in India. Till it is done, the political analysts may keep their options open and refrain from concluding that coalitional politics and political development go ill together.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> For an alternative viewpoint, see L. P. Singh, "Political Development or Political Decay in India?", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XLIV, No. 1 (Spring, 1971), pp. 65-80.

## ADMINISTRATION AND THE CITIZEN

V. Jagannadham

ADMINISTRATION and the citizen is a subject of interest because the traditional theories of cooperation between the two are not quite adequate to throw light on the changing pattern of relations emerging in the welfare/socialist states. As far back as Aristotle, the role of each is described as practical wisdom and public information respectively. The operationalization of these two over centuries has been undergoing changes. Whatever is the form of government, monarchy, oligarchy or democracy, those in authority would be anxious to continue as rulers by paying some heed to public needs and reactions. In a democracy, the administration-citizen relations are significant because the support and consent of the governed is a prerequisite for the sustenance of representative government. More than this, in a welfare/socialist state, besides police, revenue and defence, the new functions of the state include production and distribution of goods and services as well as promotion of well-being through assistance in cash or kind. These functions also involve new tasks, like conflict-management, counselling individual citizens through case work, or mobilizing them for collective action through community organization or changing their manners and customs through extension education. These new tasks require the cooperation and participation of a new kind and of wider extent by the citizens. The traditional theories of relationship between the state and society or Government and the citizen, either of *laissez-faire* or *ma-bapism*, are inadequate to explain and to cope with the new dimensions of administration-citizen relationships.

By about the end of the last century, the relationship between law and public opinion in a democracy was discussed by A. V. Dicey.<sup>1</sup> In the first half of this century, some studies were made of citizen and officials.<sup>2</sup> The importance of the subject grew sharply after the second

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<sup>1</sup> A. V. Dicey, *Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century*, London, Macmillan, 1948 (2nd edn.).

<sup>2</sup> Herman Finer, "Officials and the Public", *Public Administration*, Vol. IX, Jan.-Oct., 1931, pp. 23-34; and G.H. Stuart-Bunning, "The Personal Relations of Officials with the Public", *Public Administration*, Vol. IX, Jan.-Oct., 1931, pp. 36-40.



world war, thanks to the growth of welfare/socialist ideologies in the new states. In the old states too, the problem is assuming importance for a different reason. People in affluent societies are growing less concerned about the old concept of liberty than a love of material comfort and pleasure. The focus of relationship between State and society has shifted from political liberty to economic prosperity and social justice. Political liberty is more or less taken for granted in the old liberal democracies but in others the same old concern about it is not there. The State has expanded its political base through universal adult franchise. Administration has, therefore, of necessity penetrated into every aspect of civic life. The bulk of the citizens who are voters and beneficiaries of State services are more keen to get services supplied than the subtle aspects of how they get them.

That administration is culture bound and that public administration, therefore, could not be at a higher level than the administration in other sectors or institutions in the society; that administrators are citizens drawn from the same cluster of members in society and that they cannot, therefore, be different from the average citizen except to the extent to which their organizational rules and conventions as well as personal training and supervision enable them to act differently. These two views are often heard. These views deserve to be critically examined.

Two features distinguish public from other sectors of administration: firstly, public administration is the arm of the State which has exclusive right to enact laws and enforce them with the force of the State behind it. Secondly, other sectors of administration are subject to regulation by Government administration and, therefore, public administration could not equate itself with standards in other spheres. It should set and follow higher standards of efficiency and integrity as well as courtesy and consideration for citizens. \State is society organized for and through law and as such it is the trustee of organized collective action for the welfare of the society.\ Citizens, therefore, expect public administration sub-culture to rise above the normal patterns of management in commerce and industry. It should act as an umpire in conflict situations; as an enlightened entrepreneur in production sectors and as a liberal philanthropist in promotional activities. The equation with other sub-cultures and the identification of common culture as the source of all sub-cultures could not be pleaded as an alibi for deficiencies in public administration and much less in its relations with citizens.

However, so far, in the field of public administration science, the emphasis has been more on the study of 'administration' than on the

'public's' relations with administration. Organizational and procedural efficiency, personnel cadres and promotion prospects, equipment and comfort for administrators, primacy of interests of State as against citizens have largely influenced the theory and practice of administration. Partly, the prevailing phenomena of 'red tape' or delays, discourtesy and dishonest practices in administration may be attributed to the neglect of its human aspects. This is one side of the picture. On the other side, the enormous volume and variety of activities undertaken by the Governments at different levels in production, in public utility undertakings and in social services and welfare matters, have introduced new complexities and technicalities unfamiliar and irritating to the public. Most of these changes are introduced in haste and the public have not been educated about their relevance or justification. Several of the new rules might owe their origin to old ideas and institutions. In the economic sector, scarcity of resources and foreign exchange has necessitated the introduction of controls, licences, etc. These are multiplying and with these irritation, harassment and corruption are also increasing. Along with these controls, two features are emerging into prominence. Pressure groups and political parties seem to be gaining influence as against individual citizens. Further, the role of intermediaries as contact persons or as file-pushers is also coming into vogue. The common feeling is that without influence or pressure nothing could be got done in government.

Society is also passing through a period of transition, tension and turmoil due to external and internal forces, such as ideological or class-conflicts, rapid pace of social change, the spiralling prices and increasing scarcities. Social instability is also a cause of citizens' unhappiness with administration because, easily, one could attribute one's failure to the octopus of inept administration. The revolution in expectations unmet by the available goods and services is causing frustration among different groups of citizens, particularly among the urban youth and among industrial and white collar workers. The frustration is manifesting itself in violent demonstrations which, in turn, is dealt with by counter-violence by Government. Violence countered by violence is another source of tense relations with the 'establishment' among literate awakened citizens. The demands on the management of such conflict situations by Government, though not new, are unprecedented.

The background in which administration and the citizens currently operate makes it necessary to modify the old concepts of State versus citizens or authority versus liberty, as the framework of citizen administration relationships. No longer do we find these 'contra' concepts meaningful because the scientific-technological culture, industrial urban

economy and the welfare/socialist State ideologies forebode expansion rather than contraction in bureaucracy. To the pervasiveness must be added the technicalities and complexities in law and administration as well as the ignorance and inertia of citizens. These are reinforced by distance between the two; by alienation and by mutual recrimination. Distance, alienation, etc., persist notwithstanding decentralization, formal association of citizens in advisory committees and in spite of attempts at promoting mutual understanding. The concept of citizens as sovereigns looks hollow in the face of the phenomena of 'bureaucratic dominance' and bureaucratic behaviour as ruling servants.<sup>3</sup> The problem in administration-citizen relationship is simultaneously to curtail the 'despotism' of administration and to combat the indifference and hostility of the citizens. In future, State and society have to forge a new equilibrium between bureaucracy and citizen in the new conditions of economy and culture. What could be the frame of approach to evolve a new balance between administration and citizen?

The main objectives of administration should be stated in operational terms of promoting citizen satisfaction. Just as in Economics, the concept of consumer satisfaction governs production and distribution, so also in Public Administration the concept of 'citizen satisfaction' should be regarded as the critical factor for determining the acceptability or legitimacy of the government. Implicitly, this has always been the case, particularly in representative democracies with plural parties competing for power. But parties, like Trusts and Cartels in the economic sector, have a tendency to become aggressive and monopolistic as well as manipulative of citizen attitudes. It is becoming increasingly important for mobilizing the willing cooperation of citizens to survive and grow in the competitive world economy and society. The concept of 'citizen satisfaction' requires greater concretization in institutional and operational terms than is implied in the concept of consent of the governed<sup>4</sup> or citizens as sovereigns.

This has not so far happened in the science of public administration because administration is circular and diffused in process, fragmented in character and highly abstract and imperceptible for control. Moreover, administration is hierarchical and publics are plural. Which administration and which citizen are we having in mind when we speak of administration and citizen is not always specific. Further,

<sup>3</sup> Paul H. Appleby, *Citizens as Sovereigns*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1962; and W.A. Robson, *The Governors and the Governed*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1964.

<sup>4</sup> Brian Lapping & Radice Giles (eds.), *More Power to the People: Young Fabian Essays on Democracy in Britain*, London, Longmans, 1968; and John C. Livingston & Robert G. Thompson, *The Consent of the Governed*, New York, Macmillan, 1971 (3rd edn.).

different citizens get into touch with administration at different levels, such as the Secretariat, the directorate and the 'cutting-edge' or counter levels. The bulk of the citizens come into contact with civil servants at the bottom, such as the policeman or a postal clerk or a bill collector. Both citizens and civil servants at this level are inarticulate and uninfluential. For those dealing at higher levels, the difficulties are softened by contacts in clubs or through other influential ways, but at the bottom, helplessness breeds frustration. The problem of 'citizen dissatisfaction' as well as 'civil servants' point of view at the lower levels goes unrepresented and unattended to. The forums of legislatures (during 'question hours' and debates, committees on petitions, etc.) no doubt exist but they too concern themselves with broader issues than particular instances. Ventilation through press has limited appeal because civil servants are 'neutral, impersonal and impartial' and responsibility could not be fixed on any particular person for shortfalls or failures or deficiencies or misdemeanours. Limitations like these make it necessary to concretize and operationalize the objective of 'citizen satisfaction' and the administrative processes affecting this objective.

Three fields could be mentioned in this context: firstly, the proneness for cooperativeness between the administration and the citizen; secondly, the active association and participation of citizens in administration; and thirdly, the channels for articulation and redressal of citizens' grievances and the degree of citizens' confidence in their functioning fairly and speedily. These three could be regarded as reliable indicators; if these are taken care of, they may secure sound relationship between administration and the citizen. If these could be adequately safeguarded from the standpoint of the objective stated above, we could concretize the subject.

### *Propensity for Mutual Cooperation*

The term cooperation implies a two-sided readiness to work together with mutual trust and understanding. It implies administrative responsiveness to the needs and demands of citizens as well as citizens' knowledge and sympathy with the administrative system's functioning and the limitations under which the individual administrators work. Callousness, aloofness, haughtiness, suspicion and resentment of administrators towards citizens' requests and demands are misplaced any time, anywhere, but more so in the emerging culture of the democracy as much as the ignorance, indifference, reluctance, fear and recrimination by citizens. The proneness for cooperativeness is reflected in what are called 'convergent' attitudes and actions of citizens—i.e., where citizens support governments' policies and programmes. Citizens may differ from them but they should not disrupt administration

by 'divergent' actions, such as violent demonstrations, destruction of public property, etc. Differences could be and are often settled by constitutional means and over a period of time differences get sorted out and ironed among communities committed to democratic behaviour. Social scientists could develop indicators of 'convergence' and 'divergence' as well as the middle range phenomenon of a parallel continuum of both in which citizens may support some aspects of an administrator's policy and programme but show dissatisfaction with other aspects. This could be styled 'critical cooperation' which indeed is a healthy sign of a vital and effective democracy. Democracies with irreconcilable minorities bent upon violently disrupting the structure and operation of administration are a contradiction.

The propensity to cooperate or otherwise could, in institutional and interaction terms, be measured. For example, in revenue administration, the tax-laws and their evasion could be an indicator. In the sphere of production, the labour-management relations and the industrial unrest could serve as examples. In the social services/welfare sector, the rate of investment, and the utilization rate as well as the attitudes of citizens towards the personnel providing the services could form the base for study.

### *Active Association and Participation*

Citizen association with and participation in administration is much desired but little achieved. Certain ambivalent ideas and institutional mechanisms produce a make-believe atmosphere about this aspect. The traditional democracies operate with conventional ideas, like free and fair elections, multiple parties, and elected legislatures as effective forums for discussion, consultation through and criticism of advisory bodies or *ad hoc* commissions, free press, freedom for organizations and associations, etc. These are a necessary infrastructure and serve a useful purpose. But the new culture demands something more and better than associating vocal citizens with advisory committees to represent the interest groups or the beneficiaries' view-point. Participation in the political process of voting and representation in the legislatures and in the cabinets is a preliminary process and a good index of political maturity. But like the profit motive in the field of commerce, the lure for office robs the political process of disinterested participation in civic affairs. Defeated or displeased political leaders may cause more havoc to democratic processes than indifferent citizens. Moreover, in all democracies, the elected Ministers constituting the apex of the administrative pyramid and having an effective role in the two-way channel of promoting mutual understanding between administration

and citizens often fail to do so because elected executives may either degenerate into vocal mouthpieces of the permanent establishment or become severe saboteurs of administration from inside. In either case, it is a disservice.

However, two trends are manifest in the citizen association-participation syndrome in administration. On one side, participation by individual citizens, enlightened or otherwise, is giving way to domination by special interest groups or members of political parties. By itself, this substitution is a logical consequence of the mass society becoming more functionally specialized and more politically mature but in effect, the average citizen feels submerged in or rendered helpless by the big organizations. On the other side, new links are forged between the interested associations and the corresponding departments in governments whereby the administration yields to the big bosses among the pressure groups, sometimes ignoring 'public interests'. The administration occasionally uses the top brass in the interest organization to put across the department's point of view as the considered view of the professional or specialized group for sale to the decision-makers in the competition for a place in the top priorities of government allocations.

In other words, we see distortions in the traditional channels of participation. Old assumptions and veneration for old institutions are blocking the administrative system from adapting itself to the new demands. This may be illustrated from the traditional ideas about decentralization as an effective instrument of citizen association and participation in administration. The concept of decentralization has a universal validity. However, a process of recentralization sets in actual practice under the new facilities for speedy travel, quick communication through telephone and telex messages between the headquarters and the field. Emerging financial mobilization-distribution patterns also promote the dependence of decentralized units on the higher levels of organizations—political or administrative. In effect, decentralization is a political formality and recentralization is an administrative reality. These realities explain some of the frustrations manifested in the bulging 'divergent' trends. Under these circumstances, where do we look for new patterns for promoting association-participation motivation among citizens?

Certain old traditions, like mystification and secretiveness in administration, intended to create a sense of awe among citizens about authority and to bolster up the prestige of administrators, are no longer as relevant as before. Prestige of administration deserves sustenance but not by making the corridors of secretariat catacombs for common

citizens. The fear of secretariat corridors being flooded by common citizens with undue requests has no justification if administration is principle-minded, fair and impartial in its dealings with common citizens. When these desired qualities are wanting in administration, status symbols and procedural hurdles could not lend support to sustain the prestige for the administrative edifice. They tend to erode the substantive aspects of authority in the service of public in the administrative sub-culture. Under these circumstances, the derisive attitude of the youth towards 'Establishment' and the recrimination of administrators by citizens become common. Many examples of feudalism in administration hampering its adaptation to the new culture could be cited, but one is enough to indicate the direction of change.

### *Grievance Redressal*

The increasing activities of government and the penetration of bureaucracy into remote areas of the country enhance the scope for grievances to multiply. Along with the increase in the breadth and depth of governmental activities, much change has not taken place in the traditional attitudes of civil servants and methods of communication of the Government with the public. Extension methods in the development programmes constitute a desirable departure from the past but unfortunately the Extension Officers also, by and large, tend to become bureaucratized. Further, the thin spread of limited resources on a variety of programmes in vast areas has roused expectations without any prospect of providing satisfaction. Consequently, complaints and grievances of the people, both with the quality and adequacy of services, are galore.

Complaints and grievances are not confined to the citizens outside government. These are also mounting among the civil servants within the administration in regard to service conditions, promotions, etc. The complaints of the people in and out of government tend to undermine confidence in government as regards fair-play and its competence to manage tensions arising out of developmental activities and expanding bureaucracy. The internal staff relations within the Government leave much to be desired; without a change in this area, the growth of trade unionism among and strikes by civil servants become more common.

### *Some Trends of Action*

Governments, being aware of these emerging strains in bureaucracy, have attempted to deal with them through investigations by committees



and commissions, establishment of Directorates of Public Grievances with a view to supplementing the prevailing methods of handling complaints and grievances. To deal with the public from a positive side by educating and informing the public, Directorates of Public Relations have been established. The mass media of communication, such as radio, press, films, television, etc., are also pressed into service for keeping the public informed. A Bill is pending in the Parliament to create Ombudsman-type institution in India called Lokpal and Lokayukta.

While these are welcome additions to administrators' approach to handle public complaints and grievances, their effectiveness is in doubt. The need for preventing or minimizing the scope for complaints could never be over emphasized; complaints could also be anticipated due to the bludgeoning of administrative activities and personnel and appropriate machinery could be evolved and sustained to handle them.

What, however, one finds in the grievance-redressal approach is optimism at the start and pessimism during the functioning of the newly established Directorates of Public Grievances. Within a short time of establishment, some States have abolished them. Moreover, the mechanisms created to handle them, such as Staff Councils in the secretariat, and Joint Councils of Management in industries have not been yielding encouraging results. These experiences create skepticism in the competence of the administrative system to adapt itself to the changing needs and conditions in a sustained manner.

Three areas have been identified and elaborated above as forming the appropriate subject-matter for studying administration-citizen relations. These are: (1) propensity for cooperation, (2) association with and participation in administration, and (3) complaint and grievance redressal. The first is a characteristic of State-societal culture and climate. The second is largely institutional, though the actual functioning of these depends upon several inter-personal and sub-cultural characteristics. The third is predominantly administrative insofar as the complaints arise out of a gap between expectations aroused through party promises and government policies and their fulfilment by the administration. At the stage of prevention, the political leaders forming government could, but they normally do not, take care of relating their policies to their capacities in mobilizing resources. The size of the gap between political promise and administrative performance could be indicative of the degree of frustration. The redressal of

grievances by administration is handicapped by the increasing volume and by the non-viability of the system and its procedures to handle them. The foregoing discussion of the identified areas and the trends of developments in the country within these areas deserve further study for reinforcing the confidence in the capacity of the political and administrative system to adapt itself to the changing demands of the people on the system.

How do we proceed to face the future in this field of study and action? Vague ideas and inchoate institutions managed by personnel among whom old attitudes and traditions die hard have been governing the field. Time is ripe for a more concrete and systematic approach to the reform of administration as well as education of citizens. This could be suggested after referring to some impressions and ideas on the subject.

### *Impressions and Evidence<sup>5</sup>*

The substance of impressions about the relations between the administration and the citizen could be summed up in the phrase 'mutual blaming'. Political leaders blame administrative leaders about lack of commitment and administrators blame political leaders about their ineptness and interference. Citizens suffer both in a state of helplessness or resort to divergent activities. That administrators are discourteous and disrespectful to the citizens, particularly at the lower level, is an impression that one comes across frequently. There are charges of callousness in the approach of the officials to the needs of the common citizens. Administration, it is said, behaves like a soulless machine. Administrators are accused of being too much pre-occupied with files and treating citizens' requests as cases on files rather than of human beings. The civil servants are also believed to be more keen about furthering their career prospects by satisfying their superiors, even by becoming courtiers than carrying out their duties with devotion, rectitude and impartiality. Many citizens feel that the business of influential persons takes precedence over attending to common citizens' business.

Administrators, on the other hand, complain about the ignorance and indifference among the citizens even in giving correct information. The civil servants complain that expectations of the citizens from the Government are high; and that citizens and interest groups come forward with selfish demands for out-of-turn favours which could not be fulfilled except by deviation from rules of business in the Government.

<sup>5</sup> IIPA, *Administration and the Citizen* (Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference of the Members of the IIPA), New Delhi, IIPA, 1961.

Many citizens, they feel, demand undeserved favours. They find that the members' attendance at the meetings of the consultative committees is infrequent and their interest in the business is peripheral. Further, they feel that most of the criticisms about delays, corruption, etc., are either unfounded or exaggerated. Within the system that prevails in the country and under the prevailing conduct rules of officials, the civil servants feel that they are doing their best.

Mutual perceptions or impressions which are unfavourable to both sides arise from a lack of understanding of each other's roles as well as the exasperations caused by expanding activities and regulations of various kinds. Sometimes, the activities and controls are conflicting or inconsistent. They may cut across the interest-satisfaction of citizens—individually or groupwise—and the goals of State, such as stability, solidarity, harmony, justice, etc. Probably, therefore, a more appropriate hypothesis for administration-citizen relationships would be not to emphasize the normative goals of perfect convergence nor the prevailing normal practices in administration but point out the feasible aspects of reducing the gulf or divergence. The emphasis could be more on the preventive-positive steps of communication, supervision and constitutional methods of conflict-resolution than on the negative, disruptive aspects of dissent and violence by the administration and citizens respectively. Mutual respect, rather than blaming, and constructive approach instead of carping criticism of each other, should mark the endeavours on both sides in improving the system and the sub-culture.

Keeping these ideas in mind, we made a study of the citizen and the administrator in a developing democracy<sup>6</sup> in the urban and rural areas in and around Delhi. In this study, we found "that the Indian administrative system has penetrated into the most traditional sectors and areas, that it has been having only a very limited impact on those citizens whose thinking is retrospective and whose socialization to the new order is slow. But citizens involved in the modernization process are responding more and self-confidently, if they see their demands and expectations in the process of realization and if they can tolerate frustrations of the development pace. Where the transition process is beginning, its pace is slow, where demands are not being responded to, and frustration for some is intolerable, then, despite the intervening governmental efforts about 'modernizing' of the personnel attitude, citizens can be critical, cynical and even hostile . . . . We found a complex and paradoxical

<sup>6</sup> S. J. Eldersveld, V. Jagannadham & A. P. Barnabas, *The Citizen and the Administrator in Developing Democracy*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1968. Also published in the U. S. A. by Scott Foresmann, 1968.

mosaic of support and hostility within the attitudes of Indian citizens towards the administration. Although there is a degree of support and consensus, it is tenuous or mixed with doubt. The support is coupled with latent hostility. Uninformed rural citizens seem to be less critical than the informed and the elites. There is a feeling that as educational level rises, as more information about the system may be demanded and as certain types of contact with certain types of bureaucrats become far more, hostility and criticism may also increase."

These findings, though paradoxical and disturbing, call for new patterns of administrative behaviour and new techniques of socialization. In another study made by us of a single department in a metropolitan Corporation<sup>7</sup>, we found that the citizens are not well informed about rules and regulations because the communication is defective and the language of the communication is dysfunctional. As a result of this, we found opportunities opened up for unscrupulous civil servants, "to harass the citizens either through delays in disposal or through blackmailing them into paying heavy sums for getting them out of offences connected with deviations . . . ." The opportunities for harassment seem to be on the increase. We have also found that many of the maladies or malpractices in administration are directly caused by low calibre, poor knowledge and unhealthy attitudes of civil servants who come into direct contact with the people. These characteristics are also hampering proper supervision and enforcement of the rules and regulations.

These impressions and ideas are no doubt part of common knowledge but their ascertainment through systematic surveys in new. Further, these surveys also have helped to identify areas needing attention in the future. Prof. Janowitz and his colleagues have studied the perspectives towards Government in a metropolitan community.<sup>8</sup> Four types of perspectives have been emphasized by them as central to their study. They are:

- (1) *Knowledge*: The public must have an adequate level of knowledge about the operations of the public bureaucracy. Inadequate knowledge facilitates despotic administration, whereas too much knowledge theoretically could deprive an administrative agency of essential autonomy and produce subservient behaviour.

<sup>7</sup> V. Jagannadham & N. S. Bakshi, *Citizen and the Municipal Bureaucracy*, New Delhi, IIPA, 1971.

<sup>8</sup> Morris Janowitz, Deil Wright & William Delany, *Public Administration and the Public: Perspectives Toward Government in a Metropolitan Community*, Ann Arbor, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1958.

- (2) *Self-interest*: The public must consider that its self-interest is being served by the public bureaucracy. As a check on the disruptive consequences of self-interested demands on the bureaucracy, the public must be aware simultaneously of the bureaucracy's capacity to act as a neutral and impartial agent in resolving social conflicts.
- (3) *Principle-mindedness*: The public must be of the general opinion that the public bureaucracy is guided in its action by a set of principles guaranteeing equal and impersonal treatment. Administrative routines, however, must be sufficiently flexible to cope with individual differences in order to insure adequate dealing with clients.
- (4) *Prestige*: Public perspective toward the public bureaucracy must include adequate prestige value toward public employment as compared with other types of careers. Very low and very high prestige values would interfere with the bureaucracy's ability to operate on the basis of democratic consent. A very low prestige could tend to bring about subservient administration, while extremely high prestige could tend to result in despotic administration.

The first three types correspond to sociologists' categories of cognition, gratification and moral evaluation. The fourth, *i.e.*, prestige, according to them, serves as a summary concept and describes public respect or esteem for bureaucracy and the civil servant.

While the above mentioned study laid stress on public perspective of administration, the IIPA study has supplemented this aspect with administrator's self image as well as his image of the public. Our study includes a self and comparative image of both administrator and citizen. "Implicit in any complete analysis, therefore, a comparison of at least two different levels is required—a comparison of the official's view of his own performance and role with the public's view of that official's performance and role; a comparison of the official's view of the public's view with the public's view or expectations about that role. An additional type of comparison is also useful—the administrator's estimate of what the content of public perspective towards administrators is or is likely to be, compared to the actual content of the public's perspectives. Since the behaviour of leaders and citizens in any society is based on expectations, understandings, or estimate of the attitudes and behaviour of other actors in the system, this type of analysis may be vital. It may lead us to clues as to the premises, perhaps empirically unsubstantiated, on which action, by both administrators and citizens, rests."

The major components of the citizens-bureaucrat relationship which we consider essential are:

- (1) adequate citizen and official knowledge of administrative norms, practices, and structure;
- (2) genuine support for the goals, policies, and programmes of the government;
- (3) positive evaluations of the job performance of governmental officials;
- (4) perceptions of the administrative system as sensitive and responsive to the public, rather than inflexible and remote;
- (5) belief in the integrity and honesty of the administrative cadre, rather than a tendency to view it as corrupt or corruptible;
- (6) a high prestige status for public employment;
- (7) perception of administrators as committed to egalitarian goals and practices, rather than to favouritism or political advantage;
- (8) feelings of efficacy and optimism about citizen action in the political system generally, and in the administrative sub-system particularly; and
- (9) motivational orientations emphasizing cooperative action with administrative officials in the implementation of developmental goals.

The nine elements include the four mentioned by Prof. Janowitz *et al* and a few additions relevant to the Indian context for the effective, functional and democratic administrative system in India. These elements provide the motivation and motorforce for mutual cooperation between the administration and the citizen as well as providing an infrastructure for deriving satisfaction by the citizens. These also keep the relations between the administration and the citizen in a state of mutual trust and confidence notwithstanding a shifting equilibrium appropriate for changing conditions. These components are relevant also from the standpoint of evolving a 'balanced' relationship between the administration and the citizen, *i.e.*, to prevent the dominance or subservience of administration as well as to minimize the ignorance, apathy or helplessness of citizens.

The foregoing framework for a study and understanding of the administration and citizen relations is neither exhaustive of the subject nor comprehensive about the trends. Its purpose is to highlight the

significance and implications of the subject. For future guidance and action, some important matters may be mentioned for attention.

In administration, as in other walks of life, traditions die hard and legacies persist notwithstanding their obsolescence. Resistance to change is almost proverbial because law and administration are by definition conservative and they always lag behind times. However, if certain leads are not introduced into the system, it has to face the contingency of being overthrown because the limits of tolerance could not be stretched too far even with Indian people who proverbially are accustomed to tolerate the intolerable.

A top priority item for change in administration is its secretiveness, confidentiality and mystification. This had already been referred to earlier. Except in highly explosive matters of defence, home or external intelligence, in the rest of the departments there is no need to emphasize them. That trust begets trust is nowhere more true than in the relations between the citizen and government in a democracy.

Communication from Government to citizen suffers from poverty of imagination, complexity in expression and circumlocution about processes. Many a time, the need for simplification of language and procedures and a directness of approach is emphasized but never successfully implemented.

Association-participation nexus is tenuous and hollow. Political partisanship and administrative convenience override genuine interest in seeking citizen participation. The relations of Government with non-governmental organizations testify to the correctness of the above mentioned statement. Formal compliance without earnest and sincere eagerness to encourage genuine participation is easily discovered and people react to it in their own way—most often by violent divergent articulations. Non-governmental institutions and enterprises are described as equal partners in development but deeds belie the professions. This is a rich area for further exploration and exploitation.

The complaint-grievance channels require a thorough overhauling. Anti-corruption bureaus are believed to suffer from corruption. Such belief may not stand the test of proof but in such matters credence and impressions matter more than facts supported by evidence.

The outstanding maladies in administration are delays and diffusion of responsibility. These affect the citizen more than the ineptness in policy-making or inadequacies in planning or of resources. Many



suggestions are on files about remedying these maladies but probably due to the absence of a 'will' to improve or due to the lack of resilience in the system, these evils not only persist but they seem to grow with the volume of work and the passage of time. These matters need top-priority attention.

Ultimately, the tone and colour of administration-citizen relations are set by the leaders in different walks of life. Citizens become what their leaders make them to be and administration operates under two forces: leaders' direction from above and citizens' understanding and cooperation from below. Administration is a trustee but subject to the watchful eye and the guiding hand of people above, people inside and people below. The emphasis on 'public' and the administrations' relations with it are as important for analysis of bureaucracy as the new techniques for improvement of organizational efficiency.

#### For Additional Reading

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## TRAINING IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA

*Shriram Maheshwari*

WHEN, in 1965, the present writer was organizing training courses on techniques of administrative improvement for the civil servants, they were perhaps the first systematic efforts in the field of mid-career training for middle level public personnel. It is heartening that in a period of six years, a fairly broad range of training courses have become available to the serving civil servants. While this reflects, no doubt, a wider recognition of the need as well as desirability of education and instruction for public personnel, the immediate impetus to this development came from the emergence in 1965 of a separate Training Division in the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (later, shifted to the Cabinet Secretariat) coinciding with the Indian Institute of Public Administration's decision to dismantle its own programme of Master's Diploma in Public Administration to free its faculty to mount on training on behalf of the former.

### TRAINING INSTITUTIONS

The foregoing does not imply that training in public administration in India began only in that year. A number of training institutes have been in existence for varying periods for this purpose. Indeed, one can not fail to recall the names of the College at Fort Williams, Calcutta (1800-1806) and the East India College (1809-57)—popularly known as the Haileybury College—set up at a time when the British supremacy over India was still not complete and unquestioned. Coming nearer to our own times, the Union Government maintains the National Academy of Administration, the National Police Academy and a number of similar institutes for imparting training to the new recruits to various all-India and central civil services. The States have their own schools for training of their public personnel. Such schools have been established in Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Mysore, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Uttar Pradesh, the first State to have set up an officers' training school, which it chose to abolish in 1962, is contemplating its revival.

What is emphasized in the foregoing is that mid-career training for civil servants is a more recent development. Until 1967 or so, the training schools enumerated above reflected the government's narrow vision of training and were generally content to train only the newly recruited personnel. Today, many of them have forged ahead, broken new ground and have been organizing a variety of mid-term courses for civil servants in addition, of course, to the initial in-service training, which, taken together, marks a distinct physical shift in the government's attitude towards training. This trend is no less reflected in the new nomenclatures acquired by many of these more recently and, as a result, what used to be called 'training schools', have become 'staff colleges' or 'institutes' now. The range and quality of training organized, however, differs very widely.

As stated earlier, a number of institutes have been organizing training courses for public administrators. Quite a few of them have been created principally and primarily for training (e.g., National Academy of Administration), while some are research-cum-training organizations (e.g., The Indian Institute of Public Administration). There are also some (e.g. Institute of Applied Manpower Research) which, being weary of their nebulous character, probably looked at training as a device to accord them legitimacy and respectability. Regardless of the precise mix of activities or the underlying motivation, one may wish to have a list, even though illustrative, of all such organizations operating at the central level. The list is as follows:

- (1) Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad (autonomous).
- (2) Asian Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi.
- (3) Central Emergency Relief Training Institute, Nagpur.
- (4) Customs and Central Excise Training School, New Delhi.
- (5) Family Planning, Training and Research Centre, New Delhi.
- (6) Indian Audit and Accounts Staff Training College, Simla.
- (7) Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi.
- (8) Indian Institute of Mass Communication, New Delhi.
- (9) Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi (quasi-government).
- (10) Indian Revenue Service (Income-tax) Staff College, Nagpur.
- (11) Institute of Applied Manpower Research, New Delhi.
- (12) National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie.
- (13) National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad.

- (14) National Institute of Health Administration and Education, Delhi.
- (15) National Institute for Training in Industrial Engineering, Bombay.
- (16) National Police Academy, Mount Abu.
- (17) Railway Staff College, Baroda.
- (18) Secretariat Training School, Delhi.
- (19) Small Industries Extension Training Institute, Hyderabad.
- (20) Vaikunth Mehta National Institute of Cooperative Management, Poona.

At the level of local government, there was for long none except the All India Institute of Local Self-Government, Bombay—a non-governmental organization set up in 1927. Although local government constitutes the direct responsibility of the States, it is the Union Government which has attempted to do the most in the field of training of the local governmental personnel. The National Institute of Community Development, set up in 1958 under the name of the Central Institute of Study and Research in Community Development, has been the apex organization for training, among others, of personnel connected or concerned with rural local government. The Union Government set up a network of training institutes for rural bureaucracy which have subsequently been transferred to the State Governments. In 1967, the Union Government moved forward to set up four regional centres for training in municipal administration in addition to a centre at New Delhi.

#### PROFILES OF TRAINING

Information about the total number of civil servants who have received some kind of a mid-career training is not presently available. But it may be safe to assert that the Indian Institute of Public Administration has been in the forefront of mid-career training in public administration.

Although the Institute's commitment to training emerged more distinctly around 1965-66, its entry into this field dates back to a much earlier period. It was in the early sixties that the Institute pioneered in this area by organizing, though in a somewhat *ad hoc* manner, training courses for serving civil servants as well as those working in public undertakings. At that time, the Institute was engaging itself in

teaching, research and training but in 1967 the teaching programme was abruptly dropped in favour of training which quickly emerged as the principal pre-occupation of the Institute. Again, although the Institute's interest in training has become, in a way, more systematic and planned, its distinguishing identity has in the process lost some of its sharpness. While most of the training courses are conducted by the faculty of the Institute, there are some courses which public personnel who are employed elsewhere organize in the Institute, using it as an umbrella.

The dominant role of the Institute in the field of training is borne out by the table given below which describes the themes and the number of courses conducted since 1965 till June 1971. Indeed, no discussion of the present theme may be considered complete or even adequate without a mention of the role played by the Indian Institute of Public Administration in this field.

<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>Subject of Courses Conducted</i>	<i>No. of Courses</i>
1	Appreciation Courses on Techniques of Administrative Improvement	10
2	Budgeting and Financial Control	5
3	Administrative Behaviour	2
4	Administrative Behaviour and Leadership	1
5	Development Administration	7
6	Economic Decision-Making	2
7	Modern Aids to Management	3
8	Materials Planning	4
9	Problems and Techniques in Plan Formulation at the State Level	1
10	Performance Budgeting	10
11	Project Formulation	5
12	Personnel Administration	3
13	Social Welfare Administration	3
14	Social Policy and Administration	2
15	Training of Trainers' Course	1
16	Training Coordinators' Course	1
17	Effective Reading and Efficient Listening	1
18	Introduction to Computers	1
19	O & M Techniques in the Government	1
Total:		<u>63</u>

A total number of 1,518 persons have passed through this network of training courses conducted in the Indian Institute of Public Administration. Of these, 1,009 (66 per cent) are the Union Government employees, 507 (33 per cent) have been drawn from the States—including Union Territories (their number being 77)—and the remaining two officers were deputed by foreign countries. Of this number (1,518), 179 officers participated in the ten appreciation courses on techniques of administrative improvement conducted during 1965-69 in collaboration with the Department of Administrative Reforms. Of these, 96 came from the States, 81 were from the Union Government—including its public undertakings—and the remaining two were from South East Asia, one each from Ceylon and Philippines.

The above mentioned break-up reveals some significant trends. First, this confirms uneven participation by the several levels of government. The bulk of the participants are drawn from the Union Government. Although the States taken together employ well over two million persons as against less than half a million that are borne on the pay roll of the Union Government (excluding defence, railways, and posts and telegraphs), their personnel in the training courses constitute a smaller percentage. Apart from considerations of mere statistical symmetry, as the States have to bear the brunt of the developmental tasks and challenges, training as a tool of executive development is desperately needed at this level to strengthen their sinews. This calls for sustained, integrated efforts to convince the States about the utility of training and to plan such courses as carry meaning to them. It needs to be pointed out that the Courses on Techniques of Administrative Improvement were in great demand by the States, being patronized by them to the extent of 54 per cent, the remaining 46 per cent of the personnel being from the Union level. Secondly, there is no adequate spread of the participants in terms of the totality of bureaucracy. The following table summarizing the service background of the participants of the Appreciation Courses on Techniques of Administrative Improvement confirms it:

<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>Service to which the Participants Belonged</i>	<i>No. of Participants</i>
1	State Administrative/Secretariat Service	77
2	Central Secretariat Service	37
3	Indian Administrative Service	21
4	Indian Ordnance Factory Service	8
5	Army	4

<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>Service to which the Participants Belonged</i>	<i>No. of Participants</i>
6	Indian Audit and Accounts Service	4
7	Indian Police Service	4
8	Survey of India (Class I) Service	2
9	State Forest Service	2
10	Air Force	1
11	Indian Foreign Service (B)	1
12	Military Lands & Cantonment Service	1
13	State Engineering Service	1
14	Other services	16
Total:		179

This has come to happen owing to a variety of reasons. The request for nomination of candidates is addressed to the secretariat (Central or State) which is also the ultimate sponsoring authority. In the circumstance, it is not unlikely that the secretariat personnel, taking advantage of this knowledge, succeed in getting themselves nominated in larger numbers. Not unoften, the information does not get disseminated to the field organizations, thus keeping the sphere of choice restricted. At any rate, the secretariat personnel have an evident edge over others in the matter of nomination for training. Secondly, it is not always quite easy to sponsor persons engaged in line or executive jobs. Provision must have to be made to appoint someone else when a district collector or a sub-divisional magistrate is nominated to a course. But if an under secretary or a deputy secretary is tipped for a training programme, his post may not be filled up for the period when he is away for training. Thirdly, low though the States' combined utilization of the training facilities is, the inter-State variations are no less marked. A few States have been showing a larger measure of keenness in training, while others have been consistently shy of such institutionalized efforts at executive development. The following table depicting the State-wise break-up of the participants to the ten appreciation courses on techniques of



administrative improvement bears it out:

<i>State/Union Territory</i>	<i>Number of Participants Sponsored</i>
Gujarat	14
West Bengal	11
Andhra Pradesh	8
Jammu & Kashmir	7
Kerala	7
Maharashtra	6
Uttar Pradesh	6
Mysore	5
Nagaland	5
Rajasthan	5
Delhi	4
Tamil Nadu	4
Assam	3
Tripura	3
Punjab	2
North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)	2
Bihar	1
Orissa	1
Haryana	1
Madhya Pradesh	1
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Total:	96
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No political labels intervene to determine the States' participation in these courses. The inter-State variations could be explained in terms of the attitude of the Chief Secretary and other key officers in the secretariat. If the latter repose faith in training, their State invariably takes advantage of the training courses.

In 1966, the paramount consideration was to get the thing going. And, in this process, not much thought could be given to the implications and repercussions of all the operative decisions that were necessary for the launching of training courses. Today, training as a concept of executive development has come to be better understood and appreciated and what is more, it is an ongoing proposition. The inelegant aspects that have escaped attention in the haste need to be identified and weeded out. For instance, in 1966 a decision was taken to offer an 'honorarium' of Rs. 200 per talk (of two hours' duration) to a speaker. Although this was later reduced to Rs. 100, the slashed amount has still scope for rationalization. As it is, it has sometimes and at places created a measure of vested interest in training. It may be stressed that the civil servants in Britain receive no honorarium for the talks given in the civil service training schools. Secondly, the course director must not be entitled to any honorarium. In the academic world, a well-established rule bars a 'project director' from receiving any honorarium for the work he is called upon to do. In the absence of such a norm in the field of training, it is not entirely unlikely to come across 'course directors' to whom financial benefits have been flowing from the courses that they direct. This is an unwholesome practice. Thirdly, training is the avowed responsibility of the personnel working in the training institutions. The secretariat personnel must, as a rule, keep away from the responsibility for actually directing and conducting training courses. The secretariat is the policy-making organ of the government; it decides on questions, such as which courses are to be organized and where. If the self-same personnel start running the courses, it becomes an uncalled for deviation from the basic philosophy underlying the secretariat organization in the Indian government.

#### SOME INHIBITING FACTORS

Two personal habits make for less than optimal extraction from training. Zeal for study generally burns at a low ebb in the country, and bureaucracy is obviously no exception to it. On the other hand, security of employment and (up to a level) promotions, consciousness of authority which, among others, generates a feeling of superiority to rest of the mankind and fairly widespread habits of personal comforts tend to induce a frame of mind in the civil servants which makes pursuit of higher knowledge not directly relevant or meaningful either to life or to career. So, when an officer comes to participate in a training programme, he may have probably been on way to obsolescence; what is more, he is intellectually not quite trim and ready and at least in the first moments of impact finds himself virtually at sea. Training demands—even postulates—an ingrained regular reading habit on the

part of the participants. Secondly, time seems to flow more leisurely for us: the pace of work in the country is generally much slower. Consequently, not many may draw, from each hour spent in training, the optimum output it is capable of yielding.

These apart, training in public administration in the country presently suffers from a serious handicap in the sense that the provision for training abroad keeps it perennially eclipsed. Foreign travel has an extraordinarily powerful temptation for an Indian; a training programme abroad, preferably in the West, is easy enough to cause anxious throbbings in most bureaucratic hearts and to launch the proverbial thousand ships in the Indian bureaucracy. Training arranged within the country does not evoke even a fraction of this enthusiasm. This situation would continue until the government girds up its loins and becomes firm in its decision to sponsor its personnel only to such training courses as are run within the country. This implies that the government should have a sizable training budget to enable adequate diversification of the training courses within the country as well as for improvement of their quality. In social sciences, including, of course, public administration, there is hardly anything in the field of training which we, within the country, do not or cannot have. If the government is not completely convinced of this argument, a better course of action could possibly be to invite foreign experts to India to conduct training courses right within the country.

In a bid to endow the training-within-the-country with a measure of allurements, some courses have begun of late to be conducted in the salubrious climate of the hill stations or in the exotic environment of posh hotels. It needs to be forcefully pointed out that training must be imparted on the premises specifically established for it; the training institutes are equipped with the needed facilities, such as library, resource personnel, etc. To argue that private sector is already patronizing such courses is neither here nor there. Public administration is to be the pace-setter in the society: it need not, indeed must not, copy the practices and behaviour of private administration in all matters.

#### IMPACT OF TRAINING

'What precise contribution training that has been imparted so far has made?' is a legitimate question to ask. Has it led to greater efficiency in public administration? Has it made public administration more sensitive to people's aspirations and conveniences? Has it properly fitted the public personnel to assume and discharge the various tasks of development? Has it rendered public administration more economical

making it yield a fair return on the tax-payers' money? These are among the plausible questions which are at the same time too loaded and complex to admit of straight answers. The goals, implicit in the above mentioned questions, are dependent on a coalition of a wide range of variables, training being only one of them. Theoretically, it may be possible to gauge the impact of training—for which the exercise could be as follows. A character profile of the would-be-trainee should first be made, vividly identifying both his strengths and weaknesses in terms of the job that he has been doing. During his period of training, he should remain completely sealed off from the other influences, thus making only one variable—training—operative on him. A similar character profile of this person needs to be prepared after he returns from training and is posted on the job he was handling prior to his sponsorship. Here, one should emphasize that there must be no change in the job or the environment within which it was performed earlier, thus keeping all other variables intact and unchanged. The difference between the two sets of profiles would be the equivalent of the contribution made by training. Since no individual can possibly be quarantined in the way indicated above, this exercise may excite only academic interest. Indeed, in the present stage of development of social science research, evaluation of training is nearly an impracticable proposition. But does it, then, imply that the act of training is to be performed only as an article of faith? A poor country is unlikely to afford training without an assurance of optimum return in the shape of greater efficiency, economy and sensitivity to the people's problems and anxieties. There is no unanimous view on the general contribution made by training. At one end of the spectrum stand those who, taking a romantic vision of training, hold that training invariably adds to the functional efficiency of the personnel, broadens their mental horizon and endows them with a perspective. The other end of the spectrum views training as a paid holiday, enabling the bureaucrats to have a pleasant time at the tax-payers' expense. The latter view may be summarily dismissed if a training programme is well-led and well-fed. The truth seems to lie in between these two extreme view points. Training is a stimulant. But if a person lacks inherent zeal for knowledge and individual excellence, it would not enable him to take off the ground. Training is at best a catalytic agent.

In the absence of a completely objective device of evaluation, the participants' reactions to a training programme are being presently made the basis of evaluation of training. The detailed procedure for this is to ask each of the participants at the end of the course to give his comments on its usefulness on a four or five-point scale. These responses determine the degree of usefulness of the course. The second

method is that those organizing a training programme assess its utility and usefulness. Another device which has perhaps never been tried in public administration in the country is to ask the employers to evaluate the participants after their return from a training programme.

As indicated earlier, no really objective evaluation of training has been attempted in public administration. In the absence of such an analysis, it may be compensating to have a peep into what the participants of some of the training courses themselves have to say on this question. The participants' general reactions to the training they have received are reproduced below in their own language:

*Sl. No.**Participants' Reactions*

- 1 "Training should first be arranged for the top-most men in the organizations."
- 2 "Training did stimulate organized thinking on various problems."
- 3 "It has stimulated my thinking power to obtain better results from myself and from those who work with me."
- 4 "It gave me different possible approaches to apply under different circumstances and also to understand other view points."
- 5 "It enables one to have an idea on recent developments in the fields covered by it."
- 6 "I did start bouncing with enthusiasm immediately after my return (from training). Everybody appreciates the need for improvement but somehow the mentality of the top boss in government departments does not change. The usual cynical attitude—'what is all new about this? I know all about it. This is another fad and is only jargon-mongering. I do not want the new techniques. My experience and leadership are there'—this sort of attitude persists."
- 7 "Training generated fresh trends of thought, awareness of management problems, and the utility of the modern aids in solving them; forced one to think afresh; enlarged the horizon of thinking."
- 8 "In addition, it provided an opportunity to discuss the problems with officers of different backgrounds."
- 9 "Normally, one tends to develop prejudices and stops growing after some years of service. The course brought to focus the

*Sl. No.**Participants' Reactions*

modern ideas and procedures in a systematic and organized manner."

- 10 "The course took us into the realm of new subjects which we had not studied and inspired us into further study and application."
- 11 "The course was useful in learning the exact meanings and implications of a number of expressions about which one has occasionally the feeling of being uneducated."
- 12 "The course offered an opportunity for having two weeks to read at random and think of subjects outside one's field of work."
- 13 "The usefulness of a course of this kind is obvious. I would not, however, say that the course was very useful because the ideas generated here cannot be put to any use unless the top and higher management is first inculcated with this approach."
- 14 "The course exposes one to new ideas and forces one to think afresh. However, not many ideas being of immediate practical use, one is liable to forget soon."

#### CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Training as developed in the government makes one draw a few broad conclusions. A growing realization in government of the significance of management in the execution of our plans is being reflected in the field of training also. The training courses in the concepts, techniques and tools of management are being developed and are in demand. Indeed, in years to come, management is likely to solicit training more ardently than any other field in public administration.

Secondly, as stated earlier, there is a trend towards diversification of themes in the training courses, which on closer scrutiny, however, is found to be less than genuine. Although the titles of the courses do suggest sharply differentiated individual contents, this is not always so. One is likely to discover an embarrassingly wide component of themes figuring in most of the courses, which tends to signify that a course-title has not yet acquired a set of well-defined and standard vocabulary or perhaps is not viable to be offered as a self-contained unit. Also, there is lack of unanimity on the precise duration of a training course,

which presently ranges from one to twelve weeks. The appreciation course on techniques of administrative improvement, referred to earlier, was of the duration of nine weeks. Even the same course for the same kind of participants is known to have waxed or waned on its own will. It should be obvious that there must be a certain irreducible minimum period which is necessary for instruction and proficiency in a theme (*i.e.*, two years for M.A., two or three years for Ph.D.). Indeed, the present state of training bears an imprint of groping in the dark, which, to a point, is understandable in view of the training itself being a relatively new development in almost all the countries. Nevertheless, one would tempt to emphasize that the experience gathered during the last five or six years should throw up some guidelines for action on matters such as mentioned above.

Thirdly, the training courses are also not always planned in a realistic way. A training programme ought to deal with the live problems and issues currently faced by the administrators attending it, with a sustained focus on devising of strategies and styles of solving them. What happens sometimes is that a training programme comes to be organized not because there is any felt need for it, but because either the theme is in fashion or someone occupying a vantage position has 'learnt' a technique and is interested in organizing a training programme. The central fact which is sometimes overlooked is: training is to be organized for the enlightenment of the trainees, not for the trainer. As a consequence, there presently appears to be a hiatus between training as an operative proposition and the prevalent administrative realities. Its side-effects are injurious to public administration. Concentration on themes which are not being currently practised nor are likely to gain acceptance in the immediate future entails a risk of a psychological order. Such exclusive reliance implies a total disapproval or rejection or reprobation of the existing administrative system. A trainee exposed to these new-fangled jargons whose rationale is justified by commenting on the imperfections and shortcomings of the present administrative arrangements is likely to develop, consciously or unconsciously, disrespect and disaffection towards the whole machinery of administration, its methods of work and even personnel. Such an attitude on the part of an administrator is dangerous for his efficiency and morale, for he has necessarily to function within the given administrative framework and employ existing tools of work. Besides, all the prevalent administrative codes, regulations, procedures and practices are really not so stupid as they are implied to be. No rule, for instance, says that a civil servant should come late to his office, pile up cases, or abuse his power and authority. It is crucially important to ensure undoubted practicability, under the prevalent Indian conditions, of the themes covered



under training. If, on the analogy of 'demonstration farms', we could have a network of 'model' organizations where the substantive contents of training are in habitual operation and practice, a break-through in the promotion of training would have been made. Training is likely to be dysfunctional if its contents are not realistically filled up and communicated.

Which segments of the civil service need to be trained first and foremost has been almost completely overlooked in the designing of the present set of courses, particularly in the determination of catch-points in the country's personnel system to take advantage of them. While the presently available training facilities are, as a rule, aimed at middle and senior levels, the rub lies with the junior and lowest parts of the bureaucracy (e.g., the clerk, the inspector, and the ticket-collector). The personnel at these levels, with whom a citizen necessarily comes in frequent contact, and whose chief preoccupation at present seems to be organized and motivated harassment of the citizens, are the ones who desperately need training—in office procedures, in expeditious performance of tasks, in public relations, to name a few. Likewise, those who are in the role and position of 'implementors' of decisions sorely stand in need of training, for implementation of programmes has proved to be the proverbial Achilles' heel of Indian administration in general and planning in particular.

Nor is there any provision of 'training' for top level civil servants—of the level of secretary and additional secretary. Because of sheer excessive workload, the top personnel ever remain deprived of any free time to think and reflect on the work they have been doing, thus threatening to render them jaded and rigid. This, in turn, is bound to retard accomplishment of organizational goals and generate unhappiness, even frustration all along the hierarchy. Training is a possible device to rescue the top bureaucrats from such a situation. Doubtless, a different outfit is to be designed for this level, which could assume the form and spirit of a largely self-propelling week-end seminar or conference during which each of the seminarists must, mentally no less than physically, disconnect himself from his official chores.

Fourthly, the participants are sometimes chosen by the sponsoring organizations on the basis of sheer availability, not in terms of who ought to be or need be trained. It is, therefore, not uncommon to find in a training programme some who are in it precisely because they were considered to be 'spareable' by their organizations. It has also happened that same individual has been nominated, in quick succession, to course after course—apparently because his organization might not

have made up its mind on his posting or he himself might be considered to be a 'trouble boy' in his organization, making the latter think in terms of seeking riddance of him, even though temporary and for a short time. Such actions—and underlying motives—impart a distinctly uninspiring image to the concept of training.

Fifthly, there is absence of a regular follow-up of the trainees. When a course is over, its participants disperse apparently never to be heard of again, with no formal contact with the training institute. Whence do they come, none in the training institute may anticipate or control; whence they flock after training is, again, something which none may foresee. *Laissez-faire* appears to be the key note of training at present.

Sixthly, it appears that the government has yet to develop a long-term commitment to training as a concept of personnel development. Training is not yet regarded as a part of long-range planning of public personnel. This, more than anything else, constitutes its worst weakness. In a sense, training without career planning of personnel is like placing the cart before the horse. Training could be effective only when it comes to be accepted as an integral part of career planning. Thus viewed, it needs to be imparted in the job on hand; also, when an officer is due for promotion, he should be obliged to undergo a course of training in the subjects that lie ahead of him. Such a concept of training is already popular in the defence services, thereby affirming its feasibility in the field of civil administration as well.

Finally, a striking feature of training programmes in the country is a near complete absence of a dialogue between the capitol and the campus. The government, both Union and State, normally thinks of setting up its own training school when it contemplates training of public personnel. Ordinarily, it does not think of tapping and using the facilities already available in the universities and the kindred institutions. For a wide variety of courses, the best venue is the campus itself, for no training school in India has ever succeeded in equalling, much less surpassing, an academic institution in the range and depth of talent and scholarship. The present practice of having training institutes separate and distinct from the normal centres of education contains psychologically adverse side-effects as well. The Indian civil service has had a tradition of aloofness from the community: separate training schools tend to perpetuate and strengthen the aloof character of the Indian bureaucracy. If the civil servants are enabled to receive at least some of the training in the already established campuses, psychologically and emotionally, they would tend

to think of themselves as part of the larger society and would remain closer to the realities. This suggestion presupposes that for this task the traditional academic faculty needs to be suitably supplemented by induction of academically oriented practitioners of public administration. Indeed, a systematic programme of periodic interchange of personnel between the academic institutions and the government is apt to be invigorating to both.

India expects much more from training: to make up the deliberate omissions of the educational system as well as of the public recruitment policy in addition, of course, to the usual harvest from training. Provision for teaching of public administration exists in not more than ten universities, which is all too inadequate in terms of the country's requirements and needs. The Union Public Service Commission and State Public Service Commissions do not yet insist on testing the candidates' knowledge in public administration at the time of their recruitment. Public Administration does not figure even as an optional subject in the competitive examinations conducted by the public service commissions, let alone its listing as a compulsory one. While training must be provided to civil servants, it should at the same time be enabled to take off from a much higher base by a widespread provision of teaching of public administration in our universities and colleges and by making its knowledge obligatory on the part of the candidates seeking public employment either under the Union Government or in the States.

It is but appropriate, in the end, to utter a word of caution lest one is carried away with wild hopes about the efficacy of training. Training is only one, though important, of the several measures requiring to be pressed into service to bring about allround improvement in the functioning of the machinery of government. Improvement must be made in the organization, business methods, matters relating to personnel, such as recruitment, deployment, promotion, etc., to name a few. Above all, policies and programmes have to be articulated and shaped more rationally and meaningfully. Training is no Alladin's Lamp to work miracles, all by itself.

Nor should one overlook the crying need for 'training' of the political element in the government. 'Training' appears to be the only device to rectify the effects of adult franchise in a predominantly illiterate society. Moreover, polity being relatively new to this country as compared to bureaucracy, training is desperately needed to make the political element conversant with its role and place in the syndrome of government. The term 'training' may perhaps be an unalluring

expression for this class, but what is intended is that there must be regular, week-end seminars and conferences for the occupants of ministerial *gaddies*, as well as for legislators. Participation in such forums must, of course, remain voluntary but if programmes could be designed imaginatively, the politicians would certainly begin taking interest in them. Democracy must make deliberate efforts to constantly educate and train its manipulators. The Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies is engaged, since its inception in 1965, in this field of 'training' of 'our masters', but its focus is, in tune with its nomenclature, political and constitutional, not administrative. A forum like this needs to be diversified and contents of the programme need to be much more enriched and variegated.

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## ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION —PERSPECTIVE AND FINDINGS

B. S. Narula

THE setting up of the (all-India) Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) on January 5, 1966, by the Government of India, was a historic landmark in the attempt at administrative reorganization and improvement which had started soon after the advent of planning in the early fifties. This effort gathered momentum after 1963 in the face of the administrative lag and inadequacies revealed by the mid-term appraisal of the Third Five-Year Plan. A number of committees and working groups went into various aspects of administrative reforms. But the overall impact was hardly significant. When the ARC came on the scene, considerable thinking had been done regarding the nature of administrative problems and the directions of changes needed.<sup>1</sup> There were, however, two perspectives which had not received adequate attention in the earlier attempts at proposing reforms. These, as mentioned in the ARC's terms of reference, were: "making public administration a fit instrument for carrying out the social and economic policies of the Government and achieving social and economic goals of development" and making the administration "responsive to the people". Implicit in the Commission's terms of reference were two additional objectives, namely, promotion of national integration and maintenance of efficient standards of administration throughout the country.<sup>2</sup> The Government Resolution constituting the ARC, listed 10 specific areas of inquiry, extending over the entire gamut of administration from the village to the Union Cabinet. It was, perhaps, for the first time that the subjects of machinery for planning, centre-state relationships and redress of citizens' grievances were the subject of inquiry by a high-level reforms body. Underlying the establishment of the ARC was the idea that proposals for reforming the administration needed to be conceived in an integrated and overall perspective for the country as a whole and in terms of all the main aspects of administration.

<sup>1</sup> For details, see J. N. Khosla, "Administrative Reforms in India" in Hahn Been Lee and Abelardo G. Samonte (eds.), *Administrative Reforms in Asia*, Manila, EROPA, 1970, pp. 270-286.

<sup>2</sup> See item 3 (ii) of the Schedule to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Department of Administrative Reforms), Government of India, Resolution, dated, New Delhi, the 5th January, 1966.

The ARC set up 20 study teams, 13 working groups and 1 task force. It gave 20 reports to the Government. An attempt is made in this article to present some of the more important trends in the thinking of the ARC and their relevance to contemporary administrative situation. Due to want of space, it is not practicable to go into the ARC proposals in extenso; only two major areas are covered, namely, "structure and methods" and "staffing", though a passing reference is also made to the more important recommendations of the ARC in other fields.<sup>3</sup>

### *Perspective of Reforms*

At its very outset, an attempt was made in the ARC to evolve an overall approach to the problem of administrative reforms. Though the thinking in this regard did not crystallize into the adoption of written guidelines, the general discussion did lead to some sort of a broad perspective. The main ingredients of this perspective, as it eventually emerged in various ARC reports, were as follows:

- (1) Basic considerations which should guide the making of recommendations by the Commission, e.g., the intensity or magnitude of administrative deficiency or inadequacy; the urgency for reform; the requirements of adapting the administrative system or procedure to the demands of developmental functions or tasks; the need for improving efficiency, effecting economy and raising administrative standards; the need for improving the responsiveness of administration to the people and the viability of the proposed reforms in terms of administrative, social and political conditions.<sup>4</sup>
- (2) The three major constituents of administrative organization—structure, methods and personnel—are closely inter-related and need to be considered together from the point of view of improving efficiency and effectiveness of administration.<sup>5</sup> Further, the public administration system is also conditioned by the stage of social, economic and political development of the country

<sup>3</sup> The discussion in the article centres largely around the ARC recommendations contained in its reports on: (1) *The Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*; (2) *Personnel Administration*; (3) *State Administration*; and (4) *Delegation of Financial and Administrative Powers*. The corresponding reports of the ARC study teams and working groups have also been drawn upon.

<sup>4</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *The Administrative Reforms Commission and its Work—A Brief Survey*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1970, p. 8.

<sup>5</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1968, Pt. II, Vol. I, p. 22, para 3.2.

and affected by the attitudes and motivations of those who run it.<sup>6</sup>

- (3) It is necessary "to take a realistic view of things and strike a balance between the needs of continuity and those of change". Radical changes in existing structures and methods should be suggested only where they are very much necessary. "Administrative practices and traditions which are no longer suited to new challenges of a fast developing country must be overhauled and even weeded out."<sup>7</sup> It also needs to be borne in mind that "transplantation of foreign practices is not necessarily the panacea for various administrative ills". Solutions to administrative problems have to be found in consonance with the national genius.<sup>8</sup>
- (4) In the matter of programmes of development, it is important for their efficient implementation that "the Central Ministries and Departments of State Governments should work out in fuller detail the administrative and operational implications of each programme and scheme and ensure their proper phasing. The existing arrangements within the Government Departments in regard to programme planning and management would have to be considerably improved".<sup>9</sup>
- (5) In the context of changed political and social conditions, a stage had been reached where it is necessary to rearrange the Centre-State relations in a manner that will enable the States to play a greater role in development and take over from the Centre, progressively, responsibilities in areas which undoubtedly belong to them. The role of the Centre in areas covered by the State should be largely that of a pioneer, guide, disseminator of information, overall planner and evaluator.<sup>10</sup>

#### STRUCTURE AND METHODS

##### *Contemporary Deficiencies*

The Commission identified the major organizational deficiencies as multiplicity of agencies, overlapping and diffusion of functions and

<sup>6</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on the Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1968, p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>9</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on the Machinery for Planning*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1968, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on the Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, *op. cit.*, p. 78.



proliferation of personnel. In Commission's view, the methods and procedures were ill-suited for proper policy formulation as well as for efficient programme execution, and the level of decision-making was being pushed upwards. Powers and responsibility did not match in several cases and there was over-centralization of authority in administrative ministries and departments, and a desire on their part to protect their 'preserves' jealously. The arrangements for coordination were hardly adequate; there was a marked tendency towards too much cross references. Though the secretariat system had lent balance, consistency and continuity to administration, it was "encumbered with unessential work" and had become for a large part "an unweildy and overstaffed organization" leading to "occasional blurring of responsibilities and choking of administrative machinery."<sup>11</sup>

The ARC has suggested organizational reforms largely in seven main directions as follows:

- (1) a more rational distribution of work in the secretariat and among the executive agencies,
- (2) improvement of arrangements for coordination,
- (3) reduction in administrative agencies and staff,
- (4) strengthening of the top structure and adoption of board-type of management,
- (5) reduction in levels of consideration,
- (6) integration with the secretariat of the field agencies, and
- (7) delegation of powers.

### *Grouping of Subjects and Coordination*

As regards grouping of subjects at the secretariat levels, the ARC recommended for the Centre an overall scheme of reorganization of ministries and departments into 16 Ministers' portfolios and 38 departments (including Ministries without any department) as against 19 Ministers' portfolios and 40 departments existing in September, 1968.<sup>12</sup> This was based on considerations of rationality and efficient manageability of charges, tempered with the need for economy. The initial proposals in this regard were formulated by the ARC Study Team on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work,

<sup>11</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>12</sup> There are today 40 departments and 20 ministries.

and built around the concept of 'nodal' agencies, *i.e.*, administrative departments which exercise a good amount of influence on the working of other agencies or of government as a whole, such as Home and Finance Ministries.<sup>13</sup> This Study Team observed, "The criterion of rationality is not applicable everywhere, but where it is, the grouping of subjects according to this principle can lead to the most effective type of coordination. Where this principle is not applicable, the only course to adopt is to have heterogeneous grouping subject to manageability of individual charges."<sup>14</sup> The ARC defined the principle of rationality in somewhat different terms. It explained, "The principle of rationality does not necessarily mean homogeneity of items of work. It implies affinity of subjects and tasks in terms of the operational inputs to attain a particular programme goal or policy objectives."<sup>15</sup>

An additional principle kept in view, both by the Study Team and the ARC, was that of stability. The ARC noted, "In the past, Ministries and Departments have been split often to suit particular political exigencies. This has naturally affected adversely the efficient working of the government machinery and created fresh problems of coordination."<sup>16</sup> It was of the view that "Stability in the basic administrative structure is very important for future administrative growth on balanced and healthy lines. At the same time, political exigencies requiring some increase in the number of Ministers' portfolios cannot altogether be ruled out. Such increase should be brought about by a regrouping of departments and not by splitting them or realigning their subjects."<sup>17</sup>

The ARC proposal for 16 Ministers' portfolios was, in some ways, an improvement upon the Study Team's scheme inasmuch as it contemplated that all subjects must be represented in the Union Cabinet through one of its members, and that the practice of having Ministers of State with independent charges was not satisfactory enough. Partly for this reason and partly for other considerations, ARC proposals visualized 16 'Super ministries', and the combination into a single Ministry of: (a) Ministries of Commerce and Industry, (b) Ministry of Transport, Shipping and Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation, (c) Ministry of Information & Broadcasting and Department of Communication, (d) Ministry of Health, Family Planning and Urban

<sup>13</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, op. cit., Pt. I, para 2.1.1.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, para 1.6.

<sup>15</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on the Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

Development, Department of Social Welfare and Ministry of Education, and (e) Ministry of Petroleum & Chemicals and Ministry of Steel, Mines and Metals. It also proposed some transfers in subjects, such as the Department of Statistics to the Department of Economic Affairs from the Cabinet Secretariat; External Publicity to the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting from the Ministry of External Affairs; the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research to the Department of Industrial Development from the Ministry of Education; and the responsibilities in the matter of judicial administration of the Ministry of Home Affairs to the reorganized Ministry of Law and Justice.<sup>18</sup>

The ARC Study Team had recommended that the Prime Minister should be provided institutional support for effective performance of leadership tasks, and that the Departments of Administrative Reforms and Parliamentary Affairs should be in his direct charge. The ARC, however, favoured the Prime Minister holding the charge of the Departments of Personnel and Atomic Energy as well as of Planning. Taking note of the comparative practice in the U.K., France, U.S.A., etc., the ARC urged that the new Department of Personnel should be under the direct charge of the Prime Minister, and should not be located in the Ministry of Home Affairs as had been suggested by the Study Team. It further proposed that the Department of Administrative Reforms should be shifted from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the charge of the Deputy Prime Minister. The Ministry of Home Affairs under these recommendations would have become very much truncated.

The Department of Personnel was created in August 1970, and placed in the Cabinet Secretariat. The functions of the Ministry of Home Affairs in regard to the appointment of the judges of the High Courts and Supreme Court were transferred, in March 1971, to the Department of Justice under the Minister of Law and Justice, though the Home Secretary continues to be in charge of the subject. The Department of Administrative Reforms has continued to remain in the Ministry of Home Affairs. With the re-formation of Smt. Gandhi's Government after the General Election of 1971, certain items, like the Central Bureau of Investigations (from the Ministry of Home Affairs) and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence-cum-Enforcement (from the Ministry of Finance), have also been transferred to the Department of Personnel, located in the Cabinet Secretariat, which functions

<sup>18</sup> In September 1968, when the ARC gave its report on the subject, certain changes in the regrouping of subjects, on the lines recommended in March 1967 by its Study Team in its interim report, had already been carried out by the Government. For details, please see, Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, op. cit., p. 78.

directly under the Prime Minister.<sup>19</sup> A crucial suggestion made by the ARC was that the Cabinet Secretary should be more than just a coordinator; he should act as the principal staff adviser of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet on all important policy matters. A couple of outside expert advisers have been appointed in the Prime Minister's Secretariat which has come to assume added significance.<sup>20</sup> The general trend has been towards the strengthening of the Prime Minister's control over and leadership role in administration.

As to improving coordination at the secretariat level, the ARC has recommended a five-fold approach, namely, (i) intra-ministry co-ordination through the policy advisory committee (mentioned below); (ii) building inter-departmental coordination into a rational system of grouping of subjects; (iii) fixing responsibility for inter-departmental coordination in a multi-department Ministry on one of the departments which would act as nodal agency; (iv) representation of each subject in the Cabinet through a Cabinet Minister (i.e., coordination through the creation of super-Ministries); and (v) a reorientation of the system of Cabinet Committees with an under-pinning of Secretaries' Committee.<sup>21</sup>

### *Reduction in Staff and Administrative Agencies*

The ARC proposals for reduction in the number of administrative agencies and personnel appears to have been very much dominated by considerations of efficiency and economy. It urged that the Planning Commission should reduce its personnel and expenditure, that the executive staff in the public sector undertakings should be substantially pruned, and that the planning and technical cells to be set in the central departments and ministries should be of small size. It favoured the rationalization of executive departments in States and the retention only

<sup>19</sup> It would be of interest to note that the ARC Study Team on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work had proposed the creation of 8 special cells in the Cabinet Secretariat, each dealing with a group of Ministries with allied activities. This arrangement had been suggested with a view to improving the co-ordination of policy, ensuring timely and adequate implementation of Cabinet decisions and providing a continuing feeder line of information to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister about developments in different parts of the Government machinery. (Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, op. cit., Pt. I. para 4.22). The ARC, however, did not accept this recommendation on the ground that it would lead to the creation, within the Cabinet Secretariat, of a parallel organization and that the arrangements proposed might even affect adversely the individual responsibility of Ministers.

<sup>20</sup> Neither did the ARC nor any of its Study Teams ever recommended the induction of expert advisers into the office of the Prime Minister or of individual Ministers. A couple of members of the ARC were favourably disposed to the idea but it never fructified into a recommendation due to the opposition of the ARC bureaucracy.

<sup>21</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, op. cit., pp. 94-96.

of those regional offices which subserved some definite administrative needs. It emphasized that the proliferation of personnel must be checked, and that the staff strength of all organizations should be reviewed by O & M or Work Study units.

The ARC also proposed abolition of several offices, *e.g.*, L.I.C. Zonal Offices, Additional Members of the Railway Board, Controller of Capital Issues, etc. It has also suggested merger of the Department of Communications with the Posts and Telegraphs Board, and amalgamation of the Departments of Cooperation and Community Development.

Another set of recommendations of the ARC relates to the transfer of the executive work from the Secretariat to the field agencies. It was urged that the centrally sponsored schemes should be reduced to the minimum and that items of work which, properly speaking, should not be handled by the Centre should be transferred to the States. This, and the decentralization of planning in those fields of development in which it can be more advantageously organized, supervised and implemented at the State and lower levels, has been proposed more for political reasons than for considerations of economy and efficiency.<sup>22</sup>

Notwithstanding its general approach of economy, the ARC did in some places recommend the creation of new offices and posts. It favoured strengthening of Finance and Accounts Branches of administrative ministries, creation of a full evaluation wing in the Planning Commission, appointment of Area Officers and District Branch Offices in the Life Insurance Corporation, constitution of an Industrial Development Service for manning the various positions in Directorate General of Technical Development, and appointment of deputy heads in executive departments in the States to look after day-to-day administrative work, and Additional Directors in State Departments of Industries dealing with both large and small industries sectors. The ARC has strongly opposed establishment of several new agencies proposed by its Study Teams or Working Groups, *e.g.*, setting up of zonal life insurance corporations, separation of posts and telegraphs, constitution of a separate Ministry for Union Territories, etc.

### *New Organizational Forms*

With a view to preventing fragmentation of industrial effort in public sector, the ARC recommended setting up of sector corporations

<sup>22</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Machinery for Planning*, *op. cit.*, p. 2; and Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, *op. cit.*, para 83.

in eight industrial and manufacturing areas as well as for air transport, shipping, hotels and tourism. The sector corporation may be considered an improved organizational form which would help promote and coordinate activities in the fields of industrial development, personnel recruitment and development, R & D, sales, wage policy, etc., in a segment of public enterprises of the same or allied character, on an integrated basis. Unfortunately, the Government have not accepted this recommendation.

For developing organizational capability in the top structure, the ARC appears to hold a brief for the board type of management. In the area of regulatory-developmental administration, the ARC has favoured constitution of development boards (*e. g.*, a Coal Development Board and a Textiles Development Board) consisting of technologists, economists and management experts. Other collegiate type of top management organizations suggested by the ARC include a Commission on Prices, Cost and Tariff, a Small Scale Industries Commission, State Planning Boards, a National Council and a Coordination Committee for Science and Technology, reconstitution of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research into 5 separate commissions (on the pattern of Atomic Energy Commission on the basis of well-defined groups of allied disciplines, an Inter-State Council on Centre-State Relationships, and a Policy Advisory Committee in each Ministry or major Department. The latter would consist of the heads of all secretariat 'substantive work' wings (including the heads of non-secretariat organizations to be integrated with the secretariat) and would make possible enmeshing of several strands of expertise and a group approach to problem solving.

For public sector corporations, the ARC has recommended management boards of mixed type, comprising a number of full-time functional directors, 2 part-time government representatives and two or three part-time non-officials. The ARC is emphatic that the government representatives as well as the part-time non-official members should be selected on the basis of their professional qualifications and experience. Welcoming the introduction of the principle of collective decision at the top levels, the ARC has opposed the proposal of its Working Group for abolition of the Company Law Board.<sup>23</sup>

Surprisingly, nowhere in the ARC reports one finds any detailed statement of the superiority of the collegiate type of top structure. While this pattern has some definite advantages in regard to the integration of

<sup>23</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Economic Administration*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1966, p. 80.

diverse expertise and for problem solving, it does slow down the speed of decision-making and, as the past experience shows, leads, at times, to conflict of personalities. One only wishes that the ARC might have also suggested ways and means for more efficient functioning of the Board type of top management.

### *Levels of Consideration*

A central theme of the ARC scheme of reorganization of structures and methods is the reduction in the number of the levels of consideration in order to prevent delays and promote quick decisions. Building on the previous experiments with the pilot section and the attache system and the more recent experience with the officer-oriented pattern in the Works Division of the Ministry of Works and Housing, the ARC has recommended the adoption of desk-officer system. Under the proposed system, the work would flow direct to each officer who would be required and empowered to dispose of a substantial amount of it on his own, taking guidance from senior officers where necessary. An allied recommendation is that the number of levels of consideration and decision-making in the Central and State Secretariats should be reduced to two, namely, (i) Under Secretary/Deputy Secretary, and (ii) Joint Secretary/Additional Secretary, the existing functionaries known as assistants and section officers being utilized as staff aids. It deserves to be noted that the Study Team on the Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work had suggested three levels of consideration and decision-making. Initially, the Commission agreed with the Study Team but later it decided upon two levels. However, in some of its other reports, the ARC has proposed three levels, e.g., in the Directorates of Industries in the States and the Planning Commission.<sup>24</sup>

The ARC has supported the recommendations of the Study Team for the reorganization of secretariat wings to provide for homogeneous charges, unity of command and a distinct budget. The Study Team had also recommended a flexible flat type of organization with three levels, each level having more than one pay scale, an increase in the span of control of the Joint Secretary from two to three divisions plus a cell for planning and policy, a registry and a unit of office management. But the ARC did not accept these recommendations. The Study Team had also proposed a total elimination of noting below the level of

<sup>24</sup> In this connection, the Administrative Reforms Commission has observed the following: "A complex hierarchical organization and complicated procedures...are... particularly ill-suited for a developmental organization like that dealing with small industries". [Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Small Scale Sector*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1969, p. 26].



the 'chief' of the secretariat wing.<sup>25</sup> The ARC, however, recommended a cautious approach in the matter and proposed that noting should be confined to the more essential matters. It has, all the same, supported the Study Team's proposal that policy matters should be processed by preparation of self-contained memoranda.

### *Secretariat-Field Relations*

Another vital area of organizational reforms covered by the ARC is secretariat-field relations. Among the important causes of tension, in this field, mentioned by the ARC, are the frustrating control by the secretariat which is not well familiar with field conditions, the lack of understanding between the secretariat personnel (mostly generalists) and the field staff (largely specialists) and the involvement of the lower echelons in checking proposals put forward by the heads of the non-secretariat agencies. The Commission has noted that a recent trend has been to accord *ex-officio* status to heads of a number of non-secretariat organizations. A more recent development is the placing of heads of certain non-secretariat organizations in the concerned Ministries, e.g., the Commissioner of Family Planning, Director Generals of Border Roads, Security Force, and Civil Defence.

A radical reform in the present pattern of secretariat-field relations has been mooted by the ARC Study Team on the Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work. It has proposed a total abolition of the present invidious distinction between the secretariat and the non-secretariat organizations and the integration of all important non-secretariat agencies with the secretariat, their heads serving as principal advisers to the Government in their respective areas on all operational matters including operational policy. The Study Team has proposed a comprehensive scheme of administrative offices in place of the present secretariat-centred system. It has suggested that the present secretariat titles should be abandoned and a secretariat wing should in future be headed by a 'chief', and a division by a 'director'. All personnel below the 'director' would bear the designation 'executive'. These new titles will equally apply to the heads and deputy heads of the field agencies which are integrated with the secretariat.<sup>26</sup> The amalgamation of the field organizations, with the secretariat, as proposed, would render surplus their counterpart policy branches in the secretariat. It

<sup>25</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, op. cit., Pt. II, Vol. I, paras 4.14 to 4.30.

<sup>26</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, op. cit., paras 3.18-3.28, 4.18, 4.21, and 4.24(8).

would also induct specialists and experts (who normally head the field agencies) into the secretariat at the policy-making levels.

It is unfortunate that the ARC has not accepted fully the above-mentioned fundamental reforms proposed by the Study Team. The ARC has taken the view that the non-secretariat organizations which have functions and responsibilities of a regulatory character, or which are mainly concerned with provision of services or production or supply of goods, should not be integrated with the secretariat. It favours continuing of the *status quo* in this regard for two main reasons: (i) insulation of the regulatory process from interference by the Government, and (ii) assuring the necessary operational autonomy for effective enforcement of a regulatory policy. However, the Commission agrees that field agencies engaged primarily in planning, implementation, coordination and review of a single development programme or several allied programmes, covering a substantial area of the activities of the Ministry and having a direct bearing on policy-making, should be integrated with the secretariat. The ARC has evolved some detailed criteria in this regard.<sup>27</sup>

The ARC does not favour the conferring of formal *ex-officio* secretariat status on the heads of the executive departments which are merged with the secretariat and would like them to retain their present titles, but enjoy status adequate to their responsibilities. It is difficult to understand how these heads are going to pull their weight just by being functionally placed in the secretariat when their secretariat colleagues would continue to enjoy the power and glamour of secretariat status. The attitude of overlordism exhibited by the secretariat bosses is currently at the root of many of the generalist-specialist tensions. The remedy proposed by the Study Team would have helped create a new psychological climate. But the ARC has stuck to the traditional policy-execution dichotomy and its partial acceptance of the Study Team's proposal robs it of much of its intrinsic values.

<sup>27</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, op. cit., paras 91-104. The ARC has made an exception in the case of the Central Boards of Direct Taxes and Indirect Taxes on the ground that these organizations, though regulatory, have historically a distinctive character of their own and the combination of policy-making and executive functions has in their case worked very well in the past. At the State level, the executive departments which have been listed for a merger, with the State Secretariat, are : agriculture, animal husbandry, forests, fisheries, cooperation, community development, public works, irrigation and power, medical and public health, education, social welfare, transport, commerce, industry and technical education. However, the executive agencies dealing with subjects like police, excise, stamp duty and other taxes, labour inspection, factories inspection, vigilance, jails, treasuries, etc., being of a regulatory character, are not to be amalgamated with the State secretariat. [Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on State Administration*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1969, Chapter IV, paras 12-17].

*Delegation of Powers*

In the field of delegation of financial powers, the ARC has taken the stand that the approach should be to delegate to the 'maximum possible' rather than the 'minimum necessary', and that delegations should be reviewed periodically and the changes needed should be made through amendments to the rules and not through executive instructions.<sup>28</sup> This general recommendation has been supported by specific proposals of larger delegations to the Branch Offices of the L.I.C., zonal and divisional Railway administrations and state departments of industries. It has also been urged that the Railways should be permitted to procure stores special to them through their own organizations. The ARC have also suggested that the higher authorities should exercise restraint in calling for information on issues which are the subject matter of delegated power and should train their juniors to develop the habit of taking decisions on their own.<sup>29</sup>

However, the ARC has opposed the recommendations of the Study Team on the Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work for delegation of selected responsibilities to administrative Ministries in regard to the scrutiny and acceptance of budget proposals.

The Study Team had also proposed that the patterns of delegations should be increased to suit the nature of work in different typical organizations, both 'line' and 'specialist'.<sup>30</sup> But the ARC considered that the existing two-fold pattern of delegation to Heads of Departments and Heads of Offices was adequate enough. It felt that an increase in the number of patterns should be achieved mainly by suitable adjustments in the prevailing system. The ARC insisted that redelegation of powers by Heads of organizations should only be with the approval of the Ministries and that it should be subject to periodical review.<sup>31</sup> As against this, the Study Team had urged that powers to be redelegated should be classified into two categories, namely, those which could be delegated at the discretion of the head of the organization and those which would require prior approval of higher authorities for redelegation. Thus, the ARC has hedged its recommendation for 'maximum possible' delegation by procedural safeguards, revealing an attitude of caution and restraint.

<sup>28</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Delegation of Financial and Administrative Powers*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1969, pp. 2-30.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>30</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, Part II, Vol. I., *op. cit.*, para 7.20.

<sup>31</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Delegation of Financial and Administrative Powers*, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

The Study Team had as well suggested a pattern of delegation of personnel powers. It considered that the administrative ministries should normally deal with policy issues and major items of work in relation to senior management, and all other items should be delegated. It had, similarly, proposed that the headquarters of an executive agency should concern itself with minor tasks regarding senior management and all major tasks concerning middle management; and that the supervisory and executive officers should handle minor tasks in relation to middle management and should have full powers regarding all other staff.<sup>32</sup> The ARC has only noted this recommendation, and made no comments.

#### PERSONNEL IN THE MACHINERY

It is in the field of personnel administration that the ARC has taken a bolder and non-traditional stand, though not comprehensive enough from the view-point of the needs of development. Taking note of the new developmental responsibilities of the Government and the changing character of regulatory administration due to the thrust of economic and social forces, the ARC feels that the advance of science and technology has projected new tasks of administration, and combined with the increase in the scale of governmental operations, this lends a new dimension to problems of personnel administration. According to the ARC, the main deficiencies in this field are: preference for the generalist in policy and management positions, disparities between the needs of various jobs and the qualifications and experience of men who man them, emphasis on seniority in selection for higher positions and inadequate opportunities of promotion for the meritorious among the lower ranks.<sup>33</sup>

Here, it would be of interest to note the findings, in regard to senior management in government, of the ARC Study Team on the Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work. This Study Team has noted that most senior personnel are men of 'high ability and dedication with a rich fund of experience and judgement'. They have contributed 'materially to whatever has been achieved in modern India'. Top administrators have today quite an excessive amount of work to turn out, leaving them very little time to think, plan, reflect upon, and review the work they direct. 'Too few are responsible for too much.'<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Delegation of Financial and Administrative Powers*, op. cit., p. 120.

<sup>33</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Personnel Administration*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1969, pp. 5-6.

<sup>34</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, op. cit., Part II, Vol. I, paras 6.6., 6.12.

The Study Team added that the concept of senior management had not as yet received adequate enough attention within the Government. Nor was the 'management' of senior management unified at one place. The safeguard principles of 'seniority' and 'reservation of posts' tended to obstruct the entry into the senior management of talent from all available sources, and "... there has been an almost unseemly struggle for higher shares in senior management posts for the various cadres, creating an impression that the guiding consideration in the minds of all concerned is the good of this or that cadre rather than that of senior management itself".

As it is, the standards of selection for senior management have not been uniformly high in recent years. There is too much mobility at the senior levels, too short tenures, and "because of generalism, the mistaken idea persists that every senior administrator is good enough to handle almost any senior management assignment".

### *Unified Pay Structure*

An important reform suggested by the ARC is the creation of a unified pay structure (of 20-25 grades) on the basis of job evaluation. It is contended that such a structure would help remove the existing disincentives to improved performance and also facilitate personnel mobility. While the advantages of ensuring equal pay for equal work are apparent, the proposal for unified grading structure has much wider implications. If accepted and implemented, the concept of an assured career service with only few selection barriers will give way to a structure of number of distinct—and short—grades each one of which will be attained on the basis of performance in the lower one.<sup>35</sup> It is understood that this recommendation has been remitted by the Government to the Pay Commission for processing.

### *Staffing for Policy Advice*

As regards staffing of the middle and senior levels at the headquarters of the Central Government, the ARC has taken the view that the growing variety of administrative tasks requires not only knowledge and experience of management concepts and techniques but also of the programme content. The new demands of administration cannot be met unless the specialists and the technical experts are integrated into the administrative hierarchy and there is equality of opportunity for members of all services, both technical and non-technical, to rise to

<sup>35</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Personnel Administration*, op. cit., Chapter IV.

the higher positions in the Government on the basis of merit and performance.<sup>36</sup>

The ARC has suggested a detailed scheme to promote specialization and also provide opportunities to members of all services to climb to the top. It has recommended that senior and middle management positions at the central headquarters in areas for which functional services already exist or can be formed should be manned by members of those services. For middle management positions in other areas, the ARC has proposed a scheme of specialization covering 8 broad fields and stipulated that entry to them should be open to all Class I officers with 8 to 12 years of service, on the basis of a special test. The 8 areas of specialization proposed are: (i) economic administration, (ii) industrial administration, (iii) agricultural and rural development administration, (iv) social and educational administration, (v) personnel administration, (vi) financial administration, (vii) defence administration and internal security, and (viii) planning.<sup>37</sup> The ARC proposal also envisages the deputation, to the Centre, of Class II officers from State Services for the post of Under Secretary in functional areas like agriculture and education and for secretariat work.

The posts of Joint Secretaries and upwards, outside 'functional areas', should, the ARC suggested, be filled on the basis of general managerial competence, preferably from among those with experience in one of the 8 middle management specialities, and it should be possible to move from one broad area to another. The ARC has also recommended that the IAS should in future serve a uni-functional purpose and attend to revenue and land administration, law and order, civil supplies and other regulatory work.

A similar scheme of staffing of senior level in State secretariats has been recommended by the ARC. It has been urged that for posts

<sup>36</sup> The ARC recommendations concerning 'open door' for all service cadres to the top was significantly influenced by the thinking of its Chairman, Shri K. Hanumanthaiya. Inaugurating a Joint Seminar of the Regional Branches of the IIPA in Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Madras, Maharashtra and Mysore at Hyderabad, on November 20, 1967, he observed : "The new developmental responsibilities call for administrative leadership which is drawn from a broader base, which is enriched by the experience from various specialized areas of administrative activity. There is need today to throw open opportunities at the highest level in administration to all sections of society, like the scientists, economists, teachers and men with specialized experience in business and industry. It is wrong to reserve all the first places in Government for career officers. Monopoly in any form is bad. It creates an irresistible desire for power and nurses class consciousness and inefficiency."

<sup>37</sup> The ARC have defined a functional 'area' to include not only one or more technical functions for which pre-entry vocational education is required (e.g., engineering) but also those which call for specialization in a particular branch of administration (such as, accounts and income-tax) though they do not require pre-entry vocational education (Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Personnel Administration*, op. cit., Chapter III, para 17).



of Secretaries, technical and functional officers of the State services should not be precluded. Further, the heads of executive departments should normally be drawn from the corresponding State functional services and that the personnel of the State services should also be considered for ex-cadre posts which are presently reserved for IAS officers.

There has been much discussion on the ARC's identification of functional areas of administration and areas outside the functional category. Some have even described the latter as 'non-functional'. The ARC is itself responsible for this confusion over a scheme which it was at great pains to evolve but did not spell out in clear terms. What the ARC, perhaps, meant was that there should be 8 areas of specialization at the middle management level of deputy secretary and *equivalent*. Many of these posts could be staffed by 'functional services' which already exist. These are the 'functional' posts. There will be posts for which no single functional service can have monopoly rights and for which all should be able to compete. If the ARC's scheme is read backwards, this is what it comes to.

It was a coincidence that the civil service of India and of the U.K. were being examined at about the same time. It was unfortunate, as far as the ARC was concerned, that the Fulton report of U.K. preceded its own on personnel administration by some months. In the event, both reports echoed much the same philosophy; therefore, it would be plausible to infer that the ARC was influenced by the Fulton document. However, a closer examination would not support such a proposition. Even before the Fulton report came out, the Study Teams of the ARC, on which the final report of the ARC on personnel administration was based, had already come out with recommendations emphasizing specialization, pay reforms, enlightened secretariat, etc. Also the ARC spelt out its scheme of administrative specialization in concrete detail, while Fulton did not. There is reason to believe that the need for concrete ideas in this matter has since been recognized in the U.K. Sir William Armstrong, Permanent Secretary, Civil Service Department, U.K., has in a speech, delivered last year, envisaged the deployment of administrators and specialists in 8 broad groups of Ministries.

It would be interesting to note that the ARC Study Team on the Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work has recommended a somewhat different solution. Emphasizing that the present "heavy reliance on the generalist source deprives senior management of the depth which might come from a large admixture of persons



possessing basic specializations",<sup>38</sup> it has proposed that "there should be systematic talent hunting for entry into senior management, within the traditional source of the IAS, in the various central services and, most important, amongst the technical and scientific employees of the government". However, in view of 'right kind of experience' needed for senior management which the IAS officer has, it must remain its 'principle feeder source'. An important measure proposed by the Study Team for developing efficient and competent middle management is specialization in : (i) headquarters work, (ii) 'substantive' work, and (iii) 'staff' work of different types. As regards the last, the areas recommended are: personnel administration, financial management, planning, O & M, economic analysis, statistics and public relations. For specialization in 'substantive work', the Study Team has proposed the building up of corps of trained generalist-specialists in three broad sectors: industries, social services, and agriculture. The Study Team adds that it is important to develop a corps of specialists in personnel administration, financial management, planning and O & M, "drawn mostly but necessarily not entirely from generalists".<sup>39</sup>

Another approach which has been mooted is the development of specialized knowledge and experience within the IAS. This is more or less implicit in the executive assignment system which is being evolved in the Office of Career Management in the Union Department of Personnel. The recent addition of 'Economics in Governments' and 'Management in Government' to the training syllabus for the IAS probationers and refresher courses will help in this direction. And, if the quota for departmental promotion to the IAS is also increased suitably and the specialist and technical personnel with managerial experience are freely considered, it would open up another way of meeting the problem. This will not, all the same, provide an adequate answer to the rising aspirations of the specialists unless something is done to remove the disadvantages they suffer from in the matter of pay and prestige.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, op. cit., Pt. II, Vol. I, para 6.11 (1).

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, para 6.36(5).

<sup>40</sup> Incidentally, for the staffing of the public sector undertakings, the ARC has not favoured an 'open-door' policy of recruitment of managerial talent from all sources. Taking the view that the large proportion of deputationists (ranging between 33 to 38 per cent in non-technical posts) was inimical to the development of personnel from within and to the success of the enterprise, the ARC strongly urged that the public sector undertakings should shed off the deputationists, giving them, however, the option to get absorbed permanently. The recommendations having been accepted by the Government, most of the deputationists are reported to have expressed a desire to go back. This would obviously create an immediate problem of their placement in the parent departments as well as that of finding substitute talent for public enterprises. For preserving the operational autonomy of 'sector corporations' and facilitating personnel development from within, the ARC also does not support the Industrial Management Pool or any other such scheme.

India has got today a well-established system of civil service, with the multi-purpose generalist cadre of the IAS permeating key levels of administration in the States and at the Centre. In this respect, India is fortunately better placed than many other developing countries. There is no denying the need for induction of specialists and technical personnel in larger number in middle and senior management positions and for their integration with the administrative hierarchy. It is, anyhow, worth considering whether a radical break with what exists will bring about the needed change in the capability and outlook of the administration. Or, will it be preferable to improve upon the existing system and remove the causes which constrain its efficient functioning? The problem is much more complex and difficult than what appears on the face of it. The answer needs to be found in the context of the total situation—administrative, social and political.

### *Need for a Wider Perspective*

The difficulty with the ARC approach to staffing of policy and management positions is that it goes only one step forward and not far enough to meet the requirements of development administration, as differentiated from regulatory administration. In a developing country, like India, functional specialization, though of crucial importance, is only one of the factors which can make development administration tick. Effective formulation and management of development policies and programme demands much more. With increased differentiation of roles within the administrative system, the need for integrative coordination equally goes up. Again, development administration, with its added emphasis on the achievement of *positive results*, promotion of institutional change and a heightened sensitivity to the environment, calls for a new class of administrators who possess just not specialized knowledge or managerial skills but also 'development-oriented' values, attitudes and motivation as well as a high commitment to service to the people.

If the past experience is any guide, regulatory administrations have shown initiative, resourcefulness and a concern for getting results mostly in times of emergency only. In normal times, however, the values and attitudes developed in regulatory administration<sup>41</sup> come in the way of their being 'development minded' and being adequately responsive to the people and the rapidly changing but not totally unstable environment which characterizes the development programmes. From this

<sup>41</sup> According to the ARC, regulatory functions involve the regulation of the activities of the individual in wide sense and include collection of taxes by Government agencies. (Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, *op. cit.*, para 92.)

perspective, both the generalists of yesterday and the specialist of today do not appear to be equipped adequately for policy advice positions. We, perhaps, need in these places a 'composite' type of administrator who is both a generalist and specialist, who has an integrative faculty of a high order as well as a good grasp of the basic concepts and facts of the area in which he functions, who is sold to innovation, and above all, who has *positive*, development-oriented values and attitudes.

### *Training in Management*

Connected with the scheme of staffing of positions of policy advice is a set of detailed proposals for training in management for all the three levels in the Central Secretariat—junior, middle and senior. Training for the middle-level management is proposed in 3 areas: headquarters work, broad area specialization and sub-area specialization. A programme of further education has been proposed at the senior management level, oriented towards policy-making, programme planning and review and problem-solving. It is to be divided into two parts—(A) a general study and orientation supplemented by group discussions, seminars and syndicates; and (B) specific studies of a set policy problems or a detailed study of the entire policy-making process in a segment of area of administrative activity. The ARC adds that, for Part A of the programme, the services and the expertise of the Indian Institute of Public Administration may be utilized.<sup>42</sup> Part B is to be arranged in other professional institutions, like Institutes of Management at Ahmedabad and Calcutta, Administrative Staff College at Hyderabad, Institute of Economic Growth or any other agency which specializes in the area which would be of interest to the senior civil servant.<sup>43</sup> The ARC did not relish the idea that training for senior management should be handled by a government training institution. It explained, "The development of different abilities and skills needed at the senior level requires an atmosphere which does not inhibit critical thinking and is conducive to problem-solving. The need is for an environment where sectional views and attitudes and the accustomed patterns of thought are challenged, and free association of ideas and exercise of imagination is encouraged. We feel that such an open climate for self-development and opportunities for inter-action can be better found in a professional

<sup>42</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Personnel Administration*, op. cit., p. 75.

<sup>43</sup> The ARC Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of work has recommended that no one (generalist, technologist or scientist) should in future be considered eligible without first completing successfully a training course for senior management. The existing senior managers of less than 3 years' standing should also undergo a similar course (The Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, op. cit., Part I, Vol. I, para 6.19 (F-ii).

organization."<sup>44</sup>

Some other key recommendations of the ARC concern the formulation of a clear-cut and far-sighted national policy on civil service training, emphasis in training on building proper values and attitudes, organization of foundational courses for members of Class I State Services and Class I Technical Central Services, expansion of refresher courses, creation of civil service training institutions in States where they do not exist, improved training facilities for Class III and IV personnel and research on training needs, methods and techniques. An important gap in the ARC scheme of training is the absence of any proposal for management training of technical and specialist personnel working in executive agencies. Its love for managerial training for specialists did not extend beyond the secretariat policy and management positions.

### *Motivation for Superior Performance*

The 'open door' to the top for all service cadres, recommended by the ARC, is closely inter-linked with its basic philosophy of promotion from within. Here, the overall approach of the ARC was as follows: "The system of appointment should be in accordance with the basic principle that a person from the lowest ranks can rise to the top if he has acquired the necessary qualifications and if his performance has been outstanding."<sup>45</sup> For providing an incentive for talented youngmen in junior positions to get on the fast moving track to climb up, the ARC has urged for an increase in the promotion quota to 40 per cent, wherever it is lower, and filling up of half of the vacancies available for departmental promotion to Class I positions by a special competitive test. For scientists, the recommendation is that it should be possible for them to earn a promotion without a change in the nature of the job. For providing an objective base for promotion and helping employee's development, the ARC has recommended an improved system of annual confidential reports. The annual performance appraisal, the ARC suggests, should be done on the basis of a brief resume to be prepared by each employee of the work done by him during the year. The Commission feels that it should not be necessary under the revised procedure, to communicate adverse entries to the officer reported upon.

But the ARC has forgotten to recommend any scheme of further education for the Class IV and Class III employees which would enable

<sup>44</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Personnel Administration*, op. cit., p. 75.

<sup>45</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Life Insurance Administration*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1968, p. 12.

them to move up. When this matter was taken up, it was thought that the cost involved would be too high. As regards psychological incentives, the ARC recommendations are largely confined to cash awards and advance increments for contributing valuable suggestions, grant of medals and commendatory certificates for exemplary or special achievement, and special awards for superior group performance. For motivating personnel to superior performance, the ARC seems to have adopted an approach of combining both the carrot and the stick. Feeling very much concerned over growing indiscipline and strikes by government employees, it has proposed the extension to State Government employees of the prohibition imposed by the Centre on strikes in essential services, making disruptive demonstrations in offices a public offence, empowering all supervisory officers to suspend a subordinate for gross dereliction of duty and the constitution of civil service tribunals at the Centre and in the States to hear employee's appeals against orders inflicting major punishments of dismissal, removal from service and lowering of rank.

Material and non-material incentives apart, the basic philosophy which underlies the ARC's approach to improving the efficiency of the individual civil servant is the cultivation by him of a sense of duty and other virtues as well as a better appreciation of his obligations to the nation. "The sort of mentality which avidly seeks to contrast the financial prospects of the Civil Service with more lucrative opportunities of commercial employment is not the one on which we can depend for the realization of the social and economic goals of the nation. The urge to work for a cause higher than oneself, and the consciousness of serving noble ends, can generate energies which can transcend and vanquish material handicaps. The young men and women who are selected for the Services should be made to feel that the opportunity to participate in the nation building enterprise is in itself a valued privilege and a means of self-fulfilment."<sup>46</sup>

Following the above mentioned philosophy, several recommendations have been made which incidentally add a light touch to otherwise dull and drab reports, e.g., starting each training day with a prayer, abstinence from intoxicating drinks by probationers, banning the employment in public service of the spouse of a civil servant, and a jaunt in a village for two weeks to get acquainted with rural life and conditions.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Personnel Administration*, op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>47</sup> For an interesting commentary on the philosophy of the Administrative Reforms Commission, please see V. V. Moharir, "Administrative Reforms in India", *Development and Change*, Vol. II (1970-71), No. 2, pp. 93-94.

*Central Personnel Agency*

A nodal reform proposed by the ARC, which has already been implemented by the Government of India, was the establishment of a central personnel agency both at the Centre and in States, *i.e.*, a separate Department of Personnel charged with the responsibility for formulation of overall personnel policies and overseeing their implementation, planning, career development, talent-hunting, and development and selection of personnel for senior levels. The ARC proposal contemplated that the new Department of Personnel should not administer itself any service cadre so that it could devote itself to policy making without holding a brief for any service interest. However, the new Department, as of today is the controlling authority for the IAS. The ARC Study Team on the Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work had proposed that the application of service rules to individual cases at present being dealt with by the Establishment Division, Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance, should be taken over by the new Department of Personnel so as to facilitate unification of personnel functions in the central agency. The ARC, however, did not agree with this proposal and suggested that the powers of Finance Ministry in such matters should in future be exercised only in consultation with the central personnel agency. This is one of the good instances of the sacrifice of the principle of rationality for maintaining the *status quo*.

The ARC has also recommended that the staffing pattern and methods of work of the new Department of Personnel should be 'research-oriented' so that it is able to devote concerted attention to formulation of new policies, set new standards and raise the quality of administration. Under its charter, the Department has to serve as the focal point for research on personnel matters and it has already initiated some studies on problems like performance appraisal, strike, recruitment, procedures and talent hunting. As suggested by the ARC, it proposes to set up an advisory council on personnel administration. The staffing pattern, however, continues to remain mostly traditional. If the Department is to fulfil its role of modernization of the public personnel system, it will have to strengthen its research activities substantially and farm out a series of studies of various professional institutions. It is only on the basis of research that the Department will be able to suggest new ideas and innovations. The working Group on the Department of Personnel (set up by the ARC Study Team on Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work) visualized that the head of the Department should be a person with ideas and a flair for realistic innovation,

and the Joint Secretaries in charge of its different wings should not only be intellectually gifted but also possess capacity for innovation and passion to get their ideas implemented.

#### OTHER IMPORTANT RECOMMENDATIONS

There are several areas which have been reported upon by the ARC but paucity of space does not allow their coverage. In the field of financial management, a far-reaching recommendation of the ARC was that performance budgeting should be introduced in all departments and organizations dealing with development programmes. This proposal has been accepted by Government and is being implemented. The Indian Institute of Public Administration is assisting the Government in the changeover to the new system. Another significant proposal, which has been implemented, related to the setting up of 4 or 5 special audit boards for public sector enterprises consisting of senior officers of the organization of the Comptroller and Auditor General as well as outside experts in commerce and financial matters. The ARC also urged the need for a change in the attitude of audit authorities and observed: "Audit, instead of being content with playing a negative and neutral role, should aim at a positive and constructive approach directed towards seeking improvements in organizational efficiency and in the effectiveness of the financial rules and procedures."<sup>48</sup>

The ARC has been very critical of the tortuous and dilatory procedures which cause inconvenience and harassment to the public as well as of the inadequacies of the existing arrangement for the redress of public grievances. The remedies proposed include the establishment of Ombudsman type of institutions of Lokpal and Lokayukta, streamlining of procedures, fixing of time-limits for disposal of citizens' applications and strengthening of the departmental redress machinery. In some of its reports, the ARC has urged the reinforcement of the system of advisory committees, railway users' consultative committees and consumers' councils. The ARC recommendations bearing directly on improving responsiveness of the administration to the citizens needs and difficulties are only a few. On the whole, its proposals aim at bringing relief to the citizens through the improvement of administrative efficiency in the long run. In the matter of Panchayati Raj administration, the ARC has favoured the vesting of all developmental responsibilities at the district level with the Zila Parishad and the continuance of three tiers, and it insists that the appointment of the District

<sup>48</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Finance, Accounts and Audit*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1968, para 94.



Development Officer, who will be the Chief executive officer of the Zila Parishad, should be open to all services.

The ARC was particularly anxious to improve the public accountability of administration. Following the U.K. practice, it suggested the establishment, over time, of new standing committees for five broad sectors of administration, namely, social services, economic administration, defence and foreign affairs, food and agriculture, and transport. The ARC also proposed that the Public Accounts Committee should take upon itself the task of reviewing the performance in relation to budgeted programmes. A special Parliamentary Committee was suggested to examine the annual progress reports and evaluation reports on Plan performance, and an all-party Parliamentary Committee of both Houses to oversee the expeditious implementation of recommendations made by the ARC itself. While urging the tightening of parliamentary control, the ARC pointed out, "There appears to be among Members of Parliament a general distrust of civil servants and a feeling that the Government machinery is invariably inefficient. Such an attitude tends to demoralize civil servants." The ARC pleads that a balanced view should be taken of the functioning of a Government agency and odd instances of *bona fide* mistakes or shortcomings should be viewed against the background of overall achievements.<sup>49</sup>

#### CONCLUSION

The foregoing review of the thinking and proposals of the ARC highlights that its overall approach was, by and large, one of balancing the need for administrative change with the requirements of administrative stability. The fundamental administrative reforms recommended by the ARC are only a few, *e.g.*, performance budgeting, Lokpal and Lokayukta, unified grading pay structure, induction of specialists into middle and senior policy and management positions, sector corporations, special audit boards for public sector enterprises, a full-fledged department of personnel at the central personnel agency, etc. In most cases, the ARC tried to wrestle with the current administrative problems by proposing improvements and adjustments rather than any basic changes. The ARC, however, did attempt to probe deeply into some important problems and, its 20 reports and the reports of its 33 study teams and working groups deal with a wide variety of administrative

<sup>49</sup> Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, *op. cit.*, para 70. The Government of India has not accepted the proposal for 5 sectoral standing committees of Parliament on the ground that these would not be in consonance with the basic scheme of the Constitution. Nor has the Government conceded the demand for an all-party Parliamentary Committee.

issues. Referring to the role of the ARC in highlighting the generally neglected issues of public administration, a versatile civil servant, with rich and wide experience in administrative reforms, has pointed out, "A comprehensive commission can be likened to a major irrigation project, such as a big river dam. This catches the public imagination because of its spectacular dimensions. But it takes long to build, its costs keep mounting, there are inevitable muddles during the construction stage and the utilization of benefits, once the job is done, develops slowly. All these may make people weary of the whole project and they begin wondering whether a series of minor projects would not have been more profitable. Minor projects do certainly have their own advantages, particularly as they yield quick results. But only a dam can harness the full potential of a river."<sup>50</sup>

As regards the limitations of the ARC effort, it must be conceded that the manner in which the ARC conducted its deliberations did not lend itself to viewing the problems of different sectors and segments of administration from an integrated perspective, both vertically and horizontally. The fact that several of its study teams and working groups dealt with problems of programme administration did help somewhat towards formulating proposals in the light of the inter-relationship between structures, methods and personnel within each programme area. Barring some exceptions, the reports, however, do not indicate that this aspect was gone into in detail.

Another important lacuna in the ARC effort was the virtual absence of any strategy of selecting key or nodal points of administrative reforms. One of the study teams did make such an attempt but not the ARC. The ARC appears to have spread itself too thinly and many of the reports abound in minor procedural issues and at times, even non-administrative matters. Again, the ARC approached the problem mostly from the point of view of structural and procedural reorganization and did not pay much attention to behavioural components. There was too much concentration on the immediate problems and the future needs and challenges do not seem to have received their full due. Though the ARC has, in several places, conceded the need for varying the organizational structure and personnel policies and practices to meet the particular needs of a programme, it has not, for the most part, spelt out any framework for a systematic 'differential' or 'contingent' approach to administrative reforms. The ARC rejected the proposal for a flat and flexible wing organization put forward by its Study Team on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of

<sup>50</sup> N. K. Mukharji, "Methods of Administrative Reforms—The Indian Experience", a paper read at the Round Table on Administrative Reforms and Development organized by the National Institute of Administration and Development, Beirut, April, 1970, para 25 (2).

Work but it did not make any substitute proposals. Due to its over-anxiety for economy and pruning of administrative proliferation, it fought shy of taking a wider view of bigger government, of a more elaborate but dynamic and resilient administrative machinery.

Lastly, the ARC failed to evolve any clear conceptual and comprehensive framework for dealing with problems of development administration. It is only in a few of its recommendations that it has attempted to differentiate between development administration and regulatory administration, *e.g.*, integration of the non-secretariat organization with the secretariat, performance budgeting, a ban on periodic transfers of field staff engaged in development programmes and the setting up of developmental boards with both regulatory and developmental functions. The recommendations concerning the constitution of the policy advisory committee and development of various specializations at the headquarters of the Government are designed to help to improve the policy-making process, but inadequate attention has been devoted to improving the administrative capability of field agencies and to the installation of appropriate information systems and use of modern management tools. The scheme of staffing of policy positions, suggested by the ARC is deficient inasmuch as it is built only around the need for specialization rather than the wider requirements of development programme as differentiated from regulatory administrative activities. If the latter perspective had been followed, the conclusions too would have been different.

It is all too easy to criticise, denigrate and reject the best of a Committee's labours. So it is with the ARC. Perhaps, it bit more than what it could chew; it was vague where it might have been definite; it was forthright where it should have been circumspect; and it could have been progressive where it took more or less a traditional approach. The ARC sat at a time of social and political flux, when the need for radical change was keenly felt, not in one sector but all over, and when change was eagerly expected. The ARC tried to meet the challenge to its best. Opinions may differ on particular recommendations but it must be said to the credit of the ARC and its study teams and working groups that, by and large, they succeeded in producing an extensive scheme of administrative reforms and a rich crop of new ideas and perspectives. "The information collected by the study teams and the discussion of issues in the reports of the study teams and the commission are likely to influence decision-making in matters of public administration for many years to come. This is likely to happen even though particular remedies suggested by the commission may come to be rejected."<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> N. K. Mukharji, *op. cit.*, para 25(1).

## RECENT TRENDS IN ADMINISTRATION IN COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT

*P. R. Dubhashi*

**E**XPANSION and diversification—these two have been the major trends of development administration ever since the country embarked upon the planned process of economic development. These trends have been noticeable in cooperative development also.

Our approach to planning adopted hitherto assumed that the objectives of planning would be achieved through the mixed economy. The mixed economy was to consist of three sectors—private, public and cooperative. In this three-sector model, cooperative sector was accorded an important place. It was envisaged that the cooperative sector would provide balanced direction and a sense of value to our economy more particularly; cooperative was to be the principal form of organization in the field of agriculture and allied enterprises—cottage and small-scale industries, consumer distribution and myriad other economic activities. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Architect of Indian Planning, described the role of cooperation in our economic development in dramatic terms in the course of his address at the time of inauguration of Regional Office of International Cooperative Alliance in New Delhi. He said, “I want to convulse the country with the cooperative movement. Cooperation should be the basic economic activity in Indian Villages.”

It was the monumental Rural Credit Survey Committee Report (1955), which provided the blueprint of cooperative development in our agricultural economy. The report recommended what has come to be known as integrated scheme of rural credit. The scheme envisaged that cooperative credit institutions would be the principal agency of agricultural finance. Neither commercial banks nor takavi loans through the Revenue Department nor the money-lenders, however regulated, would, according to the report, provide a satisfactory agency for agricultural finance. It recommended a crop-loan scheme according to which the requirements of agricultural finance would be related to production plans, finance would be production-oriented and made partially available in kind and closely supervised and its recovery would

be ensured by linking-credit with marketing. While lending procedures would be rationalized, the three-tier cooperative structure, consisting of primary credit cooperatives, district Central Banks and State Apex Banks, would be strengthened. There would be massive State participation by way of share capital contribution and managerial subsidies. At the same time, the Reserve Bank of India would reimburse agricultural finance issued by the cooperatives at 2 per cent below the bank-rate. The Committee also recommended that the Imperial Bank of India would be nationalized into the State Bank of India and would provide remittance facilities for agricultural credit. The Agricultural Credit Department of the Reserve Bank of India would be strengthened in order to spearhead an ambitious programme of cooperative finance.

It is on these lines that the cooperative credit structure was developed during 15 years following the Report of the Rural Credit Survey Committee.

The most recent and comprehensive view of the implementation of these policies and programmes was made by the All India Rural Credit Review Committee, 1969. While suggesting a number of improvements in lending policies and procedures and making a number of recommendations about the strengthening of the cooperative credit structure, the report, in the main, affirms the continuation of the trends and directions of the past.

However, a new element was introduced with the imposition of social control over all large commercial banks and subsequently their nationalization on September 19, 1969. The nationalized banks led by the State Bank of India were to redirect their resources to the nation's principal industry, *viz.*, agriculture. This marked the beginning of the multi-agency approach in agricultural development and in particular in agricultural finance.

However, cooperatives, because of their extensive net-work reaching right down to the village level, continue to be the principal agency of agricultural finance in our country.

But provision of crop finance (short-term finance) for agriculture is not enough. It was realized that the agricultural development depends principally on investment in land. The 'original and inherent properties' of the soil in India had got exhausted in the absence of such investment. These investments were required in the shape of land reclamation, minor irrigation, soil conservation, etc. Long-term finance was needed for all such projects. The Cooperative Land

Mortgage Banks were providing long-term finances only for the redemption of old debt but the five year plans envisaged a new role for these institutions. They were to be the principal agencies for providing long term agricultural finance for land investment. But how would the massive finance required for this purpose be met? A big gap in this was filled up when, during the middle of the third Five Year Plan, the Agricultural Refinance Corporation was established to provide massive refinance facilities to the land development banks at the State and primary levels in order to undertake financing of technically feasible and economically sound projects. The Corporation advised adopting approach of area development. The pioneering role of the Agricultural Refinance Corporation in financing long-term loan for development went on expanding from year to year. The Fourth Five Year Plan target on long-term finance is Rs. 700 crores.

If credit and banking constitute the basic sector of cooperation, marketing and processing represent the growing sector. The marketing societies were entrusted with dual functions, *i.e.*, supply of agricultural prerequisites, like seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides, etc., on the one hand and the sale of agricultural produce on the other. The two-tier structure of cooperative marketing at the taluk and State level has been brought into existence to discharge these functions. The integrated credit plan of the Rural Credit Survey Report recommended that a substantial part of agricultural credit could be given in kind. It also recommended that credit should be linked with marketing so that the agricultural cooperative marketing societies selling agricultural produce would collect and sell the produce of farmer members and repay the loans issued by the cooperative credit institutions.

Marketing is performed more effectively if it is linked with processing. Processing of agricultural produce, therefore, was opened out as an important field of cooperative development.

The National Cooperative Development Corporation was established as a central agency to promote cooperative marketing, cooperative storage and cooperative processing. It devised a number of schemes, such as provision of share capital, loans, margin money assistance for the establishment of technical cells, etc., to facilitate cooperative development in these fields.

It was felt that the best form of organization in the field of rural industries was cooperatives. The first and second Working Group Reports on Industrial Cooperatives laid down principal policy guidelines in this field. It would be possible for rural industries to survive

in a competitive condition only if they are enabled to have advantages of large-scale organization for procurement of raw material and sale of finished products. The Damry Committee Report made recommendations for financing these industrial cooperatives. In the context of the growing problem of unemployment, it was felt that the industrial cooperatives have an important role to play. Labour construction cooperatives provide employment opportunities to the landless. With the new emphasis on 'growth with social justice', cooperatives have to serve as instruments of economic development of the small farmers and agricultural labourers. In fields, like dairy, poultry and piggery, cooperatives provide a new hope to the small farmers.

In a planned economy, there is always a tendency for prices to rise. The consumer needs protection against rising prices, scarcity of basic commodities in the market and adulteration. This, it was felt, could be provided through the cooperatives. Cooperatives were involved in the procurement of foodgrains and the distribution of foodgrains and other essential commodities of good quality at fair prices to the common man. After the Chinese aggression in 1962, the centrally sponsored scheme was launched to set up cooperative wholesale stores and retail stores throughout the country. Following the devaluation in 1966, departmental stores were established in major cities to make a massive impact on the situation created by inflation and scarcity.

## II

The above mentioned brief survey of the evolution of cooperative policies during the last decade and half would show what an important place was assigned to cooperative movement in our economic development. It could well be said that cooperatives left no sector of economic activities untouched. Before the era of planning, cooperatives were functioning principally in the field of agricultural credit but even there, as was reported by the Rural Credit Survey Committee, cooperatives only touched the fringe of the problem, covering only 3 per cent of the requirements of agricultural finance.

Figures about expansion and diversification of cooperative activities would show that cooperation is a fast growing sector in our economic development. In less than 15 years, the volume of cooperative agricultural credit advanced from less than Rs. 50 crores to more than Rs. 500 crores. The three-tier structure of Apex Banks, District Central Banks and the Primary Cooperative Credit Societies has come into existence throughout the country. Long term development credit would be of



the order of Rs. 700 crores during the Fourth Five Year Plan. Cooperatives are handling 50 to 60 per cent of the fertilizer distribution by all agencies in the country. Their fertilizer business was of the order of Rs. 250 crores in 1970-71. There are State Marketing Federations and Taluk Marketing Societies with about 36,000 retail depots organized even in the remote areas of the country-side. Not confining themselves only to fertilizer distribution, cooperatives have entered into the field of manufacture of fertilizers. The biggest fertilizer factory licensed so far is the Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Ltd. at Kalol, which has been licensed to set up a fertilizer complex consisting of natural gas based ammonia and urea plants at Kalol and a complex fertilizer plant at Kandla in Gujarat State. The total cost of the plan is estimated at Rs. 91.60 crores. More than 2,000 cooperative Processing Units have been assisted in the country. They include cooperative sugar factories, rice mills, oil mills, spinning mills, ginning and processing units, fruit preservation and processing plants, etc. The storage capacity made available by cooperatives is of the order of 4.6 million tons. The consumer cooperative stores in urban areas handle merchandise worth Rs. 270 crores whereas in rural areas it is of the order of Rs. 335 crores. Consumer cooperatives run departmental stores intended to provide comprehensive services to the consumer. There are more than 100 cooperative departmental stores throughout the country.

The facts and figures quoted above are enough to indicate how there is no comparison between the size of cooperative business in 1955 and today. Then the cooperative business ran into lakhs; today it runs into crores. Moreover, the economic activities in which the cooperatives have been engaged as a result of the process of expansion and diversification are not simple operations of merely providing credit. They are now engaged in advanced and sophisticated types of economic activities, *e.g.*, the land development projects for pisciculture, horticulture, plantation, or area development which have to be based on scientific project formulation. Similarly, technique of project planning and evaluation is required for agricultural and processing enterprises. These demand an expert analysis of marketing, factors affecting size and location, benefit-cost analysis, project engineering, project budgeting, etc. Modern techniques of banking are required more and more, both in the field of short-term and long-term credit. Recently, many State Land Development Banks have entered into an agreement with the World Bank which has rightly insisted on the employment of scientific techniques for assessment of the repaying capacity. The management of the departmental stores requires advanced techniques of inventory control, budgeting and evaluation. Marketing, Supply and Consumer Cooperatives have to prepare purchase and sales budgets and discounted

cash flow statements. These examples are enough to show how personnel with only routine skills of a rudimentary sort are no longer adequate for cooperative management. Cooperative development depends, as development in other spheres and sectors, on professional management.

The need for skilled manpower as the 'king-pin' of cooperative development was recognized and the Vaikunth Mehta National Institute of Cooperative Management, Poona was established in order to provide managerial training in all sectors and aspects of cooperative enterprise; but there is a noticeable gap between the skills and techniques demanded by cooperative business and the skills and techniques of personnel now serving in the cooperative enterprises. These qualitative changes have to take place simultaneously with enormous quantitative expansion in institutional and departmental personnel.

Cooperative institutions have not been able so far to evolve a modern personnel policy. They have not been able to attract and recruit trained personnel of high calibre. They are still depending, to a great extent, on personnel deputed from Government. But the governmental personnel have, by and large, only the routine administrative experience. Moreover, 'birds of passage' cannot serve long-term development of cooperative enterprises. The supreme requirement, therefore, is for a sustained attempt to develop scientific management and managerial personnel for cooperative enterprises.

Cooperative enterprises are managed by elected Boards. They have to provide leadership for cooperative enterprises. This leadership has to be of a functional nature. Enlightened leadership and professional management are the two wheels of the chariot of cooperative development advancing on modern lines. Unfortunately, as a hang-over of the past, cooperatives have yet to emancipate themselves from the incubus of politics on the one side and bureaucracy on the other. There are exceptions to this, like the cooperative dairy at Anand (Amul) which is the best of its kind throughout Asia, but such examples will have to be multiplied if the cooperative movement is to play its destined role in the economic development of our country. Cooperative commonwealth is a laudable objective; but its realization is possible only if the cooperative movement can combine within it soaring idealism with professional managerial expertise.

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## LEGISLATORS' ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE PERCEPTIONS IN AN INDIAN STATE: AN EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION\*

*Manindra Kumar Mohapatra*

PUBLIC bureaucracies are large-scale organizations and their analysis can best be undertaken by the approaches of organization research. There have been significant developments in organizational theorizing in the sixties, after years of naked empiricism and micro-level studies of morale, motivation and efficiency. The re-conceptualization of organization as an open-system seems to be the most significant development in organization theory.<sup>1</sup> Systemic perspective of organization has in two ways affected the nature of contemporary research efforts dealing with organizations. First, the researcher views organization as a social system and the totality of relationships within the organization are considered relevant for understanding organizational behaviour. Second, the organization is seen embedded in an environment and its interaction with the environment is viewed as an organizational process. Recent studies designed to evaluate organizational effectiveness incorporate not only the closed systemic measures, like productivity, morale, motivation, problem-solving ability, but also open-systemic measures, such as adaptability and co-optation.<sup>2</sup> Thus, organization research today tends to acquire the orientation of macro-level, open-system analysis.

A significant variety of organization-environment analysis is the study of relationship between organization and the diverse 'publics' that surround the organization. In the organizational theory literature,

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<sup>1</sup> Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, *Social Psychology of Organization*, New York, Wiley, 1966, pp. 26-29. Also see W.V. Heydebrand, "The Study of Organization", *Social Science Information*, October, 1967, pp. 59-86.

<sup>2</sup> James Price, *Organizational Effectiveness*, Homewood, Dorsey Press, 1968, pp. 95-135.

various typologies of such 'publics' have been conceptualized.<sup>3</sup> A study of their orientation toward organization and that of the organizational members toward the 'publics' is considered as a significant area of organizational research. In all open-systemic organizations, such studies seem highly relevant. However, in organizations, like public bureaucracies, hospitals, and educational institutions, analysis of public perspective seems to be more relevant than in other organizations. A review of traditional research on public bureaucracy also reveals that the researchers in the past were concerned with the institutional-legal relationship between bureaucracy and legislature, courts, and the political executive.<sup>4</sup> However, behaviourally-oriented research on public bureaucracy has paid limited attention to this significant area of relationship with organizational public. On the other hand, the researcher on other types of organizations have devoted greater attention to this problem of relationship.<sup>5</sup>

Cross-national studies on legislator-bureaucrat relationships suggest that the legislators constitute a significant type of demand-making clientele for most public bureaucracies.<sup>6</sup> This article seeks to examine the administrative-value patterns of legislators in the State of Orissa, in India.<sup>7</sup> Orissa is considered as one of the least modernized

<sup>3</sup> The concept of "organization public" is well developed by Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations*, San Francisco, Chandler 1962, pp. 59-81. For an empirical research operationalizing this concept in public bureaucracy, see R.S. Friedman *et. al.*, "Administrative Agencies and the Publics They Serve", *Public Administration Review*, September, 1966, pp. 192-204.

<sup>4</sup> For a review of such research in the United States, see R.L. Peabody and F.E. Rourke, "Public Bureaucracies" in James G. March (ed.), *Handbook of Organizations*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1965, pp. 802-837.

<sup>5</sup> Some studies on organizational publics in organizations other than in public bureaucracies include W.G. Bennis *et. al.*, "Reference Groups and Loyalties in the Out-patient Department", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1958, pp. 481-500; Peter M. Blau, "Patterns of Deviation in Work Groups", *Sociometry*, 1960, pp. 254-256; R. Clyde White, "Prestige of Social Work and the Social Worker", *Social Work Journal*, 1955, pp. 21-23; and William Claudile *et. al.*, "Social Structure and Interaction Processes on a Psychiatric Ward", *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1952, pp. 314-334.

<sup>6</sup> Edward A. Shils, "The Legislator and his Environment", *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 18 (1950-51) pp. 571-584; James A. Robinson, "Process Satisfaction and Policy Approval in the State Department: Congressional Relations", *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 67 (1961), pp. 278-283; Wilder Crane, "The Errand-running Function of Austrian Legislators", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 1962, pp. 160-170; Basil Chubb, "Going About Persecuting Civil Servants: The Role of the Irish Parliamentary Representative", *Political Studies*, October, 1963, pp. 272-286; R.E. Dowse, "The M.P. and his Surgery", *Political Studies*, 1963, pp. 333-341; and Dean Mann, *The Citizen and the Bureaucracy*, Berkeley, Institute of Governmental Studies, 1968.

<sup>7</sup> For literature on contemporary Orissa Politics, see the following: F.G. Bailey, *Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963; Richard P. Taub, *Bureaucrats Under Stress*, Berkeley, University of California,

States in India. Public bureaucracy in Orissa is an elitist organization embedded in a backward state with low level of literacy, income, urbanization and political mobilization. The state legislators in Orissa as representatives of the people make certain demands on public bureaucracy which is primarily responsible for administering the state. Often such demands are dismissed by the bureaucrats as particularistic and personal. On the other hand, the elected representatives argue that such demands are the genuine demands of the people of their constituencies. They generally suggest the callousness of public bureaucracy toward such genuine public demands and the need for a distinct administrative role of the legislators. They would like to play the role of intervener in relation to bureaucratic decision-making on behalf of their aggrieved constituents. Such administrative role orientations of the legislators and their evaluation of the administrative system in Orissa is the theme of this piece of empirical research.

### *Method*

Field work for this research was conducted in the summer of 1969 in India.

The administrative values of Orissa legislators were identified by using survey techniques. The legislator respondents constituted a purposive sample. In choosing this sample, the basic criterion was to exclude all legislators who had supervised the public bureaucracy in their capacity as ministers and deputy ministers. Thus, out of the total members of Orissa Assembly (139) in summer 1969, 104 legislators were considered eligible for inclusion in this sample. Of these legislators, 85 were actually interviewed. The remaining eligible legislators could not be interviewed due to contact failure, evasion and two cases of refusal. The data presented here relates to only this purposive sample of 85 legislators.

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*Contd. from previous page*

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**Table 1**  
**Party Affiliation of Respondent Legislators**

<i>Party</i>	<i>Strength in Assembly</i>	<i>Party's Membership Among Respondent</i>
Swatantra (ruling)	49	32
Jana Congress (ruling)	26	11
Congress	30	16
Praja Socialist	21	17
Communist	7	5
Sanyukta Socialist	2	2
Communist (Marxist)	1	1
Independents	3	1
Total:	139	85

**Table 2**  
**Party Affiliation of Legislators not Interviewed**

Congress	6
Jana Congress	4
Swatantra	3
Praja Socialist	3
Communist	2
Independent	2
Total:	19

**Table 3**  
**Reasons for the Failure to Interview**

Refusal	2
Evasion	2
Legislators contacted but could not be interviewed due to lack of time on their part	9
Failure to contact	6
Total:	19

## LEGISLATORS' PERCEPTION OF THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE

All Orissa legislators, interviewed in connection with this research, indicated that their constituents do approach them for intervention in the bureaucratic process. They also expressed that, within varying degrees, most of them intervene on behalf of the aggrieved constituents. In order to identify the orientation of the respondent legislators toward the propriety of their intervention in the bureaucratic process on behalf of their aggrieved constituents, the following question was administered to all respondents.

Question: How important a part of your job as legislator, do you think, it is to hear constituent's complaints on administrative matters and meet with the concerned administrative officials to redress such grievances? Why?

The responses of the legislators to this question provided the empirical basis of conceptualizing the administrative role of legislators as "interveners" and "non-interveners". The legislators who manifestly indicated in their responses normative unwillingness to intervene in the bureaucratic process on behalf of their aggrieved constituents were classified as "non-interveners". The respondents, who, on the other hand, indicated normative willingness to intervene on behalf of the aggrieved constituents were classified as "interveners". The responses, however, varied in their verbosity and rhetoric with each group of respondents. The typical responses of each group are reproduced below. Since the responses were in the Oriya language, the translated versions may be considered as approximate.

*Responses of Interveners*

All 70 respondents indicated a manifest normative willingness to intervene. The most typical responses were as follows:

"It is our duty" (*Kartabya* in Oriya).

"It is our main duty" (*Pradhan Kartabya* in Oriya).

"It is our sacred duty" (*Pabitra Kartabya* in Oriya).

"It is partly our duty, but an important one."

"Seventyfive per cent of our duty is constituency service and 25 per cent is legislative work."



"It is our duty because we know local condition better than officers."

"I am most interested in such work, because we are not effective in legislation work."

"Yes, it is our duty, as it provides some relief to aggrieved constituents."

### *Responses of the Non-interveners*

In marked contrast with the above-mentioned responses of the interveners, the following responses of the non-interveners indicate a manifest normative unwillingness to intervene in the bureaucratic process. In all, there were 15 such respondents who could be classified as non-interveners. "Yes, I intervene, but we are meant for legislation, not for interference." "We should see Ministers and not directly intervene in administration." "It is beyond our jurisdiction." "It is not my duty." "We should deal with public policy." "It is not our duty to intervene in administration." "Yes, I intervene. But this affects legislative work." "Intervention is not MLA's function. He should deal with debates, legislative questions and other things." "It is improper to intervene in administration." "I do not think we should intervene in matters affecting individual grievances." "I do a lot of party work." "I have no time to verify the truth in complaints." "In order to be a popular MLA, one has to do this work, but it affects other legislative work." "I do not like to do it, but I have to do it."

### NATURE OF INTERVENTION

The types of constituents' requests that necessitate intervening behaviour on the part of the legislator are likely to be varied in most political systems. On the basis of survey research in Orissa, it was possible to identify the nature of such requests that necessitate intervention. A broad open-ended question was administered to the respondent legislators to identify such information. It was as follows:

"We are doing research on the grievances of the general public about public administration. Could you please indicate what types of complaints connected with the administrative system are generally brought to you by your constituents? Could you give 3 typical illustrations of such complaints?"

*Typology of Complaints*

The responses to this question provided a wide range of replies. This instrument did not provide the basis for a detailed in-depth case study of constituents' complaints. It did, however, generate a typology of complaints that the legislators are required to handle in Orissa State. The following pages suggest one way of classifying these complaints, in order of frequency:

- (1) Developmental demands,
- (2) Corruption, bribery and graft,
- (3) Employment and unemployment,
- (4) Transfer, posting and cancellation of transfer,
- (5) Permit, quota and licence, and
- (6) Assorted demands.

*Developmental Demands*

Most legislators indicated this as one type of constituents' complaints that necessitate intervention by individual legislators in the administrative process. This type of demand involved requests for specific governmental projects in different regions of the constituency. The nature of these developmental demands may be best expressed in the words of Weiner: "Rural people are developing high expectations with respect to the services the government can perform for them so much so that many rural people and especially rural politicians, look upon the community development programmes as a kind of patronage or pork-barrel program for rural India. One increasingly finds village leaders speaking with pride of their ability to get things from government for their village—a new road, school, panchayat hall, enclosures for stray animals."<sup>8</sup> It seems necessary here to elaborate somewhat about the intervening behaviour of legislators with respect to these developmental demands. The legislators receive requests from constituents for new roads, supply of electricity, high frequency of state owned bus service, money for test-relief operations (public works projects) in flood-affected or famine-stricken areas. The requests or demands under this category appear to be collective demands rather than personal in nature. Very often, the legislators are asked to expedite the developmental projects when politico-administrative factors delay the completion of the projects.

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<sup>8</sup> Lucian W. Pye and Sydney Verba (eds.), *Political Culture and Political Development*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 220-221.

*Corruption, Bribery and Graft*

Grievances of the constituents relating to corruption, bribery, speed-money charges against public personnel fall under this category. Dissatisfaction within this area related to three major types of public employees; these include employees of the Revenue, Police and Forest Departments. Directed towards the employees of the revenue office were largely complaints related to land ownership. The forest department employees were tied to the question of free access of constituents to the forest products. The police personnel were reproached for several cases involving the harassment of villagers. The revenue department was mentioned in cases involving the speed-money (money paid to clerical employees for quick processing of requests) for agricultural loan purposes.

*Employment and Unemployment*

Constituents' grievances relating to this category involved requests for action against discriminatory hiring practices by government agencies, State-owned public enterprises and State universities. A number of instances within this section reflected the grievances of candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who felt that the upper caste recruiters violated the quota system on the basis that candidates were not suitable.<sup>9</sup> Major targets were Hindustan Steel Ltd., Hindustan Aircraft Ltd., and other central organizations. Apart from such types of requests, there were general demands for more job opportunities. A number of specific professional students had sought the assistance of legislators for the creation of more jobs for Oriyas in central government undertakings in Orissa.

*Transfer, Posting and Cancellation of Transfer*

Constituents' grievances under this category largely came from low and middle-level government employees. Most employees in Orissa are legally transferrable to any place within the State. However, lower paid employees, like clerks and peons, find it economically impossible to move out of a certain area. Even in the case of certain higher-level employees, there may be a general preference to be located in a certain area. These preferences may be influenced by considerations, such as nearness to native town, availability of schooling facilities for

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<sup>9</sup> Certain percentage of government positions are exclusively reserved for the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. However, if no suitable candidates from such groups are available, the recruiting authorities are permitted to recruit candidates from other caste groups.

children, cost of living, closeness to cultural centres and others. These preference patterns result in transfer to an advantageous place being perceived as a reward (and *vice versa*). Since transfers and postings are ordered by the administrative hierarchy, lower-level employees request the legislators to intervene. Legislators are asked to generate transfers, to cancel transfer orders and to create advantageous locations for the newly appointed employees. In certain cases, constituents displeased with certain area officials ask the legislator to secure his transfer from the area.

### *Permit, Quota and Licence*

Requests under this category generally come from the business class. An aggrieved dealer, who failed to get the approval of an administrative official on his application for controlled goods, may approach the legislator to expedite a favourable disposal of his application.

### *Assorted Grievances*

Perhaps this is the most interesting category of demands. It may include requests from students from the constituency to ensure their admission to professional schools owned by the State, a request from a lower-level public employee who has been ignored in promotion, an applicant for a residential plot in Bhubaneswar who has failed to secure it even after a long delay, a student whose scholarship money is being subjected to an illegal deduction by a teacher and such other requests. When such requests are compared with the types of case-work that certain Western legislators handle, one is surprised to notice their substantive similarities.

## CORRELATES OF ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Why is it that such an overwhelming proportion of the respondent legislators in Orissa indicated 'intervener' orientation? Even among those respondents who did indicate 'non-intervener' role orientation, there appears to be a tendency to intervene. Before attempting to explain this specifically in terms of Orissa legislators, it seems pertinent to seek some general explanations for this political phenomenon.

Interventionist orientation in relation to the public bureaucracy, on the part of law-makers, legislators, and councillors, seems fairly

widespread. As Table 4 indicates, interventionist orientation has been empirically observed among such diverse groups of legislators as British MPs, French Deputies, US Congressmen, Thai legislators, State legislators in Michigan (USA), and among the Japanese Prefectural Assemblmen. Although it is difficult to generalize on the basis of these and other diverse studies, a number of explanatory variables clearly emerge to explain the pattern of legislators' interventionist orientation in relation to public bureaucracy. Among other things, the constituents' demand for intervention (case-work), the legislators' personal convictions about his appropriate role in the political system, his fears and hopes about future elections, his desires for power and status, administrators' willingness to cooperate with legislators for mutual benefits, and the frustrated back-bench legislators' search for a meaningful role in otherwise stultifying legislative settings seem to explain this universal political phenomenon of intervention by legislators in the administrative process collectively.

In seeking explanations for the predominance of the intervener role orientation among the Orissa legislators at the outset, it seems meaningful to focus on the political culture in Orissa. Empirically, the most pertinent question that we might ask is what do the people of Orissa think about the legislators' role in the political system. This question could be further narrowed down to the 'legislators' and the 'constituents': What do the people in Orissa expect their legislator to do? What do the legislators themselves think that their job is? An answer to the first question is difficult to suggest in the absence of a systematic study of the popular perception of the representative role. However, Professor Bailey's anthropological case-study suggests a partial answer to this question. In his words, "This, indeed, is what the voters want: their MLA is not the representative of a party with a policy which commends itself to them, not even a representative who will watch over their interests when policies are being framed, but rather a man who will intervene in the implementation, and in the ordinary day-to-day administration. He is there to divert the benefits in the direction of his constituents, to help individuals to get what they want out of the administration, and to give them a hand when they get into trouble with officials. This is the meaning which the ordinary villager and some of their MLAs attach to the phrase 'serving the people'."<sup>10</sup> This generalization, though not based on any systematic or comprehensive data, provides some insight into the popular perception of representative's role and about the legislators' perception about their purposive role.

<sup>10</sup> F.G. Bailey, *Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963, p. 25.

Table 4  
Cross-National Findings on Administrative Role Orientation of Legislators

Sl. No.	Political System	Nature of Role Construct	Definition/Description of Construct	Pervasiveness of Role in Legislative System
1.	Michigan Legislature	Ombudsman <sup>1</sup>	Legislators whose purpose was to operate through local, state and national bureaucracy to satisfy their constituents.	Ten per cent of sample.
2.	U.S. Congress	Errand Boy <sup>2</sup>	Legislators who consider constituency case-work as their primary activity.	Sixteen per cent of sample.
3.	Thai Legislature	Controller <sup>3</sup>	Members of Parliament who see the job of executive oversight as their major.	Forty-three per cent of sample.
4.	French Parliament	Servants <sup>4</sup>	French Deputies who focus upon interventions with administrators on behalf of constituents.	Sixty-eight per cent of sample.
5.	Japanese Prefectural Assembly	Administration Role <sup>5</sup>	Normative conception of Assemblymen as to whether they ought to participate actively in administration's decision or remain passive.	No data reported.
6.	British Parliament	Welfare Officer Role <sup>6</sup>	MPs who consider it proper to handle constituents' grievances.	Sixty per cent of sample.

<sup>1</sup> John W. Soule, "Future Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent State Legislators", *Midwest*, August, 1969, pp. 439-444.

<sup>2</sup> Roger H. Davidson, *The Role of Congressmen*, New York, Pegasus, 1969, pp. 99-100.

<sup>3</sup> Michael Mezey, "The Functions of a Minimal Legislature", a paper delivered at the 66th Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association (APSA), Los Angeles, 1970.

<sup>4</sup> William H. Hunt, "Legislative Roles and Ideological Orientations of French Deputies", a paper delivered at the 65th Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association (APSA), New York, 1969.

<sup>5</sup> Young C. Kim, "Role Orientation and Behavior: The Case of Japanese Prefectural Assemblymen in Chiba and Kanagawa", *The Western Political Quarterly*, June 1969, pp. 390-410.

<sup>6</sup> Anthony Barker and Michael Rush, *The British Member of Parliament and His Information*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970, pp. 194-195.

Another aspect of Orissan political culture is a likely source of explanation for this predominantly interventionist orientation among the respondent Orissa legislators. This relates to the problems of the power equation between the politicians (including legislators) and the bureaucrats. Although the situation is not unique to Orissa, an average administrator enjoys a higher social status than a legislator in Orissan political culture; for the administrator enjoys security of tenure, comes from upper social strata, has the privilege of a university education in a system where most people are illiterate, and has both tangible formal and implied administrative powers that can reward or punish the average citizen. On the other hand, the average politician (including the legislator) generally comes from a lower class background, has an unimpressive scholarly record, enjoys an uncertain term of office, and has little formal means to reward or to punish citizens. In a situation like this, it would not seem unnatural for the legislators to seek to expand their nebulous role of 'serving the people of the constituency' by becoming the unofficial Ombudsman for aggrieved citizens (or friends) of their constituency. The nature of the public bureaucracy in Orissa, with its general unwillingness to be responsive to the people, indirectly helps the politician to assume this role. A legislator is likely to intervene in the administrative process on behalf of the aggrieved constituents for the purpose of asserting his status within the community. This might explain an interesting observation made during the field work for this article. A number of respondent legislators indicated that their constituents were not conscious about their rights; and as such, they generally failed to register their complaints regarding the bureaucracy. However, some of these legislators encouraged constituents to register complaints so that they could pursue such grievances with the public bureaucracy. Thus, there was a tendency to "make-work" for themselves on the part of some legislators.

Apart from these political cultural factors which we have just described, the nature of the legislative setting in the Orissa Legislative Assembly provides an institutional context that could be related to the interventionist orientation of the respondent legislators. The general sessions of the Orissa Assembly tend to be rather brief. Table 5 (p. 679) provides an indication of this.

Although no systematic content analysis has been undertaken, a review of the proceedings of the Orissa Assembly reveals that much of the policy-making task is not undertaken in the Assembly. Most proposed legislation tend to be cabinet-sponsored legislation. These are obviously drafted by the civil servants in the secretariat. Discussions during the process of legislation tends to centre around constituency grievances or regional problems. For instance, when a proposed



bill involving expenditure for the education department is being considered, most members participating in the discussion tend to point out the educational backwardness of their constituency or region and chastise the government for their negligence. However, there is evidence in the legislative proceedings to indicate that a small group of members do discuss substantive questions of policy, but their number is small. The majority of legislators in Orissa tend to utilize floor debates as an opportunity to ventilate constituency grievances, not as a means to make meaningful contributions to the formulation of policy. This seems to be the case during the "Question Hour". An overview of the interpellations indicate that most questions deal with constituency grievances. Moving resolutions on questions of public policy, proposing private members' legislation, and doing effective work at the committee-level are legislative functions that are undertaken only by a small minority of MLAs in Orissa Legislative Assembly.

Table 5

## General Sessions of Orissa Assembly: 1967-1968

<i>Sessions</i>	<i>Number of Days for Meeting</i>
<b>1967</b>	
Budget Session	6
Monsoon Session	32
Winter Session	15
Total:	53
<b>1968</b>	
Budget Session	32
Monsoon Session	9
Winter Session	11
Total:	52

On the whole, an average member of the Orissa Legislative Assembly performs relatively few legislative functions. It seems likely that, in a legislative setting of this kind, an average legislator begins a search for his identity as legislator. What is he supposed to do? Why did he come all the way to Bhubaneswar? Perhaps he turns to the political

culture for cues. What do the people of his constituency want him to do, now that the legislative institution wants him to merely support the majority party in power (if he happens to be a member) or ventilate constituency grievances (through questions, resolutions and floor debates)?

Although the political culture in Orissa and the nature of the institutional setting in the Orissa Assembly predisposes an average MLA to be an intervener, why do a small proportion of the respondent legislators rather explicitly reject this role? This raises a significant question about the correlates of administrative role orientation, particularly with respect to the correlates of non-intervener role orientation. Who are these legislators who reflect the minority administration role orientation? What were their background attributes? Did their pattern of political socialization significantly differ from that of the other MLAs? What about their occupational and educational background? Did the nature of their political experience vary from that of the interveners? Can we provide a general profile of such legislators? What follows is an attempt to explore systematically some of the attributes which could be associated with their roles. While doing this, we should be aware of the fact that most of the legislators who are oriented toward 'non-intervenor' roles also intervene.<sup>11</sup>

#### BACKGROUND ATTRIBUTES AND ADMINISTRATIVE ROLES

##### *Caste*

For a number of contextual reasons associated with politics and society in Orissa, it may seem relevant to hypothesize the relationship between caste and administrative roles. We may anticipate finding more upper caste individuals among the non-interveners and fewer interveners with upper caste backgrounds. Although in contemporary Orissa upper caste origin does not necessarily imply a more sophisticated social origin, somehow, social sophistication and the level of caste hierarchy seems very much related. Considering the likelihood that more sophisticated legislators in most political systems tend not to be interveners, we may hypothesize a relationship between higher caste and non-intervener role orientation. Another possibility also suggests this hypothesis. Because the upper and the middle echelons of the

<sup>11</sup> A very recently published study on the "Welfare Office Role Orientation" of British MPs (this is conceptual equivalent of "administrative role") reports that the rejectors of this role tended to be "Conservative", "earlier entrants", "university graduates", "public school men", and "MPs who lack adequate secretarial assistance". See, Anthony Barker and Michael Rush, *The British Member of Parliament and His Information*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970, pp. 173-204.

Orissa bureaucracy seem to represent disproportionately the upper caste groups, a latent hostility toward the bureaucracy may be generated in the lower caste legislator and this may provoke him to become an 'intervener'.

The data tends to reflect that a high percentage of non-interveners are indeed upper caste legislators. Most of them belong to Brahmin, Karan and Khandayat castes. However, as the data adequately reflect, most upper caste men among all respondents are interveners. While caste has obviously not determined the administrative role orientation of all legislators, it probably has some influence.

### *Regional Origin and Administrative Roles*

There are sharp politico-economic differences between the coastal regions of Orissa and the hill districts of Orissa. An attitude of hostility toward coastal people characterizes the political culture of the hill districts. On the basis of such an attitudinal orientation, it may be hypothesized that the hill district legislators may have a latent hostility towards the bureaucratic structure in Orissa which is dominated by the coastal Oriyas.

In the data presented here, the hypothesized relationship tends to hold true. Among the non-interveners, the hill district representation is very low (27 per cent); and among the interveners, the coastal representation is five per cent below their actual size among the respondents. There is, however, a noticeable correlation between caste and region. Most of the upper caste legislators among the respondents tend to represent the coastal Orissa, and the hill district legislators tend to be the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Hence, it may be suggested that a caste-region mix tends to influence role orientation. The upper caste coastal legislators tend to be non-interveners and the lower caste hill district legislators tend to be interveners.

### *Education and Occupational Background*

The percentage of educated persons in general population of Orissa tends to be rather low. According to the 1971 census, the level of literacy was as low as 28 per cent. A higher educational background and a professional occupational background may be associated with non-intervener role orientation; this seems to indicate the probability that an educated person might consider intervening as an undignified job. This is also likely in the case of individuals who have pursued respectable careers, such as lawyers, teachers and government servants.

A closer analysis of the data presented here proves to an extent the hypothesized relationship. For instance, while the respondents include only 4 per cent lawyers and 9 per cent law degree holders, the representation of lawyers and law degree holders among the non-interveners rises above these percentages. The interveners include nearly 40 per cent agriculturists. However, it is very interesting to find that professional politicians have higher representation than among the non-interveners. A closer look at the nature of their background revealed that most of them were politicians with a past association with the Indian national movement. Such politicians are likely to have a more idealized image of a politician and a legislator. Hence, rejection of an intervener role by these 'freedom fighters' should be considered reasonable.

#### *Political Socialization and Administrative Role Orientation*

In the context of this study, it seemed reasonable to hypothesize earlier political socialization on the part of non-interveners and later political socialization on the part of interveners. Further, the source of political socialization seemed relevant in this context. It appeared reasonable to suppose that the legislators who had received their earliest political interests from ideological movements or were associated with the Indian national movement would tend to be non-interveners'. These hypothesized relationships provide some support in the available data. A majority of the non-interveners (53 per cent) were associated with the freedom movement. A great majority of non-interveners were also aware of politics by adolescence. In addition, although an equal percentage of interveners and non-interveners had relatives in politics before their entry into politics, a higher percentage of non-interveners attributed their source of political socialization to the primary groups. These trends do indicate the relevance of the pattern of political socialization as a variable capable of influencing the choice of the administrative role by Orissa legislators. However, considering the differences between the sizes of the interveners and non-interveners, it is difficult to establish a conclusive relationship between political socialization and one's administrative role orientation.

**Table 6**  
**Social Background of Interveners and Non-Interveners**  
(in percentages)

	<i>All Respondents (N 85)</i>	<i>Interveners (N 70)</i>	<i>Non- Interveners (N 15)</i>
<i>Caste Affiliation</i>			
Upper Castes	41	33	80

(Continued)

Table 6—Contd.

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes	59	67	20
<i>Regional Origin</i>			
Coastal Orissa	48	43	73
Hill Districts	52	57	27
<i>Education</i>			
Law Degree	9	7	20
College Degree & some college education (includes Law Degree holders)	52	39	53
Matriculation	18	20	14
Less than Matriculation	37	36	33
<i>Occupational Background</i>			
Lawyers	4	2	13
School Teachers	16	18	6
Agriculturists	35	40	26
Politics & Social Work	32	25	46
Government Employees	7	8	6

Table 7

**Time of Earliest Political Interest  
Recalled by Interveners and Non-Interveners  
(in percentages)**

<i>Time Recalled</i>	<i>All Legislators (N 85)</i>	<i>Interveners (N 70)</i>	<i>Non- Interveners (N 15)</i>
Childhood (up to 15)	33	37	46
Adolescence (16 to 20)	31	35	40
College (21 to 25)	16	21	6
At the time of entry into Politics (after 25)	5	5	6

Table 8

**Sources of Earliest Political Interest  
for Interveners and Non-Interveners**

*(in percentages)*

<i>Sources of Interest</i>	<i>All Legislators (N 85)</i>	<i>Interveners (N 70)</i>	<i>Non- Interveners (N 15)</i>
Primary groups	21	17	40
Political & civil participation	36	32	46
Influence of leaders	57	60	53
Influence of movements	51	48	33
Personal pre-disposition	45	44	46

Table 9

**Relatives in Politics: Interveners and Non-Interveners**

*(in percentages)*

	<i>All Legislators (N 85)</i>	<i>Interveners (N 70)</i>	<i>Non-Interveners (N 15)</i>
Relatives in politics	60	60	60

Table 10

**Association with Indian Freedom Movement:  
Interveners and Non-Interveners**

*(in percentages)*

	<i>All Respondents</i>	<i>Interveners</i>	<i>Non- Interveners</i>
Freedom fighters	38	30	53

LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE  
ROLE ORIENTATION

The role of intervener in the Orissa Legislature is a demanding one. Most legislators lack secretarial assistance. The communication pattern in most Orissa Districts tends to be primitive. During an interview, one respondent described his frustrating experience in securing adequate information about the complaint of a constituent from government offices. He had to walk several miles to a Block Headquarters, only to discover that the official in-charge had left the headquarters for several days. Under such conditions, it would seem reasonable to assume that the legislators who are otherwise busy in legislative work, such as committee work, action-plans for floor activity and such other business would tend to reject the intervener role. One way of looking at the individual legislator's involvement in the legislative activities could be through certain empirical indicators. In this context, such evidence has been formulated on the basis of the published records of the Orissa Legislative Assembly. These published proceedings are available to the public long after the actual legislative event; the complete set of debates for the Orissa Legislative Assembly in 1968 is still not available.

Seniority in the legislature may reflect an individual's greater involvement in the legislative activity. Although the rate of re-election to the Orissa Assembly has continued to be low; yet, a number of legislators in the Assembly are in their fourth term of office. We may hypothesize that seniority in the legislature should make most legislators non-interveners. For, unlike the freshmen legislator who is still groping for an effective role in the legislature, a senior legislator should have been able to establish himself. The data presented here reflects that a majority of non-interveners (54 per cent) were in their second or third term of office. Nearly 70 per cent of the interveners were freshmen legislators, however, the intervener group also included four per cent such legislators who were in their fourth term of office, while none of the 'non-interveners' were in their fourth term.

Membership in the political parties should be considered as a correlate of administrative role of the legislators for a number of reasons. In general, the legislators belonging to the ruling party may be more effective in playing the intervener role, although certain leading members of the opposition are more effective than the government back-benchers. This general effectiveness in handling complaints by the ruling party members might motivate them to be interveners;



whereas, the opposition members may reject such a role out of frustration in dealing with cases of unsuccessful intervention. With this assumption, we can hypothesize that a higher percentage of interveners would belong to the ruling party. The data basically reflects this trend. Nearly 66 per cent of the non-interveners are members of the opposition benches.

The committee work in the Orissa legislature is not undertaken by every legislator. Since committee membership implies greater involvement in the legislative activity, it may be assumed that individual legislators not engaged in committee work are generally less involved in

**Table 11**  
**Legislative Activity of Intervenors and Non-Intervenors**  
(in percentages)

<i>Seniority</i>	<i>All Respondents (N 85)</i>	<i>Intervenors (N 70)</i>	<i>Non- Intervenors (N 15)</i>
<b>Legislator's term of membership</b>			
4th term or more	3	4	0
3rd term	11	8	27
2nd term	18	17	27
1st term	68	70	46
<b>Committee Chairmanship (1967-1970)</b>			
Legislators with at least one committee chairmanship	5	7	0
<b>Committee Membership (1967-1970)</b>			
Legislators holding one membership or more	68	78	80

(Continued)

Table 11—Contd.

<i>Seniority</i>	<i>All Respondents (N 85)</i>	<i>Interveners (N 70)</i>	<i>Non- Interveners (N 15)</i>
Legislators holding two memberships	7	52	66
Legislators holding three memberships or more	31	27	53
<b>Resolution Moving (in 1967)</b>			
Legislators moving one or more resolutions	22	17	47
Legislators moving five or more resolutions	10	7	33
Legislators moving ten or more resolutions	5	2	20
<b>Interpellating (starred questions in 1967)</b>			
Legislators raising no questions	12	15	0
Legislators raising 1 to 20 questions	57	57	60
Legislators raising 21 to 50 questions	16	17	13
Legislators raising over 50 questions	12	10	26
<b>Party Affiliation</b>			
Legislators in ruling coalition	51	56	33
Legislators in opposition	49	44	66

Table 12

**Legislative Institutional Perception:  
Interveners and Non-Interveners**

*(in percentages)*

<i>Achieved Legislative Goals</i>	<i>All Respondents (N 85)</i>	<i>Interveners (N 70)</i>	<i>Non- Interveners (N 15)</i>
Political goals	21	10	13
Policy goals	23	20	40
Constituency service	68	68	66
<b>Normative approval by others</b>			
Most legislators approve intervention	84	90	60
Most legislators disapprove intervention	16	10	40
<b>Effect of intervention on other types of legislative activity</b>			
Intervention affects other work	14	13	66
Intervention does not affect other work	86	87	33

the legislative activity than those who hold committee assignments. However, this should not obscure variations in the work-load of different committees and party work assignments for non-committee members. It can be hypothesized, however, that individuals with more committee assignments would prefer the role of non-interveners for the obvious reason of work-load. The data provided here includes the committee structure for the period between 1967-1970. On the basis of this data, it appears that a higher percentage of non-interveners are involved in committee work. However, as the data also reflects, none of the non-interveners hold a committee chairmanship.

Most of the legislators in Orissa do take part in floor activities of different sorts, including debates, interpellations, moving of resolutions, and introduction of private members' bills. The frequency and quality of these activities could be considered as indicative of an individual legislator's involvement in the legislative process. Of these activities, two major types are more universal and perhaps more easily amenable to quantitative analysis; these are questioning and resolution moving. Both activities also indicate more effective legislative behaviour than making random speeches during the debates, as some legislators often do. Both activities require some individual research efforts by legislators, however crude the methods involved may be. From the available documents, the frequency of such activities by the individual legislators have been identified. Such data, however, is confined to the year 1967, consisting of three sessions of the Assembly. It may be hypothesized that legislators who are more frequently involved in these types of legislative activities would tend to be non-interveners; this reflects the basic assumption that it involves more work for the legislators. The data supports the hypothesis. While a higher percentage of non-interveners is involved in resolution moving and questioning, the interveners are not involved in these. This evidence should, however, be considered with some qualifications. It is likely that the Orissa Assembly ruling party had some form of normative sanction against its party member's open criticism of the government which are the major objectives of interpellating and resolution-moving. Since more interveners are members of the ruling party, the lower frequency of their involvement in resolution-moving and interpellating may be due to such norms, if any. Nevertheless, the evidence still supports the case of the non-interveners greater involvement in the legislative process in contrast to the 'interveners'. However, since no data is available on the individual legislators' party work involvement, it is difficult to suggest if involvement in such work could be related to the non-intervener role.

Apart from these indicators of legislative institutional variables affecting administrative rules, three other perceptual factors shall be taken into consideration here. The first one relates to the perception of achieved legislative goals. In response to a survey question, the legislators indicated their hitherto achieved goals as legislators.<sup>12</sup> It could be hypothesized that the interveners would more frequently refer to constituency service and the non-interveners would refer to policy-oriented goals. But the data does not provide evidence to support this hypothesis. Almost equal percentage of interveners and

<sup>12</sup> This is a slightly modified version of questions generally used in legislative behaviour research. This is to distinguish between legislative goals and achieved legislative goals.

non-interveners emphasized constituency service. But a slightly higher percentage of non-interveners than 'interveners' do emphasize policy and political goals.

The second perceptual indicator relates to legislative norms on intervention work. Assuming that the interveners and non-interveners have two different sets of reference groups in the Orissa Legislative Assembly, it would seem reasonable to hypothesize that the interveners would perceive the normative approval of intervention work and the non-interveners would perceive a negative norm about intervention. The data supports this hypothesis. A majority of both interveners and non-interveners see a norm supporting intervention work. But a higher percentage of non-interveners perceive a negative norm than the interveners.

The third perceptual indicator relates to the individual's perception of the impact of intervention work on other forms of legislative activities. It may be hypothesized that the non-interveners would tend to indicate that intervention work affects other forms of legislative activity. This evidence appears in the data. An overwhelming percentage of interveners did not think that intervention work affects other forms of legislative activity. This is contrary to the perceptual data on non-interveners, most of whom think that intervention work affects other forms of legislative activities.

#### CONSTITUENCY RELATED VARIABLES AND ADMINISTRATIVE ROLES

In the present context, a number of contextual factors suggest the relevance of constituency-related variables as correlates of administrative role. It appears that the nature and degree of constituents' pressure on the legislator for intervention work should have some impact on the legislator's role orientation. It may be hypothesized that the legislators who perceive great pressure on them from the constituents for intervention work would tend to be interveners, but the perceptual data obtained from the respondent legislators regarding the degree of pressure does not provide evidence to support this hypothesis. A majority of interveners and all non-interveners do perceive great pressure from their constituents for intervention work. This finding should not be surprising in view of the fact that all respondents indicated that they were interveners, despite the variation in role orientation.

An almost identical relationship emerges when we examine the perception of the respondent legislators about the impact of intervention work on future electoral outcomes. An overwhelming majority of both interveners and non-interveners indicate that intervention work will have some impact on their future electoral outcome. The perceptual

data on the competitiveness of their last election also seems unrelated to the variations in role orientation. The objective measure of constituency competitiveness (based on electoral support in the 1967 election) seems related to the administrative role orientation. The other constituency-related variable that indicates some relationship to the administrative role orientations of the respondent legislators is the degree of political mobilization in the constituency as indicated by the percentage of electoral participation in the 1967 election. Nearly 53 per cent of non-interveners were elected from constituencies with more than 50 per cent electoral participation as against 28 per cent of interveners.

On the basis of the empirical evidence just presented, it is difficult to suggest if constituency-related variables, in general, account for variations in administrative role orientation. However, this should not belittle the significance of constituency-related variables in affecting the role behaviour (though not orientation) of Orissa legislators. On the other hand, constituency-related behaviour seems to negate the impact of role orientation on role behaviour. Although the non-interveners do not like to intervene, they have to do so because of tremendous pressure from the constituents. They are also as fully aware as are the interveners that intervention work is likely to be rewarding in the next election.

Table 13

**Constituency Related Variables and Administrative Roles**  
(in percentages)

	<i>All Respondents (N 85)</i>	<i>Interveners (N 70)</i>	<i>Non- Interveners (N 15)</i>
<b>Voter Support</b>			
(per cent of constituency votes received in 1967 election)			
71 or more	2	2	0
61 to 70	7	8	0
51 to 60	23	22	26
41 to 50	34	37	20
31 to 40	25	22	40
30 and below	7	5	13

(Continued)

Table 13—Contd.

	<i>All Respondents</i> (N 85)	<i>Interveners</i> (N 70)	<i>Non- Interveners</i> (N 15)
<b>Electoral Participation</b>			
(per cent of constituents who voted in 1967 election)			
60 or more	10	8	20
50 to 59	22	20	33
31 to 49	47	47	47
30 and below	20	25	0
<b>Perception of Constituency Competitiveness</b>			
(Was the last election easy?)			
Easy	65	67	60
Difficult	35	33	20
<b>Perception of Constituency Pressure for Intervention</b>			
No great pressure	9	11	0
Great pressure	91	89	100
<b>Perception of the Influence of Intervention Work on Future Election</b>			
Some influence	80	79	87
No influence	20	21	13



The emerging relationship between the electoral participation in constituency and administrative role suggests some explanation here. A higher level of electoral participation in constituencies could be associated with a higher level of political mobilization or awareness. This may involve the higher frequency of requests for intervention work from the constituents. Thus, we may anticipate, in general, that non-interveners would have a higher work-load involving the intervention work requests. This is likely to produce a negative orientation on the part of the legislators toward intervention work.

#### LEGISLATORS' PERCEPTION AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY AND ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE ORIENTATION

Since intervention work by legislators involves working with the public bureaucracy, it may seem obvious to assume some relationship between the administrative role of legislators and the legislators' perception and evaluation of the public bureaucracy. Five major perceptual variables relating to public bureaucracy have been examined here for their relevance. These variables are as follows:

The first one relates to the individual legislator's perception of his success in dealing with the public bureaucracy in connection with intervention work. It may be hypothesized that the interveners would indicate a higher degree of success than the non-interveners. It is likely that their success in dealing with the intervention cases would encourage them to be interveners.

The second variable relates to legislators' perceptions of the bureaucracy's approval of intervention work by legislators. It may be hypothesized that a higher percentage of non-interveners would perceive disapproval of the bureaucracy on this dimension. Perhaps, this perception of the non-interveners influences their role orientation.

The third variable relates to the legislator's perception about the adequacy of information on administrative matters in general. It may be hypothesized that the interveners would consider information on administrative matters as more adequate. It is likely that their satisfaction with the adequacy of information about administrative matters would make them more self-confident about their competence in handling intervention work. The data on the perceived adequacy of information on administrative matters is based on survey research.

The next two variables relate to the legislators' administrative value and their evaluation of the public bureaucracy in Orissa. The nature

of data presented here requires some methodological explanation. The following questions in the survey instrument sought to examine these aspects of the legislators' perceptions.

### *Questions*

"What personal qualities would you like to see in an effective administrator?"

"What changes would you like to see in the administrative system in Orissa? How can these changes be achieved?"<sup>13</sup>

On the basis of the responses to these questions, the administrative values of the legislators were identified. Such values were codified under two major categories. The values that were closely related to populist ideas as: "administrators should establish contact with people", "administrators should be courteous to elect representatives", "administrators should reach the common man in villages", and "administrator should deal with the complaints of villagers with human concerns", were classified as "populist" administrative values. On the other hand, the responses that indicated Weberian administrative values, such as "there should be non-political decision-making by administration", "administrator should tighten the discipline in his department", "administrator should adequately grasp the problem involved and arrive at quick decision", "administrator should objectively implement the law", were classified as Weberian administrative values.<sup>14</sup> Manifestly, the "populist values" indicated a more humanized and perhaps politicized administrative system. The "Weberian values", on the other hand, manifestly indicated a somewhat neutral or non-political administrative system. Assuming the limitations of the subjective coding process involved here, it may be hypothesized that more non-interveners would indicate Weberian administrative values. Their unwillingness to intervene in the administrative process could be associated with their Weberian administrative values.

Again, the coding of the legislators' responses on the evaluation of the public bureaucracy was based on manifest "support-hostility-neutrality" indicated in the responses. The responses containing manifestly hostile attitudes towards the public bureaucracy, such as "all

<sup>13</sup> For an attempt to identify the administrative values of bureaucrats using such instrument, see Jerry Weaver, "Value patterns of a Latin American Bureaucracy", *Human Relations*, June, 1970, pp. 225-233.

<sup>14</sup> This typology is comparable to "democratic" and "bureaucratic" administrative values as operationalized in a study of Indian administrators. See Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy*, Glencoe, Scott, Foreman, 1968, pp. 80-91.

administrative problems will be solved, if we throw out a few IAS officers", "administrators have a colonial outlook", and "administrators are self-seeking people" were coded as hostile. Certain responses indicating a support attitude were expected but none were so.

**Table 14**  
**Perception and Evaluation of Bureaucracy:**  
**'Interveners' and 'Non-Interveners'**

(in percentages)

	<i>All Respondents (N 85)</i>	<i>Interveners (N 70)</i>	<i>Non- Interveners (N 15)</i>
<b>Success in Intervention</b>			
Some success	92	91	93
No success	8	9	7
<b>Bureaucratic Approval of Intervention</b>			
Generally approve	44	50	13
Generally disapprove	56	50	87
<b>Adequacy of Information on Administration</b>			
Adequate	28	27	6
Inadequate	72	73	94
<b>Administrative Values</b>			
Populist	100	100	100
Weberian	44	37	80
<b>Evaluation of Administra- tive System</b>			
Supportive	0	0	0
Neutral	43	47	26
Hostile	54	53	73

The other responses that manifestly did not indicate hostile attitude toward administrators were classified as neutral. Such responses generally emphasized economic improvement, political stability and such

other suggestions for administrative reforms. It may be hypothesized that the non-interveners are likely to be less hostile to the bureaucracy and, thus, indicate neutral attitudes.

The data on bureaucratic perception and evaluation does not generally support these hypotheses. There are evidences in support of some. Firstly, the degree of success in working with the bureaucracy does not seem related to variations in administrative role orientations. An equal percentage of interveners and non-interveners indicate some success in dealing with the bureaucracy. This tends to indicate that all types of legislators have some degree of success, depending upon the number of attempts. Secondly, a higher percentage of non-interveners perceive bureaucratic disapproval of their intervention work than the interveners. Thirdly, there appears some significant variations in the administrative values of interveners and non-interveners. Although all legislators emphasize "populist" administrative values, a high percentage of non-interveners also emphasize Weberian administrative values. Lastly, the non-interveners seem more hostile toward administrators than the interveners.

#### CONCLUSION

On the basis of the preceding data, we might be able to derive a number of tentative conclusions. Firstly, it appears very clearly that the respondent legislators in Orissa have an interventionist orientation in relation to public bureaucracy. In the case of a high proportion of respondent legislators, this tends to be the legislative goal. The legislative institution as a social system tends to provide a normative sanction to such an attitudinal orientation. Individual legislators probably find job-satisfaction through such intervention work and the norms of Orissan political culture also support this role orientation. In the Orissan political system the mediating role between the sophisticated public bureaucracy and the illiterate villager is needed; most state legislators tend to fulfil this systemic need. Although legislators' intervention is not always effective, such interventions are fruitful at times. The nature of intervention work by legislators in Orissa has its counterpart in other systems as suggested through cross-cultural research findings.

Secondly, on the basis of the preceding analysis, we can also generalize, if not theorize, about the correlates of interventionist and non-interventionist roles among the legislators in Orissa. While the profile of a typical intervener remains somewhat cloudy, certain emerging profiles of the non-interveners are apparent. A typical

non-interveners tends to be an upper caste Oriya from coastal Orissa, who perceives tremendous pressure from the constituents to intervene. He is more involved in other forms of legislative activity, such as questioning, debating, and resolution moving. His college education or his past association with ideological movements has given him the Burkean image of a legislator with broader legislative goals. He perceives more clearly the bureaucratic rejection of his intervener role and perhaps has greater contact with bureaucrats and administrators. However, he also knows that the intervener role will aid him for the purpose of re-election and might give him some influence, both inside and outside the constituency. And as such, he behaves as an intervener despite his orientations to the contrary. This is perhaps a composite image of the non-intervener legislator in Orissa that emerges.

Finally, the public bureaucracy in Orissa, like its counterparts in other systems, confronts a situation in which the legislators want to play an interventionist administrative role. However, unlike in most Western systems, this role of the legislator has not been institutionalized in Orissa and perhaps in other similar political systems. The intervention process in Orissa continues to be personal, and haphazard and perhaps still operates under a situation of bureaucratic hostility. One way of coping with this situation on the part of bureaucracy could be through co-optation. Perhaps some individual bureaucrats in Orissa have co-opted the individual legislators for mutual benefits. In general, it appears bureaucrats in Orissa continue to consider legislator's intervention in the administrative process as unnecessary, undesirable and obnoxious. But as Paul Wallace suggests in a recent review, the political culture of India is undergoing a change. "Her hierarchically ordered authoritarian past in which administrative entities commanded without question is being transformed. A subject culture is becoming a participant culture."<sup>15</sup> According to this author, an institutionalized administrative role for the legislators seems inevitable in the face of this change.

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<sup>15</sup> See Paul Wallace's review of Shanti Kothari and Ramashray Roy, *Relations Between Politicians and Administrators at District Level*, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1959, in *American Political Science Review*, March, 1971, pp. 223-225.

## RESEARCH METHODS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION : A CRITICAL SURVEY OF IMPORTANT WORKS IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY

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THE study of public administration in India as a separate discipline and a distinct field is of comparatively recent origin, even though interest in public administration in India has been traced by many writers as far back as the ancient times. Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is claimed by many to be one of the important treatises in public administration and is ranked among the classics on the subject. However, a beginning in the study of public administration was made during the 'fifties, but only as a part of the discipline of 'political science', which itself had only recently separated from its parent subject of 'history'. Although a scientific approach to the study of public administration and an empirical enquiry into the various administrative phenomena have just started and have still to gather significant momentum, the study of administrative practices, structures and institutions in historical perspective had been attracting the attention of the historians and civil servants for quite some time in the past since the days of the British. Thus, contrary to the prevalent belief that historical researches on public administration in India had been sparse or meagre, there is quite a rich collection of books and articles dealing with various facets of administrative history particularly relating to the period of the British East India Company and the administration under the British Crown.

This article attempts to examine critically some of those important works in the field of public administration, in which historical and comparative methodology have been used. The purpose is not to present a detailed bibliographical essay on the subject, but to comment upon the methodology adopted and to discover the gaps that still remain to be bridged through further researches. Thus, the article

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does not attempt to survey the vast literature available in the field of 'Indian administrative history' or in the field of 'comparative public administration' with reference to the Indian institutions of public administration, nor does it aim at including an account of the primary material available in these fields. Its objective is very limited, *i.e.*, to present a state of research in the historical and comparative methods in the study of public administration in India.

## HISTORICAL METHOD

The historical approach to the study of political and administrative phenomena, in general, centres on the study of the origins and growth of certain institutions. It has also been used to trace the causes or reasons which led to certain political or policy decisions or to understand the existing constitutional and legal set-up in a country. However, according to one student of history, "The aim of history is to interpret human institutions, and to understand the laws which have governed man's progress through the ages, that is to say, to interpret human culture and civilization in its various manifestations. . . . Its function is to rationalize, so far as possible, and to trace the life of nations and the development of human genius."<sup>1</sup> A more significant function of historical method of research is "to bring out clearly the bearing of the past experiences and institutions on the present ones and to show a living connexion between them".<sup>2</sup> In India, the social, cultural, and political institutions were so inseparably welded together in a synthesis that, to draw a true picture of the working of the modern institutions, researchers in the field of social sciences could scarcely afford to ignore the historical perspective. In fact, invariably they had to turn to history for the understanding, justification or explanation of a particular institution or a political and social phenomenon. A general survey of the important works relating to the study of political and administrative institutions through the various periods of Indian history indicates that, while many scholars were fairly successful in describing the old institutions in the social, cultural and economic perspectives of their own time, they failed "to evolve an analytical scheme within which an antecedent factor is related in terms other than chronological for a particular event or development".

For our present purposes, the most important works in the field may be classified under five distinct periods: ancient India, mediaeval India, Mogul period, British East India Company, and modern period

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<sup>1</sup> P. Saran, *The Provincial Government of the Mughals (1526-1658)*, Allahabad, Kitabistan, 1941, Preface.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



since 1858 till today. The works relating to modern period could further be divided under four sub-categories: (1) general administration, (2) state and provincial administration, (3) civil service, and (4) district administration.

### *Ancient India*

Writings of political and administrative institutions of this period are very few. A.S. Altekar's *State and Government in Ancient India* (Benares, 1955) is based on ancient classics and describes the various aspects of the administrative structure and traces their development. However, it does not give a clear picture of the administrative machinery as a whole, nor does it attempt to discuss its procedural aspects. C. P. Bhambhri's study *Hindu Polity* (Meerut, 1969) contains chapters on taxation, inter-State relations and justice in ancient India without attempting a comprehensive analysis of the administrative system. V. R. R. Dikshitar's *Mauryan Polity* (Lahore, 1943) is also on the same lines. V. Subramaniam's thesis on *Sangam Polity* (Bombay, 1966) deals with a survey of Municipal and village government, warfare and military organization, law and justice, revenue and finance and other economic activities. This is a fairly exhaustive account of the administrative system of Sangam Tamils in the second century and also examines the interaction of the social life on the administrative system. A more recent work, *History of Indian Administration, Vol. I, Ancient Period* (Bombay, 1968) by B. N. Puri traces the evolution of the administrative system of India from the Rig Vedic period to 1000 A.D., including the Mauryan Administration (400-200 B.C.), the Gupta Administration (300-500 A.D.) and the Harsha Administration (606-647 A.D.). The historical methodology followed by the author is an improvement on the other works in the field, inasmuch as he has tried to provide a framework which enables to link one period of history to another and to analyse and compare the characteristics of their respective administrative systems. For example, he concludes that while Gupta administration preserved the official hierarchy of the Kushans, it placed a stress on decentralization. A. Sharma's *Principles of Public Administration in Ancient India* (Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow) is merely an effort to describe the various political and administrative institutions in ancient India.

### *Mediaeval India*

Some important works on administrative system in Mediaeval India suffer from being purely historical and descriptive. U.N. Dey's

*Administrative System of Delhi Sultanate* (1206-1413 A.D.) (Allahabad, 1959), A.B. Pandey's *Society and Government in Mediaeval India* (Allahabad, 1965), and I.H. Siddiqi's *Some Aspects of Afghan Disposition in India* (Aligarh, 1969), fall into the same category. However, two works, viz., P. B. Udgaonkar's *The Political Institutions and Administration of Northern India During Mediaeval Times* (750-1200) (Delhi, 1969), and R. P. Tripathi's *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration* (Allahabad, 2nd Revised Ed., 1956) stand apart. The former is a comprehensive, comparative and a critical account of the political and administrative institutions of the period, and the latter, in addition to the description of the various political institutions of mediaeval India up to the advent of Akbar, also deals with certain theoretical aspects like the Muslim theory of sovereignty, the Zenith of Despotism and so on. He has also attempted to trace the evolution of some of the administrative institutions individually and severally, e.g., the growth of the Vizarat Department, and the Revenue System.

Two articles also deserve to be mentioned in this context. K. N. V. Sastri's "The Administrative History of India", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration (IJPA)*, Vol. II (1956), pp. 349-358, and D. P. Verma's "Indian Administration Through the Ages", *Research Bulletin of the University of the Panjab*, Vol. 38 (VI), 1962, trace the various characteristics of Indian administrative system since Manu, Kautilya, Ashoka, Muslim period, the British period, right up to Independence and after. Although based on secondary sources, both the authors have tried to trace the modern institutions to the ancient times. For example, Sastri points out that the problems of Ashoka are still the problems of Jawaharlal Nehru, and Verma thinks that the modern concept of socialistic society was already prevalent in the olden days.

### *Mughul Administration*

The material available on the administrative history of this period is less satisfactory. Jadunath Sarkar's work *Mughal Administration* (Calcutta, 1921) is still regarded to be among the firsts to give a historical and descriptive account of the working of Mogul administration, particularly the sovereign and departmental heads, the treasury and the household departments, provincial administration, taxation, law and justice, army and navy, city administration, etc. Sarkar's work has, however, come for criticism inasmuch as "it touches few of the fundamental and important problems, much less the highly controversial and complex questions connected with Mughal Government. . . The author's method of treatment betrays an unfortunate lack of a sympathetic



revenues, the administration of civil and criminal justice and the civil services. The author has also taken care to analyse the efforts at reforms in each of these aspects of administrative system. It is here that one finds a good use of historical methodology, as the book furnishes an adequate perspective of the enquiry into the causes of the various administrative practices which have been transmitted to modern times. N. Chatterji's *Clive as an Administrator* (Allahabad, 1955) and *Bengal under Diwani Administration, (1765-1772)* (Allahabad, 1956) are merely descriptive studies of the revenue system and the various facets of the administration of the times of Clive.

Another important work relating to this period is of Nirranjan Dhar's *The Administrative System of the East India Company in Bengal, 1774-1786*, Vol. I (Calcutta, 1964) and Vol. II (1966). Based on contemporary manuscript records and parliamentary papers, the author has proceeded on the hypothesis that "the British Administration did not consist in the continued growth of national institutions. Nor did it develop in pursuance of a premeditated plan. The story of this administration is the story of the series of experiments made by foreign rulers in a strange land. These experiments were carried out under various stresses and strains and exhibited a considerable vacillation of purpose too. But still, on the whole, there is a steady advance towards the forging out of machinery for "securing justice and legislation".<sup>5</sup> The works, thus, contain a detailed study of the civil, criminal and judicial administration and of the police department during the period.

Various other works are available relating to this period which describe either one particular aspect of administration or the system of administration under one British civil servant or another. More important of these are: W. K. Firminger's *Historical Introduction to the Bengal Portion of the Fifth Report* (Calcutta, reprint 1962), which is a detailed study of the changes in the organization of the revenue administration during the years 1769 to 1787; K. N. V. Sastri's *The Munro System of British Statesmanship in India* (Mysore, 1939); and T. H. Beaglehole's *Thomas Munro and the Development of Administrative Policy in Madras 1792-1818: The Origins of "The Munro System"* (London, 1966) are all an attempt to describe the development of Ryotwari system of revenue since the days of Cornwallis. D. Bhasin's *History and Administration of the North-Western Provinces (subsequently called the Agra Province) 1803-1858* (Agra, 1956); and K. N. V. Sastri's *The Administration of Mysore under Sir Mark Cubbon (1834-1861)*

<sup>5</sup> Nirranjan Dhar, *The Administrative System of the East India Company in Bengal, 1774-1786*, Calcutta, Eureka, 1964, Vol. I, p. IX.

(London, 1932), are descriptive and historical account of a province and an Indian State during the period. W. A. Rahim's *Lord Dalhousie's Administration of the Conquered and Annexed States* (Delhi, 1963) is another attempt to describe the system of administration of the Indian States under a particular Governor-General. S. V. Desikachar's study on *Centralized Legislation in British India 1834-1961* (Ph.D. Thesis, Delhi, 1959), is a work in which historical methodology has been used for analysing the role of an executive agency in law-making. A. K. Ghosal's *Civil Service in India under the East India Company* (Calcutta University, 1944) is a study of the origin and growth of civil service from the times of East India Company, and deals with recruitment, training and other aspects of personnel management in a historical setting.

#### ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA SINCE 1858

##### *General Administration*

There are a number of studies relating to this period. Some have attempted to describe the administrative set-up under a particular Viceroy and have invariably touched upon his policies on various aspects of administration. More important of such works are Dharma Pal's *Administration of Sir John Lawrence in India (1864-1869)* (Simla, 1952); Virendra Pal Singh's *Administration of India under Lord Northbrook 1872-1876* (Delhi, Ph.D. Thesis, 1952); Edward C. Moulton's (*Lord Northbrook's Indian Administration 1872-1876* (Bombay, 1968); Michael Edwardes', *High Noon of Empire : India under Curzon* (London, 1965); Stephen E. Koss's *John Morley at the India Office 1905-1910* (New Haven, 1969); Stanley A. Wolpert's *Morley and India 1906-1910* (Berkeley, California, 1967); K. S. Srivastava's *The Administration of India under Lord Mayo* (Ph.D. Thesis, Allahabad, 1948); and Brij Saigal's *Administration of Lord Elgin I* (Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow University). Y. B. Mathur's *Changes in the Administrative System of the Punjab 1849-1875*, is somewhat different in the sense that it deals with the administrative system of a province during the British Rule over a period of time.

The "Administration of India", as a whole, has been the focus of attention through the method of historical research by many writers. Sir John Strachey's *India, Its Administration and Progress* (London, 1903), is perhaps the first attempt in this direction. B. B. Misra has rendered a yeoman's service to the literature on the background of Indian administration by bringing his book *The Administrative History of*

India 1834-1947: *General Administration* (London, 1970) to cover the period till Independence. He has made an attempt "to present in broad perspective the development of modern political and administrative institutions. The study brings out, for example, the gap that often remained between the statutory provisions of a constitution and the practice that had to take into account the exigencies of social, economic and political development". The originality of this work, as claimed by the author, "lies primarily in its attempt to correlate administration to society and to seek in history a comparable body of experience about questions that occur either to practising administrators or to scholars interested in the subject of administrative reforms".<sup>6</sup> His article, "Efforts for Administrative Reforms before Independence", *IJPA*, Vol. IX (1963), pp. 311-35, although a very short version of his big volume, provides quite an insight into the ways the administration was sought to be reformed. Sri Ram Sharma's *Evolution of Public Administration in India* (Allahabad, 1965) is also an attempt in this direction but it lacks the depth, penetration, and analysis of the former. G. Anderson's *British Administration in India* (London, 1923), can perhaps be regarded as the first amongst the textbooks on Indian administrative system. Although much of the contents may be of historical value today, yet an attempt was made by the author to acquaint the students with the administrative set-up of the country in the British India.

H. V. R. Iyengar's *Administration in India: A Historical Review*, is a collection of three lectures delivered by the author at the Bhartiya Vidya Bhawan in 1966. In these lectures, the author has very broadly and superficially dealt with the administration under the Gupta Empire, during the Moguls, the Mahrattas, the British period and the post-Independence period. Of particular interest is his detailed analysis of the intricate and sophisticated machinery of administration set out in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. Shri Ram Maheshwari, on the other hand, has tried to trace it in his *Evolution of the Indian Administration* since 1858 through a chronological linking of the various Government reports on administration. It contains summaries of important reports on the Indian administrative system. The author has, however, not made any attempt at a historical analysis of the various stages in the growth of the Indian administration and the impact of one over the other. It is, at best, only a compendium of the summaries of various governmental reports. B. S. Khanna's *Trends in Public Administration since the Transfer of Power* (Hoshiarpur, 1955) is an attempt to study the emerging trends in public administration in India in the perspective of historical development. B. Abraham's *Central Administration in India between*

<sup>6</sup> B.B. Misra, *The Administrative History of India 1834-1948 : General Administration*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 7-8.

1906-1958 (Ph. D. Thesis, Allahabad University, 1965) traces the evolution of Indian administrative system through historical analysis.

The impact of the British Administration on the Indian system has also been a subject of study. This indeed seems to be a very fruitful exercise in the historical methodology. Bernard S. Cohn's *The Development and Impact of British Administration in India : A Bibliographic Essay* (New Delhi, 1961), is an attempt at a detailed review of the literature from the Moguls to the British India dealing with various aspects of history. M. Ruthnaswamy's *Some Influences that Made the British Administrative System in India* (London, 1939), was perhaps the first attempt at a critical examination and analysis of the underlying principles of the administrative system of India by a political scientist. V. Subramaniam's "Indo-British Legacy in Administration : Its Dialectic and Dilemmas", *IJPA*, Vol. XIV (1968), pp. 266-76, is a brief but a penetrating analysis of the legacy of the Indo-British administrative system, which was fashioned on a cross between the older patchy element of Eastern proto-democracy and the Western ideas of the British administrators from the early period of East India Company. The author contends that the Indo-British dialectic was the more elaborate and fruitful in regard to administrative evolution. It was of importance for those outside India as its results were either deliberately transplanted or deliberately injected in all British territories of the colonial administrators there. This article is one of the examples of how the historical methodology in research could be fruitfully employed to establish certain theoretical framework and a common plane on which other systems of the same time could also be studied and examined.

Several other works like S. S. Basawanal and K. R. S. Iyengar's *A Handbook of Indian Administration (under the Government of India Act, 1935)* (Bombay, 2nd edn., 1939); M. R. Palande's *Introduction to Indian Administration* (Bombay, 1951); Asok Chanda's *Indian Administration* (London, 1967); and IIPA's *The Organization of Government of India* (Bombay, 1958 and 1971) have also used historical methods to trace the development of certain aspects of administration in India, but are mostly descriptive and written in textbook style. However, N. C. Roy's *A Critical Study of Some Aspects of Public Administration in Bengal* (Calcutta, 1945) is different as it gives us a critical analysis of Rowland's Committee Report on the Administration of Bengal in 1945. Some other works dealing with different aspects of administration are: R. S. Jain's *The Growth and Development of Governor-General's Executive Council, 1858-1919* (Delhi, 1967); Debidas Roy's *Food Administration in East India (1939-1950)* (Santiniketan, Vishwa Bharti, 1958); and A. S. Gupta's *Police Reforms in India 1857-1957* (Ph.D. Thesis, Allahabad, 1965).



*State and Provincial Administration*

Administration of Indian States before Independence has also been the theme of various writers. Happily, many of those who undertook the studies were not historians but students of Political Science who had some knowledge of the structure and processes of administration. *Mysore Administration* (1922-1926) : *A Review in Eleven Chapters*, written by anonymous author in journalistic style gives an idea of the system of those days. K. N. V. Sastri's *An Introduction to the History of the Administration of Mysore* (Mysore, Vasley Press, 1937), is a much better work on the same subject attempted by a reputed scholar. P. N. Masaldan's *Provincial Autonomy and its Working in the United Provinces* (Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow University, 1942), was an attempt at an analysis of the working of Provincial Autonomy in the U.P. in historical perspective. Harnam Singh's *Government and Administration of Jammu and Kashmir State* (Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow University, 1943), was the first, which set up a model, for the study of State administrations for other researchers. A student of political science rather than of history, the author has made good use of the historical method for an analysis of the background for the development of various administrative institutions and has tried to analyse the relationships of various structures of Government and administration. Subsequently, I. D. Sharma, C. A. Perumal and R. M. Joshi undertook the studies on *Government and Administration of Baroda* (Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow University, 1948), *Some Aspects of Administration of Travancore-Cochin* (Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow University, 1961), and *Administrative Set-up in Rajasthan* (Ph.D. Thesis, Lucknow University, 1963), respectively. Mention may also be made of N. V. Rajkumar's *Education and Working of the Government in Travancore* (1940), K. C. Markandan's *Administration of the North-Western Frontier Province* (Ph.D. Thesis, Allahabad University, 1950), R. C. Verma's *Provincial Administration in India* (Ph.D. Thesis, Allahabad University, 1951); S. P. Bhargava's *Some Aspects of the Administration of C. P. and Berar 1861-1930* (Ph.D. Thesis, Nagpur University, 1951), P. D. Kashliwal's *Administrative System of Jaipur Since 1800* (Ph.D. Thesis, Jaipur University, 1951), T. V. Mahalingam's *Administration and Social Life under Vijayanagar* (Ph.D. Thesis, Madras University, 1955), Narender K. Lackanpal's *The Governor of Punjab from 1937 to 1947* (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Punjab), K. B. L. Gupta's *The Evolution of Administration of the Former Bharatpur State, 1722-1947* (Ph.D. Thesis, Rajasthan University, 1961), B. P. Gupta's *Growth of Administration in Bikaner State, 1818-1947* (Ph.D. Thesis, Rajasthan University, 1961), and N. R. Visalakshi's *Growth of Public Services in Madras State* (Ph.D. Thesis, Madras University, 1962). M. Zaheer and Jagdeo Gupta's *The Organization of the Government of Uttar*

*Pradesh: A Study of State Administration* (Delhi, 1970), though regarded as a descriptive study of the present structure of administration in the State, has an additional value inasmuch as the authors have used the historical method in tracing the evolution of each of the departments of the State administration. The first section of the first chapter is an account of the administrative history of the U.P. Government since the death of Aurangzeb. E. N. Mangat Rai's *Civil Administration in the Punjab* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), is an analytical account of the State administration in India in which the author, a member of the Indian Civil Service, has raised a number of problems common to States in India and has discussed them from the point of view of an administrator. The first chapter in this volume gives a historical account of the development of administration in Punjab. G. S. Halappa's edited volume on *Studies in Administration* contains two essays on "Administrative Evolution in Karnataka" and "History of Recruitment in Mysore", which have used the historical method, and R. J. Rebello's "Mysore Secretariat" contains a very brief description of its evolution.

Historical methodology has also been used by many others who have been concerned with the study of individual aspects or institutions of the present-day Indian administration, but have thought it proper to trace the growth of such institutions in their historical perspectives. Thus, H. N. Kak's "Decentralization of Police Administration", *IJPA*, Vol. VIII (1962), pp. 40-51; N. Srinivasan's "Changes in Central Ministries and Departments Since Independence", *IJPA*, Vol IX (1963), pp. 384-395; A. R. Tyagi's *Rights and Obligations of Civil Servants in India* (Delhi, 1961); Vidya Bhushan's *Prison Administration in India (with Special Reference to Uttar Pradesh)* (Delhi, 1970); C. P. Bhambri's *Parliamentary Control over State Enterprises in India* (Delhi, 1960); T. R. Sharma's *The Working of State Enterprises in India* (Bombay, 1961); A. Premchand's *The Control of Public Expenditure in India* (New Delhi, 1963); R. K. Jain's *Management of State Enterprises in India : A Study of the Organization and Management of Public Sector Enterprises in Indian Setting* (Bombay, 1967); S. Bhattacharya's *Financial Foundations of the British Raj* (Simla, 1970) and many others fall in the same category. In the last mentioned work, the author has used the historical method to study the people and ideas "whose interactions produced the financial policies with which the British unpinning their raj in an era of reconstruction and consolidation after the upheavals of 1857". Its backbone is an investigation of the structure of public finance, as remodelled by Wilson (the first Finance Member of the Viceroy's Council appointed in 1859) and his successors, an analysis of government revenue and expenditure, and a summary of contemporary Indian and British attitudes to India's economic state. Amba Prasad's

*Indian Railways : A Study in Public Utility Administration* (Bombay, 1960), is, however, distinct. Although it is mainly an attempt to study the Indian railway administration and its history and progress during the modern times, "the history has been presented in the light of sound principles of public utility administration and with a view to studying the record of performance of the various systems of management which prevailed in India during the period, especially state management and company management and of the administration as a whole...Taking into consideration the lessons of the past history of railway administration in India, its present requirements and possible future developments, the kind of reorganization needed has been suggested. The study is thus a two-fold attempt at analysis of the different phases of organization and operation and also of interpretation."<sup>7</sup>

### *Civil Service*

An administrative institution that has received a much wider and a deeper attention at the hands of historians, civil servants and political scientists is the Indian Civil Service. All the writers have used the historical methodology in the treatment of their themes though with varied emphasis and different objectives. L. S. S. O'Malley's *The Indian Civil Service 1601-1930* (London, 1931) is a historical account of the development of the Indian Civil Service during 1601-1930. It has touched almost all the aspects relating to selection, training and attempts and effects of Indianization on the civil services. Sir Edward Blunt's *The Indian Civil Service* (London, 1937); Sir Evan Maconochie's *Life in Indian Civil Service* (London, 1929); and C. A. Kincaid's *Forty-Four Years A Public Servant* (Edinburgh, 1934) are all written by ex-civil servants. Their attempt has been to describe the stresses and strains, joys and sorrows, the aura of authority surrounding the civil servants of the British Government in India, as also to depict the prevailing social conditions of India of that period. The two works in the field, which are regarded as classics are by Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India: The Founders* (London, 1953) and *The Guardians* (London, 1954). The author has made use of the historical method to analyse the nature, the qualities and the character of the men, who ruled India from under the Moguls (1600-1751), the Revolution (1751-1798), the Golden Age (1798-1858), and the British Crown in India (1858-1909). The author has in these volumes traced the story of the administrators of the British Crown against a background of political change and of growing complexity in the business of government in the following words : "a caste of Guardians who had been amateur despots expert in

<sup>7</sup> Amba Prasad, *Indian Railways : A Study in Public Utility Administration*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1960, p. VII.

nothing or everything, answerable in practice mainly to themselves, foreign to the country they ruled—transformed themselves into a modern civil service, indigenous and answerable to a legislature. While they did this, they used to carry on a surreptitious, intermittent and undeclared civil war with the people to whom they were handing over power and whom they were supposed to be training for responsibility. At the same time they could never lose sight of their first main task, which was to preserve order, to keep chaos at bay.” Here is an example of how historical method can be used to describe vividly the character and influence of a whole class of personnel in the changing perspectives of the times.

H. N. Kunzru's *The Public Service in India* (Allahabad, 1917); R. Dwarkadas' *Role of Higher Civil Service in India* (Bombay, 1958); N. C. Roy's *The Civil Service in India* (Calcutta, 1958); G. P. Srivastava's *The Indian Civil Service: A Study in Administrative Personnel* (Delhi, 1965); V. M. Sinha's *The Problem of Re-organization of Superior Civil Service in India* (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sagar, 1957); K. M. Panikkar's *Civil Services, History and Problems* (Bombay, 1955) and R. N. Thakur's *All India Services: A Study of Their Origin and Growth* (Muzaffarpur, 1963), are some other works in which the use of historical method has been made by Indian authors to analyse the role, the structure, the recruitment and training of the ICS in India. Kewal L. Panjabi's *The Civil Servant in India* (Bombay, 1965) is the first collection of memoirs of 20 members of the Indian Civil Service, which depicts the various kinds of experiences that the Indian members of the ICS had to encounter during their career. N. B. Bonarjee's *Under Two Masters* (Calcutta, 1970) is an account of the experiences of an Indian civil servant who served both the British Government and the Government of Independent India and has very aptly brought out the differences in the approach and attitude of the officials during the times of the British and after Independence. He has also dealt with the interaction of politics and bureaucracy after Independence, although it may be said to be a highly personalized and a subjective account. Terence Greagh Coen's *The Indian Political Service* (London, Chatto and Windus, 1971), is a very good study undertaken through historical and analytical method to trace the origin and growth of a select band of specialized body of about 150 British officers during 1783-1947, who were responsible to safeguard the British interests in the Indian States. It is indeed a penetrating analysis of the system of 'Indirect Rule' in India through the historical analysis of the structure, role and the background of the members of this band of officials.

#### *District Administration*

Besides the civil service, another administrative institution which has received the greatest attention at the hands of the researchers is

district administration in India with particular reference to the role of the Collector. Almost all the works on the subject have made use of the historical method either to trace the evolution of the administrative system since the time of its inception to the present day or to make a contrast in the role of the District officer of the olden times and the modern times. S. S. Khera's *District Administration in India* (Bombay, 1962), and other works on the subject had the same approach. A recent study by S. K. Sharma on *Deputy Commissioner in Punjab* (New Delhi, 1971), has also included a full chapter on the historical development of the office of the Deputy Commissioner right from the times of the Vedas. However, his approach has been purely descriptive and provides some sort of historical perspective to the present-day operations of the Deputy Commissioner. A good number of articles, some based on primary and others on secondary sources, have also appeared in various journals. M. P. Pai's "The Emerging Role of the Collector", *IJPA*, Vol. VIII (1962), pp. 478-488; D. P. Verma's "The Changing Role of the District Officer, 1864-1960", *The Research Bulletin of the University of Panjab*, Vol. 43, 1963; A. Avasthi's "The Changing Role of the Collectors/Deputy Commissioners", in A. Avasthi and S. N. Verma (eds.), *Aspects of Administration* (New Delhi, 1964) are all based on secondary sources. B. B. Misra's "The Evolution of the Office of Collector 1770-1947", *IJPA*, Vol. XI (1965), pp. 345-375; Chittaranjan Sinha's "Evaluation of Judicial Functions of the Collectors in Bengal Presidency", *IJPA*, Vol. XIV (1968), pp. 876-897; Henry Maddick's "The Present and Future Role of the Collectors in India", *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 1963), pp. 75-87; and Haridwar Rai, "The Changing Role of the the District Officer", *IJPA*, Vol. IX (1963), pp. 238-257, have all utilized primary source material to discuss the changing role of one of the most important officers in the British administrative system with a view to analysing his future role in the context of Independence and changing circumstances. The historical method has also been utilized in some writings to interpret the various facets of the administration of a district in India in the perspective of modern administrative principles and terminology. Haridwar Rai's following articles: "The District Officer in India To-day", *Journal of Administration Overseas* (London), Vol. 6, No. 1 (January, 1967), pp.13-27; "Dual Control of Law and Order Administration in India; A Study in Magistracy and Police Relationship" *IJPA*, Vol. XIII (1967), pp. 43-64; "District Magistrate and Police Superintendent in India: The Controversy of Dual Control", *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (July 1967), pp. 192-99; "Helping the District Officer in India", *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January, 1969), pp. 26-37; "Paternalism in Indian Administration: The Non-Regulation System of Field Administration under the British",

*IJPA*, Vol. XV (1969), pp. 193-211; "Politico-Administrative Bases of Indian Field Administration", *IJPA*, Vol. XVI (1970), pp. 457-486; and "Areas of Field Administration in India" in K. R. Bombwall and L. P. Choudhry's (eds.), *Aspects of Democratic Government and Politics in India* (Delhi, 1968); and A. K. Ghosal's "Changing Patterns of District Administration" in India, in Bombwall and Choudhry's above mentioned book, are all indicative of the trend of establishing institutional functional relationship in historical perspective.

#### AREA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH IN HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY

This brief survey of the literature on Indian public administration, based on historical methods leads us to various conclusions. While there seems to be no dearth of primary sources and research material on Indian administration, particularly relating to the British period, it appears (barring a few exceptions) that the material has been utilized primarily by historians whose main concern was to give an account of the kind of administrative practices or structural institutions obtaining in a particular period of Indian history. These scholars had no basic training in the theory and practice of public administration and naturally, therefore, their main emphasis has been only on the descriptive account of administrative machinery in a chronological order. The description of the administrative apparatus and procedures in isolation with other organs of Government and without proper evaluation of the kind of pressures and circumstances which influenced the growth of such apparatus compels us to infer that most of the authors proceeded in their historical research on the assumption that there was a dichotomy between policy and administration, for in almost all studies we do not come across a proper evaluation of how the administrative machinery was able to influence the processes of decision-making and policy-formulation.

Historical method has recently been increasingly used by political scientists and students of public administration. But their attempts have been merely confined to provide us with a background for any particular administrative phenomenon or institution. The method has not been used by many to interpret the past institutions to see if there was a 'system' in their evolution to provide the basis for any indigenous administrative theory.

The utility of historical method in public administration primarily lies in an analysis of changes through a period of time and in the efforts to evolve a pattern of analytical study whereby the antecedents of a particular administrative procedure or institution can be related to some

other factors other than the purely chronological ones. This may not be an easy exercise, but at the same time it has not been tried by students of public administration in India. Nor has there been an attempt to study the transitions from one historical phase to another except in a few studies, that were written just before Independence.

In terms of areas of administration, it is evident from the above-mentioned analysis, that only a few institutions in the Indian administrative system, e.g., the civil service, the district administration, and the revenue administration have come for attention, other areas of administration have mostly been neglected in terms of historical research. For example, except for Misra's book, there is no comprehensive study of the British administration in India on the model undertaken by Leonard D. White in his books *The Federalists*, *The Jeffersons*, and *The Jacksonians*, and *The Republican Era 1869-1901* (New York, 1948, 1951, 1954 and 1958). Besides giving an account of the history of Federal administration of the United States of America in these volumes, White sought to make a systematic study of American ideas about public administration, and to explore the origin and growth of the opinions that Americans now possess about public management in the light of prevailing values and events, personalities and institutions from which they were largely derived. This kind of approach in the use of historical methodology is to a large extent, absent from a majority of volumes on the administrative history of India. Neither these works attempt to depict the characteristics of society, the flow of events, and the quality of personalities nor have they placed emphasis on the practical problems of government and the formulation of ideas as these problems were surmounted. Further, no attempt has been made to study the "administrative reforms" in different aspects of administration. Studies on history of functional administration in various phases are also conspicuous by their absence. For example, Personnel Administration, Financial Administration, Administration of Justice, Law and Order, etc., provide various aspects where historical researches are still lacking.

Administration of Indian States and a comprehensive study of indigenous administrative institutions, and the impact of British administration on the administration of Princely States in India, provide another area where historical method could be fruitfully applied in public administration. It is time that researches in these fields are undertaken before the rich material in the possession of 'Princes' in India is either destroyed or meets its natural destruction through negligence. For example, a study on the 'Administrative Institution of Indian States and their Working' would, I am sure, prove to be both interesting and illuminating.



A growing trend that is being witnessed in India today is that many erstwhile public servants, including the military officials, have started writing their memoirs giving the inside story of the decision-making process. While such accounts tend to be subjective, yet they provide basic research material for scholars to interpret the interaction of bureaucratic, political and other factors in the processes of policy formulation and decision-making in historical perspective. One hopes that this trend would also catch the attention of the civil servants and the politicians who could, through their memoirs, provide a good amount of research material for future scholars concerned with the study of administrative phenomenon in historical perspective and for the development of various case studies for professional administrators.

Finally, it can be said that historical method has still its potentialities and is an effective tool to understand the administrative institutions and processes in their full perspective. But this method has been utilized by the students of public administration more as a sort of introductory approach to study such institutions and no attempt has been undertaken by them to establish a more meaningful framework of analysis and interpretation of the past institutions in the perspective of the prevailing theories and terminology of the discipline of public administration.

### COMPARATIVE METHOD

The study of public administration through comparative method opens up immense possibilities of fruitful and meaningful research. However, in contrast to the historical method, this has been utilized on a very small scale by the researchers in India. The reason is that the significance of comparative method of research has not been fully understood by many students of public administration. Most of the works that have been published in the name of comparative studies are no more than a juxtaposition of the account of one institution in a particular country over the account of the same institution in another country. Most other works in the field give an account of a foreign institution or practice and in the end make a small comment comparing it with some such similar institution in India without adequately taking into consideration the range of variables and the cross-cultural patterns which make the analysis difficult, if not impossible.

#### *Cross-National Studies*

Two major works, which have incorporated the comparative method of research in a cross-national perspective are R. B. Jain's

*A Comparative Study of the United States Civil Service Commission and the Union Public Service Commission in India* (Ph.D. Thesis, Indian School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1969); and D. N. Bhalla's *The Damodar Valley Corporation: A Study of the Transplantation of Foreign Administrative Institutions into India* (Den Haag, 1969). The former studies the system of personnel administration in the two countries. It is not merely a study of the structural organizations of the two agencies, but it also attempts to analyse the similarities and differences in the role and functions of the two agencies and their overall impact on the system of personnel administration. In making this comparison, the author's aim has been to explore the possibilities of reforms in the system of personnel administration in India in the background of a more mature system of the USA, recognizing, however, the historical, constitutional, social, cultural, and economic factors that have conditioned the working of these institutions in their national settings. The study is based on the first-hand researches conducted by the author at the United States' Civil Service Commission and the British Civil Service Commission. Similarly, Bhalla's work analyses the experiment of the transplantation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) model in the United States for the Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) in India and examines various political, ecological and cultural factors. This is perhaps the first study which has attempted to evaluate the impact of the ecological and social factors on the working of 'imposed structures' borrowed from outside the country. N. P. Nair's doctoral dissertation on *Administration of Foreign Affairs in India : with Comparative Study of Britain* (Ph.D. Thesis, Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, 1966) is an attempt to understand the organization for the administration of foreign affairs in India in the perspective of the British experience.

Other works, such as IIPA's *Staff Councils in UK and India* (IIPA, 1960); *A Study of Personnel Systems in South East and Far East Asia* by J. N. Khosla and Ajit Banerjee (IIPA, 1963); C. N. Bhalerao's *Public Service Commissions of India: A Study* (Delhi, 1966); A. R. Tyagi's *Civil Service in Developing Democracy* (Delhi, 1969); and M. P. Jains' *Lok Pal* (Delhi, 1971), have also incorporated the comparative method of study. But mostly these efforts have been confined to the description or working of the various institutions in different countries without having a common framework of analysis or a theoretical hypothesis to test with respect to several countries. In most cases, the description of the institutions in one country is interposed on the other and the narration has not even taken into consideration the peculiar characteristics of each of such institutions which govern their functioning.

*Textbooks on Public Administration*

A number of textbooks that have appeared in the market on public administration written by Indian authors purporting to carry a comparative account of the system of public administration in many countries, specially the UK, the USA, and France. Some of these works are: A. Avasthi and S. R. Maheshwari, *Public Administration* (Agra, 1971); C. P. Bhambhri, *Public Administration: Theory and Practice* (Meerut, 1960); S. R. Nigam, *Principles of Public Administration* (Allahabad, 1965); M. Ruthnaswamy, *Principles and Practice of Public Administration* (Allahabad, 1962); D. R. Sachdeva and Vidya Bhushan, *A Textbook of Public Administration* (Delhi, 1961); V. P. Singh, *Lok Prashasan* (Delhi, 1961); Parmatma Sharan, *Public Administration: A Text Book for University Classes* (Agra, 1962); M. P. Sharma, *Public Administration in Theory and Practice* (Allahabad, 1963); and A. R. Tyagi, *Public Administration : Principles and Practice* (Delhi, 1966). All these books have one thing in common, that is, they have relied very heavily on standard textbooks published abroad, and while they try to pack in a good deal of information about different administrative systems, there is no common framework for analysis. It is here that the comparative method of study can be fruitfully employed to develop a textbook on public administration, which will incorporate the development of the concepts and practices of public administration in India in the light of such developments in other countries. The major thrust could be centred on the testing of the so-called universal generalizations about public administration with reference to the Indian situation, and in the light of a comparative study of varying national and social characteristics of certain nations, to determine what aspects of public administration, if any, have no bearing on the national and social setting.

Certain other books, which deal with one aspect or a functional area of public administration also claim to have adopted a comparative approach to their studies. But, in fact, they more or less follow the same textbook type approach, with certain exceptions and consequently suffer from the same defects. Some of the works falling in this category are: R. C. Agrawala, *Comparative Study of the Indian Constitution and Administration* (New Delhi, 1966); P. K. Wattal, *Parliamentary Financial Control in India* (Bombay, 1962); C. P. Bhambhri, *Parliamentary Control Over Finance in India* (Meerut, 1959); R. N. Aggarwala, *Financial Committees in Indian Parliament* (Delhi, 1966); D. K. Sinha, *Working of Public Corporations in India* (Allahabad, 1966); A. K. Murdheshwar, *Administrative Problems of Nationalization : With Special Reference to Indian State Enterprises* (Bombay, 1957); S. S.

Khera, *Government in Business* (Bombay, 1963); Nabagopal Das, *The Public Sector in India* (Bombay, 1966); Om Prakash, *The Theory and Working of State Corporations with Special Reference to India* (London, 1962); R. S. Arora, *Administration of Government Industries* (New Delhi, 1969); D. S. Ganguly, *Public Corporations in a National Economy: With Special Reference to India* (Calcutta, 1963); S. L. Shakdher, *Budgetary System in Various Countries* (New Delhi, 1957); J. S. Bhalla, *Public Enterprises in UK, USA and India* (Bombay, 1969); and S. R. Nigam, *Local Government in India* (Allahabad, 1968).

### *Comparative Methods in Government Reports*

The technique of using comparisons also finds expression in practically all the reports and studies made by the Parliamentary Committees or special commissions and investigatory bodies appointed by the Government from time to time. A survey of the numerous *Estimates Committee Reports* on various aspects of administration would bear testimony to this fact. Similarly, the *First and Second Pay Commissions' Reports* (1950 and 1959), the *Reports of the Law Commission* (1959 and 1971) *Report of the Committee on the Indian Foreign Service* (1966), and the *Reports of the Study Teams of Administrative Reforms Commissions* on different aspects of Governmental administration in India invariably carry a good number of pages describing the practices and procedures in different countries corresponding to the aspects dealt with in the Reports. A. V. Seshanna is understood to have undertaken a detailed study of the civil service in seven different countries for the *Third Pay Commission Report* expected to be out in 1972. All these are merely efforts to acquaint the personnel of those bodies or commissions with the situation in some foreign countries with a view to helping them arrive at certain conclusions with reference to the processes or institutions under review. Very few of such studies have attempted to analyse deeply the situation in other countries with the perspective of cross-cultural and environmental differences. Although the importance of such studies in the reports cannot be minimized, this being a common technique followed in other countries (e.g., the studies of the various civil service systems (USA, France, etc.) undertaken by the Fulton Committee while formulating their *Report on the Civil Service* (London, 1968)), yet they can hardly be called true comparative studies in terms of academic research.

### *Periodical Literature*

Comparative method has also been adopted in many articles published in some of the Indian journals. While there are a large

number of articles, which deal with the study or analysis of the functioning of some aspects of public administration in other countries (which have not been taken into consideration for the purposes of this article as these fall outside its scope), studies in comparative administration are still few. Perhaps the first article on the study of "Comparative Public Administration" in India was by Paul H. Appleby [*IJPA*, Vol. I (1955), pp. 3-7], in which the author raised certain theoretical problems, e.g., identifying substantial elements of kinship between the systems, importance of culture and ecology of public administration and the terminological problems in the study of comparative public administration. R. S. Milne's *Concepts and Models in Public Administration* (IIPA, 1966), deals with the whole history and implications of the movement on comparative public administration. While V. Subramaniam's "Middle Range Models in Comparative Administrative Studies", [*IJPA*, Vol. X (1964), pp. 625-630] discusses the theoretical basis of Rigg's Agraria and Industrial models and points out that institutional comparisons are *prima facie* pointless and a total understanding of each new society was required before one could begin to make comparisons. V. A. Pai Panandikar's "Public Administration in Asian Countries" [*IJPA*, Vol. 16 (1970), pp. 13-23] is an analytical study of the developments in public administration in Asian countries and highlights some of the important neglected dimensions of public administration in general which are common to most of the countries in the region. Similarly, A. T. A. Rahman's "Theories of Administrative and Political Development and Rural Institutions in India and Pakistan", [*Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. 8 (October 1969), pp. 243-256] deals with the rural institutions of the two countries in the framework of developmental administration.

On the institutional aspects, various comparisons have been attempted. Bureaucracy and the civil service have been the favourite themes of most of the writers. Wallace S. Sayre's "Bureaucracies: Some Contrasts in Systems", [*IJPA*, Vol. X (1964), pp. 219-229], and O. Glenn Stahl's "Of Jobs and Men", [*IJPA*, Vol. XIV (1968), pp. 256-265] are the two articles which discuss the basic contrasts in the bureaucratic systems with reference to practices in the USA and Britain (and India). C. P. Bhambhri's "The Indian Foreign Service" [*Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. 7 (October 1968), pp. 528-537]; Lynton K. Caldwell's "Education and Training for Public Administration—Some Contemporary Trends" [*IJPA*, Vol. V (1959), pp. 261-273]; J. W. L. "Henley and Hyderabad" [*IJPA*, Vol. IV (1958), pp. 66-78]; S. Lall, Adams, "Civil Service Neutrality", [*IJPA*, Vol. IV (1958), pp. 1-13]; S. R. Maheshwari's "Employment of Retired Government Officials in India" [*IJPA*, Vol. XII (1966), pp. 232-254]; R. A. Deshpande's

“Organisation and Functions of Public Service Commissions: A Comparative Study”—I & II [*Civic Affairs*, Vol. 8 (1960), No. 3, pp. 22-28, and No. 4, pp. 13-21]; C. N. Bhalerao, “The UPSC (India) and US Civil Service Commission” [*Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 13 (1957), pp. 216-28]; and R. B. Jain’s “The United States Civil Service Commission: Its Place in the Machinery of Government” [*IJPA*, Vol. XVII (1971), pp. 86-116], by and large, seem to follow the conventional approach to the study of the administrative institutions on a comparative basis, although some of these have also referred to the factors other than the institutional and structural ones, which affect the working of such institutions in different countries.

Some other articles falling in the same category, but dealing with other institutions of public administration are: Laxmi Narain, “Constitution of the Governing Boards of Public Enterprises”, [*IJPA*, Vol. VIII (1962), pp. 18-39]; H. K. Paranjape’s “Political Rights of Public Sector Employees” [*IJPA*, Vol. VI (1960), pp. 339-361]; Richard E. Hamilton, “Damodar Valley Corporation : India’s Experiment with the TVA Model”, [*IJPA*, Vol. XV (1969), pp. 86-109], relating to the public sector; S. L. Shakhder, “The Estimates Committees”, [*IJPA*, Vol. V (1959), pp. 388-401, and Vol. VI (1960), pp. 16-26]; K. L. Handa, “Rationale of the Indian Financial Year”, [*IJPA*, Vol. XVI (1970), pp. 220-233]; and S. L. Shakhder, “Comptroller & Auditor General of India and the UK—A Comparison” [*IJPA*, Vol. IV (1958) pp. 393-410], in the field of financial administration; D. G. Karve’s “Police Administration in India—A Re-appraisal of the Aims and Means” [*IJPA*, Vol. II (1956), pp. 307-315]; Kailash Prakash, “Service at the Post Office Counters in the United Kingdom and India : A Comparative Review”, [*IJPA*, Vol. X (1964), pp. 73-87]; Shanker P. Mukherji, “Government Without Tears—A Survey” [*IJPA*, Vol. XIV (1968), pp. 277-307]; and S. N. Chaturvedi, “Machinery for Redress of Grievances”, [*IJPA*, Vol. XII (1966), pp. 636-655], are some of the articles dealing with services rendered to the public and the procedure of citizen’s grievances in various countries.

B. S. Khanna’s “The Training of Administrative Services in India” [*IJPA*, Vol. I (1955), pp. 359-360]; A. Avasthi’s “Organization and Management—The States”, [*IJPA*, Vol. IX (1963), pp. 469-490]; Jitendra Singh, “The Administrative Reform Report of the States—A Content Analysis” [*IJPA*, Vol. IX (1963), pp. 491-513]; IIPA, “Collector in the Nineteen Sixties”, [*IJPA*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (1965)] are some of the prominent works which attempt to deal with the comparison of administrative institutions and processes in the regional framework—an approach which could lead to some fruitful research in Indian situation.

In the empirical-comparative analysis, a recent article which deserves special mention is Kuldeep Mathur's "Administrative Mind in a Developing Nation: An Empirical Exploration", [*IJPA*, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (1970), pp. 575-96]. This article is an attempt "to investigate the behavioural orientations of the developmental bureaucrats in India", and "to evaluate their perceptions of the outstanding behaviours and practices of the public administration system".

In his comparative analysis, he has, at the outset, identified certain geographical, socio-economical, and political factors which present a different background for the Block Development Officers (BDOs) of two different States. In the background of such differences, he has through the factor-analysis technique, attempted to develop the major dimensions of bureaucratic thinking and perceptions so as to establish an empirical pattern of the reactions of the bureaucrats to the changing environments. He has further attempted to develop a typology and a profile of the local administrators in a near-similar cultural pattern and to find out the differences in the perception and reactions of the bureaucrats of one State from the other and to correlate such differences. For such an analysis, the author has used the computer technique to develop the profiles of the bureaucrats and has employed discriminant analysis method to find out whether the BDOs differ in the two States along the perception-dimensions.

The author's effort in this direction furnishes a refreshing analysis of the different behavioural patterns of two groups of the same class of officials in two geographical settings having different socio-economic and political background. He has attempted to prove that the differences in their behaviour pattern were not only due to their different socio-economic and political settings but also reflected the differences of their educational background, recruitment and training methods.

Dr. Mathur's attempt at a comparative analysis of the perceptions of the same level of local administrative officials in two adjoining States in India is a model that could be followed for similar enquiries in other aspects of administrative phenomena and at other levels of State administration. Much of the comparative analysis today must be based on empirical techniques and tools of research. Dr. Mathur's model could furnish an insight in the various patterns of interactions of politics and bureaucracy and the perceptions and attitudes of the officials at every level of administration in relation to their work, motivational factors and in evaluating the morale of employees at every level of administration. Similarly, one could also conduct enquiries into the attitudes and perceptions of various citizens' bodies and the various



social and economic groupings towards bureaucracy, bureaucratic decisions and their expectations of the bureaucrats in terms of goal achievements. Dr. Mathur's study should certainly inspire further research work in the vast panorama of similar cultural patterns of State Governments in India which furnish a good rubric for comparative analysis. However, one is rather sceptical in the success of this model in culturally different situations, unless one is careful first to analyse how far the cultural differences have a correlation with the differences in the perceptions of the officials belonging to different regions.

#### COMPARATIVE STUDIES : AN OVERVIEW

The rapid survey of the literature on comparative public administration undertaken above indicates a very limited use of the comparative method of research in a scientific and comprehensive manner by Indian scholars. It shall not be an exaggeration to say that there has been a little understanding and significance of the use of comparative method of the study of public administration in India. The three dimensions of comparative research, *viz.*, the vertical comparison—comparison between national administrative phenomena and regional or local administrative phenomena—and the horizontal comparison—analysis of administrative processes over a period of time, and the study of administrative institutions and processes across national boundaries with new orientation and approach—have yet to be fully explored by the scholars of comparative public administration in India.

Comparative public administration delineates an area of concern and a methodological orientation that differ from the traditional approach of merely juxtaposing the description of a number of similar institutions in different countries at one place. It offers to study the administrative processes and organizations for the purpose of answering common problems and questions. It attempts to identify the characteristics of various administrations in terms of certain established analytical categories in the light of which identification of administration phenomena becomes probable for as many administrative systems as possible. It purports to examine not only similarities and differences in the norms, institutions, and behaviour of administration, but also accounts for them and aims towards the development of a body of knowledge in the light of which predictions of trends and policy recommendations can be made. It is in this sense that it becomes a matrix from which theories emerge and at the same time serves as a laboratory for their testing. As Professor Dwight Waldo has put it:

“To compare is to examine similarities and differences simultaneously, the effort is bent forward to two main ends: (1) to

discover, define and differentiate the stuff (politics or administration) to be compared, wherever in the world it may be; and (2) to develop criteria of differentiation that are useful in ordering and analyzing the 'stuff' once it has been identified. In this task, the contemporary stock of provoked or fashionable concepts in the social sciences (as well as those 'indigenous' to Political Science) has been drawn upon extensively. The works of Weber and Parsons, structure-functionalism as conceived in various sources, the concept of culture, the decision-making scheme, communications theory and cybernetics, systems theory—all these and several more sources have been drawn upon by both movements."<sup>8</sup>

#### PROBLEMS OF COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

Evidently, this kind of approach to the study of public administration is fraught with many difficulties. The basic problem is of the competence in comparative research methodology. But that is not the only problem. Even if it is assumed that a researcher is in know of the comparative methods of study, there is always the difficulty of 'models building', *i.e.*, to choose between various concepts and models of comparative research or to develop a theory or hypothesis, around which a generalization applicable to many administrative systems could be built and tested.

Besides, an Indian scholar, in particular, faces the difficulties in respect of the availability of data and material particularly across national frontiers. The prohibitive cost and the time involved may itself deter a researcher to venture in this direction. Further, there are difficulties arising from the nature of data, which some governments may regard as confidential and, therefore, may not be easily available to a researcher. There are other difficulties which arise from the range and nature of variables which have to be used in the study of comparative administration. Some variables are just incapable of precise measurement. A researcher may use certain 'general' or 'cross-national' variables (*e.g.*, psychological or socio-economic), but the unique character of each administrative policy and organization has, in some form, to be measured, if comparisons are realistically to account for the presence of a particular type of administrative phenomenon. Difficulties also arise from the interplay and inter-relationships between the norms, structures, and behaviour of the administrative systems.

<sup>8</sup> Dwight Waldo, *Comparative Public Administration : Prologue, Performance, Problems and Promise* (Symposium on Business Policy, April 8-11, 1963, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University), pp. 10-11, mimeo.

Models and theories must take into account all of these factors. Further, any meaningful comparative research must take into account the study of the societies as a whole which are sought to be subjected to comparative analysis. Obviously, this means that an inter-disciplinary approach to the study of administrative phenomena has to be made. In India, study of public administration through an inter-disciplinary approach has yet to begin on a serious footing. This in itself is a big handicap for a researcher in this country to undertake research through comparative method. It is, therefore, not surprising that the models should be difficult to build and that the researchers have found this method of research even more difficult than the empirical or behavioural approach, techniques of which to some extent have been perfected.

#### AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH THROUGH COMPARATIVE METHOD

The list of difficulties presented above does not suggest that comparative research in India is not possible, or there are no avenues where research on a comparative plane is feasible. Indeed, the national frontiers of India present a veritable paradise for researchers in comparative administration.

In the first place, there is ample scope of comparative research in various administrations of States and Union territories in India. The socio-economic, ecological and cultural factors, which are to certain extent similar and to certain other extent diverse in various regions of the country, present a challenge to a researcher to make a scientific inquiry into the study of administrative institutions, programme administration and policy implementation on regional basis. An enquiry into the causes of dynamism through which the same institutions work in a particular territory or a State and the slow pace at which they work in other regions would be a worthwhile focus for attention for improvement of administrative organizations in various States and Union territories. The more the States or Union territories are included in the survey, the more is the possibility of 'administrative theory-building through empirically-tested generalizations about Indian Administration'. Such a research undertaken by Indian scholars would also obviate the subjective element that is likely to crop up in researchers who are exposed to their own political culture, *e.g.*, of the Western type. With some imaginative and concentrated efforts on the part of the professional institutions and universities, a unified programme to study various administrative phenomena on cross-regional bases could perhaps be drawn. This will help build up a substantial amount of literature on the basis of which the future researchers may develop improved research models for comparative study.

Secondly, there is considerable scope for researches with a comparative approach in respect of policy and programme administration in public and private settings. This will especially be fruitful in the comparison of the performances of public enterprises with private enterprises, particularly with reference to the same industry. The development of public sector on an unprecedented scale has confronted the government with the problem of running those enterprises on a basis in which they could generate sufficient dividends necessary for the establishment of a socialist welfare State. The horizontal studies over a period of time of nationalized industries (*e. g.*, it would be interesting to compare the performance of banking industry before nationalization and after nationalization over a period of time along with a comparison, say for example, with regard to consumer satisfaction, of the banks in private and public sectors, would indeed be meaningful and logical.

Thirdly, vertical comparisons of various aspects of functional administration between the National Regional and Local Government open an extensive field for researchers. It is generally admitted that the administration at regional and local levels is weaker as compared to the national level. This may perhaps be a universal phenomenon. In Indian context, however, it would be fruitful to undertake such exercises with a view to locating the factors which hamper the growth of sound administrative practices in many areas. The combination of comparative method with empirical analysis will, it may be hoped, solve many bottlenecks of administrative processes.

Finally, comparative studies, on a cross-national basis, provide vast potentialities for scientific and meaningful research towards the identification of a universal administrative-culture, if such a concept has any value in the process of 'generalization on universal plane'. Admittedly, such studies would have to be undertaken with considerable planning, insight and with an adequate knowledge of the unlimited range of variables that interplay in the administrative processes across national frontiers. However, the difficulties are not altogether unsurmountable. To begin with, cross-cultural studies can be undertaken on a regional basis (*e. g.*, with respect to administrative phenomena in South Asian countries) with a little systematic effort. For instance, a common theme for a comparative analysis could be the "Impact of public administration on the developmental process with reference to South Asian countries or with reference to Latin American countries or East African countries". Another theme for comparative and historical exposition can be the "Impact of the British administration on the development of public administration

in various erstwhile colonies". Yet another comparative study can be in respect of an analysis of "Planning and decision-making processes in various countries" in a particular region.

Similarly, comparisons can also be made between various aspects of administrative processes in India and some other developed countries like USA, UK, France, Scandinavian countries and the like, with a view to testing the validity of administrative generalizations evolved through regional comparisons, and for the purposes of determining the overall performance of an administrative system in terms of goal-achievements. For instance, a common framework in this context can be an analysis of the administration of social services and welfare activities with respect to as many systems as possible.

However, all these suggestions are based on the assumption that the researches will be undertaken with reference either to a common framework to point out the similarities and dissimilarities and to account for them or to test the validity of certain generalizations through empirical studies of as many systems as possible. Only then, comparative studies can be scientific and more meaningful and not simply by following the conventional method of interposing the description of two seemingly similar structures or institutions at one place, which has so far been the practice with most of the Indian scholars.

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## PUBLIC RELATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

*I. P. Tewari*

**M**ANIFESTATIONS of civilization are a product of interaction between man and his environment. From the early period, when he sought shelter in caves against sun, shower and shiver, to the present stage of his living in air-conditioned skyscrapers, it has been one ceaseless endeavour on the part of man to grapple with his environment. This process of interaction is not only a heroic saga of conquest of man over his environment but also of change: man changing the environment and getting changed in turn. The process is constant and continuous.

If change is constant and continuous, it is inherent in all social situations. What do we mean then by the concept of environmental change? Change undoubtedly is a historical process. What we are trying is to step up that historical process by use of social engineering. We have planned to harness resources on the surface of the earth and underneath to produce wealth for the use of man; tame rivers to irrigate land, to produce electricity, to light our homes and to replace human muscles as sources of power; harness mineral wealth to produce goods and services: simultaneously we do not want to wait till these environmental changes bring about change in man. We have planned to change man by educating him into new ways of living, working and thinking—new ways of health, hygiene, use of tools and acceptance of new ideas on several scores.

We have undertaken to initiate the programme in unison because we do not want to leave things to the historical process. Howsoever inevitable, that process is long drawn and also full of risks. It has often been found that man, though endowed with initiative and power, is by nature conservative. He is resistant to change. Man has to be prepared to accept change as a deliberate way of life. Public Relations in such a programme of directed total change—change of environment and also of man—as a tool and also as technique gains paramouncy.

Public Relations (PR) has been defined as a “planned and deliberate attempt to create understanding between an organization and its publics”.

What kind of relationship do we envisage between the agency which is seeking to bring about change and the publics which it is seeking to change?

What comes uppermost in this context is the relationship of acceptability: acceptability of the agency as agent of change. The agencies of change in India are recognizable as units of administration at the Union level, the State level and also at the local level. In their relations with publics, these must be acceptable as entities wedded to change in all earnestness. Clarity of objectives on the part of these agencies and the direction in which the change is sought to be affected constitute the essence. If their professions are vague and ambiguous, their credibility is bound to suffer and the public will not take long to discover their vagueness. In any programme of directed change, it is not the volume of words that carry conviction, but it is the directness of end objectives as culminating points in a chain of action events. It may, thus, be assumed to be the basic PR exercise at all levels of administration: only a greater clarity of objectives can ensure greater acceptability of the message of change.

But units of administration are composed of individuals who, as functionaries, come in contact with people at all levels—from Secretary of a Department to District Collector and, finally, the smallest administrative functionary at the village level. Apart from the acceptability of the unit as agent of change, each functionary in his individual capacity should also be acceptable as an agent of change. Individual's acceptability will depend upon his knowledge of the change that he is seeking and also the conviction that he carries with his words. Is he convinced of what he is saying? If he lacks in conviction, let him make no mistake about his words falling on deaf ears.

But what is most significant in this chain of activity, on the part of those seeking to bring about change, is the knowledge of the people whom they are seeking to change. The success of any programme of change would vary in proportion to the knowledge on the part of change agents of the public, their way of life and living, and the total environment in which they work.

There is a tendency on the part of administration to take people for granted and initiate new practices on wrong assumptions. A determined Collector of a backward district in one of the States wanted to erect standing urinals in a place of pilgrimage as a part of a health hygiene measure to prevent spread of epidemics during pilgrimage season. For a while, people did not know what he was up to. As soon



as they discovered the purpose for which contructions were taken up, people mounted an agitation against the measure as being sacrilegious. The constructions were erased overnight. The attempt ended up in a costly experiment resulting in waste of resources and personal frustration on the part of a well-meaning officer. But worse was the hostility generated against him leading to the loss of his credibility and acceptability.

Even the most devout of missionaries, who approach people with the message of salvation, seek to acquire knowledge of the way of life and living of the people among whom they seek to spread the Gospel. Earnestness on the part of change agent is not enough : it must succeed in eliciting responses from those who are intended to be the beneficiaries of change. It is inconceivable that change will be effected without knowledge of how people live, work and think! And larger the area, more ancient the culture, larger the layers in Society, the more difficult it becomes to effect change as more difficult it is to acquire knowlege of people's ways of life and living. In a vast country like India, which has been deprived of physical means of communication among its people, life and living patterns have grown in regional isolation. Almost after every thirtyfive miles of radius is discernible a distinct pattern of living.

How to acquire knowledge which appears to be a prerequisite? The British had evolved the system of compilation of district gazetteers for the benefit of newly arrived British administrators, in their own times. They had realized the need of it when change was not their objective. But compilation of gazetteers or organization of surveys may not help much, constant communication—which is essentially a two-way process—both horizontally and vertically, alone can generate that knowledge which has become a prerequisite.

Communication, to be constant and effective, has to be accepted in all its dimensions. In a country determined to bring about environmental change, its dimensions appear five-fold:

- (1) In a situation of development, information flows from top downwards—from political leadership to citizens, from experts in new technology and in new methods of farming to the people in villages, from health authorities to the individual home. And equally important characteristic of flow of information is its continuity and evenness among political leadership, policy-makers, experts, planners and all those who are partners in the drama of planned environmental change.

- (2) Flow of information from people to the leadership and the experts implies feedback from those who are at the receiving end of the communication to those who are at the giving end; for it may just be that a communication from top may well be off the mark and provoke resistance rather than elicit collaboration. It is repetition of a truism to say that massive involvement in transformation calls for pressure and initiative from below as well as leadership from above.
- (3) Communication must flow among people who stimulate each other through examples and experience in their innovative efforts. Communication about the successes achieved by a farmer in a neighbouring village may prove to be a catalytic agent in a village which has been resistant to change. It is very important that rural issues must be understood elsewhere and the impact of urbanization is felt in the rural areas.
- (4) Intimately linked with the above three is communication as a mainstay of systematic efforts for the development of human resources. This includes Education at the primary and secondary levels, guidance and in-service training of teachers and extension workers, widespread instruction in functional literacy for adults, etc. None of the accepted functions of education and training can be accomplished today at the scale and pace required by rapid rural transformation without communication.
- (5) A planned change implies transformation of institutions. By implication, it also means transformation of cultural life and values. Planned development implies transition from a traditional way of life based on subsistence economy confined to the village community to a market economy in which the village is linked intimately with a nation and the world.

#### FLOW OF COMMUNICATION

The dimensions enumerated above indicate that flow of communication has to be accepted as an integral part of a policy of change and not as an *ad hoc* superimposition of a seemingly necessary adjunct.

How will communication flow?

The most ancient form of communication, which will last till man lasts, is the use of words and gestures, for conveying ideas. This is generally described as man-to-man communication.

Researches in communication have so far established that this is the most effective form of communication. A determined effort of PR has to ensure the use of man-to-man communication as a pivotal technique. Whether it is communication among the functionaries at the top, or from the people to the administration or among the people, interpersonal communication has to be steadily maintained. Students of communication have watched with interest the Herculean touring which Shrimati Indira Gandhi undertakes all over India. There is no occasion which she misses to visit a part of the country. At her residence, there is a continuous stream of groups of human beings representing varieties of interests, coming in and meeting her. She speaks to them as much as she listens to them. What is true of a political leader is equally true in the case of administrative leadership at all levels and of all shades, if it is assigned a task of bringing about environmental change. Talking to people, listening to them, advising and guiding them rather than issuing orders and seeking compliance thereof on the basis of authority, has to be accepted as an integral part of administrative function.

But person-to-person communication, though effective, has a limit. It cannot reach large groups of human beings scattered over vast areas. In order to ensure continuity in the flow of communication over a large territory, mass media have to be harnessed as they alone open up that possibility. But mass media communication are only reinforcing in character and hence supportive in action.

Despite limitations, however, mass media alone can help reach the largest number of people in the shortest possible time.

But before mass media are used an administrator has to ensure that these are evenly spread out in the society. The UNESCO has worked out a norm according to which a country must have 10 newspapers, 5 radio sets and 2 cinema seats per hundred of population. The position in India is 1.3 newspapers, 1.8 radio sets and 1.7 cinema seats per 100 population. It is necessary, therefore, to ensure that there are enough listening sets available in the country and also there are enough transmission hours available before radio can be conceived as a possible medium for utilization. It is equally important that there are enough printing presses in the country to produce printed material for reading, but more important is literacy among those for whom the material has been produced. Not only the production of films should be assured but the availability of facilities for showing these films all over the region. Equally important is the presence of television and the like. In other words, what is required is a determined programme

for expansion of media in the country so as to cover every section of the people and also the spread of literacy among human beings who will be the consumers of mass media.

An equally important aspect is the enunciation of a policy governing the use of mass media; for mere presence of mass media is not enough; its indiscriminate and undirected use is likely to do more harm than good. There should be clarity on kinds and contents of programmes, the structure of organization, and the place they have been accorded in the public policy. How much of authority have the media been allowed and what have been the objectives placed before them? What is the perspective on objectivity and responsibility which the media men bring to bear on their activities?

Equally important is the training in media techniques. Training is required not only in the techniques but also in the role which the medium can play in society. Such a training is required not only for media-men but also for other categories of personnel-administrators, policy-makers, and researchers. Another aspect of training is the preparation required at local levels by training the villagers in the utilization of communication coming through mass media. The training of monitors of radio clubs, health workers and extension agents, teachers of schools, children and adults. These extension agents have got to be given extensive training in the manner in which the flow of communication coming on the media is best integrated at the local level.

Media communication, by and large, in India has been flowing only in one direction, *i.e.*, from media channels to the people. There is no worthwhile effort to gauge the reception and the ultimate impact of this flow. Training of research workers and personnel responsible for feedback channels assumes importance in this context. Unless there is a continuous flow of feedback from the receiving end to the giving end, programmers of media communication will, by and large, be functioning in isolation. It is only the feedback channel that opens the eyes and ears of the producers.

Where do we arrive then? Communication based PR has got to be accepted as a component of development programme. The construction of a dam which leads to electrification and irrigation, production and utilization of fertilizers, improvement of health and hygiene—these objectives can be attained in a manner and on lasting scale when PR, through inter-personal and media channels, is accepted as an essential ingredient of development.

Such a planning establishes a link between media-oriented policies on the one hand and programme-oriented policies on the other. It must, in turn, be integrated into overall planning as well as into that of individual domains (education, rural development, industrialization, etc.). It is, for example, no longer possible for an educator to decide to make use of broadcasting without first ensuring that broadcasting facilities do in fact exist, that they can be used for education purposes and that adequately trained personnel is available. Nor can ministries of agriculture expect to employ radio for rural development unless the quality of broadcast signals reaching the rural areas is adequate, and the people possess radio receivers. More generally, governments cannot count on the communication media as forces of national integration and civic allegiance if they have not first provided them with adequate resources, structures and programmes. Communications are the concern of the government as a whole, not only of ministries of information or the media organizations, and funds allocated for their use cannot be channeled to a single department. Moreover, there is the need for field personnel to ensure proper utilization of the media. As media organizations have no base in the villages and community development agencies no media institutions, only systematic cooperation between them can lead to practical results.

Communication planning as a part of PR activity, which takes equal note of the priorities of society and the needs and preferences of the individual, of local requirements as well as national priorities, of private initiative as well as public policy, appears non-existent at present. Yet, that is what is needed for the constructive application of communication based PR to bring about a total change in environment.

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## TAX ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA — A BRIEF SURVEY

S. V. S. Juneja

IT is proposed in this article to examine, in the light of certain genuine principles regarding the framing of tax laws, their administration and the measures that would be helpful in the effective implementation of these laws, including the elimination of the evasion and the corruption that stands to be a feature of the situation of many countries, the structure of tax administration in India. It is suggested that the situation in India may, broadly speaking, reasonably be regarded in this context as being typical of that which exists in a number of underdeveloped countries, particularly in Asia and Africa and especially in those countries that achieved independence relatively recently after a prolonged period of colonial existence as part of a European empire. These countries vary considerably in population (from 7.5 million in Ghana and 56.5 million in Nigeria to about 500 million in India), per capita GNP (from \$60 in Nigeria to \$143 in Ceylon), and degree of 'openness' (from 10.9 in India to 80.8 in Malaysia).<sup>1</sup> Yet, in several of these countries the colonial power entered into an economy, the most important (from the point of view both of its contribution to the GNP and of its being the predominant mode of life) feature of which was traditional agriculture, 'technically' close to the subsistence pattern, but governed by a well understood system of land tenure and liable to recognized taxes. The colonial power generally took this system as it found it, adapting, systematizing and codifying it to suit the needs of its administration. While the system of land tax was, thus, often based on the traditional system, the structure of income and other taxes was built from a 'scratch', as it were, in response to the needs of an increasingly complex economic milieu.

There would, therefore, appear to be enough similarity in the situations existing in these countries perhaps to justify the hope that an examination of the tax structure in India could be of some relevance to the problems that these countries may be facing.

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<sup>1</sup> J. R. Lotz, and Elliott R. Moorss, *Measuring 'Tax Effort' in Developing Countries*, IMF Staff Papers, 1967.

## CRITERIA OF EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION

It has been suggested<sup>2</sup> that an efficient and effective tax administration should have the following characteristics:

- (1) As a first step, it is necessary to codify the various tax laws, basing on an orderly statutory rearrangement of the entire tax system in accordance with a definite outline. This would, *inter alia*, call for legislative drafting of adequate competence. In the drafting of tax laws, various strategies could be adopted, from the very detailed laws seeking to cover all contingencies to very general statutes based on the assumption that it is not in fact possible to foresee all possible contingencies. There is also, of course, the possibility of entering into agreements with individual parties where their operations form a significant segment of the economy.
- (2) It must be assured that all those who are liable to pay the tax are on the tax rolls. Once this is achieved, and as an effective income tax is basically a self-assessed tax, it is necessary to ensure as high a degree of initial taxpayer compliance as possible. This can be facilitated, for example, by making the returns forms, etc., easily and quickly available.
- (3) "No tax will work effectively...unless its administrators maintain an aggressive attitude with respect to the correctness of the taxpayers actions"<sup>3</sup> (*i.e.*, there is need for effective audit and examination of returns).
- (4) Where disagreements arise between the taxpayer and the tax office, a procedure for handling such controversies must be evolved that confirms the taxpayers confidence in the system as a whole by providing, where necessary, for judicial review. Uniformity of judicial decisions (and speed in reaching them) arrived at by special procedures (in view of the complexity of tax cases) on the part of the judiciary will help in establishing effective tax administration.
- (5) Taxes assessed must be effectively collected and delinquency should not be tolerated. The tax administrator must be equipped with effective penalties which he can wield firmly and intelligently. Often a combination of lump sum penalties

<sup>2</sup> Stanley S. Surrey, "Tax Administration in Underdeveloped Countries," reprinted in R. Bird and O. Oldman (eds.), *Readings on Taxation in Developing Countries*, Boston, Harvard Law School (International Tax Programme).

<sup>3</sup> Stanley S. Surrey, *op. cit.*, p. 506.



and percentage penalties, varying with the amount of the tax will be most desirable.

It may be added that an excessively high tax rate is itself likely to constitute an inducement to attempts at evasion of tax, just as excessively severe penalties are unlikely ever to be enforceable, and thus their existence on the statute book can prove to be counter-productive in terms of respect for the law. Both tax rates and penalties must be meaningful—neither more nor less—to be effective.

- (6) Finally, there is the matter of personnel and, connected with this, the question of what may be termed as 'public relations'. Poor pay, lack of training, and inefficiency constitute a standing invitation to corruption, just as lack of courtesy and consideration in dealings with the taxpayer profoundly influence national attitudes toward the tax system and tax administration.

## TAX ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA

The main sources of revenue in India are income and corporation taxes, sales taxes and excise duties, and the land tax. In 1959-60, the income and corporation tax formed 27 per cent of the revenues of the Union Government and the excise duties 44 per cent. Excise duties accounted for 23 per cent, sales tax for 16 per cent, the land tax for 20 per cent and income taxes about 18 per cent of the revenue of the State governments.<sup>4</sup> The administration of the income and corporation taxes, of the sales tax and the excise duties is broadly similar. The land tax administration is a distinct, separate organization. It is, therefore, proposed to deal with the tax administration under two heads: income tax, taken as typical of the other taxes mentioned, and land revenue.

### INCOME TAX

Income and corporation taxes can, under the Constitution, be levied only by the Union government, though a part of the collections, is passed on by the Union to the States. The set-up of the tax collection agency may be briefly indicated. The agency primarily responsible for the development of Central tax policy is the Department of Revenue in the Ministry of Finance. However, most of the functions of supervision of the administration of Central taxes have been assigned to a separate statutory body called the Central Board of Revenue, which

<sup>4</sup> Harvard Law School, *World Tax Series ; India*, Boston Little, Brown, pp. 30 & 32.

was established in 1924. Under the Central Board of Revenue are Commissioners of Income tax who are in charge of income tax administration either for particular areas or for certain classes of taxpayers' categories of income on types of cases. The basic work of assessment of income by the Income Tax Officer is subject to control and inspection by Inspecting Assistant Commissioners; the work of the latter is, in turn, under the general supervision of the Commissioner, subject to examination and control by Directors of Inspection. The basic responsibility for assessment of the income of taxpayers lies with the Income Tax Officer. His jurisdiction generally covers a geographical area; however, he may be assigned to certain classes of taxpayers of certain items of income.

How well does the system stand against the criteria of an effective tax administration discussed in the preceding section?

### *Codification*

Income tax, in its modern form, was introduced in India for the first time in 1860, to overcome the financial difficulties which followed the 'Mutiny' of 1857. Between 1860 and 1886, there were a series of experiments in the field of direct taxation, and the first systematic legislation on income tax was enacted in 1886. In the following years, the structure of the income tax has undergone a series of changes, prompted mainly by the need to raise additional revenues; changing economic conditions, judicial decisions and the suggestions of several committees and commissions of enquiry regarding the more efficient and equitable administration of the tax also played their part. The Act of 1886 was substantially amended in 1916, 1918 and 1922. Fairly considerable amendments were made in 1939 following the recommendations of the Income Tax Enquiry Committee, 1936, and the provisions affecting liability to income tax are substantially as established by the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1939. The Act has undoubtedly been amended from time to time since 1939 and complaints can be heard to the effect that certain of its provisions are overlapping or contradictory and that the law on the subject needs codification afresh. Yet the Taxation Enquiry Commission of 1953-54, while it suggested particular amendments, was apparently satisfied enough regarding its general clarity and intelligibility to abstain from any recommendation regarding any general re-codification of the law.

The Income Tax Acts have tended to be very detailed and specific. A great deal of material (if not always clarity) has been added in the process of judicial review in the last 80 years and the substantive

provisions and judicial interpretation would, between them, perhaps cover most of the issues that are likely to arise.

### *Locating the Taxpayer*

It has not been possible to lay hands on any assessment regarding the completeness of the records of the income tax department. However, in the circumstances prevailing in India, the number of persons who would be liable for payment of the tax would be small relative to the size of the population. The great proportion of the income tax collections also come from a relatively small number of centres; according to a report about half of the total income tax collections in the country are realized from Bombay and Calcutta 'circles'. Further, the income tax department has a reputation for an efficient 'intelligence' organization. While an element of uncertainty remains, it is felt that the tax rolls are probably fairly complete.

The position with regard to voluntary taxpayer compliance is, however, much less satisfactory. It has been suggested that the feeling is part of the general attitude of distrust, at its best—and, at its worst, hostility—towards authority that has been one of the less desirable by-products of a generation's agitation for freedom from colonial rule. Whatever the reason, the existence of an attitude that does not regard deliberate tax evasion as anti-social conduct must be recognized. It is clear that this greatly reduces the effectiveness of the tax administration; some of the measures suggested under the general heading of 'public relations' may perhaps help to mitigate the adverse effects to some extent.

### *Audit and Examination*

In this sphere, the income tax administration has run into difficulties. The difficulty is not of inadequate audit: rather, there are complaints of delay in completing assessments of tax by the Income Tax Officers. The Taxation Enquiry Commission<sup>5</sup> found that in 1953 there were over half a million cases for assessment of tax pending with all income tax offices in the country; of these, over 1,75,000 pertained to a previous year. An analysis of these figures revealed that 80 per cent of these pending cases related to categories which did not involve any substantial revenue, and the Commission was moved to recommend that the usual standards of scrutiny and examination of accounts should be relaxed for these cases. There was no other way in which disposal of work

<sup>5</sup> *Report of Taxation-Enquiry Commission 1953-54*, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, 3 vols. vol. II, p. 215.

could be speeded up; in fact, the pending assessments of even the higher income categories would take the department a year to get through!

This was clearly a case where departmental instructions and procedures, embodying the standards of an earlier period, were obviously out of touch with present requirements. It was no longer feasible to make the same detailed scrutiny of each case which more leisurely times had made possible (this could perhaps be achieved by means of computers, but that raises a whole set of other issues which it is not proposed to go into here); it was also unnecessary, in reasons of efficiency, to spend a great deal of time in the scrutiny of returns of categories that would only make marginal difference in the total revenue. A random check would be quite effective and less wasteful of time.

### *Controversies Between Taxpayers and Tax Offices*

The Income Tax Act permits the modification of assessments at various points in the assessing procedure. It also provides for appeals by the taxpayer to Appellate Assistant Commissioners, for further appeals to an Appellate Tribunal and for references to the High Courts of the States of questions of law arising out of the orders of the Tribunal. An appeal against a judgment of a High Court may even be made to the Supreme Court if the High Court certifies the case for appeal or if the Supreme Court grants special leave for an appeal.

The taxpayer is clearly not being 'placed at the mercy of a single tax official' or being 'faced with arbitrary administrative action unchecked by judicial review'.<sup>6</sup> On the contrary, there is a school of thought that is inclined to hold that the Act is far too liberal in the matter of appeals. As a result, cases may drag on for years and it is seldom possible to bring to book an offender wealthy enough and resourceful enough to take advantage of the full latitude of the law. At the same time, the pending appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioners have tended to accumulate; the Commission found that in April 1953 there were more than 70,000 appeals pending. Of these about 20,000 were more than a year old. These appeals represented a whole year's workload for the Appellate Assistant Commissioners. Thus, the liberal provisions of the law regarding appeals themselves have tended to delay the finalization of assessments. There has, consequently been a section of opinion that has suggested the enactment of legislation which, while protecting the taxpayers' right to seek redress against what he may consider an unfair assessment, will help to prevent abuse of the provisions regarding appeal.

<sup>6</sup> Stanley S. Surrey, *op. cit.*, p. 509.

### Collection of Taxes

The record of the tax administration regarding collection of taxes is also uninspiring. The Taxation Enquiry Commission found<sup>7</sup> that the collection of taxes was greatly in arrears, and that these arrears had been mounting steadily over the previous 10 or 15 years. In April 1953, the amount outstanding came to Rs. 1,750 million.

What sanctions does the Income Tax Officer have at his disposal? Penalties can be imposed for failure to file returns, for failure to furnish required information and for making false statements. The penalty for the first offence can be up to a maximum of one and a half times the amount of the tax due; for the remaining two offences, one and a half times the difference between the tax assessed and that which would have been assessed had information been furnished or false statements not made. The making of false statements before the Income Tax Officer is also a criminal offence which carries a penalty of up to six months' imprisonment.

These penalties do not in themselves appear adequate. Also, their deterrent effect will depend *inter alia* on the chances of wrong doers being caught and these tend to be small. No wonder, therefore, that periodically proposals are made for enhancing the prescribed penalties drastically.

### Personnel and Public Relations

Most of the officials of the department of the rank of Income Tax Officer are chosen by a competitive examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission. A few would be promoted from among the ranks of Inspectors. Appointments to posts senior to those of Income Tax Officers are made by promotion from among the latter.

The Enquiry Commission was generally satisfied regarding the system of appointments and promotions. The candidates selected for appointments also undergo a year's vigorous training in accountancy and law which includes some months as understudy to more experienced colleagues. Yet, there were in 1954 a large number (*i.e.*, 27 per cent of the total) of Income Tax Officers who could be regarded as not being fully qualified on account of their failure to pass the prescribed 'departmental' examinations.

More than their technical qualifications, however, the Commission felt that attention should be paid to reorienting the attitude of

<sup>7</sup> Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

the tax administration to the people with whom it had to deal, reflected, *inter alia*, in such matters as not keeping taxpayers waiting, provision of suitable rooms where those who had appointments could wait, and of arrangements for a place where taxpayers could present their problems in a confidential, orderly way, etc.

Above all, there is the problem of corruption, which, more than anything else, tends to vitiate the reputation of the tax administration. Tax administration, by its nature, offers temptations, greater than those to which officials of most other departments are exposed. The disease itself would tend to suggest the remedy; higher emoluments for tax administrators. A reluctance that pleads inadequate resources meets the reply that any increase in compensation will literally more than pay for itself in the higher calibre personnel that are likely to be attracted to the job and the resulting increase in the effectiveness of the tax administration. Yet, the matter is not as simple as that. It is not only better—and more honest—tax administrators that an under-developed country needs, but better doctors, better teachers, better scientists and better engineers. It is not easy to assign relative priorities *inter se* in terms of salary incentives for these different categories, and the claims for higher emoluments have generally come up against the necessity, if other important segments of the public services are not to be demoralized, of maintaining at least a broad uniformity of pay scales among departments. Surrey has suggested<sup>8</sup> the upgrading of the revenue positions. This may be of some help; it is, however, clearly inadequate.

What else can be done? A system of periodical transfers of personnel to different locations would certainly help to lessen the compulsion that a taxpayer may feel to offer illicit inducements to the tax administrator. This has, in fact, been the normal practice in the tax administration structure in India; an Income Tax Officer or an Assistant Commissioner can normally expect to stay in a particular post for not more than three years, after which he would move on.

Yet, the initiative does not come always from the side of the administrator. Inducements are often offered by tax payers seeking a lenient assessment or such other favours. Here, strict supervision by departmental superiors and the knowledge that swift punishment would follow proven dishonesty would go a long way to ensure the integrity of the tax official. The government has gone beyond this. Each tax administrator—and most other government employees—is required on first appointment under the government to file a statement of

<sup>8</sup> Stanley S. Surrey, *op. cit.*, p. 517.

his wealth. This, along with similar annual statements, is kept with the official's confidential records. There also has been set up a 'vigilance' organization, headed by a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, having its representatives attached to each department at various levels, whose responsibility it is to try and prevent corruption and, where this has failed, to see that appropriate disciplinary action is taken against the offending official.

Finally, there is the system of appeals from the assessments of lower level officials to higher authorities prescribed by the law. This has already been discussed.

#### LAND REVENUE

The administration of the land revenue is distinct from that of all other taxes. The tax is levied and administered only by the States, each of which has a chief revenue authority, generally known as the Board of Revenue. Each State is divided into 'Divisions' and 'Districts', under a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner respectively. The Deputy Commissioner is variously designated as District Officer, Collector or District Magistrate and has, in fact, been the main administrative and executive authority at the district level. He is responsible for the assessment, collection and administration of the land revenue. In this function, he is assisted by a hierarchy of officials down to the village accountant, who is now everywhere an employee of the government and paid by the government (till about 15 years ago, the post was, in some States, hereditary). The land revenue administration is also the court of last resort for tax collectors : when the departments concerned are unable by any means to realize any taxes, the District Officer is asked to realise the amounts by distraint of the property of the defaulters, etc. (It may be mentioned that, while there may be features of this structure peculiar to India, the District Officer continues to exist, under different designations perhaps, in most of the former British colonies, and a discussion of the land tax administration in India would, therefore, not be without relevance elsewhere.)

Most of the problems of tax administration anticipated by Surrey would not apply—or at least to not anything like the same extent—to land revenue. The law is the oldest and best understood in this country. It has been amended and refined over a period of a hundred years, interpreted minutely by the courts and codified on more than one occasion. The records cover every piece of agricultural land in the country and contain details of each owner and cultivator. Collections are made twice a year by a machinery that extends to every village.



Fresh assessments are made every 20 years or so and disputes generally pertain to ownership, rather than to the amount assessed; there is a recognized machinery for appeals up to the Board of Revenue, and in some cases to the High Court.

Yet, one problem suggests itself immediately. An assessment based on the value of the land and on anticipated returns from the land may well be rendered irrelevant with the growth of technology in agriculture; it may also cause hardship in times of crop failure. The latter contingency is provided for; the Collector has powers to suspend—and, if necessary to recommend remission of—collections of revenue from areas affected by natural or other calamity. The former is certainly a problem. But it would perhaps be reasonable to say that changes in agricultural productivity is a relatively slow process and the periodic ‘settlements’ would generally provide for this; in the intervening period, the farmer would certainly benefit from any increases in productivity.

The discussion with regard to the land tax has, therefore, tended, in the past few years, to focus not on the assessment of the tax, but primarily on the machinery for its collection. This has been coupled with the recent trend toward establishing elected local councils as organs of local government and it has been suggested that these councils should be empowered to collect the revenue, a commission on all collections forming part of the resources of the local councils. The Taxation Enquiry Commission was of the view that there was “no objection to the collection of land revenue being entrusted to village panchayats whenever suitable, the panchayat getting a commission on the recoveries. In actual fact, however, such a course is not likely to be feasible except in a limited number of instances.”<sup>9</sup> Some States have gone ahead with this proposal, but no final pattern has emerged. A general conversion to this practice is likely to have profound effects beyond the sphere of tax collection on the whole system of district administration.

Another aspect of the problem may perhaps be mentioned. Some States did institute a tax on agricultural incomes (the normal income tax does not apply to income from agriculture), but later dropped the scheme for what some are inclined to regard as essentially political reasons; it was not found feasible to increase the burden on a sector that accounts for over 85 per cent of the electorate. The proposal has lately been revived. The arguments put forward by Ved Gandhi are: “the agricultural sector of the Indian economy today is being undertaxed as compared to the non-agricultural sector . . . it has been

<sup>9</sup> *Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission, op. cit.*, p. 236.

shown that all income classes of the agricultural sector are presently enjoying a tax differential advantage in comparison to their counterparts in the non-agricultural sector".<sup>10</sup> He has, therefore, suggested a correction of these 'intersectoral' and 'interclass inequities'. The argument has been reinforced by the spurt in agricultural productivity over the last two years, flowing from the increased use of fertilizer and irrigation, now made economic by the increase in prices of agricultural commodities, and above all by the development of what some people have referred to as new, 'miracle', seeds. However, others are inclined to feel that any increase in taxes on agriculture at this stage might be counterproductive; they would wait till the increase in productivity and production has 'stabilized'. The debate continues.

### CONCLUSION

What conclusions can be drawn from this brief look at tax administration in India?

First, the credit side. The law is generally codified and, by and large, well known and understood. The tax rolls and records would appear to be reasonably complete.

On the debit side, there is a widespread lack of voluntary taxpayer compliance, born partly of an inherited (from pre-Independence days) lack of respect for authority which is aggravated by a doubt regarding the absolute integrity of some in responsible positions in the tax administration. While the government has already moved to deal with this problem, the public image of the administration, marred by poor public relations, will change only slowly.

The emoluments of the tax administrator cannot be changed radically without upsetting the structure of general civil service salaries; as a result, the personnel attracted to the department are less able than they might otherwise be. This is compounded by outmoded procedures and office routine. Yet, the introduction of the most modern technological aides (e.g., computers) would raise problems of funds and, to begin with at least, employment in a land where unemployment or at least under-employment is already widespread.

Penalties would seem to be inadequate. Their deterrent effect is also much reduced by the infrequency with which it is possible to

<sup>10</sup> Ved P. Gandhi, *Tax Burden on Indian Agriculture*, Boston, Harvard Law School, (International Tax Programme), 1966, p. 225.

enforce them. Perhaps the provisions regarding appeals will have to be rationalized to ensure a more effective tax administration.

As far as the land revenue is concerned, the problem is at present whether it should be collected by the department concerned or by the elected local councils. As yet, there is not enough data on which to base an opinion regarding the effectiveness of the local councils in this matter.

It is suggested that the problems discussed may reflect the conditions in other underdeveloped countries also. It is hoped that some of the steps taken to deal with these problems may also be of help to those seeking solutions to similar problems, elsewhere.

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## NATIONAL PLANNING AND POLICE

G. C. Singhvi

IF we focus our viewing lens on national planning<sup>1</sup> in India, we will find a host of subjects arrayed before us. They are: agriculture (including agricultural labour, finance and marketing), cooperation, food, land policy, community development and rural extension, animal husbandry, dairying and horticulture, forests, soil conservation, fisheries, village and small industries and handicrafts, irrigation and power, mineral resources, scientific and industrial research, industrial development and policy, foreign trade and commercial policy, transport and communications, health, education, labour, employment, housing, social welfare, welfare of backward classes and rehabilitation of displaced persons. In this backdrop, one does get tempted to wonder why police and the armed forces are not included in the domain of national planning in India.<sup>2</sup>

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India and the chief architect of national planning in India, himself gave a subtle cue to the non-inclusion of police and armed forces in the ambit of national planning. "The major problem of India," he had said in 1952, "is that of development. We must never lose sight of this objective. The army and the police only provide the background because they create the conditions in which that development is possible."<sup>3</sup> The accent of endeavour in national planning being on increased production and, at the same time, on the achievement of wider social objective,<sup>4</sup> it must have been felt that the place of police and armed forces lay outside the periphery of this economic and social framework.

<sup>1</sup> National planning has been defined as the process of preparing a set of decisions for action in the future, directed at achieving national goals by optimal means.

<sup>2</sup> "A government that confined its activities largely to the chief functions prescribed by classical liberalism, namely, defence and domestic policing, could do much to solve many of the gravest political problems in India. A strong army and efficient police are likely to do more for Indian self esteem and independence, than any result that could possibly emerge from planning." —William Letwin, "What Is Wrong With Planning: The Case of India", *Fortune* (Chicago), V. 67, No. 6 (June, 1963), abstracted in IIPA Public Administration Abstracts, Vol. 7, No. 8 (August, 1963), p. 206.

<sup>3</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *Speech* delivered at the U.P. Police Officers' Mess at Lucknow, on November 22, 1952.

<sup>4</sup> Planning Commission, Government of India, *First Five Year Plan* (People's edition), Delhi, Manager of Publications, Government of India, 1953, page 11.

Armed forces being a Union List subject, it must not have been adjudged necessary to bring them within the scope of the planning process<sup>5</sup> where cooperation of and collaboration with States was almost a *sine qua non*. But this test, it would be appreciated, does not apply to the police forces. For insofar as police is concerned, public order, police (including railway and village police) and administration of justice are State List subjects just like agriculture, education, public health, forests, fisheries, etc. What then could be the rationale behind the inclusion of the latter in and exclusion of the former from the national plan?

A plausible and appealing explanation could be that the planners probably did not relish the idea of police being listed as a plan subject. For, with the advent of Independence, India had ceased to be a police state, the very concept of which was abhorred in that euphoric atmosphere. It had emerged as a welfare state avowed to secure to all its citizens justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. And "from the maintenance of law and order and the collection of revenue", the emphasis had then shifted "to the development of human and material resources and the elimination of poverty and want".<sup>6</sup> The Establishment was prone, with the history of British rule over India still fresh in mind, as a rule, to regard all relics of colonialism with extreme distaste and police (considered to be an instrument for the perpetuation of colonialism) could not have been an exception to the rule.

Then, as a people, we fear executive authority and police is so prominently associated with executive authority in the public mind that it is but natural that it should find itself more narrowly restricted than most of other departments of civil government. "In India, there is a hangover of old days when the police was distrusted and considered as something apart from the citizen."<sup>7</sup> Possibly this popular attitude of suspicion influenced the pattern of national planning in which police had no place.

Voice of reason must have certainly whispered into the ears of those in authority that "a strong and efficient police service is necessary for the well being of the community to a greater degree than any other public service in peace time".<sup>8</sup> It must also have inescapably occurred

<sup>5</sup> "There cannot be a dichotomy between Civil planning and Defence Production planning. Soon after 1962, the Planning Commission pointed out the need for joint planning but the Defence Ministry did not encourage these efforts".—P. V. R. Rao, *Defence Without Drift*, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1970, p. 248.

<sup>6</sup> *First Five Year Plan*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>7</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *Message* (New Delhi, dated January 25, 1954) for the IV All India Police Sports, held in Mysore in 1954.

<sup>8</sup> Government of U.K., *Report of Committee on Police Conditions of Service* (Chairman ; Lord Oaksey), 1949.

to them that "whatever Government was in power, its plans of social reforms must be allowed to develop and outgrow their teething troubles in an atmosphere of calm and good order. For this, the country would look to the police and on their loyalty and efficiency much would depend".<sup>9</sup> Despite all that, scales must not have weighed in favour of the inclusion of police in the national planning process for obvious political and historical reasons.

Almost two decades have elapsed since plan effort was initiated by putting the First Five Year Plan into operation (April, 1951). During this period, many things have happened and new and unpredictable forces have been unleashed to remind us (that the truth has to be learned the hard way) that our country needs a national police policy. Notwithstanding that, all these years, police has continued to be a non-plan department. Planning is and needs to be conceived as a flexible and dynamic process. There should be no rigidity about the plan perspectives. And then, "though 20 years is a long span in the life of a man, it is but a moment in the life of a nation".<sup>10</sup> There is yet time, therefore, to have a second and searching look at the fundamental circumstances, dimensions, settings and problems which compel us to consider the prospect of police being accorded a place in the process of national planning.

First, it is admittedly true that we plan for national prosperity. National prosperity is likely to be elusive, if ordered civilization does not exist. And it may be reiterated with advantage that without police, ordered civilization could not and would not exist.<sup>11</sup> That is the value of the police to the community.<sup>12</sup> As economic producers, they produce the conditions which make material production and commerce possible and, like any other producer, they can by their own efforts increase their output. Compatibly with this approach, the police should be a plan-department.

Second, police service is essentially a personal service. Most of the other departments work with things while the police department spends a greater proportion of its time and effort in working with people.

<sup>9</sup> Harold Scott, *Scotland Yard*, Deutsch, 1954.

<sup>10</sup> Geoffrey Tyson, *Nehru—The Years of Power*, London, Pall Mall, 1966, p. 9.

<sup>11</sup> "We tend to take law and order for granted. But no super-structure of progress and prosperity can be possible unless we have peace and stability in society. This is more so when we are in the midst of significant social and economic changes."—Y.B. Chavan (then Union Home Minister), *Speech* delivered while inaugurating a seminar on personnel administration organized by the H.C.M. State Institute of Public Administration at Jaipur on September 29, 1969.

<sup>12</sup> We cannot possibly conceive of a coin with a cheerful looking economic head and a depressing looking law and order tail.

And that late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's (who politically underwrote the national plan) "... hope lay chiefly in people rather than in things was poignantly recorded in his last will and testament"<sup>13</sup>. The act of accommodating the police in the band wagon of national planning would accordingly amount not only to paying a befitting homage to that great national leader but also to rendering a genuine service to the people at large.

Third, whenever the question of containment of governmental expenditure has arisen because of exigencies of the nation's economy and financial stringency, the axe, more often than not, has fallen on non-plan expenditure. And expenditure on police falling as it inevitably does in the category of 'non-plan', police also have to bear their share of the brunt. And "where the Indian Police have failed, they have failed through... the difficulty in obtaining sufficient funds for expansion at the critical period when the on-coming of new conditions made that expansion desirable on the most generous lines."<sup>14</sup> This handicap<sup>15</sup> to which police has had been subjected to so far, could to a great extent, be removed by declaring police to be a plan-subject (and whatever that follows).

Fourth, crime and violence<sup>16</sup> have considerably increased since the fifties. Maintenance of law and order has increasingly been rendered more difficult. And in the words of Walter Lippman, "the indispensable condition of law and order is that law and order prevail". We have witnessed the ascendance and downfall also of different political parties (or odd combinations thereof) forming State Governments in dubious ways coupled with the emergence on the national political

<sup>13</sup> Geoffrey Tyson, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> J.C. Curray, *The Indian Police*, London, Faber & Faber, 1932.

<sup>15</sup> Apposite to the context is an observation of A.R.C.'s. (Patil) *Study Team's Report on Personnel Administration (Personnel Planning, Staffing of Public Sector Undertakings and Personnel Management)* (A.R.C., New Delhi, October, 1969): "These services cannot form a pressure group, nor can they catch the public eye—which newer and more 'glamorous' departments can easily do. We are referring here to the traditional departments like Police and Revenue which form the infrastructure for the entire national, political and economic activity, yet in the more 'important' day-to-day discussions, are often in the background."

<sup>16</sup> The recent report of the National Commission on the causes and prevention of violence, appointed by the U.S. President in June, 1968, has analysed basic causes underlying the chief varieties of contemporary violence. While suggesting a number of measures, like re-ordering of national priorities, greater role of and expansion of opportunities for youth, lowering of voting age, better educational opportunities for all children, a basic annual income for all those families who cannot care for themselves, adoption of a national arms policy, creation of Central offices of Criminal justice, etc., directed to removing these causes, the Report observes: "Necessary as measures of control are, they are only a part of the answer. They do not cure the basic cause of violence. Violence is like a fever in the body politic: it is but the symptom of some more basic pathology which must be cured before the fever will disappear". (Based on a news item in *IIPA Newsletter*, October, 1971). And who could cure it in India—a broad based Planning Commission, like the one envisaged in this article.



scene of the unhealthy and deprecable phenomena of political defections (floor-crossings). In such a vitiated political climate, the temptation on the part of politicians to use the police as a whipping boy understandably registers an upward trend. Then, unfortunately, "there is no agreement among different segments of the people as to what is expected or wanted from their police agency."<sup>17</sup> All in all, police officers "face challenges without precedent".<sup>18</sup> "The balance of power within our society has turned dangerously against the peace forces. . . . The fighting of this balance is the primary business of each community and of the nation."<sup>19</sup> And these facts indicate the dire need of going in for police planning at the national level, to enable the planners make a realistic and pragmatic assessment of police requirements and devise ways and means to meet them.

Fifth, during the last several years, Central Police Organizations have started playing a prominent role in meeting the policing needs of the country. They have undeniably become a force to be reckoned with. Examples of such organizations are the Central Intelligence Bureau and allied Security Organizations, the Central Bureau of Investigation, the Central Reserve Police, the Assam Rifles, the Border Security Force, the Railway Protection Force, the Industrial Security Force and the National Police Academy. These organizations come in touch with and assist the police of the States at many points. As a result, the entire gamut of relationship between the Union and the States in this behalf has assumed a new complexion. They draw their senior officers on deputation from the States. (For all senior posts in the police, whether in the States or in the Union, are held by IP/IPS officers borne on the cadres of the States). Thus, the days when law and order was considered to be an exclusive preserve of the States are gone for ever. The subject from the angles of planning and effective co-ordination ('blending and balancing' of the different aspects of policing, i.e., 'economic, socio-political and administrative') should, therefore, legitimately be dealt with at the national level. The Union Government in developmental administration must necessarily cope with 'ensuring internal order'.

Sixth, in 1902-5, an Indian Police Commission held its deliberations and submitted a comprehensive report, the implementation of which

<sup>17</sup> William B. Malnicoe and Jan Menning, *Elements of Police Supervision*, Glencoe (Calif.), Free Press of Glencoe, 1969, p. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Evelle J. Younger (Chairman of President Nixon's Task Force on Crime and Law Enforcement), "Challenges to Police in Changing World", *The Indian Express*, February 21, 1969.

<sup>19</sup> Walter Lippman, "Selma : Background to Campaign Against Crime", *The Indian Express*, March 19, 1969.

imparted to the working of the police in different States a uniformity which continued to be in evidence right up to 1947. After our achieving Independence, no such all-India Police Commission was constituted. Instead, most of the States appointed their own Police Commissions. This step, instead of motivating police forces to promote the idea of national integration, has, in a way, tended to make them self-centred. They have thus got stuck up in a quagmire and need be taken out of it. And this could be done by placing police-planning in the hands of the Planning Commission.

Seventh, the working of the police in India is broadly governed by the Police Act (Act 5) of 1861, which establishes the police on a provincial (now State) basis. It must, however, be said to the credit of the framers of the Act that over a century ago, when provincial governments and Central Government were virtually one and the same and a part of the whole (British Raj), they took a wise and discerning precaution of laying down that except as authorized under the provisions of this Act no person, officer or court shall be empowered by the State Government to supersede or control any police functionary (section 3). This clause has a marked operational significance indeed. Similarly, insofar as determination of pay and conditions of service of police officers is concerned, the Central Government is supposed to accomplish it for superior police officers while the State Governments are empowered to do it for subordinate ranks of police officers only.<sup>20</sup> This shows that though police is a State List subject, the Centre has a big say in matters relating to police administration even according to the Police Act of 1861.

Eight, "the organization of the police on provincial basis acts like the reserves of a bank on which a large super-structure of credit can be built."<sup>21</sup> And, in this building up of a super-structure, the Union Government can, by bringing police within the orbit of national planning, exert a healthy influence (conductive to growth) on the State Police in the same way as the Reserve Bank of India exerts tangible social influence over all other banks in the country. By undertaking police planning in proper perspective at the national level, a lot of duplication and diffusion of effort and expenditure being incurred by the State's

<sup>20</sup> According to Section 1 of the Police Act, 1861, the term 'subordinate ranks of a police force' is to be construed to mean members of that force below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Section 2 of the Act lays down that pay and all other conditions of service of members of the subordinate ranks shall be such as may be determined by the State Government. It follows, by implication, that the pay and conditions of service of Deputy Superintendents of Police and Superintendents of Police in State Police Service and of officers belonging to the Indian Police Service shall be determined (not by the State Government but) by the Union Government.

<sup>21</sup> J.C. Curraj, *op. cit.*

Police forces in keeping with their notions of independence and dignity, could be averted.

Ninth, a Study team of the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) also recently asked the Union Government to take a positive stand on the maintenance of law and order in States. The constitutional provisions, especially in Articles 256, 257, 352, 355, 356 and 365, require elevation of policies relating to public order beyond the limits of States and clearly indicate that the Union Government has a positive and a vital role to play.<sup>22</sup> That is why the Study Teams of the ARC have delved deep into the question and have suggested, for example, that all big cities should have Police Commissioners and that the Indian Police Service (IPS) should get a new deal. The ARC have, thus, sought to dispel the erroneous impression that the Union Government has to keep aloof from the question of law and order since these subjects fall in the jurisdiction of the States. In conformity with this logical thinking, let the myth that police has no place in national planning be also exploded once and for all.

Tenth, coming to the design of development, "though some scholars consider development as a changeover from a transitional to an industrial society or as a process of modernization in a generic sense",<sup>23</sup> the "general consensus among scholars is, to treat development as a total plan of action which encompasses all aspects of social activities, where growth rates of production and consumption form only one of the several forces which are geared to national progress".<sup>24</sup> "Thus, in development administration, there has to be a confluence of different types of development objectives and programmes—political, social and economic, and underpinning all these, the managerial revolution."<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, the regulatory 'input functions' like 'creation of general conditions of development' by maintenance of peace and tranquility, attuned and harnessed to the goals and process of such national development, have also an important place in development administration.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>22</sup> News item: "Centre can Intervene in Law and Order Situation—ARC Report", *The Hindustan Standard*, Calcutta, July 8, 1970.

<sup>23</sup> J. N. Khosla, "Development Administration—New Dimensions", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Jan.-Mar., 1967).

<sup>24</sup> Shaikat Ali and Garth N. Jones, *Planning Development and Change: An Annotated Bibliography on Development Administration*, Lahore, Panjab University Press, p. 12.

<sup>25</sup> B. K. Dey, "Bureaucracy and Development—Some Reflections", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XV, No. 2 (Apr.-June, 1969).

<sup>26</sup> "... it is unrealistic to talk of development administration as a special type of administration except in the sense that in a country which is trying to develop, all administration has to be development administration.... The role of the police has to change with changing requirements; the very quality of the policeman has to change, through recruitment and training, for a semi-literate policeman may be able to perform

And this place needs duly be accorded by birnring police 'in' national planning.

Eleventh, "in this day when the doors to the cosmos are slowly being pried open by the brilliance and inventive foresight of some men... little comparable change has taken place in police doctrine over the years. The police officer is still pretty much in the middle when it comes to labour violence, race riots, civil disturbances and disaster. A great need lies here in the field of theoretical thinking".<sup>27</sup> Coming nearer, "many things have changed in India in the 24 years of Independence but even the most ardent admirer of the police will not claim that this force has undergone any material change".<sup>28</sup> To change this unchanging face of the Indian Police, "professionalization of the police service", is called for "because only highly professional policemen are able to cope with the complicated problems and societal pressures that accompany"<sup>29</sup> unrest, violence and crime. Therefore, if we cherish to treat causes<sup>30</sup> rather than pay lip-service to symptoms, we should as stated above, evolve a national police policy by bringing police within the purview of national planning.

What has been stated in the preceding paragraphs indicates the imperative need of taking up police planning as a part of social planning (and economic and social planning is a subject at Item No. 20 on List III—Concurrent List—in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of

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basic duties especially among an unsophisticated population, but he will not do when general literacy increases or when a sophisticated clientele develops with the rest of the development process.... We might go further with a recent French example, where the traffic police issue to tourists, who offend against car parking restrictions, 'Welcome to France—you may care to note our parking regulations' notices in lieu of the summonses issued to French offenders; this is a police contribution, however minor to the development of tourism and it came about by not treating law and order as distinct from development". —W. Wood, "Development Administration : An Objection", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec., 1967), p. 714.

<sup>27</sup> Clifford L. Scott and Bill Garet, *Leadership for the Police Supervisor*, Springfield, Illinois, U.S.A.

<sup>28</sup> Thakur Ghanshyam Narayan Singh, "Unchanging Face of the Indian Police", *an article published in The Assam Tribune*, August 24, 1970.

<sup>29</sup> William B. Melnicoe and Jan Mennig, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>30</sup> "For law-breaking is so widespread in our society, it is so persistent and so aggravated, that we cannot point to one cause and to one remedy.... Such a criminal infection implicates... civilization and its institutions: the family, the schools, the communities, the churches, the courts, the police and last but not least, indeed above all, the prevailing popular standards of value as regards violence, greed, lust, indulgence and addiction.... To deal with the causes which produce criminals, we have to make all the efforts to improve the worst conditions of our society, syndicated crime, the slums, broken families, the school dropouts, the wild birth rate among the disinherited, ignorance, incompetence, disincentives to honest work as well as the atmosphere of brutality and violence created by yellow journalism, yellow literature, yellow movies, yellow television, especially among people where the family is broken and the church is lame".—Walter Lippman, *op. cit.*

India) at the national level by the Planning Commission. The objectives as may be identified, priorities as may be laid down and programmes as may be chalked out by the Planning Commission should be embodied in the national plan which should reaffirm the common resolve of the Governments of all the States of the Union of India as also of the Union Government of India with the support of the Indian people to carry out the plan with determination and achieve its goals, the most notable of which is making the nation move forward on all fronts in its relentless warfare against crime and violence.

The constitution of a Police Board, as an adjunct of the Planning Commission, for taking up police-planning at the national level as well as 'carrying out planned change' in the Indian Police by resource planning and utilization could be imaginatively envisioned and profitably considered. This Police Board could additionally serve as a "Central Police Advisory Board consisting of police officers of high status and standing and a chairman to be known as the Chief of Police Staff to be at the disposal of the President to assist him in deciding when and how he should ask the Centre to intervene in law and order matters in a State, as recommended by a Study Team of the ARC<sup>31</sup>." This Board could also have an activity charter analogous to the one the President's Task Force on Crime and Law Enforcement has in the U.S.A.

In this manner, the Union Government could assume and play the much needed leadership<sup>32</sup> role (by being a "friend, guide and philosopher") in relation to the State's police forces and thereby usher in a new era, characterized by 'an action-motivated, goal-oriented system' of national planning, in the annals of public-police administration in India.

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<sup>31</sup> News item : "Centre can Intervene in Law and Order Situation—ARC Report", *op. cit.*

<sup>32</sup> "Leadership", in the words of D. Eisenhower (former President of U.S.A.), "is the art of getting some body else to do something you want done because he wants to do it".

## LAW AND ORDER ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA: ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES OF THE 1970s\*

Prabhu Datta Sharma

ORDER and progress are admittedly the *sine qua non* of good government. And a self-government, in order to be a good government also, must provide minimum political stability before envisaging ameliorative measures or development plans. The developing societies everywhere in the world are inevitably engaged in a historic task of nation building and welfare politics for their teeming millions. Their potential dilemma is that when the political instability of their systems retards their development, the pressures of development, in turn, threaten their political stability.<sup>1</sup> The choice, besides being difficult, is not exclusive, and renders all dichotomous distinctions like 'law and order administration' and 'development administration' as untenable. Development is implicit in survival, and survival has to be a precondition if a society is to develop and progress. In this context, the introduction of democratic processes has complicated matters in the new emerging nations. While the increasing awareness of the democratic values has enhanced the aspirations of the under-privileged citizens, their inability to adjust with the mounting expectations has jeopardized the very survival of the democratic system itself.<sup>2</sup> The new nations can ill-afford to sacrifice either; nor can they permit this optimal lag between the pace of social dynamism and governmental competence to cope with it. The problem is of reconciling the requirements of democratic compulsions with the minimum needs of a peaceful civilized existence,<sup>3</sup> and it is in this context of democratic development that the

\* This was awarded second prize (Rs. 500) in the I.I.P.A. Annual Essay Prize Competition, 1970.

<sup>1</sup> In this connection, William Kornhauser has pertinently observed as follows: "In the transition to democratic government, the question is whether the social formations exist to support authority as well as liberty. Where demonstration proceeds without adequate safeguards for authority, it leaves the new rule naked before mass movements which would destroy it. Where democratization proceeds without adequate protection for liberty, it leaves individuals naked before mass oriented elites, which would dominate them. Unless democratic processes can be combined with stable and limited authority, they will favour mass movements subversive of liberty and of democracy itself." William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960, p. 129.

<sup>2</sup> See Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States*, London, Collier MacMillan, 1963, pp. 278-279.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* See especially Edward Shils' remarks about the meagre and fragile infrastructure of the new States, p. 22.

administrative challenges to law and order administration in India need to be examined now.

The political scene in India in the seventies presents a baffling picture. The kind of wholesale mass violence and anti-authority bias operating now, clearly indicate that the democratic functioning of the Indian political system is nearing a critical point. The inevitable consequences of democratic process, like universal adult suffrage, fundamental rights, and the rising expectations are destined to have their impact on popular perceptions and attitudinal value scales. It would be naive to assume that India could have a democratic form of government for full two decades and yet remained socio-economically stagnant and politically non-violent.

It may be worthwhile to trace historically the emergence of modern Indian polity through a dialectic process of constitutional means and violent methods. The different paths of the moderates and the extremists in the Indian Nationalist Movement had their cumulative synthesis in the Gandhian technique,<sup>4</sup> which was responsible for a special era in the history of law and order administration. Earlier, the colonial government of India, in the nature of an alien administration had none of the present variables in the law and order situations. Besides, the non-violent techniques of civil disobedience in the Gandhian era did not pose a veritable challenge to the very ingenuity of law and order administration under the British. Their administration was self-sufficient for this purpose, and did not confront either an overall challenge or a continuing crisis.

In this respect, the Nehru era continued with the Gandhian legacy in the realm of police administration. Though it has been an era of great changes, it was essentially a period of continuity in administration. Nevertheless, political stability with planned economic growth introduced its own variables of great potency.<sup>5</sup> If the character of the

<sup>4</sup> See K.P. Karunakaran, *Continuity and Change in Indian Politics*, New Delhi, Peoples Publishing House, 1964, Ch. VI.

<sup>5</sup> Even during the Nehru period, no history of political life in India can fail to note a depressing series of outrages against public order. A few of them have been catalogued by David H. Bayley in one of his recent studies, *The Police and Political Development in India* (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1969, pp. 248-249), as under :

- (1) Gorakhpur Firing, 1952.
- (2) Linguistic State Riots, 1952-55.
- (3) Calcutta Teachers' Strike, 1954.
- (4) Kharagpur Disturbances, 1956.
- (5) T.I S. Co. Strike in Jamshedpur, 1958.



National Movement during the Gandhian period was basically non-challenging to the law and order administration, the charismatic personality of Pandit Nehru and the relative political stability of his government exercised a rather negative influence on the law and order administration in free India.

The post-Nehru period brought to the fore, for the first time, the law and order problem in a democratic *milieu*. The absence of the dominant one-party system, the passing of national leadership, the violent release of mass aspirations, the tremendous impact of developmental effort on popular perceptions, and the changing pattern of party alignments stirred the whole political system to an extent that its internal contradictions became too obvious.<sup>6</sup>

#### SCENE IN THE SEVENTIES

The Gandhi centenary year (1969) ironically ended with a communal carnage at Ahmedabad. The opening of the year following it (1970) witnessed an unprecedented development in West Bengal when its Chief Minister had to go on a hunger strike in protest against the degenerating conditions of law and order created by his own government in that State. In the name of Naxalism, near anarchy has been reigning in West Bengal and in certain other parts of the country for quite some time. The problem of Chandigarh provoked neo-communalism of Hindu-Sikh confrontation in Punjab. The tragic tales of 'Gheraos', 'Bundhs', 'Morchas' and 'Senas' in almost all parts of the country seem to justify the warnings of doom.

The increasing incidence of violence and wanton destruction of public property by agitators of different kinds present a vicious crisis.

(Continued from p. 755)

- (6) Food Price Agitations, 1958.
- (7) Maharashtra, Gujarat Riots, 1958.
- (8) Food Riots in Calcutta, 1959, Kerala, 1966.
- (9) Language Riots in Assam, 1960.
- (10) Central Government Employees' Strike, 1960.
- (11) Anti-Brahmin Activities of D.M.K., 1960-61.
- (12) Hindu-Muslim Violence in Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Calcutta, 1964.
- (13) Anti-Hindi Riots in the South, 1964-65.
- (14) Constant drumfire of Student Protests in most of India's major universities, 1955-65.

<sup>6</sup> Randolph J. Rummal of North Western University, in 1963, sought to construct an index of conflict within and between Nations. He found that India ranked in the TOP ground with respect to riots and demonstrations. Along the domestic dimension of 'turmoil', India was ranked third, behind France and Argentina; with respect to revolutionary activity, it was third, behind Argentina and Chile; and with respect to subversive activity, it was eighth. See Randolph J. Rummal, *Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour within and between Nations*, Chicago, Northwestern University (Monograph), June, 1963.

The agitational approach of some of the political and para-political parties is an acute manifestation of an indiscriminate pursuit of 'power'. Regional loyalties are everywhere hardening. The value erosion is deepened by defections by elected representatives which cause political instability. Even the University campus is hardly immune from this virus. To quote David H. Bayley:

"Agitational politics (in India) has become the stock in trade of groups large and small, organised and unorganised. Congressmen are not an exception. Law is not considered sacred in itself: it may be freely broken without a qualm of conscience... Politicians thrive on it. It does not matter that other remedies exist. Nor does it matter that freely elected representatives have by majority vote determined otherwise. Agitational politics has become a customary coercive force supplementing, sometimes supplanting, the orderly processes of parliamentary government."

The pattern of violence is diverse and has varied manifestations in the public response. The net result is the disorder, insecurity, tension and vandalism that are so characteristic of Indian polity. The decline of Gandhian values of an earlier generation seems to be taken for granted.

The administration of law and order consists of different factors and processes. They include apprehension, detention, trial, conviction and custody of offenders. It is also vitally concerned with the prevention of crime. The agencies to whom this administration is entrusted are the police, the courts and the prison houses.

The scope of the present article is confined only to the first agency, *i.e.*, the police. The scope is further limited to the cases of disorders and violence which the police has to confront and handle from different militant groups of Indian society. The overall focus of the enquiry is related to the problems of law and order administration in the specific context of India's democratic system and developmental politics in the seventies. The hypotheses are that: (1) anarchic disorder erodes faith in a democratic way of life; (2) instances of mass violence and sabotage tend to subvert development efforts and seriously retard socio-economic progress; and (3) the political and psychological dimensions of democratic upsurge have a decisive bearing on the future pace and direction of the political system. Thus, in examining law and order administration in India in the seventies from the two positive angles of: (1) democratic stability, and (2) developmental viability, this article

<sup>7</sup> David H. Bayley, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

focuses only on some of the administrative challenges which police administration confronts in India from several sources. Viewing order and change as desirable objectives of a development-oriented democracy, the article also offers a few suggestions by way of identifying different sets of variables in a scientific policy of establishing a delicate balance in the operation of opposing groups in India today.<sup>8</sup>

#### LAW AND ORDER IN RETROSPECT

The basic problems of law and order situation may be reviewed at the outset. During the last two decades, while enough thought and research are being devoted to the reform of the administrative mechanism of the State, relatively very little has been done to modernize and reform the Indian Police. It is interesting to recall the following observation of Justice A. N. Mulla, former Judge of the Allahabad High Court, while passing judgment on a Sub-Inspector of Police who had fabricated evidence observed :

“There is not a single lawless group in the whole of the country, whose record of crime comes anywhere near the record of that organized unit, which is known as the Indian Police.”<sup>9</sup>

After two decades of Independence, the situation has not changed much, and the police methods of detection, confrontation and prosecution remain largely archaic. There is very little dialogue between the police and the people on common questions. The terms ‘police research’ and ‘police public relations’, have come in use so recently that even very senior decision-makers and policy-framers have their genuine hunches about their utility. The lack of timely communication among the different cadres of police and between the police and its clients is a hazard which, in several cases, is itself the source of a grave provocation for lawlessness and disorder.

The old vertical line patterns of departmental organization seem to be dogging police administration. And very few staff agencies exist to plan, process and commend action to line officers in the field. Endowed with the very important responsibility of law and order preservation, the line officers in the police department below the Superintendent of a district have neither time nor adequate discretion to implement

<sup>8</sup> I am thankful to Mr. David H. Bayley (*op. cit.*) whose study has been found most useful in preparing this article.

<sup>9</sup> See G.D. Khosla, *The Murder of the Mahatma*, London, Chatto & Windus, 1963, p. 176.

Later, on appeal by the U.P. Government, the Supreme Court expunged these remarks by observing that these “were not justified on the facts of the case” and “were bad enough...to bring the whole administration of law and order into disrepute”.

policies successfully. Untrained in modern sophisticated method of handling popular disorders,<sup>10</sup> the officials of the Indian police know very little about the anatomy and pathology of various kinds of violent disorders, ranging from student rampages to communal carnage.<sup>11</sup>

They are too sensitive to police being beaten under any situation; and occasionally they throw their wrath on innocent victims, using the odd excuse that physical presence in a violent assembly is as major a crime as to plan and organize it. Obsessed with the military discipline, the police machine in India is not only insensitive to human side of administration but seeks refuge in highly legalistic implementation of law.

The techniques of non-violent struggle employed by Gandhian Satyagrahis, who allowed the law and order mechanism to function unilaterally, have perhaps contributed to a sense of complacency on the part of the police. The police casualties then were unknown. Bred and brought up in the tradition of handling non-violent disorders, the Indian police today finds itself baffled when brow beaten by an angry mob on a university campus or elsewhere. The two-dimensional nature of mass violence is a new phenomenon for the Indian police machinery.

After Independence, the politician has also emerged as a new and effective master. He is expected to restrain the police in the interest of popular conventions, but he is also conscious of the need of his own political survival. His interference in the operation of law and order machinery is resented by the police. The problem has sparked off several controversies<sup>12</sup> recently.

However, there have been many instances when police officers have shown high-handedness in avoidable situations only because they knew that they might be tried, and the politician could pass on the buck to them. In a recent judicial enquiry about police firing at Jaipur on March, 7, 1967, in which nine persons died and 45 were injured,

<sup>10</sup> See, K.N. Prasad, "Police in Independent India", *The Indian Police Journal*, (Centenary Issue), pp. 77-94.

<sup>11</sup> In this connection, the U.P. Police Commission, submitting its report a decade back (1960-61), observed: "We regret to note that the old and crude methods of investigations still continue to persist. Complaints of beating, physical torture, maltreatment and harassment by police officers are not wanting. In fact, the methods of scientific investigations have not yet found an adequate place in the strategy of the police." *Report of the U.P. Police Commission*, Lucknow, Government of U.P., 1961, p. 70.

<sup>12</sup> *Report of the Kerala Police Reorganization Committee* (Chairman: N. C. Chatterji), Trivandrum, Government of Kerala, p. 62 ff; *Bihar Police Commission*, (Chairman: B.P. Jamar), Patna, Government of Bihar, 1961, pp. 139-141.

Hon'ble Justice B. P. Beri of Rajasthan High Court found that:

"The police parties were not besieged, as alleged. There was no firing of any gunshot from the side of the public. There was no attempt to snatch arms. The theory advanced by the district administration that firing was done by police pickets in exercise of the right of private defence of their bodies and arms (in Johri Bazar) is false in its entirety."<sup>13</sup>

Sometimes, special *ad hoc* para-military troops, like Central Reserve Police and Police Armed Constabulary, are summoned to the scene from the Union Government or from the neighbouring States to deal with serious and provocative situations. In the event of a public inquiry, the issues are shelved in the complex web of plural responsibility. Even the procedures of police confrontation, like dealing with violence in the presence of a Judicial Magistrate and conducting firing operations under his explicit orders, are creating unexpected problems by evading responsibility.

The senior police officers are not being trusted and their typical reaction to the arrangement is "if the police cannot be trusted with looking at the problems of the criminal administration, except from a narrow angle, pray, what is the use of keeping highly paid police officers as I.G. and A.I.G. of police at the State level and D.I.G. of Police having territorial and functional jurisdictions at district levels."<sup>14</sup> Direct action, *i.e.*, organized violent defiance of law, on a mass scale has no place in a democracy, as it permits only peaceful change. In India, such public protests are not only increasing, but have also developed into distinct categories.<sup>15</sup> Delivering the Mavalankar Memorial Lecture on "Direct Action and Parliamentary Democracy" at Harold Laski Institute of Political Science, Ahmedabad, in 1961,

<sup>13</sup> *Report of the Commission of Enquiry on Police Firing at Jaipur*, (Chairman : Justice B.P. Beri), 1969, Vol. III, p. 808 (unpublished).

<sup>14</sup> G.C. Singhvi, "Dual Control of Law and Order Administration in India", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (January-March, 1968), p. 164.

<sup>15</sup> David H. Bayley, classifies these categories of Public violence as: (1) the violence of remonstrance, (2) the violence of confrontation, and (3) the violence of frustration. Each category differs from the other with respect to target, occasion, organization, visibility, location, participation and duration, etc. The first "is the result of a process of public remonstrance and the heightening of a sense of open contention. While the violence itself may not be organized, the events leading up to it are". The second is "the occasion of confrontation between two groups of private citizens brought into enmity on some issue. Communal rioting is of this nature". The third "involves the seemingly senseless hitting out of individuals at any thing at hand". In India, whether it is the violence of remonstrance or confrontation: much of its momentum comes from frustration, as the circle of participants widens. The rikshaw drivers, hooligans, street urchins and unemployed youngmen join not because they identify with the initial cause, but because violence appeals to their personal predicament." David H. Bayley, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-262.

Shri Y. B. Chavan observed:

“There are four types of direct actions taking place in India: (1) wherein a group of persons take law into their hands and administer direct punishment to the supposed wrong-doer without going through due process of law; (2) wherein a particular group of people (particularly religious or caste group) feels wronged and takes vengeance by methods not permitted by law; (3) when a group of persons feeling aggrieved on occasions by the policy, launches organised defiance of law as a technique of solving the problems; and (4) actions launched by groups which are impatient to realize those agro-cultural urges, which make them aspire for better political ideologies. (They) are impatient to have it earlier in their own way in accordance with their time-table.<sup>16</sup>

During the last ten years, these groups have become more articulate. And political agitations, communal riots, student unrest and Naxalite anarchy have come to stay as grave challenges to the ingenuity, skill and imagination of all those who have responsibility for law and order administration. The distinctiveness of each category warrants a brief analysis here.

#### PATHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE

Let us now turn to examine the pathology of violence in the current national *milieu*. Since long, all societies have been organizing some kind of militant groups, committed to the violent overthrow of the *status quo*. They have acquired a new force in contemporary India. The administration of law and order is geared to the task of arresting them. In a democracy, when the police administration attempts to play this role *vis-a-vis* organized violence, it finds itself into the limelight of public attention in an invidious manner. Its actions polarize political debates between those who support and those who oppose order-sustaining policies.<sup>17</sup> Naturally, the law and order administration has to understand the pathology of mass violence and must answer relevant questions pertaining to each dimension of disorder. Let us examine some of these in the present Indian context.

*First*, there are political agitations which often slip away from the hands of their organizers and result in lawlessness, with all the grave consequences. The opposition parties, which lead these massive

<sup>16</sup> Quoted in S.P. Aiyer and R. Srinivasan (ed.), *Studies in Indian Democracy*, Bombay, Allied, 1965, pp. 301-302.

<sup>17</sup> See, David H. Bayley, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

demonstrations in front of the legislature, might be trying to ventilate popular grievances through this. But more often than not, these opposition groups generate these demonstrations.<sup>18</sup> In a democratic system, it is the basic function of a political party to protest and change the government peacefully.<sup>19</sup> These agitations, being a part of the democratic credo, ensure the lay citizen to enjoy his fundamental rights, including the freedom to organize, assemble without arms, and protest against injustice.

But no government, worth its salt, can allow this constitutional right of lawful protest to become an exercise in violent behaviour. These instances of quasi-violence, when supported, by mass demonstrations or political agitations, suddenly degenerate into mass violence and aggressive defiance of law. This raises the following significant questions:

- (1) What should be the policy of the rulers when they foresee opposition galvanising a human mass and its seathing discontentment in terms of violent disorders?
- (2) What should be the role and place of the opposition leaders in a nascent democracy, where it is easier to get the laws observed in breach by irresponsible opposition behaviour and where the ruling masters develop a habit of attending to genuine demands only when they are threatened?
- (3) How should the police machinery be regeared in terms of effective intelligence and prompt precautionary preventive measures, when such political agitations become a routine, with a recurrent pattern of Section 144, lathi charge, tear-gas, firing and curfew following?

Let us have an overall examination of all these questions together.

Obviously, the ruling party has a heavier responsibility in dealing with lawlessness. It has to exhibit statesmanship under duress, and not be swayed by considerations of power politics alone. A judicious and timely approach by the ruling party can effectively take the wind off the sails of the opposition parties. The opposition, which wants to play a subversive role, will thus be largely ineffective.

Moreover, when all parties in India are having an increased awareness about the techniques in mass demonstrations, the police machinery

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Rajni Kothari, "Direct Action, A Pattern of Political Behaviour", *Quest*, January-March, 1960, pp. 24-26.

<sup>19</sup> Raju, Kanitkar and Dandavate, "Problems of Developing an Opposition in India", in Aiyar and Srinivasan (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 638.



is geared more towards confrontation than precaution or prevention. The way in which mass demonstrations are handled explains the *post mortem* approach of the police. The break-down of the law and order machinery, for whatever reasons, humbles the image of the police in public esteem. The consequences of violence become the subject of an emotional, vituperative public debate. Police actions are broadcast from house tops. Whether stigmatized or defended, police notoriety increases. The swirl of debate tarnishes police prestige and reduces the sanctity of their charge. The net result is the erosion of faith in the democratic system,<sup>20</sup> which is, here, lost more by default than by anything else.

The *second* dimension of violence in Indian public life is that of communal riots, which had a recurrence in 1969 and 1970. The relevant issue here is not about tracing the origins of communalism in India. It is a different point whether they existed before the British or they were created by the British.<sup>21</sup> At present, there are very few serious sociological studies available, which throw light upon the changing patterns of communal conflicts in India, yet it is obvious that communalists, in collusion with political parties and vernacular press, succeed in engineering them. The communal conflicts in India seem to have subtle strategies which cut across the majority and minority groups at the same time.

In free India, the incidence of these tragedies is assisted by the peculiar political framework we are operating.<sup>22</sup> Being a very complex problem, having its roots in the history, geography, culture and politics of the country, the political exhortations alone are of no avail. Nor an ostrich-like attitude of the administration can meet the mounting challenge. The realities of this situation demand that the law and order machinery should have special strategies and methods for dealing with this problem. For example, the following steps may be taken:

- (1) Creation of a special wing or some kind of an expertise in terms of staff aid in the police organization.

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<sup>20</sup> This point is further developed in Myron Weiner's, *Party Politics in India*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 257-289.

<sup>21</sup> For details, see Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims, A Political History*, Bombay, Asia, 1959. The problem is explored further in D.E. Smith, *India as a Secular State*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.

<sup>22</sup> "Since the twenties, a good section of the vernacular press is harnessed to the yoke of communalism. Its extremism, dangerous in the past, has become doubly more so since the introduction of adult suffrage." K.C. Lalwani, "Prospects of Indian Democracy", in Aiyar and Srinivasan (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 716.

- (2) Assigning police adequate powers to take precautionary measures within the constitutional rights to freedom, especially the right to religious freedom.
- (3) Instituting personnel reforms for strengthening recruitment and training of personnel, gradually leading to the secularist attitudes and conventions in practice.

The long-range panacea for this malady is possibly the exposure of the masses to science and technology, and the evolution of the right kind of cosmopolitan attitudes in the family, the school and the office. But till that day dawns, the law and order administration should firmly take care of the problem, wherever it exists. Speed is the essence of riot control, and it is better for the authorities to err on the side of anticipation and rush an advance guard to a suspect area rather than to wring their hands in despair later. A prompt, impartial and strongly deterrent action, followed by punitive measures, can effectively make the ends of law and order meet.

*Thirdly*, there is a special kind of lawlessness by a particular group of youngsters, commonly known as student unrest. It is true that in developing nations, university students constitute a group that represents the leading edge of self-conscious change. They contribute disproportionately to informed public opinion, and are conscious of being part of a unique social stratum. Politics for them is an imperative of academic standing. Student indiscipline, as it is known in India has become a byword.<sup>23</sup> There was a time when this was purely a campus problem. Even during the nationalist struggle, it was not regarded as a serious law and order problem by the authorities. Recently, this unrest has assumed alarming proportions. Its manifestations are not only dangerously violent, but intolerably disturbing. Another factor in the student unrest today is the increasing role of the vote-catchers, who find the youth a susceptible material for their power-bargaining. This deep malady has its politico-academic overtones.

This is not simply a question of student involvement in national politics or participation in university affairs. There is a veritable challenge to law and order administration, by the restless youth in our centres of learning, resulting in vandalism, wanton destruction of public property, gross misbehaviour, coercing subscriptions to finance 'Bundhs', paralysing examinations, burning of buses, ticketless travel and even murdering of invigilators. All this cannot be dismissed merely as

<sup>23</sup> For a detailed discussion, see Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama, An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, London, Allen Lane Penguin Press, 1968, Cf. Chapters 31 and 33, Vol. III.

youthful ferment or generation conflict or creative unrest common to the whole world.<sup>24</sup> In the Indian context, this is all the more important as the people in the age group from 18 to 25 are swelling in ranks, and they are also the future decision makers.<sup>25</sup> The authorities cannot deal with them harshly nor can they acquit them on convincing grounds. The problem of law and order there is really ticklish, and before the police and magistracy jump to any conclusions about the student community as such, they should pause and screen every case of student violence in the light of the following considerations:

- (1) Whether the student mass violence is sporadic or has a recurrent pattern?
- (2) Who could be the possible leaders behind the scene of unrest and what are their motives?
- (3) Whether student leaders are professionals or are *bona fide* students with genuine grievances?
- (4) What are the issues or demands for protest and how far these demands have a bearing on their academic careers and later life?
- (5) Whether student violence remains confined to campus property or it threatens to envelope the community and assume 'castist' and communal proportions?

No single factor, howsoever preponderant, can determine the nature of student defiance of law and order. It is true that law and order machinery has to take care of it ultimately. However, it has to be the last in priority. The police administration must evolve a positive policy towards 'educational disturbances' and must review these in the context of social change and academic development in India. It must be realized that students, above all, are the most sensitive and articulate group of society which is least tolerant of police excesses. They have a

<sup>24</sup> Cataloguing the causes and cures of student indiscipline in India, the Kothari Commission have commented : "What is particularly disturbing at present is the noticeable trend towards a progressive deterioration and the fact that these acts are increasingly committed quite unapologetically and on irrelevant and frivolous grounds. In such a situation, sociological explanations are not enough. The remedies go beyond the education system." Government of India, Ministry of Education, *Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1966, p. 297.

<sup>25</sup> See M.N. Srinivas, "Changing Attitudes in India Today", *Yojana*, October 1, 1961, p. 26; and K.C. Taneja, "Growth of Population in India (1961-81)", *Economic Weekly*, Bombay, September 12, 1964, p. 1481-83.

very distorted image of traditional law and order administration.<sup>26</sup> The utter absence of any police-university relations on a continuous basis further contributes to the deterioration of the image. Again, the trouble persists because law and order administration in India usually believes more in confrontation and control rather than in prevention and precaution.

A *fourth* dimension of this violence, especially the one contributed by the youth, is Naxalism which hit the headlines in 1970. Bengal, Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and then almost the entire country seemed to be heading towards an anarchic type of the jungle law in which the Lockian natural rights of life, liberty and property were likely to be in serious jeopardy. These violent youngmen are not only anti-nationalist, but are also a serious threat to everything that stands for *status quo* or preservation of law and order. As an ideology of continuous revolution, Naxalism is a menace to the democratic way of life. Though it has recruited some of the finest youngmen to its ranks, its cult is to subvert peace and harmony in society by openly using bombs and other weapons. If allowed to go unabated, this movement would ultimately paralyze the law and order administration. It may succeed in arousing melancholic pleasure among have-nots, but it has very little positive to offer in terms of peace and plenty to the needy sections of society. That the Naxalites are inspired by external factors is also a significant fact.

The government has to deal with this kind of brigandage firmly. The law and order machinery has to meet the challenge of justifying its utility. The infectious spread of the Naxalite ideology indicates the gross failure of law and order administration. Its repeated failures may mean the breakdown of the Constitution. In order to deal with this urgent and potential threat of Naxalite violence, the law and order administration in India should judiciously consider the following points:

- (1) It has to arm itself adequately with the laws necessary to bring culprits to the book and thereby arrest the abuse or misuse of right to freedom, enshrined in the Constitution of India.

<sup>26</sup> The following excerpts from Bayley's study may prove the point: "Asked to evaluate the attitude of police towards them, not more than 25 per cent said police were suspicious, uncooperative or hostile...About a third in each sample said police were cooperative. About a fourth said indifferent and from 8 to 24 per cent said they were friendly. Students evaluated the police most favourably in Delhi, and Bangalore. Allahabad students were the most negative. Osmania students were less critical than Allahabad...In the combined sample, about one-third think the police are too harsh or employ too much force in handling public demonstrations...An equal proportion believed that police handling is firm and proper. About a fifth judge it to be haphazard". David H. Bayley, *op. cit.*, pp. 322 and 338.

- (2) External hand or foreign complicity in inciting sabotage and disorder is to be firmly plugged at the root and concerted and coordinated efforts are to be put in to combat the mounting forces of anarchy and disruption.
- (3) The common man is getting alienated from the administration and does not helpfully cooperate with the authorities. This cannot be forced, but he can certainly be educated in this belief that anarchy anywhere is misery everywhere.<sup>27</sup>
- (4) Politicians take undue advantage of the deteriorating law and order situation. They protect and shield culprits and interfere in the ordinary course of law. The administration should foil their bid and must brook no consideration, once the law has its grip on its saboteurs.

Naxalism may be a politico-economic phenomenon. But the law and order machinery can play its timely role and arrest the situation from further deterioration. Its firmness and prompt response to violation of law can restore sapping confidence among the people. Hobbes stated a revealing truism perhaps when he said, "Tyranny is better than anarchy." In India, we suffer more from the evils of non-government than misgovernment.

Lastly, there is a classical kind of lawlessness by the outlaw—also known as dacoit menace in India.<sup>28</sup> In the seventies, this challenge to law and order administration in this area has not mitigated but reappeared with fresh vigour on the border ravines of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.<sup>29</sup> Though not a political problem in itself, the dacoit menace in India has been quite harassing to law and order administration, because of its intensity. The achievements of the police in this area of lawlessness have been outstanding. Yet, enough remains to be done in the fields of detection and confrontation.<sup>30</sup> The dacoit or the outlaw has his hideout in the rural community which protects him against police detection. This is done mostly because of fear and future hazards. The police methods of cruel and inhuman harassment of their abettors or accomplices raise a new problem, *i.e.*, whether these

<sup>27</sup> Under Section 187, *The Indian Penal Code*, the people who refuse to cooperate with police in witnessing searches are liable to be prosecuted, but this is rarely done.

<sup>28</sup> "A dacoity is robbery—that is, theft with violence—committed by five or more persons."—*The Indian Penal Code*, Sec. 391.

<sup>29</sup> Seventeen school children and five villagers of Mahooch in Madhya Pradesh were kidnapped by the dacoit gang of Mohar Singh on July 17, in broad day-light and have been held to ransom since then.—News item, *The Times of India*, New Delhi, July 27, 1970.

<sup>30</sup> See K.F. Rustomji, "Pindaris, Thugs and now Dacoits", *The Indian Police Journal*, *op. cit.*, p. 158-165.

innocent supporters of dacoits need be beaten mercilessly by the police. Here, the law and order administration confronts three basic questions:

- (1) What is the fault of an innocent villager who, if he helps the dacoits, is beaten by the police and if he assists the police, faces a total insecurity of his life and that of his kin at the hands of the dacoits? Is this method of dacoit detection and liquidation tenable in the absence of police protection to the family of the police helper?
- (2) Should a political representative<sup>31</sup> allow the police machinery to go ahead with its cruel detection methods even when he is certain that his voters are innocent and the police officials are corrupt?<sup>32</sup>
- (3) Can we evolve some policy and give it a fair and honest trial for the rehabilitation of those dacoits who are repentant about their past and wish to return to the normal code of law?

The answers to these questions cannot be simple. The detection methods have not only to be improved, but protection guarantee has also to be a precondition. Similarly, the role of an elected representative as guardian of his constituents' interest has to be accepted and accommodated by the police in the discharge of their responsibility. The proposals for the establishment of rehabilitation homes for the ex-dacoits on the lines of prison reformatories are worth considering. The Gandhian approach to dacoits, as Vinoba Bhave sought to apply in Chambal Valley, needs more consideration.<sup>33</sup> Even a traditional problem of law and order administration, such as the dacoit liquidation, implies democratic overtones in the changed circumstances. These aspects in the emerging context of new goals and new roles of a modernizing society have to be further examined.

#### EMERGING ISSUES

The foregoing analysis suggests that in the Indian political system, as it operates at present, there are political leaders, communalist groups, communist party cadres, notorious outlaws and angry youngmen, who

<sup>31</sup> In Rajasthan, one of the Deputy Ministers of the State Cabinet went on a hunger strike in June, 1970, to invite attention of his own government about the gravity of this problem.

<sup>32</sup> The West Bengal Police Commission frankly admit that : "There is no denying the fact that corruption exists in the Police force and the majority of the subordinate ranks are corrupt". *Report of the West Bengal Police Commission*, Calcutta, Government of West Bengal, 1964, p. 20.

<sup>33</sup> In this connection, it is interesting to read an article by Gandhiji, on "In case of Dacoity", *Young India*, June 29, 1924.

participate, provoke and precipitate the breakdown of law and order administration in the country. The police and magistracy are called upon to face this multi-faced crisis. The common man, whether he participates or stays as an onlooker, is resentful and holds the law and order authorities responsible for the breakdown. The police officials, on the other hand, find the situation demoralizing and come down heavily on the 'whosoever available'.<sup>34</sup> The police excesses, according to the police version, is the reasonable course of law to keep the situation under control. The truth may be somewhere between the popular and professional points of view.

As the incidence of failure of law and order machinery increases, there is a growing demand for pinpointing the responsibility on either side of the line. The democratic awareness of fundamental rights does not permit the administration of law to operate in an opaque house. Nor can the law and order administration allow the criminals to go scot-free under any circumstances. This poses many problems and one can see several issues emerging in the day-to-day experience of law and order machinery in the country. Some of them may be stated here.

First of all, the people, the political leaders and the administrators all unanimously agree that in a democratic system, human life is sacred.<sup>35</sup> And wherever its violation is involved, the situation warrants an inquest. The instant demand for judicial inquiry after every incident of firing represents this democratic upsurge. The responsibility of violating or maintaining law and order has to be pinpointed in precise terms, and the objective facts have to be made known to the public.

An important question here centres round the police-magistracy relationship as custodians of law and order. The existing system of dual responsibility, in which the civil magistrate decides about the gravity of the situation and the police authorities execute his orders, is far from satisfactory. Notwithstanding the theoretical merits of the arrangement, the facts establish estranged relationship of Collector and

<sup>34</sup> Commenting upon the firing in Jaipur on March 7, 1967, Justice Beri Commission wrote: "The exchange of stone pelting between the public and the police, accentuated by excessive teargassing and undue restrictions, frustrated the police parties in Johari Bazar and they resorted to firing in retaliation of stray stone pelting—their firing was reckless towards residential houses and even a temple." *Report of the Commission of Enquiry on Police Firing at Jaipur, op. cit., p. 910.*

<sup>35</sup> Arthur Koestler, in his book, *The Lotus Eater and Robot* (London, MacMillan, 1961, p. 280), raises an interesting discussion with regard to the Asian values and oriental attitudes towards life, the sick, the wounded and the dead. He finds them 'notoriously indifferent' because of caste, wealth and health, preordained by the 'Law of Karma'. The process of democracy should certainly change them now.



the Superintendent of Police. This uneasiness between Collector and Superintendent of Police is a reflection of shift in duties and responsibilities as government assumes new burdens and obligations. The reports of the judicial inquiries reveal that behind the facade of dual responsibility, accountability can very conveniently be evaded in the quibblings of legal procedures. The District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police have to go into consultation in many matters before taking action and "time seems to have come when one should consider whether such a system, especially in the cities, is really an anachronism. The long association of the District Magistrate with the Superintendent of Police, as a result of foreign rule, has not been productive of any good."<sup>36</sup> It is an important issue as the Constitution permits freedom to protest and assemble without arms, and this involves police intervention at some stage. The law and order administration has to revise and reform its present techniques and procedures of mob confrontation. It must also devise methods of locating responsibility and punishing the guilty, even at the risk of annoying the sincere authorities for order and tranquility.<sup>37</sup>

The *second* emerging issue in the complex law and order situation is the image of the Indian police and magistracy which leaves much to be desired in the interest of its efficient functioning.<sup>38</sup> During last two decades of Independence, little has been done to improve the Police-Public relations, and thereby the general image of law and order authorities. Even if it is contended that police as an instrument of power will always be disregarded by the people, it will be wrong to conclude that public relations have no role in this area. The issue is whether enough has been done to improve this police image.

<sup>36</sup> M.K. Sinha (Ex-Inspector General of Police, Bihar), "Police in India—The Future", *The Indian Police Journal* (Centenary Issue), *op. cit.*, p. 99.

<sup>37</sup> Justice Beri Commission has made the following recommendations in this regard :

- (1) "Immediate steps should be taken to provide the Police with safeguards against the menace of stone-pelting, and discipline should be instilled in the lower ranks not to indulge in stone-pelting."
- (2) "Serious thought should be given to circumscribe the use of teargas in thickly populated areas."
- (3) "Necessary steps should be taken to enforce the existing rules regarding the proper maintenance of the Police records."
- (4) "Serious thought should always be paid before clipping the civil liberties of the people. But legal restrictions once imposed should be enforced firmly so that the majesty of Law does not suffer."

*Report of the Commission of Enquiry on Police Firing at Jaipur, op. cit.*, p. 813.

<sup>38</sup> Addressing the biennial meeting of Inspectors General of Police from all the States on July 23, 1970, the Home Minister and the Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi remarked: "Police has to take measures that they are a friendly force, a friend of the people...complaints are made that Police did more of pushing and pulling and shouting, where crowds of poor people are involved."—News item, *Times of India*, New Delhi, July 24, 1970.

In the absence of any exclusive organizational sub-machinery and training facilities for the personnel, research and innovation in these areas have suffered. Modernizing process of Police and Magistracy as effective instruments of government cannot wait for long without inviting the collapse of the dichotomous system so laboriously built in India over a long period of time.<sup>39</sup> The challenge is to keep the structures and personnel commensurate with the democratic goals of a welfare state. The popular image of law and order authorities is too critical to accomplish this. But creative research in this direction has to be undertaken by the concerned departments. The Bayley study does not find the picture too gloomy as is evident from the following data of his sample.<sup>40</sup>

### Attitude of People Towards Police

Characterized Attitude	Area and Percentage of Residents			
	Bangalore	Tumkur	Kanpur Residents	Kanpur Migrants
Friendly	37.2	28.3	5.4	3.6
Cooperative	27.8	35.5	29.4	30.4
Indifferent	13.0	12.5	20.2	14.0
Suspicious	4.2	10.7	18.2	14.4
Uncooperative	2.8	0.3	0.4	8.8
Hostile	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.03

### Proportion of People who had had Unpleasant Contact with the Police

Sl. No.	Questionnaire Item	Yes %	Yes %	Yes %	Yes %
1.	Do you know people who gave money to the police?	7.0	7.5	27.0	14.7
2.	Have you ever seen the police strike some one?	22.2	3.2	43.4	22.2
3.	Do you know anybody personally who has been threatened by a policeman?	13.5	3.2	24.0	13.1

<sup>39</sup> See S.K. Ghosh, *Law-breakers and Keepers of Peace*, Calcutta, Eastern Law House, 1969, pp. 5-15.

<sup>40</sup> David H. Bayley, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-219.

Though, in the final analysis of his survey data, Mr. Bayley maintain that there is "a profound public distrust of the Police, especially with respect to their honesty and their impartiality"; yet he concludes that "for the majority of the people, the police are faceless and nameless creatures". To improve such an image of police is difficult, but it must not be given up. Efforts must be made to find a suitable process for the purpose through sustained research. Alternatively, the people also have to initiate themselves in playing a complimentary role to the police.

The *third* emerging issue pertains to the broad direction of the Indian political system. The phenomenal release of arrested forces in recent years violently threaten the goals, nature, pace and direction of the emerging polity. If six per cent rate of economic growth is regarded as an indispensable variable for the sustenance of a democratic system,<sup>41</sup> the deterioration in the law and order situation on the home front must be deemed to be a more potential threat to its survival.

Votaries of all ideologies have their stakes in the strength of this democratic system. It is also the concern of all elites operating in the Indian polity. As democracy diminishes the legitimacy of elites, it also "encourages the multiplicity of competing elites".<sup>42</sup> When law and order becomes the first casualty of violence, the democratic structure gets shaken and, consequently, the democratic procedures of negotiation, dialogue and consensus get undermined. Schumpeter<sup>43</sup> is right, when he states that "Directly accessible elites make ready targets for mass movements" and it cannot be helped if the "constitution and other institutional devices" are not there "to regulate access to elites and to reduce pressures on them".

The military elites in Indonesia, Pakistan and several other neighbouring countries of Afro-Asian world need a closer scrutiny. They are examples in point where the governments failed to govern. The deteriorating situation of law and order in these countries not only subverted democracy, but spelt ruin of even military bureaucracies in their search for stronger governments.

The politico-economic situation in the India of 1970's, makes the crisis of a democracy a subject of serious immediate concern. It will be

<sup>41</sup> Planning Commission, *Fourth Five Year Plan 1969-74*, Delhi, Manager of Publications (Government of India), 1970, p. 50.

<sup>42</sup> William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

<sup>43</sup> Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947, p. 288.

naive to argue that economic affluence will obliterate or minimize violence in a plural society like ours. The tensions of socialism and secular democracy are not only deep-rooted, but are also very much inbuilt in the politico-cultural fabric of our national life. These tensions will enhance violence in India in future, where mass politics has created an anti-democratic situation, by inviting "the whole population, most of which has historically been politically quiescent, to engage in politics".<sup>44</sup>

Hence, the law and order problem which directly concerns the masses as well as the volatile youth groups of Indian society, is a more precise index of the speed graph of democracy than the plan targets prescribed or achieved. This does not mean that development effort is secondary, but the review of the situation in the seventies does not justify lopsidedness or imbalance between political stability and economic growth. The national leadership earlier took democracy to the grassroots, and developmental gains to the millions, but the process seemed to stagnate now.

Thus, a serious student of Indian politics can discern two emerging trends *vis-a-vis* the law and order administration in the seventies. Firstly, as time passes, the gradual disappearance of stability factors and integrative forces of politics will bring out a tension situation in which violence and conflict, among various sections of society, will be more intense and acute.<sup>45</sup> Secondly, as developmental gains become more widespread and economic security is ensured to the hitherto backward classes and down-trodden sections of our plural society, the disruptive forces will inevitably assert themselves more violently as a part of the democratic stir. The law and order administration in India must equip itself with the requisite perspectives to face and counteract the impending challenges of the coming decades.

#### PERSPECTIVES FOR FUTURE

Notwithstanding all these challenges, the very functioning of the democratic system in India so far is a tacit proof of its survival potential against violence. The law and order administration of the coming decade must preserve this factor. A long-range policy of fighting, sabotage, disruption and violence is imperative. Every kind of violence

<sup>44</sup> See William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

<sup>45</sup> This is also the conclusion of Delhi State Survey by Prof. Eldersveld *et al*, *The Citizen and the Administration in a Developing Democracy* [Glenview (Illinois), Scott, Foresman, 1967] pp. 37-38. Mr. David H. Bayley (*op. cit.*, p. 238) generally agrees with Prof. Eldersveld but "with respect to the police" he states that "Urbanization will bring a high level of articulated hostility and criticism, but the improvement in living standards or social status will not do so" as hypothesized by Prof. Eldersveld.

needs a strategy to combat it. The community, the elite, the political parties and the administration have a collective responsibility in this.

A public dialogue on the issues involved in law and order administration has to be started and sustained. It must come to grips with the living realities of Indian public life. A fragmented approach towards isolated problems in a piecemeal manner merely passes the buck, and the total problem recoils in its entirety. Historically speaking, the Indian society with its plural character has been ridden with internecine fratricide, and the elites have either sided with the rulers or had played the role of a passive spectators of historic changes. This approach is no longer helpful, especially in the law and order administration.

The elites have a valuable role in this connection. They must generate a happy 'Gestalt' through dialogue. The elite has to take a lead through the various forums of mass media. The elite here is not necessarily a power or bureaucratic elite but a leading group of normative character. Public debates on national and local issues are established institutions in the West, and are a great force behind their democratic functioning. In India, where the Constitution only creates the mechanism, a democratic ethos has to be built quite laboriously by instituting public debates in the universities, in the Press, on the Radio and TV and through other common platforms so that effective solutions of urgent problems like social peace and internal stability may be worked out by a national consensus.<sup>46</sup> A conscious accumulation of such conventions can help in evolving a dynamic perspective. India of 1970s badly needs this perspective in the context of which a well-thought out and comprehensive policy of law and order administration can be collectively formulated and successfully executed.

Law and order in any society is after all not a fire-brigade affair. Nor can the ambulance-approach provide the answer where vandals injure life and damage property. A comprehensive vision is needed to take the right decisions. The real asset to law and order administration is always that small core of dedicated and competent leadership which alone can implement policies.

<sup>46</sup> In U.K., the policemen have gone to the extent of organizing Boys' Club. In order to enlist public cooperation in crime prevention, crime prevention exhibitions have been staged in almost all big cities of U.K. In India a crime prevention officer is needed in each force, who can visit colleges and schools and address boys on subjects where police expect cooperation from them. Some amount of publicity is also necessary through the press and radio talks to strengthen the bonds of the public relations with the police and to counteract malicious propaganda either by the public against the police or *vice-versa*. S.K. Ghosh, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

Short-range policies on the part of administration actually impair its strength. The law and order authorities should not forgo the uses of a dedicated and organized elite. Only an overall statesmanship can meet this challenge with maturity, efficiency and deep insight. In India, this has especially to be distinguished from a weak-kneed policy of appeasement. The law and order authorities of the coming decade should be firm without being vindictive.<sup>47</sup> They must not be motivated by petty considerations of one kind or the other.

The government of the day has to remove the growing impression that nothing works unless violence is resorted to. The past experience in the field of law and order administration in India is a sad commentary on this kind of experience, where even most reasonable demands have been conceded to only when some kind of a showdown has been attempted by the opposition. The Bayley data is fairly reliable in this context. Bayley writes:

“As a general rule, the public continues to believe that demonstrations are a useful way of compelling official attention. For example, when they were asked whether demonstrations were useful in getting the authorities to do the right thing or correct some wrong, approximately half of the urban samples said they were useful.”<sup>48</sup>

The callousness of the authorities in responding to the genuine grievances enables them to acquire a superior bargaining position. Lack of clear thinking, absence of definite policy in terms of priorities, and yielding to pressures, are the main causes of uneven action. A mass psychology which takes these limitations for granted, engenders scarce respect for law and indirectly provokes for its observance in breach. In a developing society, where pressures and lobbying are overwhelming, the normal process is reversed and order becomes the disorder.

Law and order are not static either. With the growing dynamism of social order and a consequent shift in the forces of social change, the government must accordingly change their policies and techniques in the area of public order. The resentment of the youth and its irrepressible protests can not be viewed in the same way as the dangerous action of communalist leaders or a ‘Bundh’ organized by a militant Sena in a city. A relativist approach and a pragmatic analysis are

<sup>47</sup> See Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, London, Oxford University Press, 1959. Also see “Specification of the Modernization of Ideals” in Gunnar Myrdal, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 57.

<sup>48</sup> David H. Bayley, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

indispensable in actual administration. An administrator, with a vision, is not to be solely distributed by violence *per se*, but has to consider the motives, the repercussions and the consequences of the incident in question. He must put adequate premium on healthy discontent or creative conflict which is a reasonable price to pay for a social change in a developing country. Certain kinds of legitimate protests have to be distinguished from the criminal acts of nihilism.<sup>49</sup>

Adult suffrage can unleash an urge among the younger sections of a society for rapid change. The recent developments in the area of lawlessness by youngsters in India, need to be examined in this perspective. A different kind of law and order approach is warranted on university campus. Again, precaution and prevention rather than confrontation and repression may be more effective. Academic autonomy cannot be stretched to perpetrate all irregularities. Yet, in a society where the image of police converts the presence of a policeman into provocation, it is to be seriously considered whether keeping the police alert at the gates of university or allowing it to enter inside the campus will serve the purpose. The challenge in this context is to distinguish between the trivial and the serious, and above all, to understand the objectives of and the techniques employed by the students. The decision-making in law and order administration has to keep all this in view.

Communal violence, unlike the youth violence, requires a different kind of approach. The administration has perhaps a secondary role, and cannot have a master cure for a malady which is mostly political. We have to realize that a mere demand for firm action against the guilty is only the administrative fringe of the complex problem. Imposing collective fines is a remedy suggested on a fundamentally erroneous notion that innocent millions can correct the mischievous few. Similarly, isolating a few dozen districts and administering warning to the authorities are naive exercises in window-dressing.<sup>50</sup>

Communal violence in India cannot be curbed by political 'Jehads', and banning communal parties is less workable. Definitions of communal parties and appointment of judicial tribunals to decide who is communal, begs the question. "The abolition of communal electorates has not removed communalism. It continues to be a political force and often erupts with violence as in the riots of Allahabad, Aligarh,

<sup>49</sup> Cf. William Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-238.

<sup>50</sup> After Communal riots at Bhiwandi and Jalgaon in Maharashtra in May 1970, the Union Home Ministry in its circular letter to the State Governments suggested some of these measures to curb communal tension and avoid recurrence of these riots.



Khulna, and Calcutta (more recently in Ahmedabad, Jalgaon, and Bhiwandi). It presents a perpetual threat to the country."<sup>51</sup> Even the attempt to have a secular society becomes a vulnerable position. The experience of last 20 years demonstrates that postures taken by political parties on communalism, whether pro or anti, result in fresh tensions and more serious showdowns. The planner of policy in the field of law and order must evolve a broad perspective and give priority to underplaying the rhetoric rather than indulging in political propaganda. The cessation of a power-political angle may be the pre-condition of this national perspective.

The role of administrative machinery in combating communal violence is quite indisputable till the country achieves the aforesaid stage of national maturity. To meet the crises, the administrators in the meanwhile have to rely more on intelligence and preventive action rather than prosecutions and mass reprisals later. In this connection, the following concrete suggestion by Proudfoot deserves closer examination. He says:

"Pragmatism indicates that we will have to live with communal disturbances as part of our national life for many years to come. It would, therefore, be realistic for the Centre to take cognizance of the fact and along with educational and cultural remedies set up a central organization to deal exclusively with disturbances of a communal nature. Such a set-up entitled, let us say, Internal Security Bureau (I.S.B.) possibly under the direction of a retired army officer with intelligence experience would be principally an advisory bureau, collating and screening all intelligence of a nature likely to cause communal unrest: Such intelligence will be sent to the bureau by special cells in each State. The bureau will keep the cabinet constantly apprised and provide an early warning system of trouble flashed to other States, so that precautionary measures can be taken locally."<sup>52</sup>

The administration must also act firmly and brook no political intervention during the course of trials.<sup>53</sup> The vigour with which the administration will resist political pressures in letting off the criminals scot-free by politicians will be an index of its seriousness to deal with communal crimes in future. In a nascent democracy, a firm attitude

<sup>51</sup> V.K. Sinha, "Secularism and Indian Democracy", in Aiyar and Srinivasan (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 82.

<sup>52</sup> C.L. Proudfoot, "The War Against Communalism", *Sunday Standard*, July 4, 1970.

<sup>53</sup> A.D. Gorwala (*The Role of the Administrator: Past, Present and Future*, Poona, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1952; p. 36), says, "So far as one can judge, this kind of interference has constituted in many parts of the country a real danger to honest administration".

of the officials in the conscientious discharge of their onerous duties can go a long way in educating the political leaders.

Of equal importance is the problem of long delayed reforms in police bureaucracy. The modernization of law and order machine with personnel of high morale and integrity, is to be given top priority if the challenge of 1970s is to be met with imagination and determination. The efforts made hitherto have remained either piecemeal or perfunctory. The static structures have failed to deliver the goods.<sup>54</sup> The last two decades have not only deferred these critical and overdue reforms, but have even failed to initiate a thought process or an intellectual dialogue to precede any concrete plan of action. Scholars in the field of public administration have unfortunately been neglecting research and accumulation of field studies in this area. Even in annual police conferences and specialized training centres, there is a tendency to keep the outsiders out and justify the *status quo* in the name of costly risks and difficult responsibilities of new era. Inside the administrative ranks, there prevails a rigid discipline of bureaucracy and the innovative juniors have scarce opportunity to process their creative ideas in a free manner. Consequently, the law and order authorities today stand caught in a situation, where they are losing more, and that too in an inglorious way.

#### MODERNIZATION OF POLICE BUREAUCRACY

To attempt a blue-print of modernization of police or reform in the law and order administration is neither easy nor feasible. The objective data is yet to be collected through surveys and inquiries. The potentialities and limitations of the existing system have to be examined and a consensus has to be evolved about the new goals and new roles prescribed or assigned to the law and order administration. Independence brought no change of any consequence to the structure of police administration. The three structural characteristics distinguishing the contemporary police system of control by State governments, horizontal stratification and functional specialization between armed and unarmed police had been developed before Independence. Independence only affected the manner in which the police were held accountable, and not the way they were organized to accomplish police purposes. It is only in this specific context that reform schemes of police organization, personnel and procedures should be examined. To initiate a discussion on this, here are some points for consideration.

<sup>54</sup> The Bayley survey of Bangalore and Kanpur confirms that "Suspicion of Police honesty is widely felt. In Bangalore 33.2 per cent of respondents, and in Kanpur 55.1 per cent of the residents and 40.5 per cent of rural migrants thought there was 'great deal of corruption in the police'. Fortysix per cent of residents in Bangalore thought that Police would have to be bribed before they would do their duty and help people." David H. Bayley, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-285.

Firstly, at every police headquarter, especially at the district level, there should be a high power staff agency to aid and advise the line officials. This agency may have several specialized research cells and small organizational units, assigned with the task of inviting Press representatives, university teachers and students, party leaders and elite groups of the area to have periodic discussions and open debates on the problems of law and order.<sup>55</sup> This machinery for coordination may process suggestions, and advise the line of action accordingly. In addition to this, the other function of this staff agency can be to establish a living contact with the various kinds of public and make constant and concerted efforts to improve the image of police through radio, television, printed literature and close personal contacts of an informal nature. The organization and functions of this staff unit may be left to be governed by the special conditions of the State and the district. What is being envisaged here is a sort of "Brain Trust"-cum-Public Relations Machinery" with exclusive functions and, of course, with powers and prestige attached to its personnel.

Secondly, with the growth of democracy, the basic notion of police needs timely revision. Unlike some of the developed democracies of the West, we are not yet in a position to municipalize police. And avenues have to be explored whether police or law and order mechanism can gradually be handed over to Panchayati Raj bodies. If this is not feasible, an alternate decentralized police organization should be attempted. There can be experiments with the ideas of University Police, Panchayat Police, Riot Police, Traffic Police, Ceremonial Police, etc., with their independent autonomous police boards on the pattern of American special districts.<sup>56</sup> The idea is that a single integrated monolithic police bureaucracy of a departmental organization is somewhat inconsistent with the democratic objective of law and order in a changing society. What is being suggested here is not merely a structural proliferation or expansion with a unity of command, but a decentralized organization pattern of police reform with the district or State police as central coordinating agency.

Thirdly, in the area of personnel, the service conditions warrant a parity with other cadres of similar competence. The police should attract the best. The ideal of police has to be even better than the magistracy. In the present situation, the calibre and the salary of the police officials<sup>57</sup> are not commensurate with their responsibilities and

<sup>55</sup> For details, see Gunnar Myrdal, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Ch. II, p. 51.

<sup>56</sup> For details, see Bruce Smith, *Police System in United States*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949.

<sup>57</sup> What T.C. Arthur, a British official said about the salary of an Indian Sub-Inspector of Police in 1920's more or less stands true in the 1970's. He said, "A Sub-Inspector's salary barely suffices to secure a good cook in Bombay or an indifferent chauffeur." T.C. Arthur, *Reminiscences of an Indian Official*, London, Marston & Co., 1894, p. 111.

powers. The post of a Sub-Inspector of Police can be cited as a classical example of this imbalance.<sup>58</sup> Naturally, this calls for job analysis, work-study,<sup>59</sup> and upgrading of certain junior posts in terms of pay scales and recruitment qualifications. Even a constable should be a matriculate and, when educationally more qualified people are given entry, it would be logical to create more promotional avenues either by adding rungs to the hierarchy or through structural proliferation.<sup>60</sup> The following suggestion of David H. Bayley deserves special mention:

"It is essential that the Police develop greater numbers of more highly trained constables, capable of assuming responsible initiative in day-to-day affairs. This development was the essence of Sir Robert Peel's reforms for the London Police force in the early 19th Century. In practical terms, for India, implementation of the proposal would entail the changes : firstly, development of a different philosophy with respect to the functions of a police constable and second, a shift in emphasis between armed and unarmed police. (It) would involve lesser expenditure on the armed police . . . saving might be applied to the recruitment and training of new constables and also emphasis would shift from containment to prevention. Constables would cease to be tied in bundles, but would have their own mandate to be exercised as individual officers."<sup>61</sup>

The concept of manpower planning and a positive placement policy linked with the transfer system, has to be evolved in consultation with experts in the field. The exclusive emphasis on discipline can very conveniently be replaced by morale and motivational approaches. And attractive scheme of better incentives may be worked out in terms of appreciation, commendation, prizes, placement, transfers and promotions. Here, enough can be learnt from the practices obtained in the Defence Services of India. There may be a need to punish the corrupt;

<sup>58</sup> *Report of the Uttar Pradesh Police Commission, op. cit.*, p. 69.

<sup>59</sup> Mashwood study in West Bengal showed that Sub-Inspectors and Assistant Sub-Inspectors worked more than 10 hours a day and frequently as many as 16 hours. Constables, however, worked about 18 hours a day. Also see M.M. Singh, "Minimum Wage for a Policeman", *Transactions*, October 1962, p. 17; and *Report of the Bihar Police Commission, op. cit.*, p. 216.

<sup>60</sup> "It is quite often said and sometimes '*ad nauseam*' that the Indian police constable does not compare favourably with the London 'Bobby'. Those who draw this comparison often forget that the pay drawn by a police constable in London is the same that an officer of the I.P.S. draws; his general bearing, education, sense of humour and sense of values, not to say his sense of duty are naturally higher than those of his counterpart in India. A great deal of attention is to be paid to make (this) constable a bigger man by training and more so by raising his pay and status in order to draw the same type as is drawn to the London Constabulary." M.K. Sinha, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105.

<sup>61</sup> David H. Bayley, *op. cit.*, p. 420. Also see *Report of the Bengal Police Commission, op. cit.*, p. 132 n.

but there is a greater need to reward, encourage and motivate the honest and meritorious. This is all the more important because attainment of high morale in police organization presents difficulties by reason of its very nature. As is observed in a study, "Periods of loneliness, monotony of duties, evil consequences of irregular and often insufficient meals, all cast undesirable influence on the Policeman when he approaches his day-to-day task".<sup>62</sup>

A separate unit of personnel research can take care of these ideas and weave them into a concrete policy. Training effort in the field of law and order administration is emphasized every day, but much of this is either stereotype or wasteful in its failure to revise attitudinal value scales of the personnel.<sup>63</sup> The emphasis on physical fitness may be balanced with mental and psychological fitness of the officials. From top to bottom, the officials manning these bureaucracies need constant exposure to new ideas. Only a well-designed training programme in 'human relations' and 'community relations' on a continuous basis, focussing on the suitability and desirability of that skill can go a long way to initiate this desired change in the proper direction. To maintain high morale, the government as well as the community must make conscious efforts to accord social recognition to the police service. Some kind of representative associations to attend to the removable of grievances of the junior staff may be allowed to function within the legal framework of the State.

*Fourthly*, the modernization of law and order administration, besides being a specific process, has to be a total reform, including the procedures of detection, confrontation and prosecution.<sup>64</sup> It is always difficult for legal codes to provide a lee-way for social change. In a developing society, like ours, to meet the kinds of violence and lawlessness, we require a more comprehensive and imaginative legislation to modernize the statute books which have become really obsolete. The 1970's are the time when the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) and Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. P.C.) need meaningful amendment, if not thorough revision by an expert body of jurists and sociologists of the country. A high-power commission may be appointed by the Union

<sup>62</sup> S.K. Ghosh, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>63</sup> See *Report of West Bengal Police Commission, op. cit.*, Appendix XXVII, pp. 120-21 and "Training of Constables in Modern Set-up", pp. 56-57.

<sup>64</sup> It is being alleged that Head Constables and even constables often make investigations. See *Report of Bihar Police Commission, op. cit.*, pp. 103 ff., and Government of India, *Law Commission of India, 14th Report, 1959* (Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1960), Vol. II, pp. 735-744. This practice was condemned by the Police Commission, 1902-3 as follows: "The worst offences have arisen from permitting constables and head constables to conduct investigations of offences. No abuse calls more urgently for reform." p. 36.

Home Ministry to probe into this question of penal reforms and suggest a framework of infra-legal structure to remove the procedural bottlenecks which obstruct the course of law in meeting the ends of justice. It might be true that in certain areas, police and magistracy enjoy sweeping powers of discretion and arbitrary action. But there are areas, new as well as old, where they are yet to be equipped effectively and adequately to counteract grave situations of social crime.

The penal reform has to be probed in terms of intelligence, report system, initial action, detection methods, prosecution processes, court system, legal proceedings, witness roles and appeal facilities, etc.<sup>65</sup> The State governments which have law and order as a subject as defined in the State List of the Indian Constitution must invite experts and professionals to prepare blue-prints of basic and auxiliary reforms, and thereby strengthen their law and order machinery to confront the new kinds of challenges with efficiency. One wonders whether the officials in the police department or the members of the bar and bench in India are capable enough to tackle communal and Naxalite culprits legally with the existing procedures of Evidence Act, Law of Jurisprudence, Equity, and the conventional practice of 'Benefit of Doubt'. There is an urgent need to revise, amend and improve the legal systems of criminal prosecution in the emerging context of the new variety of social crimes that are occurring.

*Lastly*, modernization of police and judiciary is not only a matter of organizational or procedural nature. They involve a basic change in the working of these institutions which are often attended by the evils of corruption and political interference. The people, in general, must also supplement these efforts by maintaining a corrective attitude towards the police. At the structural level, the integrity and independence of law and order authorities, have to be protected by creating corporate structures and independent bureaus and commissions.

The working of the institution of Police Commissioners in capital towns, like Calcutta and Bombay, has been studied and recently recommended by the Administrative Reforms Commission (A.R.C.) for big towns.<sup>66</sup> Its adoption and gradual extension in smaller towns may ensure

<sup>65</sup> For details, see *Report of the Law Commission*, Vol. II, pp. 777-780, "Police Reforms", pp. 29-31 and relevant parts of Reports of U.P., Bihar and Maharashtra Police Commissions.

<sup>66</sup> The ARC Study Team on Police Administration has observed: "A heterogeneous population, high incidence of crime, frequency of breakdown of law and order and the rapidity with which the situation deteriorates in the cities necessitate a well-organized and closely knit police force capable of going into action at short notice. This is only possible in a metropolitan type of Police system in which the responsibility is fixed solely on the Commissioner of Police". Quoted from a news item in *The Times of India*, New Delhi, July 9, 1970.

better organizational independence of administration than what is obtaining today. The office of the Superintendent of Police at the district level has to be further strengthened in terms of responsibility and accountability, and the Collector may be absolved of the overall responsibility of law and order in the district. There is nothing new about this suggestion. J. C. Curry anticipated it as early as 1932, when he wrote, "These two officers constitute an interesting duumvirate. The relationship between these two officers is, in fact, typical of English arrangements, with their lack of logical finish. When the majority of district magistrates and district superintendents are Indians, they may well find it necessary to evolve new standards of relationship."<sup>67</sup>

The upgrading of the Superintendent of Police and the abolition of dyarchy must naturally follow a vigorous and total separation of Judiciary from the executive at the lowest rung of the hierarchy. If the District and Sessions Judge can relieve the District Magistrate of his outdated responsibility of being the head of the magistracy in the district, the district Superintendent of Police can also equally well relieve him (Collector) of his outdated responsibility of generally directing and controlling the police, so that he (Collector), in turn, may be enabled to concentrate more on land revenue and Panchayati Raj.<sup>68</sup> Attracting better people, trusting them with adequate powers and ultimate responsibility and keeping judiciary separate and independent can inspire confidence, generate efficient action and safeguard efficiency and integrity of administration.

#### CONCLUSION

The law and order situation in India in the 1970's is a challenge not only to law and order administration itself, but to the entire political system, which the country has adopted in the Constitution. A well-administered polity has to seek the preservation of peace and stability as its primary function, especially in a developing society, where the compulsions of developmental politics threaten to weaken it. The last two decades of democratic functioning in India have generated some of these compulsions. Neither alarm nor complacency on the part of the custodians of law and order can provide a balanced perspective and far-sighted policy. If the growing incidence of violence, riots, 'bundhs' and 'gheraos' are an index of deterioration in the law and order situation in the seventies, they are also a sad commentary on the outmoded structures of law and order bureaucracy, and their unscientific methods

<sup>67</sup> J.C. Curry, *op. cit.*, p. 172. See also Philip Woodruff, *The Men who Ruled India: The Guardians*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1954, Vol. II, p. 53.

<sup>68</sup> G.C. Singhvi, *op. cit.*, p. 161. Also see M.K. Sinha, *op. cit.*, 97-105.



of crime detection and confrontation. The extension of the democratic processes, like adult suffrage and political awareness along with the growing economic hiatus and an affluent middle class, have caused these tensions.

In the midst of this growing anarchy and emerging conflicts, the genuine challenge to the law and order administration is to operate its own course firmly and seriously within the given democratic framework. And this framework ensures fundamental rights of life, property and religion. It guarantees to all citizens, especially to the minorities, what the Constitution professes and stands for. It has to allow the political parties to function openly in a manner consistent with their political role in a parliamentary system. This means legitimizing constitutional protests without allowing the political system to become outworn. It has to learn to respect life and accept that prevention, not *post mortem*, as the cure for non-recurrence of violent disorders. The ruling party as well as the opposition parties have to realise this and accord this role to the law and order administrators even at the cost of their short-range political interests.

The emerging issues in the area pose challenges to streamlining, strengthening, and modernizing the existing law and order machinery. They demand an introspection and farsight on the part of all officials and non-officials committed to the task of preservation of law and order. The leadership has to exhibit statesmanship and vision. The opposition has to be respected and its role as effective mechanism for change needs to be appreciated. The purely political approach is ill-suited to meet communalism. The police authorities have to demonstrate greater and better awareness of the socio-political changes that have overtaken the country during the last two decades. The organizational hierarchies have to be made more staff-oriented and research-minded.

So is the need for long-range and sweeping personnel reforms leading to all kinds of procedural innovations and modernizing measures. Contemporary police philosophy in India is an ironic combination of British liberal tradition and British colonial practice. It involves subordination to the rule of law and popular accountability on the one hand, and passive relationship between police and public, except in times of emergency, both personal and public on the other. The patch-work expedients to reconcile the situations have kept the system more or less the same since Independence. What should really matter in the context of India in the seventies is the nucleus of change. All such fundamental changes in a democratic society are likely to endure

only when they are preceded by an open and continuous public debate or dialogue initiated by the elite and shared by the masses. Thus, the insulated administration of law and order in India eminently warrants a wholesale inquiry.

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## INSTITUTE NEWS

### In Memoriam

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#### Dr. Jitendra Singh

The Institute's Staff learnt with deep sorrow about the sudden and untimely demise, on September 24, of *Dr. Jitendra Singh*, Director of Research, Administrative Staff College, Hyderabad.

Dr. Singh served IIPA from 1959-65 as a Senior Member of its faculty. The Institute will remember him most for his personal contribution to the Institute's Case Study programme, of which he was the Secretary.

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#### Prof. B. S. Narula

With profound grief, the Institute records the death of one of its most earnest and zealous faculty members — Prof. B. S. Narula. He died on December 11, 1971, at Colombo where he was on a short-term assignment as ECAFE Consultant. He was 52.

Prof. Narula joined IIPA in 1954 as Assistant to Editor-cum-Secretary to Director and at the time of his death he was working as Professor of Public Administration in the Institute.

The Indian Journal of Public Administration (IJPA)—including PERSPECTIVES—owes much to Prof. Narula. Prof. Narula was associated with IJPA since its initial planning. He made valuable contribution in building IJPA into an international forum for exchange of ideas and discussion of various aspects of public administration. He worked as Assistant Editor of the Journal till 30 June 1970, excepting about 20

months in 1962-64 and 23 months in 1966-68.

Of particular mention is Prof. Narula's effort in helping start IIPA's Case Study Programme. He nursed it for nearly nine years. Equally noteworthy are his services to the Institute in the field of research. For a period, he served as Research Consultant to the Punjab Administrative Reforms Commission where he carried out several studies. Again, as Special Assistant (Technical) to the Chairman of the Administrative Reforms Commission, Government of India (over 3 years), he was responsible for the preparation of the initial drafts of some of the reports of the Commission. His published work includes several articles, book reviews, features, and a case study.

Affectionate and amiable, Prof. Narula was totally devoted to the Institute from the very day of his appointment. He never limited

himself to the official working hours. Neither personal preoccupations nor the weight of passing years ever stood in the way of his commitment to work. An indefatigable researcher, he died at his post.

Since August, 1969, when he was appointed Professor, Prof. Narula had been engaged in, among other things, directing training courses under the Executive Development

Programme of the Institute.

The members of the IIPA staff met on the morning of December 13, 1971 and adopted a resolution which expressed their profound sense of loss and sympathy to Prof. Narula's family.

Shri Narula cultivated a large number of friends in the IJPA fraternity who deeply mourn his sad and sudden demise.

During the quarter (July to September), the Institute conducted the following courses, for senior and middle-level officers of Central and State governments, Union Territory administrations, municipal committees and corporations, public sector undertakings, etc:

(1) Fifth Orientation Course on Project Formulation, July 1-7 (New Delhi);

(2) Eleventh Training Course in Municipal Administration, July 12-August 21 (New Delhi);

(Among the 20 participants to this Course were four Government Offices from Thailand and one from Indonesia.)

(3) Fifth Course on Materials Planning, July 26-31 (New Delhi);

(4) Fourth Course on Administrative Leadership and Behaviour, August 4-21 (New Delhi);

(During the Course, three syndicates were set up and the participants were allowed to choose, in the light of their special interest, from a given list of subjects, a subject for discussion. *Shri Mohan Dharia*, Union Minister of

State for Planning, led discussion in one of the syndicates.)

(5) Third Course on Training of Trainers, August 16-21 (New Delhi);

(The Course was inaugurated by *Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha*, Minister in the Union Ministry of Home Affairs.)

(6) Second Course on Introduction to Computers, August 30-September 4 (New Delhi); (A nominee of the Government of Philippines was among those who attended the Course.)

(7) Course on Materials Management through Systems, September 5-11 (Mussoorie);

(8) Special Course on Performance Budgeting for U.P. Government Departments, September 15-25 (Lucknow);

(9) First Course on Municipal Personnel Administration, September 13-25 (New Delhi); and

(10) Course on Modern Devices in Records Management, September 20-25 (New Delhi).

The Institute also conducted a Seminar (*Third*) on *Family Planning—Policy and Administration* (August 16-17, New Delhi) in which

experts from all over the country participated to discuss need for policy resolution, approach and methods, personnel and procedures, role of voluntary organizations, legislation, etc. The Working Paper for the Seminar was prepared by *Prof. V. Jagannadham* of IIPA, the Director of the Seminar.

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The following VIPs paid a visit to the headquarter of the Institute during the quarter:

- (1) A group of U.N. Fellows from Rumania — *Dr. S. Ghimpu*, *Dr. W. Kraft*, and *Dr. M. Stoica*—who were in India to familiarise themselves with the working of training institutions (July 3);
- (2) *Dr. John Marsh*, CBE, Director General of British Institute of Management, U.K. (July 5);
- (3) A group consisting of six doctoral and post-graduate students led by *Dr. R. C. Shah* of the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (August);
- (4) *Mr U. Thaung*, Consultant in Public Administration, ECAFE, Bangkok (August); and
- (5) *Mr. B.M. Villaneuva*, Assistant Chief, Local Government Section, U.N. Division of Public Administration, New York (August).

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*Prof. G. Mukharji*, Director of the Institute, participated in the Congress of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) held in Toronto (Canada) from July 18-23. *Prof. Mukharji* visited Civil Service Staff College and Royal Institute of

Public Administration in U.K. on his way back.

*Prof. Mukharji* took part in the XV Congress of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS) from September 6-11 in Rome. *Prof. M. J. K. Thavaraj* of IIPA, then on tour of East European countries, also attended the Congress. *Dr. J. N. Khosla*, former Director, acted as one of the General Rapporteurs for the Congress.

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The Institute brought out the following publications during the quarter:

- (1) *Citizen and the Municipal Bureaucracy* by *Prof. V. Jagannadham* and *N. S. Bakshi* (both of IIPA); Rs. 10-00, pp. 124; and
- (2) *Deputy Commissioner in Punjab* by *Dr. Sudesh Kumar Sharma*, Rs. 30-00, pp. 340.

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The Tamil Nadu Regional Branch conducted a Seminar on "Reform of Parliament and State Legislatures" on 10-11 July. *Shri K. Subba Rao*, former Chief Justice of India, who presided over the seminar, was also a principal speaker; the inaugural speech was made by *Shri K. K. Shah*, Governor of Tamil Nadu. Earlier, the Branch—in association with Rotary Club of Madras, Employers' Federation of Southern India, Madras Management Association, Madras Productivity Council, and the Federation of Association of Small Industries in India (Southern Region)—had organised, on June 26, a symposium on "Unemployment". The Symposium was inaugurated by *Shri K. K. Shah*, and the keynote address was delivered by *Shri R. A. Gopalaswami*, ICS (retd.).

In addition, the following lectures/discussions were organized by the Branches:

<i>Branch and date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Speaker</i>
<i>Poona Local Branch</i>		
July 10	"Abolition of Octroi" (discussion)	(Dr. B. P. Apte, Vice-Chancellor of Poona University and Chairman of the Branch, presided.)
Sept. 24	"Maintenance of Law and Order"	Shri S. P. Marathe, ICS (retd.). (Dr. N. R. Inamdar presided.)
Sept. 25	"Collegiate Administra- tion"	Principal D. A. Dabholkar. (Principal B. S. Bhanage, presided.)
Sept. 27	"Law and Order : Citizen's Point of View"	Shri C. N. Bhalerao, Advoca- cate. (Dr. B. P. Apte presided.)
Sept. 28	"Administration During Calamities like Flood, Fire, Famine"	Shri B. K. Chowgule, IAS. (Prof. E. R. Dhongade presided.)
<i>Tamil Nadu Regional Branch</i>		
Madras Aug. 20	"Two Decades in the Indian Foreign Service"	Shri K. V. Padmanabhan, former Ambassador of India to Iran.
Madras Sept. 24	"Public Servants and the Judicial Remedy"	Shri P. Ramakrishnan, ICS (retd.).

## RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

A Policy Planning Committee has been appointed in the Ministry of External Affairs to formulate foreign policy objectives and to evolve recommendations for action on them. The Committee will, among other things, set guidelines for external information and publicity to ensure that it subserves foreign policy objectives. Research conducted within the Ministry and the situation reports collected by it through its missions will also come under the Committee's direct supervision.

The Committee will consist of as its permanent members six Secretaries to the Government. They are: the Cabinet Secretary, the Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Foreign, Defence, and Home Secretaries, and the Secretary heading the Department of Economic Affairs. It will call in others for consultations as and when necessary.

The Government of India decided (on August 27) to establish a National Committee on Science and Technology to succeed the Committee on Science and Technology (COST). This follows one of the recommendations made by the Third Conference on Science and Technology, held last November.

The National Committee will have an eminent scientist as its full-time chairman. It will identify priorities in the field of research and development and assist the Planning Commission in drawing

up a science and technology plan to match the social and economic plan. It is also expected to act as a coordinator and principal spokesman for all the scientific and technological agencies in the country.

A Working Group appointed by the Government of India has made a number of suggestions to improve the administrative and engineering set-up of hospitals under the Ministry of Health. The Group has concluded that there should be a Control Board, headed by the Union Health Secretary to look after the hospitals. The Board will have a Chief Medical Superintendent with financial and administrative powers corresponding to those of a Head of Department. He will be assisted by a whole-time qualified Administrator and a Sanitary Superintendent.

The report also points to the need for (i) revision of pay and status of the hospital engineers, (ii) a simple 3-tier management system consisting of engineers, technologists and craftsmen, (iii) in-service training and opportunities for self-improvement to technical and non-technical personnel, (iv) Central Pool for ambulances on the lines of the fire-fighting organization in a city, and (v) night shelter and catering arrangements for relatives of patients.

The Cabinet Secretariat recently circulated the Hindi equivalents in Roman script of the designations



of the members of the Council of Ministers and of the nomenclatures of the Union Ministries and Departments for official usage. In introducing the Hindi terms, however, English words like 'rail', 'banking', 'petroleum' and 'electronics', have been retained.

As per the new titles, the Prime Minister will be addressed as 'Pradhan Mantri', and a Union Cabinet Minister as 'Mantri'. The Ministers of State will be known as 'Rajya Mantri', and Deputy Ministers 'Up Mantri'. For example, a Minister of State in a Ministry like Steel and Mines will be called 'Ispat aur Khan Mantralaya men Rajya Mantri'. The designation of a Deputy Minister will read as 'Mantralaya Men Up Mantri'.

Hindi equivalents of the Ministries, Departments, Secretariats and Offices ('Mantralaya', 'Vibhag', 'Sachivalaya Tatha Karyalaya'), as notified by the Cabinet Secretariat ('Mantrimandal Sachivalaya') are as follows: Ministry of Agriculture ('Krishi Mantralaya') : Department of Agriculture ('Krishi Vibhag'), Department of Food ('Khadya Vibhag'), Department of Community Development ('Samudayik Vikas Vibhag'), and Department of Cooperation ('Sahkarita Vibhag'); (2) Ministry of Communications ('Sanchar Mantralaya'); (3) Ministry of Defence ('Raksha Mantralaya'): with a Department of Defence Production ('Raksha Utpadan Vibhag') and a Department of Defence Supplies ('Raksha Poorti Vibhag'); (4) Ministry of Education and Social Welfare ('Shiksha Aur Samaj Kalyan Mantralaya'): (i) Department of Education ('Shiksha Vibhag') and (ii) Department of Social Welfare ('Samaj Kalyan Vibhag'); (5) Ministry of External Affairs

('Videsh Mantralaya'); (6) Ministry of Finance ('Vitta Mantralaya'): Department of Banking ('Banking Vibhag'), Department of Economic Affairs ('Arthik Karya Vibhag') Department of Expenditure ('Vyaya Vibhag') and Department of Revenue and Insurance ('Rajaswa Aur Bima Vibhag'); (7) Ministry of Foreign Trade ('Videsh Vyapar Mantralaya'); (8) Ministry of Health and Family Planning ('Swasthya Aur Parivar Niyojan Mantralaya'): Department of Health ('Swasthya Vibhag'), and Department of Family Planning ('Parivar Niyojan Vibhag'); (9) Ministry of Home Affairs ('Grih Mantralaya'): with a Department of Administrative Reforms ('Prashasanik Sudhar Vibhag'); (10) Ministry of Industrial Development ('Audyogik Vikas Mantralaya'), (i) Department of Industrial Development ('Audyogik Vikas Vibhag'), and (ii) Department of Internal Trade ('Antrik Vyapar Vibhag'); (11) Ministry of Information and Broadcasting ('Soochana Aur Prasaran Mantralaya'); (12) Ministry of Irrigation and Power ('Sinchai Aur Vidyut Mantralaya'); (13) Ministry of Labour and Rehabilitation ('Shram Aur Punarvas Mantralaya'), (i) Department of Labour and Employment ('Shram Aur Rozgar Vibhag'), and (ii) Department of Rehabilitation ('Punarvas Vibhag'); (14) Ministry of Law and Justice ('Vidhi Aur Nyaya Mantralaya'), (i) Department of Legal Affairs ('Vidhi Karya Vibhag'), (ii) Legislative Department ('Vidhaye Vibhag'), and Department of Justice ('Nyaya Vibhag'); (15) Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals ('Petroleum Aur Rasayan Mantralaya'), (i) Department of Petroleum ('Petroleum Vibhag'); and (ii) Department of Chemicals Rasayan Vibhag'; (16) Ministry of Planning ('Yojana Mantralaya'); (17) Ministry of Railways

(‘Rail Mantralaya’) (Railway Board); (18) Ministry of Shipping and Transport (‘Nauwahan Aur Pariwahan Mantralaya’); (19) Ministry of Steel and Mines (‘Ispat Aur Khan Mantralaya’), (i) Department of Steel (‘Ispat Vibhag’), and (ii) Department of Mines (‘Khan Vibhag’); (20) Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation (‘Paryatan Aur Nagar Vimanan Mantralaya’); (21) Ministry of Works and Housing (‘Nirman Aur Awas Mantralaya’); (22) Department of Atomic Energy (‘Parmanu Oorja Vibhag’); (23) Department of Company Affairs (‘Kampani Karya Vibhag’); (24) Department of Culture (‘Sanskriti Vibhag’); (25) Department of Electronics (‘Electronics Vibhag’); (26) Department of Parliamentary Affairs (‘Sansadiya Karya Vibhag’); (27) Department of Science and Technology (‘Vigyan Aur Prodyogiki Vibhag’); (28) Department of Supply (‘Poorti Vibhag’); (29) Cabinet Secretariat (‘Mantrimandal Sachivalaya’), (i) Department of Cabinet Affairs (‘Mantrimandal Karya Vibhag’), (ii) Department of Personnel (‘Karmik Vibhag’); and (iii) Department of Statistics (‘Sankhiki Vibhag’); (30) President’s Secretariat (‘Rashtrapati Sachivalaya’); (31) Prime Minister’s Secretariat (‘Pradhan Mantri Sachivalaya’); and (32) Planning Commission (‘Yojana Ayog’).

In its Third Report relating to Exploratory Tubewells Organization, the Public Accounts Committee (Fifth Lok Sabha) has observed that an important deficiency in the Organization is the lack of adequately trained personnel. Better men left the organization because there was uncertainty about its permanent setup. The Committee has expressed surprise that this permanent organization was run mostly with retired or inexperienced personnel and that the organization was without a

Chief Engineer from September 1968. It has urged Government to take a firm decision about the role, status and functioning of the organization.

The Estimates Committee of Fifth Lok Sabha, in its *First Report on the Ministry of Shipping & Transport — Visakhapatnam Port*, has pointed out that the authorities have not seriously considered the urgency of the development of the Port and have consequently neglected advance planning in this regard. After emphasizing that apart from the full utilization of funds provided for the projects, it is still more important to achieve the physical targets laid down for them, the Committee recommends that the scheduled dates of completion of the projects should be fixed on a realistic basis and advance planning should be done and detailed blueprints prepared. The Committee also observed that sufficient care was not exercised by those entrusted with the execution of the scheme in question. It has, therefore, asked for a thorough investigation of the matter and action against those who were responsible for the lapse.

Amongst the suggested reforms, the Committee has suggested a review of delegation of powers and functions to the Port Trust authorities in the matter of day-to-day administration so as to enable them to take quick and on-the-spot decisions.

The Committee has also noted with concern the observation of the Study Team of the International Association of Ports and Harbours that there is lack of understanding and coordination among the various Port officials.

Lok Sabha approved a Bill on July 31 for creation of an autonomous body to be known as “International Airport Authority of India”, to manage the airports from where international air transport services operate.

The proposed Authority will manage the international airports at Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta and Madras initially and later, if approved by Government, any other airport from where international services may be operated. It will provide services and facilities at those airports, necessary for the efficient operation of air transport services, which are now being provided by the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). It will also be responsible for the formulation and implementation of the development programmes at these airports.

The Authority will consist of a Chairman who will be a whole-time Member. The Director General of Civil Aviation will be an *ex officio* member in addition. The Authority will have not less than six and not more than thirteen members, to be appointed by the Central Government. The tenure of every member will be three years.

The air navigation services, such as air traffic control and aeronautical communication, which are of a highly technical nature, will, however, continue to be provided by the DGCA. So also the meteorological services will continue to be provided by the Meteorological Department.

As recommended in *ARC Report on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures*, a policy planning division has been set up in the Department of Personnel in the Cabinet Secretariat. Apart from processing the report of the ARC on Personnel Administration, the Unit will deal with, among others: (i) proposals received from the Ministries/Departments and other Organizations regarding personnel matters involving major policy matters; (ii) research in personnel problems of immediate and long-term importance; and (iii) objective review and evaluation of existing personnel policy in different

areas, e.g., recruitment training, career development, morale, etc., and suggest improvement, wherever necessary.

The Unit has already initiated preliminary studies with regard to performance appraisal, incentives, moral and recruitment methods. It is also collecting information from the State Governments, the Universities, leading public and private corporations and institutions in the field of personnel management concerning the practices followed by them and the research undertaken in the field of personnel administration.

The Department of Administrative Reforms in the Ministry of Home Affairs is currently engaged in two studies investigating; (i) delegation of powers to the functionaries at different levels, in the field of personnel administration: and (ii) difficulties experienced in the exercise of delegated financial and administrative powers in selected ministries and departments.

Another study of the department pertains to reviewing of procedures relating to framing of the recruitment rules.

As part of O & M services, the Department is also engaged in designing a suitable system for collection of data, storage of information, maintenance of records, etc., appropriate to the needs of a number of ministries and departments.

The Government of India gave effect, during the year 1970-71, to some of the recommendations made by the Administrative Reforms Commission in its report on Public Sector Undertakings. The important ones are: (i) definition of the extent of control of the government for ensuring greater operational autonomy to the public enterprises; (ii) appointment of whole-time functional directors and imposition of ban on

the appointment of government officers as part-time chairmen; (iii) introduction of measures for development of 'management' of the enterprises; (iv) enlargement of the functions of the Bureau of Public Enterprises, particularly in the spheres of pricing policy, planning and scheduling of projects, etc; and (v) framing of guidelines for adoption of the network technique, delegation of powers, etc.

The Government of India, in July 1971 appointed a High-Power Committee to study certain features of the structure, organization, financing and functioning of the Oil & Natural Gas Commission, and make recommendations for changes and improvements which will strengthen and enable the Commission to achieve the objective of rapid expansion of its programme of survey, exploration and production of gas and oil, both on-shore and off-shore. To be headed by *Shri K. D. Malviya*, M.P., the five-member Committee is to submit its report in a period of three months.

The Lt. Governor of *Delhi*, through a Notification issued on August 2, has created a Lower Judicial Service for the Union Territory. The total strength of the cadre is 112. Initially, 61 officers have been appointed on the basis of the recommendations of a five-man Committee, comprising three High Court Judges, the Chief Secretary of Delhi Administration, *Shri T. N. Chaturvedi*, and the Judicial Secretary, *Shri Desh Deepak*. Recruitment to the cadre in future will be through competitive examination every year.

A report by the *Shanti Prasad Commission*, set up by the Government of *Assam* in 1969, points out the need for Metropolitan Police System for Greater Gauhati area in order to create a compact and specialized police organization. It has also suggested that the responsibility for

maintenance of law and order and control of crime be vested in one single authority, namely, the Commissioner of Police, to whom are delegated the necessary executive, regulatory and restrictive powers.

The Government of *Gujarat* has asked the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, to conduct a study of its Industries and Agriculture Departments with a view to checking delay and ensuring co-ordination and timely assistance to prospective entrepreneurs in the two crucial sectors of development. Also covered by the project would be the concerned Secretariat Departments, viz., the Industries, Mines and Power Department, and the Agriculture, Forests and Cooperation Departments.

The Parliament's Consultative Committee for *Gujarat* has been constituted with 51 members—34 from the Lok Sabha and 17 from the Rajya Sabha.

In order to bring more efficiency in educational administration, the Government of *Haryana* has decided to decentralize the district educational administration and to re-organize the offices of District Educational Officers in the State. Twenty seven new offices at the Sub Division level, headed by Deputy District Education Officers (Class II), who will be designated as Sub Divisional Education Officers, have been created. Besides this, 137 more posts of different categories have been created.

This programme will involve an expenditure of Rs. 15 lakhs during the Fourth Plan period.

According to a directive recently issued, letters from Members of Parliament will now receive prompt attention of all Departments of the Government of *Madhya Pradesh*. The Departments will also keep the MPs posted with up-to-date

information in regard to Governmental policies and activities.

With a view to assessing the ground water and mineral resources in the State, the Government of *Maharashtra* has decided to set up a Ground Water Surveys and Development Agency and three Mineral Survey Units.

The Government of *Maharashtra* has reorganized its Directorate of Fisheries.

The Government of *Rajasthan* has decided to revive the post of the Director of Public Grievances at the State level. The post was abolished about five years ago.

The Government of *Rajasthan* has set up an organization called the 'Vidhi Rachna Sangathan' for drawing up, editing and publishing authoritative Hindi text of Rajasthan Laws already made and revising some of the existing Hindi translations in accordance with the latest approved terminology. The 'Sangathan' will also initiate original legal drafting in Hindi and take effective steps to popularize new legal terminology to enable the Rajasthan law Courts, lawyers, litigants, law enforcement officers, Government and the people to transact legal business in Hindi.

The Sangathan is composed of six 'Prakoshthas' (Cells) each of which consists of four 'Ghataks' (Component-Units). The work of each Ghatak will be handled by a 'Vidhi Rachnakar' (Legal Draftsman). A 'Vidhi Rachna Adhikari' (Assistant Secretary) will be incharge of each of the Prakoshthas at the operative as well as executive levels. He will be assisted by a 'Varishtha Vidhi Rachnakar.'

Three Presidential Acts were enacted on August 30 in *West Bengal* (presently under President's Rule).

While one of these concerned the management control over the Calcutta Tramways, the other two provided for: (i) 60 days notice prior to closure of any industrial unit, and (ii) Payment of compulsory gratuity to industrial labour and shop assistants.

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The Consultative Committee of Parliament for the Ministry of Health and Family Planning, which met in August, emphasized the need to give top priority to the provision of clean drinking water in the rural areas. In the meeting, it was pointed out that the States of Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat had taken steps to complete their drinking water schemes before the end of the current Plan.

The Public Provident Fund Scheme—started two years ago as a separate scheme, catering mostly to self-employed persons—would henceforth work as a scrip under the Small Savings Scheme, as per the decision taken by the Government of India recently.

As unanimously agreed to by the State Health Secretaries, who met in New Delhi on August 18 under the chairmanship of Union Health Secretary, *Shri K. K. Das*, special medical teams to implement recently formulated nutrition programme for Bangla Desh refugee children will be provided by each of the 95 Medical Colleges in the country. Two or three such teams, each comprising a Child Health Specialist, 2 to 3 House Surgeons and an equal number of Interns and Para-medical staff, will be organized by every Medical College.

About 100 such 'nutritional therapy' units started functioning in the refugee camps by the end of August to be followed by another 300 units in the next two months.

The one-month Massive Multi-Purpose Family Welfare Planning Camp at Cochin (Kerala) set a new record in sterilization when the 50,000th man underwent vasectomy operation on the 27th day (July 27) of the camp.

The Government of *Maharashtra* has instituted a scheme of Talent Development in Mathematics and Physics in Colleges to encourage the talented students in these two subjects for pursuing their study at the B.Sc. degree course level. Operative from 1971-72 academic year, there will be 25 merit scholarships for Mathematics and 25 for Physics.

The Government of *Maharashtra* has created a "Prevention of Water Pollution Board" to discharge the responsibility of preventing, abating and controlling pollution of streams on account of domestic and trade effluents in the State. The Board will also attempt to restore the wholesomeness of such streams.

The establishment of the Board follows the enactment by *Maharashtra* legislature of the Prevention of Water Pollution Act, 1969 (Mah. XVI. of 1970).

A 10-member Press Consultative Committee, appointed by the Government of *Maharashtra*, will consider representations made by newspapers against the orders passed by the Government under Section 6(1) of the Criminal and Election Laws Amendment Act, 1969. The Section prohibits the newspapers from printing or publishing any documents or matters prejudicial to the maintenance of communal harmony and affecting or likely to affect public order. The term of the Committee is for three years.

A Committee comprising seven *ex officio* Members and seven Mem-

bers from among persons in public life interested in Child Welfare, has been set up by the Government of *Mysore*. It will, among other things : (i) develop Children's Parks, Mini Disney lands, Children's Theatres, Dolls Museums, Bal Bhavans and other facilities for children's recreation in all principal urban areas in the State; (ii) advise Government on matters relating to Child Welfare; (iii) organize competitions for children in painting and other forms of art; (iv) act as a liaison agency between Voluntary Organizations concerned with Children's Welfare and Government; (v) advise Government and local authorities on all matters relating to Children's Recreation; and (vi) undertake any other activity designed to promote the welfare of children and provide recreation to them.

The main function of the 'Removal of Public Grievances Department', set up by Government of *Rajasthan* in July 1970, would be to enquire into the causes of delay in disposal and inattention to public grievances by the various departments of the State Government; the definition of 'delay' to vary from department to department and from case to case, would be specified by each Head of the Department and the Secretary to Government for the disposal of the various categories of cases, applications, etc., in their departments. The Commissioner, Removal of Public Grievances to head the new department will, in consultation with the departments concerned, suggest, from time to time, whether the prescribed period should be further reduced or extended. The department will also look into cases of delay in the implementation of the orders of the State Government and particularly of the Cabinet and will bring out instances of gross delay in this respect. It will not, however, deal with cases

involving corruption and malpractices or into cases of alleged impropriety in the decisions taken by various Government agencies. Only very glaring cases of the latter type will be taken up by this Department in its discretion or when specially desired by the Chief Minister, the Minister in-charge or the Chief Secretary. Complaints of delay against the judicial courts will not be directly dealt with, but in consultation with the High Court, the Commissioner may maintain adequate liaison with the Courts so that the matters relating to public grievances involving delays in disposal and inattention in courts are brought to the notice of the High Court and the Court may issue directions regarding the same.

Anonymous or pseudonymous applications or representations will not be entertained.

The Union Ministry of Health & Family Planning has, under Section 2 of the Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1968, declared water supply service in *West Bengal* as an essential service. This has been done to prevent grave hardship that would be caused to the people of *West Bengal* in the event of a strike in the Water Supply Service.

The Government of India have decided to increase the rate of monthly maintenance allowance available under the Post-Matric Scholarship Scheme for those belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by 50 per cent from the current academic year.

The Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) has sanctioned nine water supply schemes for the municipal and non-municipal urban areas in the Metropolitan District at a total cost of over Rs. one crore. Scheduled for completion in 1972-75, six of the

schemes will bring 20 gallons per capita of potable water benefiting nearly 1.7 lakh persons while the remaining three schemes will augment the existing water supply arrangements.

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Dissatisfied by the reasons put forth by the Ministry of Railways for exclusion of Gazetted employees from the application of sub-rule (2) of rule 6 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 (S.O. 3181 of 1968) the Committee on Subordinate Legislation (Fifth Lok Sabha), in its First Report (presented on August 10, 1971), has called for suitably amending the rules so as to do away with such differentiation, between the gazetted and non-gazetted staff or between the staff as such.

The above mentioned sub-rule provides for imposition of certain penalties on the non-gazetted staff only.

It was also brought to the notice of the Committee that rules and regulations framed under the various provisions of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (9 of 1890), pertaining to booking of goods, levy of fee and charges and other matters were not published in the Gazette. Rejecting the arguments of the Ministry of Railways for not publishing the aforesaid Rules and Regulations in the Gazette of India, the Committee has observed that, besides publicity, the publication of the Rules in the Gazette has another important purpose to serve—viz., Parliamentary control over subordinate legislation. Unless a rule is published, it does not ordinarily come to the notice of the Committee, and this renders the Committee unable to examine whether the rule-making power conferred by Parliament on the Executive has been properly exercised.



Referring to Rule 36C of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955, the Committee has commented that while the provisions of an Act may override the provisions of an earlier Act, the Executive, in exercise of their rule-making power, cannot override the same unless the latter statute expressly authorizes them to do so.

According to the Committee, Rule 414 of Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, also needs amendment. Though, prior to 1970, there was no prescribed form for making application for a telephone connection, the Department of Communications, however, introduced a new application form in 1970, which could be obtained on a payment of Rs. 10. The new form was required to be filled in by new applicants as well as by those on the waiting list. The amount of Rs. 10 was neither refundable nor adjustable. While conceding the right of the authorities to introduce a new form, the Committee has questioned the Department's power to levy a charge therefor. The Committee is of the opinion that for charging the amount of Rs. 10 per form, there should have been an express provision in the Rules, backed by an express authorization in the parent law.

About 7 lakh civilian pensioners of the Central Government drawing less than Rs. 100 have now the option of getting their pensions through money order. This facility, accorded on the recommendation of the Administrative Reforms Commission, is available to pensioners from September 1971 onwards. The money orders will be sent at Government expense.

The Government of India has decided to involve directly over 80,000 Branch Post Masters, by allowing one per cent commission on the value of deposits in the Post

Office Time Deposits for three or five years, to promote small savings movement in rural areas.

Besides institution of a revolving shield, the Post Masters will also be awarded prizes of Rs. 100, 250 and 500 for the highest collection at the Division, Circle and all-India Level respectively.

In the Department of Post & Telegraph, the qualifying standard for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates has been lowered from 40 to 33 per cent in respect of the departmental examinations for all cadres. The intention is to encourage these candidates to appear for the competitive examinations for promotion and confirmation in the Department.

The Ministry of Health and Family Planning has authorized State Governments to enforce uniform scales of salary and allowances for doctors employed under the Family Planning Scheme and the General Health Services.

Twelve thousand Central Government employees and the members of their families in Meerut also began availing themselves of the Central Government Health Service Scheme (CGHS) with effect from July 19. The Scheme, through its 88 dispensaries, now covers 2,97,000 Government employees residing in Delhi, Allahabad, Bombay and Meerut.

The Scheme is to be further extended to Calcutta and Kanpur this year. Next year, it is likely to be enlarged to include the cities of Madras and Nagpur.

The Government of Assam has decided to set up a Pay Commission, with *Shri K. P. Mathur*, Retired Judge, Allahabad High Court, as its Chairman.

The Commission will examine and make feasible and desirable

recommendations pertaining to structure of emoluments, conditions of service and existing amenities and facilities, etc., given to different classes of State Government employees, such as death-cum-retirement benefit, special pay, compensatory allowance, medical benefit, etc. The Commission will also suggest re-organization of the existing services with a view to rationalization of workload and efficiency.

The Commission will also consider the demand for relief of interim character and make recommendations to the Government on the subject.

To train lower staff to qualify for higher posts, and to strengthen and increase the efficiency of the supervisory cadres, the University of Kurukshetra will launch, at the request of Government of *Haryana*, a training programme for the employees of local bodies in the State. Actual teaching will begin next year. There will be two diploma courses: "Local Self-Government Diploma" for the lower staff, and "Local Government Service Diploma" for the supervisory and executive staff. The duration of each course will be six months.

The Government of *Madhya Pradesh* has issued a directive to all appointing authorities to collect, in a prescribed proforma, bio-data of the employees working under them.

The proforma will seek such information as—name, date of birth, place of birth, religion, scheduled castes/scheduled tribes, home town, personal marks of identification, date of appointment/retirement, academic qualifications, training received, work-experience, immovable property, near relations, and number of children. Fastened to it will be a copy of the photograph of each employee. The authorities

have been asked to maintain the proforma up-to-date along with the confidential files of the employees.

In view of the shortage of qualified degree and diploma holders in civil engineering, the Government of *Maharashtra* has relaxed the normal recruitment rule in respect of Overseers to be appointed under the crash scheme for rural employment.

The Government of *Maharashtra* has reconstituted the ten-member Joint Consultative Council for the Maharashtra Secretariat and allied Offices' staff under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary to Government. The council includes five representatives each of the Government (including the chairman) and the staff.

The Government of *Maharashtra*, under a revised scheme, has caderized secretaries of primary agricultural credit societies, seva societies w.e.f. July 1, 1971.

The Government of *Uttar Pradesh* has appointed a 15-member Pay Commission under the chairmanship of *Shri Syed Ali Zaheer*, ex-Minister for Justice, Uttar Pradesh. The Commission comprises a Member of Parliament, Members of State Legislature, other officials and non-officials including representatives of educational institutions and a retired Engineer-in-Chief of Irrigation Department.

The Commission would examine the present structure of emoluments of the State Government employees and, with a view to ensuring minimum living wages for low-paid employees in the context of the present economic condition of the State as well as the existing level of prices, and make suitable recommendations keeping in view the resources. Similar recommendations would also cover employees of Local Bodies/ Zila Parishads, Town Area and

Notified Area Committees and teaching and non-teaching staff of primary schools, Government-aided Higher Secondary Schools, Degree Colleges, Post-Graduate Colleges, Universities and engineering and technical institutions.

Recent revision of the *West Bengal Services (Raising of Age-limit) Rules, 1970*, has resulted in the following formula : (i) Where the upper age-limit for recruitment to any service or post under the State Government is fixed at less than 30 years, such upper age-limit shall be raised to 30 years; and (ii) where recruitment is made on the basis of a competitive examination and the number of chances, which the candidate can avail himself of, is specified, such number of chances shall be increased by one. These rules will operate for period of two years.

The plaintiffs (Shyam Lal Sharma and others) brought suit against the State of Uttar Pradesh (C.A.No. 1203 of 1969) on the ground that the order of compulsory retirement contained a stigma, such as "Civil Servant has lost its utility and he is considered to be a bad lot, incorrigible and no longer useful".

The Jury (Supreme Court on August 12, 1971) held the following opinion: In ascertaining whether the order of compulsory retirement is one of punishment it has to be ascertained whether in the order of compulsory retirement there was any element of charge or stigma or imputation or any implication of misbehaviour or incapacity against the officer concerned. Secondly, the order for compulsory retirement will be indicative of punishment or penalty if the order will involve loss of benefits already earned. Thirdly, an order for compulsory retirement on the completion of 25 years of service or an order of compulsory retirement made in the public interest to dispense

with further service will not amount to an order for dismissal or removal as there is no element of punishment. Fourthly, an order of compulsory retirement will not be held to be an order in the nature of punishment or penalty on the ground that there is possibility of loss of future prospects, namely, that the officer will not get his pay till he attains the age of superannuation, or will not get an enhanced pension for not being allowed to remain for a few years in service and being compulsorily retired. Where the authorities can make an order of compulsory retirement for any reason and no reason is mentioned in the order, it cannot be predicted that the order of compulsory retirement has an inherent stigma in the order, the court added.

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All the 20 base areas/blocks under the Pilot Research Project in Growth Centres have been identified. Fifteen States, including the newly created State of Meghalaya, two Union Territories, Pondicherry and Tripura and three research institutions, the Gujarat Institute of Area Planning, Ahmedabad, the Institute of Regional Development Planning, Wardha and the Gandhian Institute of Studies, Varanasi are participating in the Scheme. West Bengal is an exception.

Of the 20 areas identified, 19 have been so far approved by the Union Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Community Development. Research and Investigation Cells have been established in the nineteen approved areas.

Functioning under the overall direction of a Central Committee of Direction with the Union Minister for Agriculture as its Chairman, this centrally sponsored scheme was sanctioned for implementation during the Fourth Five Year Plan and a

total Plan provision of Rs. 1.45 crores had been made. The object of setting up Research and Investigation Cells is to evolve a technique and methodology for development of emerging and potential growth centres by providing social and economic overheads in delineated areas in terms of a carefully prepared inventory of local needs.

In a letter addressed to the Chief Ministers of States, the Union Minister of Planning has urged for promptly setting up project appraisal cells in the States staffed with the necessary specialists so that the proposals that are forwarded for inclusion in the State plans as well as in the national plans could be based on realism and expert opinion. The Planning Commission has offered its assistance in establishing such agencies at the State as well as district level.

In order to have a realistic appraisal of programmes from time to time and the resultant necessary adjustment thereto, Planning Commission is also of the view that it is necessary to have some machinery for continuous evaluation of the various programmes and progress.

In order to facilitate speedier disposal of work, better coordination, and quicker detection of leakage of tax revenue, a system of allotting permanent account numbers, on all-India basis, to all tax-payers would be introduced soon in the Tax Administration of India. A decision to this effect was taken in a Conference of Income-tax Commissioners, held on August 20. It would be tried initially in a few selected centres. The Conference was called to consider steps aimed at, *inter alia*, speeding up collection of tax arrears and disposal of assessment.

Meanwhile, an Internal Work Study Unit for the Income-tax

Department has already started functioning in the Directorate of Inspection (Income-tax). The Unit will collect necessary data for finalizing the requirements of officers and staff on the basis of the time norms evolved by the Staff Inspection Unit. It would also evolve time norms for new items of work which are being introduced, from time to time, for improving the administrative and technical competence of Department.

The Government of Orissa, on August 20, constituted an eight-member Planning Board, with *Shri Biju Patnaik*, MP, as its Chairman.

The main function of the Planning Board will be to prepare a long-term or 15-years Development Plan so as to ensure rapid industrialization of the State and modernization of agriculture with the object of opening up employment opportunities both for educated and uneducated manpower and for bringing about an allround economic development of the State.

The Board will associate with it other Ministers, Secretaries and Specialists both local and from outside, who would be invited as and when necessary.

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The Government of India has set up (on August 27) an inter-Ministerial Committee to make periodical reviews of the situation regarding production of the various commodities in private and public sectors for which processing and marketing facilities are to be provided on short and long term basis.

The Committee—a continuing body, meeting as often as necessary—is headed by the Secretary of the Union Department of Agriculture. The Secretaries of the Union Departments of Food, Economic Affairs, Industrial Development and the

Planning Commission will be the other members of the Committee.

The details of a "Blue-print for a long-term management development plan in Public Enterprises" are being currently worked out by the General Management Division of the Bureau of Public Enterprises. The experience of the more progressive multi-unit, multi-interest private sector firms, in respect of their management cadres, was also studied by the Division; the purpose was to take advantage of experience of these firms with regard to management development.

Several research studies concerning the various problems affecting the public undertakings are currently either under way or are in advanced stages of planning. Amongst them: "Morale of managerial personnel"; "Flight of technical personnel from public enterprises"; and "Management information systems in selected enterprises" covering the reporting-control requirements from the unit to the Chief Executive/Board level, from the Board to Government, from the Government to Parliament with a view to evolving some models for use by Enterprises/Ministries and suggesting rationalization of the existing reporting systems for effective management control.

A working group, set up on the recommendation of the Administrative Reforms Commission, is going into the design consultancy and project planning organization in six public undertakings. The object of the study is to assess the adequacy of existing design organizations in these Enterprises in order to enable the Government to draw up guidelines for establishing and evaluating such organizations in Public Enterprises.

A project to study market orientation in public enterprises, their

marketing set-up and the related problems has also been initiated.

Government of India has set up a Special Committee to take stock of the fluctuating position of steel availability, to initiate timely action for meeting the shortages and to lay down guidelines for canalizing agencies for distribution of imported steel to actual users. The Government has also decided to give preferential treatment in the import raw materials, components and spares to small-scale units set up in backward areas and units established by engineering graduates and ex-servicemen.

The Government of India has proposed to the Joint Wage Negotiation Committee for the Steel Industry that two representatives of the workers may be appointed to the Board of Directors of the Hindustan Steel Limited (HSL), the country's biggest public sector industrial undertaking. The Negotiating Committee is a representative organization consisting of four nominees of the employers from the four main producers of steel (Hindustan Steel Ltd., Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., and Mysore Iron & Steel Ltd.), 15 representatives on the workers' side—three each from Central Trade Union Organizations, namely, the Indian National Trade Union Congress, All-India Trade Union Congress and the Hind Mazdoor Sabha, and one representative each from recognised unions at Jamshedpur, Burnpur, Rourkela, Durgapur, and Bhadravati.

The Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation has chalked out a scheme for instituting fellowships for research in the field of tourism in the leading universities in India. A plan for instruction and professional training in tourism has also been prepared by the Ministry.

As stated in the Annual Report of the Ministry of Petroleum &

Chemicals for 1970-71, four large public sector fertilizer projects will go into production by the end of 1971—a record for a single year. The projects comprise new units at Durgapur, Cochin, Madras and expansion of the Udyogmandal unit at Alwaye; they will add half a million tonnes to the existing capacity of 1,765,000 tonnes of fertilizers. (During 1970-71 the production of fertilizer for the first time crossed the one million tonnes mark; in terms of nutrients, the output was 1,074,000 tonnes.)

The Government of India has decided to bring into force all the provisions of the Insecticides Act, which was passed in 1968, with effect from August 1, 1971, to regulate their import, manufacture, sale, transport, distribution and use to prevent risk to human beings and animals including fish and fowl. This Act extends to the whole of India.

In pursuance of the decision of the Government of India to help the growth of small and medium newspapers, the entire requirements of small and medium newspapers for import of printing machinery were met in the year 1970-71.

The Government of Jammu & Kashmir have constituted a 4-member Committee to examine the feasibility of revision of freight structure in the State consistent with the new transport policy of allowing a vehicle to ply on any route. To be headed by the Secretary of Food, Supplies and Transport Department, the Committee will also recommend

reduction in freights to the extent possible and look into the problems of spares and tyres faced by the transporters.

As a result of a conference of the representatives of the management and the labour unions of the Kerala Ceramics Ltd., Kundara, held recently under the presidency of the Minister for Industries (Government of Kerala), it was decided, *inter alia*, that representation be given to the workmen and staff of the Company on its Board of Directors. The conference agreed that: (i) These representatives will be elected by secret ballot; (ii) Only those workmen who are members of one or the other of the recognized Unions in the company will be eligible to be candidates for such election; (iii) All workmen of the company will be entitled to vote; (iv) The term of the elected representatives shall be one year; and (v) The elected representatives shall be appointed Directors of the company, by the Governor.

The Government of Kerala has since decided to extend this scheme of labour participation to five other fully Government-owned Companies.

The Governor of Maharashtra has promulgated an Ordinance to amend the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963, empowering the State Government to nominate members on the market committees where elections have not taken place, or members elected have been found to be disqualified.





## BOOK REVIEWS

*CITIZEN AND THE MUNICIPAL BUREAUCRACY (A SURVEY OF THE BUILDING DEPARTMENT OF THE DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION)*; By V. JAGANNADHAM and N.S. BAKSHI; New Delhi, The Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1971, p. 124, Rs 10.

Indian scholars are coming to grips with the realities of the administrative process with the help of empirical studies. Earlier writings on Indian administration had no relationship with the administrative reality; hence no worthwhile, empirically tested generalizations can be made about Indian administrative behaviour on the basis of earlier writings on Indian administration. This much-awaited task of theory-building and concept-formulation is possible only when the complex reality is deciphered and exposed with the help of empirical investigations. This slender volume published by the IIPA is a welcome addition to the body of empirical (or reliable) knowledge which is very conspicuous by its absence in this country.

This volume concerns itself with the study of the Building Department of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi which is responsible for guiding, regulating and controlling the construction of private houses in the city. The study describes the internal working of the Department, its procedures of work, and the bye-laws concerning construction of houses, etc. The study is also prescriptive and suggests remedies for improving the working of the Department. For a social scientist interested in empirical reality, chapter six dealing with 'Citizen's Experiences' and chapter eight

concerning 'Corporation Image' provide rich material by exposing the reality of the situation and also suggest a few hypotheses for future studies of a similar nature. Both these chapters are the product of questionnaire technique employed by the authors.

Some of the important findings of the authors need attention:

- (1) Rarely does the Building Department take the trouble of informing citizens that their Building plans have been sanctioned and could be collected from the office.
- (2) The citizen's view is that the Corporation staff is more interested in fault-finding rather than in helping the citizens.
- (3) The practice of various Zonal Engineers giving different interpretations to the bye-laws creates confusion and the rules to be followed are not always clear.
- (4) There seems to be a reluctance on the part of the Corporation staff to give information to the citizens directly. This phenomenon promotes the role of middlemen and increases the distance between the citizen and the administration.



- (5) When a house-builder gets his building plan approved, it is incumbent upon him to conform to the sanctioned plan. But it is alleged by the officials that the citizens deliberately deviate from the sanctioned plans. This allegation is substantiated as a majority of respondents have admitted to making deviations deliberately.
- (6) It is, by and large, the architects who provide information and encourage the public to make deviations with the promise that they would get them ignored or regularized. It is, therefore, not surprising that many malpractices prevail at the time of issue of completion certificates and assessment of penalties, due to the activities of the middlemen and the corrupt officials.

The study reveals a very sorry state of affairs prevailing in the Indian administration. Officials are corrupt and they use rules and regulations to harass the citizens. Citizens flout rules and regulations and offer bribes to escape penalty. Architects and contractors act as catalysts for corruption. Thus, deviant behaviour is a norm with every one concerned with this organization. Rules have been framed by the Department but they are not communicated to the prospective clients. This situation helps corruption in administration. Administrators do not implement the rules properly, citizens do not follow them and what is worse they have the feeling that they can escape punishment. The question arises: why have the rules at all?

This is a penetrating study into

the realities of the administrative and social life of Delhi. From a structural point of view, a serious defect in the study is the method of presenting statistical tables. At some places  $N$  (Total Number) is not mentioned, at others, the system of percentages is not referred. The authors would have done well to present statistical tables in the manner followed in standard survey research studies. Not only is the manner of presenting statistical tables pedestrian, the arrangement of chapters is also defective. Chapter seven, which deals with personnel, should be a part of chapter two which deals with the description of the Building Department.

Besides these minor structural deficiencies, the reviewer of the book wants to raise an important question regarding the relevance of such studies. Why are micro-level empirical studies (like the present one) undertaken? Some social situations are 'unique' and studies of unique situations are undertaken. What is happening in the Building Department of the Municipal Corporation in Delhi is not unique. Another task of the social scientist is to abstract from the prevailing reality, and for this purpose he undertakes comparative studies of organizations functioning in similar or dissimilar conditions. Whatever studies are undertaken, the purpose is to generalize and build hypotheses for future studies. As Blau and Schoenherr observe:

"The social scientists' road to understanding organizations is to conduct research on them, and he achieves his goal of improved understanding by reducing theoretical principles that explain his research findings."

They further emphasize:

"For it is our conviction that systematic theory must be

grounded in and derived from systematic empirical research."

(Peter M. Blau and Richard A. Schoenherr: *The Structure of Organizations*, New York, Basic Books, 1971, p. 4).

An empirical study should be conducted in the light of a theoretical framework, and on the basis of data and findings of the study, generalizations should be attempted. Otherwise, micro-level studies of a non-comparative nature (like the present one) have no research value. The authors of the study under review have felt shy in generalizing or theory-building on the basis of their data. This study powerfully brings out the deviant behaviour of citizens, officials, architects and contractors. Tentative generalizations are possible and should have been made. Further, explanation of the 'deviant behaviour' has not been attempted. Is something wrong with our socialization or is it a legacy of national movement that law-breaking is a virtue? In a developing society, when minimum government transforms itself into a total government, the web of rules and regulations created by it is something new for the people who are used to minimum regulation by the government. The behaviour of the people was conditioned by minimum government and minimum regulations. When total government replaces the minimum government, the behaviour pattern of the people may remain unchanged. Hence,

even if new rules are framed, they may not be observed by the common man. There can be a *lag* between people's attitudes towards governmental regulation and expansion in the rule-making activity of the present day governments in developing societies. This '*lag*' can be minimized by a network of communication system which should be developed by the modern states in developing countries.

One important finding of the authors for future researches in the field of citizen-administration relationship is that: 'administrative procedures and civil service personnel, by and large, help or harass the citizens more from the standpoint of impersonal uniformity or personal self-interest than out of considerations of caste, age, occupation or other variable'.

This finding rectifies the mistake committed by Samuel J. Eldersveld *et al* in *Citizen and Administrator in a Developing Democracy* (1968) who used these conventional categories to elicit information with regard to citizen-administration relationship in India.

Its lack of generalizing and theory-building, notwithstanding the present study, is a commendable work and is a definite contribution to our understanding of the Indian administrative process at a micro-level.

—C. P. BHAMBHRI

**LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN INDIA;** By Dr. S. R. MAHESHWARI; New Delhi, Orient Longmans, 1971, p. 392, Rs. 16.

Dr. S. R. Maheshwari in his book 'Local Government in India' has summed up his views on the following aspects of local government in India: (1) The underlying issues behind bestowing some powers on

local people for the administration of services of a local nature; (2) Political-administration dichotomy; (3) Democracy vs efficiency; (4) Cabinet form of government; (5) Role of collector in district administration;

and (6) Important issues like town planning, decentralization and personnel.

It is universally accepted that the basic motive behind allowing limited local autonomy by the British Government was to ease the pressure on Imperial finance. It was but in the logic of things that such resources could not be augmented without giving the people some participation and freedom in expenditure. The book restates the views of earlier commissions and the Resolution of Lord Ripon.

It is also true that the national leaders tried to make the best use of the opportunity provided therein as there were no other avenues of administration open to them. They used this platform for national enlightenment.

Since the scope of the local administration was limited and the provincial governments exercised external controls, disillusionment of patriots was inevitable; they voluntarily vacated offices. The view of Nehru, quoted by the learned author, thus has a historical relevance.

The politics-administration dichotomy is a perennial issue and not merely confined to local administration. The ills of political interference in day-to-day administration, corruption and ill-qualified personnel, selection on considerations other than merit are some of the features not exclusive to local bodies. Even the central and state administrations are not immune. The issues of commitment of civil servants point out the same controversy but in a larger context. It is true that the local administration failed to attract best talents because the pay scales were low, the service were not attractive and there was little scope for promotion. The malady was thus in-built in the system.

Even the All India and State Services have of late suffered in quality and are less attractive to the educated youth. The new elite of civil service is being drawn from a different social milieu and the values have also changed. The demands of a democratic set-up, frequent changes in the state administration by passing reins in the hands of opposition has developed new strains in administration. Indeed, what was the ailment in local bodies is spreading over in state and central spheres.

In the controversy between democracy and efficiency, both have their respective claim. The efficiency of administration will have to be sublimated by democratic content. This is *sine qua non* of any democratic set-up. We do not desire a totalitarian efficiency.

The author has recommended a cabinet form in local administration. It will need constitutional amendments which will not be an easy process. By conceding that appropriate amendments are feasible, a cabinet system will not work. Is it merely the defect of organizations which is at the root of malfunctioning of local government? The socio-economic background of political leadership is the prime denominator and not a form of system. The accountability of the cabinet to the general council is mere fiction. Whereas the Maud Committee has suggested a Management Board, call it even a semblance of cabinet system, is far fetched. The administration at the local level will have to be through committees having effective powers. The experiments of developed countries may be suitably used for our own system.

Lastly, about the role of district collector. The consequence of urbanization is being appraised by

both administrators and academicians. The Rural Urban Relationship Committee has definitely disturbed the malignant complacency towards the new features of development. Its contribution, in this context, cannot be denied. However, one may have reservations about the different recommendations of the Committee. The creation of Regional Authorities raises the question about the suitable role of collector in district administration when the overall task of development is assigned to these Authorities. The Administrative Reforms Commission seems to be against disturbing the present position of district collector. The law and order in the Indian context is the prerogative of the District Magistrate which cannot be shifted to any committee. Shri Maheshwari wants to shift the burden to Commissioner of Division; but another thinking seeks to abolish the Divisional Commissioners.

In this controversy, the fundamental role of local administration is often forgotten. The crux of the matter is reposing faith in local bodies. They need to be strengthened. Essentially, the problem is that there has been slow and systematic erosion of functions and resources. It is indeed sad that political leadership, of late, has been losing faith in these institutions. If democracy has to succeed, the local government should find its place in the national reconstruction with effective say and power.

The spatial growth of a town brings problems of extending services to wider areas. By its very definition, the word 'Local Government' connotes administration of a small defined area. By federal structure of local government, the author means the two-tier system of government with decentralization of

administration. Almost all big corporations have developed this system. In some corporations, e.g., Madras, the basis is statutory and formal while in metropolitan complex of Bombay it is informal. The author rightly points out that the decentralized body has inadequate powers and the coordination expected between different departments is poor.

In spite of shortcomings, it is imperative that decentralised administration must be formal. There is no other way through which the services could reach the common man. Federal form will not mean freedom to pursue independent development and other activities. This will be a part of the general and coordinated policy.

In urban centres, where decentralization has been informally adopted, is on account of the pressures on a centralized administration. Hence, decentralization needs to be viewed from the angle of the logic of urban growth and should be accepted unhesitatingly. The system will correct itself by learning from mistakes and making suitable adjustments.

The chapter on town planning is an elucidation of the existing pattern. Some problems of town planning have been spelled out. However, the crux of the problems of coordination between the Town Planning Agency and local authorities has been missed. The town planners have merely the burden of planning and have no say in execution.

The chapter on single-purpose agencies has correctly pointed the numerous problems of an autonomous single-purpose agency. It will be agreed that these agencies run counter to the fundamental ideas behind the creation of self-governing institutions. There will be general agreement over author's views about the Trusts and Housing Boards,

However, something about the proposed water and sewerage boards should have been said. Although there is a reference to Joint Water & Sewerage Board, Delhi and Bangalore Water Supply Corporations, as the chapter closes, one has the impression that the author, after initial hesitation, comes to commend these Authorities. The city transportation has not proved a financial liability everywhere in India, including Bombay and Delhi. A case should have been made to enable the local bodies for distribution of energy and power in city by taking bulk supply from government electrical corporation. This will be beneficial for both the State Government and the local body.

Dr. S.R. Maheshwari's book on Municipal Government is not only

topical but purposeful also and is likely to serve a large student community interested in civic affairs and who have offered municipal government as their course work in different universities. The author deserves congratulations as he has brought together scattered material which has been produced in recent years. It is the only book which relates to both rural and urban problems and gives a comprehensive view of local authorities on different aspects of urban and rural problems. Although designed as a text book, it will serve to create interest in civic affairs among students at large, and a large public interested in civic affairs and problems of urbanism will equally be benefited.

—R. B. DAS

**INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT:** By M.R. KULKARNI; New Delhi, National Book Trust ( India ), 1971, p. 327, Rs. 7.25.

The National Book Trust Series is doing an excellent job in giving a broad introduction to the various topics it covers. Shri M.R. Kulkarni's book presents a perspective of India's industrial Development.

The book is not an economic history but attempts to use historical perspectives to get the present into focus. He gives a balanced treatment to the plantation, infrastructure, and modern industry sectors.

The author begins with a general characterization of the plantation industries, i.e., problems of colonial exploitation and problems of setting up a modern 'enclave' organization in the agricultural sector of a developing country. He gives attention to the organizational and political conditions influencing infrastructure development. The development of modern factory industry is presented

as a story of the gradual emergence of indigenous enterprise.

The author gives a qualitative characterization of industrial development before World War I, in the inter-War period, during World War II, and during the modern era of planning.

In dealing with the modern period, the author offers a few incidental criticisms of policies in particular industries. The stress is on the achievements of the public sector and the growth of new industries, such as electronics, petro-chemicals, engineering, etc., and to contributions to import substitution.

The Appendix provides industry-wise production charts and a map with appropriate symbols making the location of plants in different industries.

—M. V. NAMJOSHI

*FUNDAMENTALS OF SOCIAL SURVEY AND RESEARCH METHODS*; By Dr. S. DANDAPANI; Delhi, Scholars' Foundation, 1971, p. 91, Rs. 8.

Since the end of the last century, social sciences have taken a pronounced turn towards quantification and empiricism. The advances in Physical Sciences, arising largely out of investigation, experimentation and verification, have, over a period of time, inspired many students of social studies to adopt these techniques in the observation and study of social phenomena. Starting from Charles Booth to the present, there has been a steady increase in the application of survey/research methods. More and more, it is becoming clear that provided we are able to ask the right question, it is not difficult to ascertain quantitatively the magnitude and dimensions of any social problem. Solutions for the problems may be difficult due to several factors but the identification of the problems and their magnitude and complexities are not beyond our reach.

While this is the state of affairs in countries where mechanization and sophistication in research methods have progressed, India has to go a long way before we reach that stage. Survey/research methods are becoming more popular and are commonly pursued in educational and administrative institutions. However, the teaching of the fundamentals of these methods and their application on a wider scale is still not very common partly because of the costs and partly due to the unfamiliarity with the methods. If the latter deficiency is to be overcome, books, like the one under review, have a great contribution to make. Dr. Dandapani has brought to bear a mature and practical mind into the preparation of a small handbook of 80 pages but packed with all that is

elemental, but not elementary, to an understanding and application of survey/research methods.

Altogether, there are 18 chapters of varying sizes and nothing essential is left out of consideration in the book. The arrangement of the matter in each chapter is such as to make it easy to grasp and remember. The great advantage of the book is that it is neither pedantic nor notes-like. It is both scholarly and practical. Some may feel that disposing off a chapter (Chapter VIII—Reliability and Validity) only on one side of a page detracts it from being regarded as of academic value. However, if we consider what the author claims in his preface, namely, "this is an attempt to catalogue a few of the important social research methods to serve as stimulators to a student who is otherwise interested in an exciting research experience" and also "to facilitate the student to have a quick glance at the research procedure and... to pack maximum points within the framework of minimum language", it must be admitted that the author has fully succeeded in his objective. This is a handbook rather than a research tome.

In view of the rising popularity of survey/research methods, it may be desirable to start teaching methodology courses in the Higher Secondary Schools both for students of Physical and Social Sciences and continue the same during the College courses. If this has to be done, we need to do two things: (1) To write books on research methods in such a way that Higher Secondary School and Undergraduate college students understand; and (2) To provide books of high standard but



of less volume in all the major Indian languages. This book could be made use of for these two purposes. The book could also be useful to officials and non-officials engaged in practical administrative investigations and surveys as preludes to policy-making decisions about solutions to problems. I am confident that this handbook on *Fundamentals of Social Survey and Research Methods* satisfy the needs of initiates into research as well as the busy practical men. I am sure that with his academic background and experience in research, Dr. Dandapani may be

writing more useful books of the type; and may, in the editions to come of this book, incorporate certain more sophisticated concepts and aspects of survey/research methods. He may also illustrate how in the Indian context these methods are applied—the good and not-so-good application of research methods. Such illustrations help students to guard themselves against the pitfalls of facile resort to poor methods of quantification and empiricism.

—V. JAGANNADHAM

**THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF UTTAR PRADESH;** By M. ZAHEER and JAGDEO GUPTA; New Delhi, S. Chand, 1970, p. 769, Rs. 50.

U.P. is a big State with 54 districts and 11 revenue divisions. Naturally, therefore, the organization of the State Government at various levels is both diversified and complex. Ordinarily, it is difficult to get a total picture of the State administration. The Indian Institute of Public Administration deserves to be congratulated for inspiring the compilation of the book under review which gives in one volume a comprehensive picture of the organization of the State Government. It fulfils a long-felt need of not only the students of Public Administration but also of public servants and of the general public, as it provides detailed information about the structure of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, its departments and the set-up at regional and district levels.

Every well begins with the study of the land and the people and the territorial history of the State. The book provides a historical development of the departments from the Company period to the present standing

their present structure. One can get all the relevant details about the working of a department, as the narrative relating to each department gives the objectives and functions of the department, the organization in the Secretariat, and the organization at the level of the Head of the Department, followed by regional and field offices down to the village level. Organization charts have also been provided at appropriate places. Wherever statutory or advisory committees, boards or councils exist, their constitution and functions have been mentioned at the end of the narrative. Particulars of annual administrative reports published by a department, as well as of Acts, Manuals and Rules, from which the department derives its authority or which govern its functions, have also been given. An exhaustive index at the end has added to the value of the book as a reference volume.

The grouping of chapters under captions like Financial Organization, Departments dealing with Economic Development and Conservation of Resources, Departments providing




Social Services, etc., is helpful in a functional study of the Government organization. One may, however, question the grouping of National Savings Organization under "Departments dealing with Economic Development and Conservation of Resources". Similarly, Irrigation & Power Departments instead of being kept under "Departments Dealing with Public Utility Services", could have been more appropriately placed under the Group dealing with "Economic Development &

#### Conservation of Resources.

The authors have refrained from analysing the rationale of the present structure, the extent of overlapping, the results achieved or the effect of the working of the departments on social or economic development as they did not want to enter into the issues of evaluation. A monumental study of this size could perhaps have been more useful with such an appraisal.

—TRIBHUVAN PRASAD



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